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Abstract
Gentrification is the term applied to the process whereby middle-class people move into 
working class areas in the inner city, either residential areas, or old warehouses or 
sweatshops. This thesis seeks on the one hand to explain gentrification as the 
consequence of the development of domestic technologies, and on the other to 
understand it as a metaphor rooted in the characteristic experience of marginality in 
modem life.
Debate over the causes of gentrification have polarized around two themes: that 
gentrification is the consequence of the rise of a new middle class heralding the onset of a 
post-industrial or post-modern society; or that gentrification is just another example of the 
contradictions underpinning capitalist development (in this case, the contradiction 
between the value of a building and the value of the land on which it sits - the rent gap 
hypothesis). This thesis argues that the falling cost of domestic technologies such as 
washing machines and vacuum cleaners has made it possible to bring the value of 
housing services which can be supplied by a Victorian house into line with the value of 
the housing services provided by the most modem house. Gentrification is then 
explained as a consequence of the middle classes taking advantage of the opportunity 
offered by these developments.
In contrast to the explanations currently dominating the gentrification debate, this thesis 
therefore argues that gentrifiers gentrify because they can^ and not because they have to. 
Consequently, the explanation of gentrification has nothing to do with questions of class, 
nor indeed of gender. Gentrification is a transient, not a cyclical phenomenon, and 
would have occurred whether the process was carried out entirely by women or entirely 
by men.
The currently dominant explanations of gentrification argue that gentrifiers gentrify 
because they have to as they are subject to forces beyond their control: the rise of post­
industrial society; or the reappearance of accumulation crises in capitalist urban 
development. These explanations are then left with the problem, not of explaining the 
existence of gentrification in those inner-city areas where it does occur, but in explaining 
its absence from all those other inner-city areas in which it does not occur, since they are 
couched in such general terms that they could apply to every member of the middle 
classes or to every inner city area, not just those associated with gentrification. These 
explanations of gentrification therefore over-estimate its quantitative significance, also.
The fact that this over-estimation occurs is however of great interest. Using arguments
derived from Robert Park and Raymond Williams, this thesis suggests that the reason for 
this is that gentrification touches on many characteristic insecurities of modem life. 
Gentrification therefore has resonances far wider than its quantitative significance would 
suggest. 'Gentrification' is a metaphorical expression, derived from 'gentry', the rural 
landowning classes. Gentrification can best be understood, therefore, in terms of 
attempts to realize an Arcadian (and class) vision of the 'countiy': a stable retreat in the 
very heart of the everchanging and often threatening 'city'. Insofar as gentrification 
represents a particular strategy for dealing with a universally experienced condition, the 
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For years, I have been dreaming of what I would write on these pages. However, even 
in these days of desktop publishing, perhaps especially because of these days of desktop 
publishing, printing out seems fated always to take place on the midnight before the 
thesis is due at the binders. So the luxury of considered reflections will have to wait for 
another day.
The idea that domestic technologies were the key to understanding gentrification was one 
that gradually expanded from a couple of paragraphs in the initial draft of this thesis. I’m 
not sure where the idea originally came from, but I can remember vividly the arrival of 
domestic technologies in our own house. When I was just a small boy of 4 or 5, our 
family became the first in our road to get central heating. The plumber's name is George 
and he had a mate, Harry, a big spider who helped him with all the tricky work 
underneath the floorboards. Harry was kind of shy though, we never did meet him. I 
can remember the excitement of our first washing machine also. In those days, the 
Hoover salesman let you try the machines out at home, so there was great excitement for 
a couple of weeks as various machines came in and out of the house. I had my heart set 
on the Keymatic, but we got the twin-tub instead. Being the eldest son in a family with 
two working parents, I was soon inducted into the mysteries of its operation.
Domestic technologies later came into my life in quite different ways. After I left college, 
I spent a year as a driver for Debenhams, delivering furnishings and domestic appliances 
all over Essex and the surrounding counties. The washing machines were the worst: a 
hundredweight of concrete in a tin with nothing to grip that wasn’t either too slippery or 
too sharp to hold on to. You never got a tip for a washing machine either. Mostly, they 
were for the young households on the new housing estates that were springing up all 
over the county at that time; machines and carpets. Furniture came later: those deliveries 
did not have any particular association with any type of development. Also all my 
brothers are in the building trade, Liam is a bricklayer, David a site manager, and Jack an 
electrician. As our family grew, and no-one seemed to be leaving home, we were also 
the first family in our road to have an extension on our house. All the brothers worked 
on it. Liam fell off the roof! For all these reasons, I suppose, I could never simply see 
the conversion of houses from working class to middle class occupancy simply as a 
social transition, with no labour involved in the process.
Having the idea was one thing, working it up into a Ph.D thesis was quite another. 
Caught in political crossfire between the LSE and the ESRC, I lost my funding after only 
one year of effective study. I had to continue part-time, working at times up to eighty
hours a week as a sound and lighting engineer, and fitting in my studies whenever I 
could. If it had not been for the support of three people in particular I would never have 
been able to carry on. First and foremost was Professor, now Lord Meghnad Desai, 
whose belief in my ability to finish far outweighed my own and, it often seemed, 
everybody else's. As important as the moral support he provided was the material 
support also. If he had not got me the job at the UN, I doubt I would have ever been 
able to give up the rock and roll and devote the full-time labour on this project which it 
desperately needed to bring it to a conclusion. Secondly, Mrs. Maureen Biancardi, my 
former manager at the University of London Union gave me all the Responsible 
Autonomy anyone could wish for, in juggling work and academic commitments. I hope 
I repaid her faith over the five years we spent working together. Last but not least, I 
would like to pay tribute to my landlord's agent, Mrs. Christine Clark; never knowing 
when the rent is going to be paid, but, in her faith that it will be paid, the provider of as 
much ontological security as a drawer full of mortgage deeds. I owe her a lot more than 
rent.
As to academic support. Lord Desai was particularly helpful in aiding me develop my 
analysis of the economics of gentrification. For every good cop', however there has to 
be a 'nasty cop' also. Filling that thankless role was my principal supervisor. Dr. 
Simon Duncan. If I would never have got as far as have without Lord Desai's support, I 
would never have achieved the quality of work necessary for a Ph.D submission without 
the discipline supplied by Dr. Duncan's unwaveringly critical comments. Despite all the 
anguish provoked by those comments, I ^  extremely grateful to have the benefit of the 
experience and advice of the man whose presence at the LSE attracted me to pursue a 
Ph.D there, when I had the pick of any institution in the country. Doing a Ph.D is a 
character-forming experience after all! In particular, it was he who put me on the track of 
the changing nature of the class relations in domestic service, and all the implications that 
had for the development of domestic technologies and gentrification. Without that 
insight, I would never have hit on the idea that gentrification depends on a breakdown in 
the classic filtering process, and not a new stage in that process, thus enabling me to fit 
the final piece in the jigsaw and to escape from the blind alley in which I had been stuck 
for some time.
I should also like to place on record my thanks to Dr Peter Wicks and Dr Brian Linneker 
for their helpful comments on my economic model of gentrification. Dr Wicks for his 
suggestion that I extend the analysis to include a government sector, and Dr Linneker for 
making me bring out the role of mortgage finance institutions in the model more clearly.
Finally, I would like to mention Kate and Bill, my mum and dad. I don't think they've
VI
ever really understood what's driven me on for all these years with so little to show for 
i t  All I can say to them, as I sit here looking at this small pile of paper, and they sit there 
looking at me is that only they and I know how much I owe them, and to remind them, in 
the words of Bruce Springsteen, that with every wish, there comes a curse.
vu
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1 Clearing the ground: gentrification, cultural materialism and 
modernity
This thesis makes a simple point about gentrification: gentrifiers gentrifry because they 
can. That it takes so many pages to do so is because the assumption in the gentrification 
literature is overwhelmingly that gentrifiers gentrify because they have to. Debates in 
gentrification studies all revolve around the assumption that gentrification represents a 
form of class constitution and that gentrifiers engage in gentrifying behaviour as a result 
of the imperatives of class constitution and/or class membership. Gentrification will only 
be explained once gentrifiers' behaviour is related to these imperatives of class, no matter 
what opinion may be taken on the processes and issues at stake in class constitution.
I completely disagree. In their anxiety to situate the explanation of gentrification in 
questions of class composition, the participants in the gentrification debate have neglected 
to examine the material resources available to gentrifiers, resources which only became 
available immediately prior to the onset of gentrification, and which therefore gave 
gentrifiers the ability to gentrify which they heretofore lacked.
Another way of describing the aims of this thesis is that it seeks to reverse the 
assumption that gentrification can be used as a synecdoche for modem society, a part 
which may be taken to stand for the whole. Not only is this illicitly to claim prior 
knowledge of the character of the society in which gentrification occurs (cf. R.Williams 
1977 p80), but it also immediately directs attention away from the specifics of gentrifiers' 
actions, which then are seen merely as ciphers for the wider issues of class and social 
change.
I argue that the basic causes in the explanation of gentrification have nothing to do with 
class, nor indeed gender. Consequently the study of gentrification cannot be used as it is 
now, a proxy in debates pitting Marxist versus Weberian explanations of social change.
Class issues, I argue, only arise in gentrification through the operation of hegemony, 
with 'hegemony' defined from a cultural materialist perspective as an active process of 
presenting capitalist exploitation as the natural and therefore inevitable condition of 
modem life (R.Williams 1977, Jackson 1989). The problem of modemity is therefore a 
recurring theme in this thesis. Prominent sociologists such as Giddens (1981, 1985
1990) and Mann (1986, 1988), have argued for a 'neo-Weberian' analysis of modemity 
as a phenomenon in its own right, incorporating other sources of social power, notably, 
the state, military power, and industrialism, as well as capitalism. While their arguments
and insight are used in the course of this thesis, I intend to maintain an economic 
orientation to the explanation of gentrification as a phenomenon of modemity. I believe 
that this gives a more focused and plausible dynamism to accounts of social change and 
that the remainder of this thesis will bear out this belief. Furthermore, maintaining this 
orientation supplies a hitherto lacking component to cultural materialist descriptions of 
contemporary life.
Cultural materialism attempts to develop the concerns of Marxism in a more consistent 
manner than traditional historical materialism. It is based on a critique of 
'base-superstructure' metaphors in traditional Marxist historical materialism. This 
metaphor employs an imagery of determinant base and reflected superstructure. The base 
is the economy. The superstructure contains an indeterminate number of levels, but is 
usually understood to be the arena of politics, civil society, ideology, psychology, 
aesthetics and culture and so forth. These metaphors are widespread, long-lasting and 
persistent. They dominate the language of the gentrification debate, as Chapter 2 
demonstrates.
Cultural materialism may also be described as a radical attempt to place the question of 
agency at centre stage. The problem with the base-superstructure metaphor is that it 
separates production from the culture in which that production is undertaken. It separates 
it from what is held to be the determining active economic 'base', and puts it in what is 
held to be the determinate passive social 'superstructure'. It then attempts to show how 
culture 'reflects' economic organization. Use of the base-superstructure metaphor, with 
its unwarrranted sundering of the integrated totality of social life into seperate idealistic 
categories, severely inhibits discussion of questions of agency in social phenomena.
Cultural materialism is also very pertinent to many of the traditional concerns of human 
and social geography. Raymond Williams often described it as the basis for a truly 
human ecology. By making the material production of culture central to the analysis of 
social life, cultural materialism enables one satisfactorily to unite structure and agency, 
form and content, material and symbolic production, to arrive at an understanding of 
gentrification in terms of changes in the material production of culture which includes all 
these dualisms under one heading (cf. Cosgrove and Jackson 1987 19.2).
In the cultural materialist perspective, culture is not a simple passive response to, or 
reflection, typification or mediation of events occurring autonomously in the base 
(R.Williams 1977). Rather it is the very medium in which those events occur.
To paraphrase Stuart Hall, culture is the medium through which people transform
the mundane phenomena of the material world into a world of significant symbols
to which they give meaning and attach value.
(Cosgrove and Jackson 1987 19.2,101)
I argue in this thesis that gentrification is one such transformative cultural process and 
can fruitfully be analyzed using cultural materialist principles.
In rejecting base-superstructure, cultural materialism historically has concentrated on 
restoring agency to the elements formerly trapped in the superstructure such as fine arts, 
literature, fashion, leisure pursuits and lifestyles, in particular the lifestyles of minority, 
counter- or sub- cultures (Hall 1988, Jackson 1989, Dickens 1990). The identification 
of agency in the elements of the base has been sorely neglected. While literary and 
cultural theory have been reconstituted and incorporated into the cultural materialist 
perspective, economic theory has remained quite excluded. This is not only ironic, given 
the integrative potential of cultural materialism, it is also dangerous to the materialist 
aspect of cultural materialism. Hence, my insistence on maintaining an economic 
orientation to the thesis.
I argue that in economic terms, agency is demonstrated through consumer choice, 
demand issues in other words, and that these can be incorporated into Marxist economic 
theory by recasting Marx's definition of subsistence at the social rather than the 
individual level. This shift in focus renders redundant the belief that class position 
determines class consciousness in a linear unmediated fashion. These results have 
immediate consequences for theorizing gentrification, since they also render largely 
redundant the debate over the relative merits of Marx and Weber's accounts of class 
constitution in which accounts of gentrification have played such a prominent role in the 
last decade.
The introduction of demand issues into Marx's economic theories allows for a view of 
money as the medium of both structure and agency in capitalist society, since money is 
only required in an economy which has to face the problem of effective demand (Keynes 
1937). We are all forced to work for money, to reduce ourselves and our relations with 
one another to abstract labour, but at the same time possession of money allows us to 
make choices, and therefore to display agency (Redfem 1987,1992).
Chapter 2 shows how agency has been poorly served in the gentrification debate, despite 
appearances and/or protestations to the contrary by the participants. It appears to have 
been treated more or less in the same way as in the old behavioural studies of economic 
location, i.e., as random noise obscuring the precise motivation, but not as 
fundamentally altering the way in which the structuring of that motivation is achieved.
On the one hand, gentrification is regarded as a phenomenon of postindustrial society, 
evidence of a new middle class. The rise of a new middle class, it is held, directly 
contradicts Marx's prediction of the progressive reduction of all classes in society to just 
two, bourgeoisie and proletariat. On the other, gentrification is regarded as a 
manifestation of switches and flows in circuits of capital, governed by trends in 
neighbourhoods' lifecycles.
Just to confuse matters, however, a substantial body of Marxist thought has accepted in 
principle the postindustrialists' criticisms of the capital logic and theoretical eclectism of 
the neighbourhood lifecycle model. Consequently a left version of the postindustrial 
thesis has grown up, known as the 'production of gentrifiers' approach. It concentrates 
on the social class origins of gentrifiers, rather than their consumption behaviour in the 
processes of gentrification. A consensus has therefore emerged in the literature that once 
the left and right versions of the postindustrialist approach can be merged together an 
explanation of gentrification can be found. It is this consensus that this thesis challenges.
Making this challenge also means confronting the proposition that gentrification can be 
used to stand for the nature of society as a whole. Chapter 3 illustrates the dangers 
inherent in this proposition, in particular as they are expressed in the postindustrialist 
consensus. Gentrifiers, in this literature, are treated as though they were some kind of 
New Age Daleks roaming the streets of the inner city, intoning "Gentrificate! 
Gentrificate!!".
These bizarre conceptions derive from the insistence that gentrification is a form of class 
constitution. Confronting this insistence in turn means confronting some of the most 
deeply held beliefs in the sociological literature, in particular the fundamental explanatory 
model in sociology, characterized by Pahl (1989) as SCA, structure - consciousness - 
action. Chapter 4 reviews this model and argues that there is no such thing as the middle 
class any more. What is called the middle class is not a class but a status group. 
However, this argument is made from a Marxist rather than a Weberian perspective, 
based on the arguments concerning the redefinition of subsistence along the lines 
described above.
Issues in the gentrification debate are characteristically framed in realist terminology, 
although much of this terminology is misapplied by the gentrification debate, as Chapter 
2 shows also (cf.Warde 1991). These problems are compounded by the debate's 
commitment to the synecdochal qualities of gentrification and to SCA. Having argued 
that gentrification cannot be used as a synecdoche for modem society, nor can it be
interpreted in terms either of realism or class, it is naturally incumbent upon this thesis to 
provide an alternative context in which the behaviour of gentrifiers might be interpreted. 
This is the purpose of Chapters 5 and 6.
Chapter 5 argues that since there are no class distinctions to speak of in the gentrification 
process, attempting to develop class categories to explain actors' behaviour in the 
gentrification process is a waste of time. It is a particular waste of time to attempt to 
develop such categories in respect of gender relations, in gentrification as elsewhere. If 
Marx’s (or indeed Weber's) categories of class do not adequately cover all areas of 
experience of social life, the solution is to develop accounts of these other areas of 
experience, not to multiply class categories indefinitely.
This latter, ironically, is the normal strategy of many so-called realists; ironic because the 
term 'realist' was originally coined in opposition to 'nominalist' in a dispute, going back 
to the ancient Greeks, over the processes of categorization. One of the greatest of 
mediæval realists, William of Occam, encapsulated realist doctrine in his famous Razor: 
"the number of categories ought not indefinitely to be multiplied"; yet this doctrine is 
exactly what self-described realist analyses of gentrification continually contradict in their 
desire to develop new class categories to explain social change.
Another topic which has exercised the gentrification debate is the question of post­
modernism. Chapter 2 examines how the debate has treated this issue. I argue that post­
modernism, if it can even be said to exist, is really a revival of early modernism. 
Gentrification is by definition therefore a study in modemity, because we all live under 
conditions of modemity. Chapter 5 also examines the broader aspects of this proposition.
The fundamental condition of modemity, I argue, following Alexander (1989), is a loss 
of meaning from our lives. The requirement to have to make sense of our lives, to give 
our lives meaning, dominates modem life in an historically unprecedented manner. This 
existential need to make sense of our lives, I go on to show, not only dominates debates 
in social science over questions of structure and agency, but is in fact the fundamental 
rationale underlying social science. If the social stmctures of modemity were not 
impervious to meaning, questions about agency would not even arise.
Questions of agency themselves, I argue, are dominated by the quasi-religious insistence 
that our lives ^  have meaning, that we can make a difference: quasi-religious, because it 
is a consoling vision of ourselves. On the one hand, social science offers us the 
consolations of religion in a world which has seen the death of God and the loss of 
meaning. Social science promises to show us that there is a rationale behind it all, for the
way we behave and the ways in which we are forced to behave. Where once we had the 
will of God, now we have economic or social forces, equally mysterious, equally 
surpassing of human understanding and equally impervious to human control. But on 
the other, there is a fundamental paradox, that we should need social science at all to 
investigate the way we live our lives. Sayer, I think, offers a brilliant resolution of this 
paradox when he states that under capitalism, "reification is a social process, not a mere 
category error" (D.Sayer 1991 p65). If, in other words, social science has taken the 
place of religion in the modem world, "a religion in which man is at once the worshipper 
and the god" (Durkheim, quoted in D.Sayer 1991 p80), this is because of the very 
modemity of the modem world.
Nonetheless, as Sayer also points out, if reification is a social process, reification is not 
therefore to be condoned. This insistence in social science, that our lives do have 
meaning and that social science must organize its concepts of agency around this, must 
be recognized for what it is, what Nietzsche terms a "homesickness", a desire to find or 
at least to organize a place for ourselves in the world (Connolly 1988): the longing to 
comfort the sense of loss felt by all such as Auden's "poor in their fireless lodgings, 
throwing down the sheets/ Of the evening paper", for whom "Our day is our loss", and 
who plead for society’s scientists to
show us 
History the operator, the 
Organiser, Time the refreshing river.
W.H Auden Spain 1937
(Mendelson 1977 p211)
Brilliant as Sayer's formulation is, therefore, I do not think that it can be taken as the 
whole explanation. To recognize this insistence is however to begin to be able to deal 
with it. Displays of agency are also displays of an independent consciousness. 
Understanding the formation of that consciousness is therefore fundamental to defining 
the ways in which agency may be said to be exhibited. Cultural materialism however 
rejects psychological explanations of the formation of consciousness, arguing that they 
take for granted the separations of individual and society, subjectivity and sociality, and 
culture and material production in modern life, separations which cultural materialism is 
particularly concemed to problematize and overcome (R.Williams 1977).
Williams makes a plea for the revival instead of a sociology of consciousness, which he 
argues was a fundamental concern of the classical sociology of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries (1977). In answering that plea, in Chapter 6 ,1 rely heavily on 
the work of Robert Park. I show that Park's writings may be interpreted as summarizing 
classical sociology, being principally concerned with developing just such a sociology of
consciousness as formed under conditions of modemity. I show how Park's interests 
and concepts, in particular, his concept of the marginal man, may be reconciled with 
R.Williams' principles of cultural materialism.
The concept of the marginal man. Park's most original contribution to sociology, was 
developed in the context of immigration into the United States. Defined as a man living 
on the margins of two cultures, of the Old World and the New and encapsulating all the 
problems of modernity, the marginal man nonetheless held out the promise of their 
resolution. I argue that the experience of standing on the margins of two cultures is the 
experience of us all in modern society. To be more precise it is the experience of the 
proletariat in capitalist society, partially incorporated into and partially excluded from 
capitalist society (Cleaver 1979). The homesickness Nietzsche talks about may then be 
understood as being generated by the memory of the experience of the formation of 
consciousness in socialization, given the experience of its alienation under capitalism. 
The formation of consciousness in socialization is at the same time the process of 
acquiring status as a person, an individual-in-society. Park eloquently demonstrates the 
paradox that where we feel most at home is where our status as persons, the recognition 
of our worth, our meaningfulness for others, is most taken for granted and where 
therefore we feel freest from the pressures of maintaining status and therefore freest to act 
like little children. But the experience of the modem world, characterized by mobility in 
the present and an indeterminate future, continually undermines that sense of security 
which allows us not to worry about status. The very attempt at creating a home in the 
modern world however can undermine the attempts of others to do the same. A sense of 
place is also a sense of status, 'place' in society. The creation of a place for some, can 
and does therefore undermine the status of others.
Gentrification can obviously therefore be interpreted as one such place-making strategy, 
in which the potential for conflict over the meaning invested in a place and the status this 
will grant to different groups is particularly high. However, the condition of modemity 
described in Chapter 5 does not simply affect gentrifiers, but everyone living in the 
modern world. The specificity of the causes of gentrification must still be made clear, 
otherwise the argument would be thrown back on the production of gentrifiers argument. 
Where the production of gentrifiers approach held postindustrialism or postmodemism 
responsible for the mysterious creation of this strange new segment of the middle class, 
this thesis would now be arguing that modemity had created them instead.
Chapter 7 shows that the explanation of gentrification rests on something that all previous 
accounts of gentrification have taken for granted, namely the very possibility of being 
able to improve a property. Gentrification could not have occurred if, to use the jargon of
economists, technical progress in the supply of housing services had not become 
disembodied through the development of domestic technologies, so that the flow of 
housing services from older properties could be brought up to the standards of the new. 
Given these circumstances, and given the mechanisms of capitalist housing finance 
(where the availability of investment funds for improvements depends not on returns to 
investment, but on the incomes of the borrowers), the explanation of gentrification then 
reduces to a routine economic problem of maximization under constraint. Gentrification 
is a subset of displacement, itself a subset of home improvements.
To argue that gentrification depends on the existence of domestic technologies however 
throws a lot of weight onto the development of domestic technologies as an explanatory 
variable. Chapter 8 shows how the history of the development of domestic technologies 
has been accompanied by the widest ramifications in the development of class relations 
and perceptions of privacy and the self. The development of domestic technologies 
characterizes the development of the social relations of capitalism in extremely significant 
and largely unexplored ways. The circumstances under which housing was provided 
before the widespread application of domestic technologies is vital to an understanding of 
gentrification. Housing which requires a specific complement of servant labour to run it 
cannot 'filter down' through income cohorts as it ages. Whatever other limitations there 
might be to the process of filtering down, this one is crucial to the explanation of 
gentrification. If housing can filter down, then although there may exist the possibility 
for displacement led improvements, there can be no possibility of gentrification 
occurring.
Gentrification, it is widely accepted, involves a substantial gap in income between those 
displaced and those moving in. Filtering down would preclude that possibility occurring. 
The middle-class housing which is to be gentrified must have been abandoned totally to 
the working class, as soon as its first occupants quit it, thus creating a discontinuity 
between the income of the present occupier and the age and/or structural quality of the 
dwelling. I show that abandonment will occur if there are fixed co-efficients in the 
production of housing services with servant labour, and competitive markets in domestic 
labour. These conditions existed in Victorian London, thus creating, a century ago, the 
one essential prerequisite for gentrification, abandonment, not filtering down.
The history of the development of domestic technologies is also the history of the 
development of suburbia. I argue, with N.Smith (1982), that gentrification cannot occur 
without suburban development, not so much however for the reasons that Smith offers, 
namely the development of the rent gap, but because it produced the residential social 
segregation by status, another condition of modernity which is also essential to
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gentrification, and which has never been highlighted in the gentrification debate.
Chapter 9 then looks at the processes of gentrification in modem times. It tries to place 
gentrification in the context of wider trends in the economy and society, something which 
is rarely attempted in gentrification studies. It compares trends in owner occupation, 
house prices and social composition in Islington since 1951 with those in London and 
Great Britain as a whole. It shows how gentrification has proceeded as the ratio of the 
prices of domestic technologies to housing has fallen dramatically since the Second 
World War. However, this has been in a political context in which rehabilitation of the 
existing housing stock through the promotion of owner occupation has been at the top of 
the agenda (Merrett with Gray 1982).
Chapter 9 also uses comparative analyses of Islington, the City and Greater London, and 
Great Britain as the basis of a discussion of the impact of changing gender relations on 
the gentrification process. Somewhat controversially, it argues that changes in gender 
roles and relations have no bearing on the explanation of gentrification, for much the 
same reason as class has no bearing on the explanation of gentrification, namely that, like 
class, gender issues in gentrification are universally theorized in terms of the standard 
sociological SCA model.
Indeed, although the participation of high-status women actively involved in 
gentrification has increased dramatically over the thirty years 1951-1981, their absolute 
numbers have been so low, that it can only be concluded that gentrification would have 
occurred whether or not women were financially involved in the process at all.
The real issue is not therefore the proportion of men to women in the process, but the 
extremely low numbers of properties actually or potentially affected by gentrification. 
Gentrification would have occurred whether or not men were financially involved in the 
process. This highlights the final paradox of gentrification studies. Why is so much time 
and attention devoted to this gentrification when quantitatively it is of such little 
significance? Chapter 10 considers this question by way of a conclusion to the thesis.
Clearly, part of the answer is to be found in the insecurities of modemity chronicled in 
Chapters 5 & 6, the need to achieve status, to give life meaning and purpose in the 
modem world; goals which can be achieved through the creation of a place, but which 
have the potential for conflict with others who have similar but exclusive ambitions for 
themselves. Gentrification has wider resonances because it touches on fears and anxieties 
within us all, which is why, as I argue in Chapter 3, analysis of gentrification is in 
general hopelessly compromised, because no such analyst likes either the process or
those undertaking it. Gentrification therefore tends to be analyzed in term of metaphors 
for sin, aliens and disease. However, since the condition of modernity is also the 
subjective experience of capitalism, which means in effect, the experience of class, these 
fears and resonances are experienced in class specific ways, that is in terms of 
dominating and incorporating hegemonies. Using Williams' analysis of metaphors of the 
country and the city in the history of English literature (R.Williams 1973b), I argue that 
the resonances of the very term 'gentrification', as well as the activity itself, arise out of 
the 'country' way of seeing and not seeing social relations, and that it is a process of 
bringing 'country' relations back into the 'city'. Since 'gentrification' is a metaphorical 
expression itself, gentrification is not simply a process of creating a place, but of a 
specifically country place; situated in the midst of the wicked city, yet one in which any 
suggestion of exploitative class relations is kept firmly out of the picture. It creates a 
haven of rest and security by the use of the language and concepts of a dominating 
hegemony, which it also helps sustain; an echo chamber through which the resonances of 
gentrification can be felt in contexts far wider than its limited quantitative impact would 
suggest.
As an instance of hegemony at work in the operation of a capitalist housing market, 
gentrification gives a particular class-meaning to the displacement of working class 
people from existing property and their replacement as occupiers of this property by 
middle class people. Gentrification represents concern about identity translated through 
the operation of hegemony into concerns about class. To explain why gentrification 
occurs then, it is necessary to engage this hegemonic representation of gentrification, not 
simply to reproduce it in our theoretical schema. Only then is it possible both to explain 
gentrification and to understand its significance in modern life. Gentrification is not 
about class constitution but about identity and status under conditions of modemity, 
where all that is solid melts into air.
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2 The gentrification debate: a false closure?
2.1 Introduction
The gentrification debate has been dominated by concepts developed in a predominantly 
Anglo-American literature (though see Clark, 1988 on Sweden, and Logan, 1985 and 
Jager, 1986 on Australia). In this chapter, I chart the course of this debate, and in 
particular the rise of the postindustrialist consensus in gentrification studies which 
followed the appearance of Rose's seminal article on rethinking gentrification from a 
Marxist perspective (Rose 1984).
Hamnett’s periodic and able reviews (Hamnett & R.Williams 1979, Hamnett 1984, 
1991) document the change in the treatment of gentrification from an interesting 
phenomenon in the history of urbanization to an instance of the ongoing class struggle in 
theory, to use Althusser's memorable formulation (Althusser 1971). This transformation 
of the terms of the debate complicate exposition. There has been considerable evolution 
both in the internal characteristics of the debate itself and in the arguments, taken from 
debates in social theory at large, which have been marshalled in support of the various 
positions taken in the internal debate.
These external debates, which include production versus consumption as alternative 
bases for class formation, the relative status of structure versus agency in social 
explanation, Marxism versus Weberianism, the very nature of society itself, are 
substantial, and ones which must be addressed in any serious account of gentrification. 
So as to impose some order on the material therefore, if discussion is not to become 
unmanageable, this chapter therefore concentrates on the internal debate. Chapters 3 
through 6 concentrate on the external debates.
Gentrification is held to be of interest for the light it throws upon these external debates. 
In fact the opposite is the case. Gentrification can be understood only after the issues 
raised by these wider debates have been addressed. The strategy, followed by all who 
engage in the gentrification debate, of arguing from  gentrification to modem society 
(whose characteristics, it is implied, we already and otherwise know and agree on - 
R.Williams 1977, p80, see below), is doomed to failure, as Chapter 3 will show, and 
needs to be reversed, along the lines presented in Chapters 4, 5, & 6.
The belief that gentrification does provide a message for our times has polarized the 
debate into left and right, or radical and liberal camps. On the radical side, there are the 
Marxist theories of gentrification led by N.Smith (1979a 1987a 1987b). Leading the
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liberals are the humanist, often explicitly anti-Marxist theories promoted by Ley (1980, 
1986 1987). However, Hamnett appears to speak for a general consensus (cf. Clark 
1988, Mills 1988), when he argues that each of these theories are only partial ones, 
which can and should be fitted together to provide the explanation of gentrification. Even 
the feminist criticisms of the neglect of gender issues in the gentrification debate does not 
challenge this aspect of the consensus:
gentrification entails the differentiation of a new urban middle-class from other
elements of the middle-class engaged in suburban or ex-urban strategies
(Bondi, 1991, pl93)
Bondi's only complaint is that the gentrification debate has not sufficiently considered the 
role of women in these class differentiation strategies.
It is the purpose of this chapter to initiate the challenge to this consensus. The 
gentrification debate claims to highlight questions of structure and agency in social life 
(N.Smith & P.Williams 1986), but the way it conceptualizes gentrification, it rules 
agency out of the picture. The direction the gentrification debate is now taking, it will 
never be able to answer the fundamental questions of why, when and where (Hamnett
1991).
Jackson notes that "explanations of... gentrification are often divided into the 
demographic-ecological and the political-economic" (1989 p56). I prefer to use a 
slightly different classification: neighbourhood lifecycle or postindustrialism. 
Neighbourhood lifecycle I define as the hypothesis that physical change in the urban 
fabric at large promotes social change in the neighbourhood. Postindustrialism I define 
as the hypothesis that sociak change at large promotes physical change in the 
neighbourhood. The reason for preferring this classification is that it brings out better the 
influence of past ideas on urbanization and urban growth in the gentrification debate. It 
is not just a rewording however: neighbourhood lifecycle and postindustrialism both 
contain aspects of demographic-ecological and political economic explanations.
Prior to 1984, neighbourhood lifecycle explanations were historically more popular in 
US literature, whereas postindustrialism was more popular in UK discussions. 
However, since 1984, postindustrialism has dominated the debate. The only holdout has 
been N.Smith's rent gap argument. I reserve detailed discussion of Smith's arguments 
for the rent gap hypothesis till Chapter 7. This chapter will demonstrate that the issues 
in the gentrification debate are not really the claims of structure versus agency, but base 
versus superstructure. Chapter 3 will then discuss the context in which the models of 
agency employed in the gentrification debate are derived, and Chapter 4 their relation to
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structure. Chapters 5 & 6 will then present an alternative account of agency and 
consciousness, which is also a description of the conditions of modem life. To argue 
that gentrifiers gentrify because they can (really do display agency) requires taking on 
some very profoundly held beliefs.
It is true that the categorization of behaviour into dichotomous terms such as structure 
versus agency may be regarded as unnecessary and unhelpful in social analysis (Shields 
1990 p270ff., Redfem 1992 p50). Inadequate as the structure-agency dualism may be, 
however, it is hardly improved by linking it to base and superstructure. In fact, there is 
no role for agency at all in the base-superstructure metaphor of social organization and 
development, because activities which take place in the superstructure (for example the 
arts or local cultures) and which therefore appear to have the character of agency have 
then to be theorized in terms of subsidiary metaphors, as being in some way reflections, 
typifications or mediations of relations in the base. All developments in the 
superstmcture must therefore be determined, in the last instance, by developments in the 
base (R.Williams 1977 p81).
It is true that this problem has been recognized in the past and attempts made to deal with 
it. Urry's (1981) categories of 'economy, civil society and the state', represent one such 
attempt to give agency a role within the base-superstructure framework. It is true also that 
there have been numerous attempts to rectify the imbalance of power between the base 
and the superstructure, in order to permit the superstructure some reciprocal influence 
over the base: for example, Althusser (1970) borrowed the concept of over- 
determination' from psychoanalysis to just this end.
However, as Williams insists (1977 p80-81), the problem does not lie in inadequate 
theorizing on relations between base and superstructure, but in the a priori and 
unnecessary separation of a whole way of life into idealistically conceptualized categories 
which are only tenously linked to each other; the belief that production and consumption 
'as such' (e.g., the economy) can be separated from the particular/orm5 (culture and the 
arts) in which that production and consumption is undertaken (e.g., civil society). A 
further consequence is the multiplication of categories in the superstructure (e.g., the 
state). Seen in this light, Urry's strategy for overcoming the problems of base- 
superstructure appears to fail at the first hurdle (cf. Frankel 1983).
Use of the base-superstructure metaphor shuts off enquiry and replaces it with the 
demonstration of already and otherwise known truths ("What is already and otherwise 
known as the basic reality of the material social process is reflected, of course in its own 
ways, [in the superstructure]" - R.Williams 1977, p97). In other words, "There is a
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persistent presupposition of a knowable (often wholly knowable) reality" (op. cit., 
pl03). Superstructural elements are then of interest only as they can be fitted into (and 
so illustrate the nature of) this reality, not because they have any intrinsic interest in 
themselves. Not surprisingly they then become very difficult to operationalize. Goodwin 
notes Urry's lack of success "at transferring the concept [of civil society] from abstract to 
empirical research" (1989 p i54). Post-industrialism suffers particularly from these 
problems, as I shall show below.
In contrast, I shall argue that the very way in which thinking about gentrification is 
conducted is of interest in throwing light on the way we all live today, whether we are 
able to gentrify or not. As a phenomenon of modem culture, gentrification (or 
gentrifiers) cannot be explained or understood in isolation from that culture; nor can it be 
defined in opposition to it, as the post-modern Other of modem society (cf. Shields 1990 
p276). The fact that it is so notoriously difficult even to define gentrification (2.3.3 
below) proves the point: it is not that 'gentrification is a chaotic concept', rather it is that 
that the thinking of those who make this argument is confused (Warde 1991), because 
their approach presumes that gentrification has to be isolated from the whole way of life 
in which it is enmeshed before it can be defined.
Despite the apparent sophistication of the arguments employed in the gentrification 
debate, therefore, I argue that they all rely on a crude base-superstructure mode of 
theorizing in which neighbourhood lifecycle and postindustrialism exhibit the characters 
of base and superstmcture respectively. None therefore give an adequate account of 
agency. They tend to 'over-explain'.
By 'over-explanation', I mean that if these devices did provide a handle on the 
gentrification process, the problem for gentrification studies would not lie in explaining 
the existence of gentrification in the areas where it had occurred. It would lie in 
explaining why it had not occurred everywhere there were (potentially) gentrifiable 
properties. One immediate reason for this tendency to 'over-explain' is that both 
explanatory devices rely on concentric zone notions of urban growth and differentiation. 
The roots of the neighbourhood lifecycle model are clearly to be found in the Burgess 
model of concentric zones. However postindustrialism displays equally close links to 
the Alonso model of urban differentiation (2.2.3 below).
On the other side of the coin to over-explanation in the intra-urban case, there is under­
explanation in the inter-urban case. Neither post-industrialism or neighbourhood life­
cycle provides any obvious reason to account for why gentrification occurs in some cities 
and not in others; when presumably all cities (in the advanced capitalist countries) would
14
experience rent gaps (N.Smith 1979a,b, Schaffer & N.Smith 1986), and/or the onset of 
postindustrial society. Hamnett (1991 pl76) makes this point, though he does not 
identify the causes of the problem in the reliance on the concentric zone models of the 
two approaches. Rather, in line with the consensus already outlined, he sees the solution 
as lying in some kind of synthesis of the two approaches. Given their basic 
assumptions, however, it is unlikely that such a synthesis would have any greater 
success in specifying the occurence of gentrification than the two approaches do 
separately at present.
The present consensus, can therefore be challenged in three fundamental aspects. The 
first is that researchers are always trying implicitly to accommodate explanation of 
gentrification to one of these two concentric zone models (of an already and otherwise 
known society). The explanation of gentrification is held to be complete once the 
gentrifier has been situated in their gentrified home. Consequently, questions of agency, 
of the "could do otherwise-ness" of human life (Giddens 1987 p220. Oilman 1971 p46) 
are ruled out of the picture, since, and this is the real problem, it is insisted that 
gentrifiers gentrify out of necessity. That necessity is itself reduced to an issue of class 
constitution, which is the third problem. Gentrifiers, knowing themselves to be different 
as a class, 'need', in one way or another to engage in gentrifying behaviour. Thus the 
third problem brings us back to the first and to the second. I have said that these are 
three basic problems; another way of describing them would be insistences. Because all 
three are so intertwined and mutually supportative, it takes quite an effort of resistance to 
challenge them, even to identify them as problems. This chapter therefore merely 
engages in the process of identification.
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2.2 Lingering traces in the explanation of gentrification: neighbourhood 
lifecycle and postindustrialism
In this section, I detail the ideas underlying neighbourhood lifecycle and 
postindustrialism. Both types of explanation emphasize structure at the expense of 
agency (cf Hamnett 1984 pp296-297 on life cycle models and p304 and p313 on 
postindustrialism; see also Rose 1984). I begin with neighbourhood lifecycle 
explanations, as they existed until around 1984, the year of Hamnett's first solo review 
of the literature, and Rose's exposé of "mix'n'match" methods in Marxist explanations of 
gentrification.
2.2.7 The debate to 1984: lifecycle models o f gentrification
According to N.Smith and R.Williams (1986), early research on gentrification tended to 
take causes for granted and concentrate on effects. This was because the effects "were 
taken by many to be a timely answer to inner-city decay" (op. cit. p4). Gentrification 
was thus to be welcomed for its ability to combat the apparently inevitable drift into decay 
and abandonment over the course of the neighbourhood lifecycle. While 
postindustrialism sees gentrification as a process which overcomes the operation of 
neighbourhood lifecycles, the neighbourhood lifecycle approach itself sees gentrification 
as one more stage in the lifecycle itself. Decay and abandonment are no longer the final 
stages of the lifecycle, but merely transitional states. Examples include Ahlbrandt and 
Brophy (1975), Lang (1982), N.Smith (1979a,1982, 1987a, 1987b), P.Smith and 
McCann (1981).
Lifecycle approaches can therefore be found in both Marxist and non-Marxist work. 
The lifecycle approach is however particularly noticeable in North American explanations 
of gentrification, of whatever theoretical orientation. Hamnett (1984 p296) quotes 
Hoover and Vernon's (1959) five stage "cycle of growth, decline and (potential) 
revitalization and renewal" as the origin of thinking on the subject of gentrification as a 
stage in the lifecycle of a neighbourhood. However, according to P.Smith and McCann 
(1981), the idea itself dates back to Mackenzie's contribution to 'The City', the manifesto 
of the Chicago School of Sociology (Park, Burgess and MacKenzie, 1925), and it 
demonstrates the continuing influence of the Chicago School of Sociology in analyses of 
urban form and process.
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Two ideas dominate in the concept of neighbourhood lifecycle. The first is that the 
lifecycle is inevitable in the history of a neighbourhood. Following the use of the term 
life' cycle, this inevitability is due to an implicit conception of the unit of analysis, be it a 
city or city block, in terms of its being an organism. Thus Ahlbrandt and Brophy (1975) 
present a stage cycle beginning with 1) "healthy viable neighbourhoods", proceeding via
2) "incipient decline" 3) "clearly declining", 4) "accelerated decline" and ending with 5) 
"abandonment". The medical analogy employed by calling neighbourhoods "healthy" or 
"viable", clearly betrays the organicism implicit in such thinking. Based on Ahlbrandt 
and Brophy's ideas, Lang (1982) goes so far as to use the term 'triage' in discussing 
housing policy options for residential neighbourhoods. 'Triage' is the exercise of 
medical judgement on a battlefield to decide which injured soldiers have a reasonable 
chance of survival if treated and those who would have no chance even after treatment. It 
is therefore a policy of selective abandonment of neighbourhoods deemed "hopeless 
cases".
The second idea dominant in neighbourhood lifecycle ideas is that the cycle works itself 
out in economic terms. This too originates in the Chicago School of sociology. 
Competition between groups leads to residential differentiation of communities, or 
'natural areas'. This competition takes place at the economic level (Ley 1983b). Thus 
the natural expression of the natural life of the neighbourhood is in terms of house prices.
Lang (1982) argued that urban lifecycle was the paradigm in urban theory. Using 
Ahlbrandt and Brophy's classification, he explained the onset of incipient decline as 
occurring "when a neighbourhood starts to lose its competitive edge". The loss of 
competitive edge shows that the neighbourhood is beginning to lose the vigour of youth 
and starting to weaken. However, the evidence for this weakening lies in the house 
prices which the properties can command, indicating the extent to which the community 
inhabiting the neighbourhood is able to compete with other communities.
P.Smith and McCann summarize these themes:
As houses age, ... they tend to become less competitive within the city's 
expanding housing market; and as their competitiveness declines they are filtered- 
down through groups of lower and lower status (population succession), initially 
for owner-occupation, but later for rental occupancy. This is explained in two 
ways: lower-status groups cannot afford to own their own homes, and, as 
maintenance costs rise for an ageing housing stock, the absentee owners are 
forced to crowd more tenants into their buildings in order to secure an economic 
return. Dwelling conversions (land use succession) are thus associated with a 
firmly entrenched pattern of economic and social decline which in turn is hastened 
by the conversion process. Eventually, structural deterioration becomes 
pronounced and, in its "abandoned" state, the neighbourhood is reduced to a place 
of last resort; its buildings have little value and their sites are no longer considered
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to be in economic use.
(P.Smith and McCann 1981 p540)
The processes involved make structure dominate over agency. Smith and McCann 
observe that:
Although cautionary notes are introduced, to the effect that decline can be arrested 
in its early stages, and neighbourhoods improved, the planning orientation of the 
models causes attention to be concentrated on the phenomenon of progressive 
deterioration as a fate that cannot be avoided unless preventative measures are 
taken...
Either the market must then take steps to "recapture" their value, by redeveloping 
them for productive use, or if it fails to do so (because of lack of demand), public 
intervention must be appealed to. The two processes of residential land use 
change are therefore accorded distinctive phases in the succession sequence, 
conversion as the symptom of decline and redevelopment as its cure.
(ibid. - emphasis in original)
Thus the role of agency is essentially reactive. The operation of the structural effects are 
toward decline and abandonment.
In N.Smith's rent gap model, the description of the visible effects of the processes at
work echoes the sequence described by P.Smith and McCann. These are:
new construction and first phase of use, landlordism, blockbusting and blowout, 
redlining, abandonment. [In N.Smith 1979a] the sequence was incorrectly 
described as a depreciation cycle rather than a devalorization cycle. Depreciation 
refers strictly to changes in price whereas devalorization is a deeper economic 
process implying the loss or negation of value as a necessary part of the 
valorization process.
(N.Smith 1982 pl47)
This 'deep economic process' is as inexorable as the processes of organic decay depicted 
in 'conventional' accounts, although from a Marxist frame of reference.
2.2.2 Postindustrialism
While "the loss of a neighborhood's competitive edge" (Lang, 1982) implies the 
existence of other neighbourhoods, the tendency of neighbourhood lifecycle analysis is 
to concentrate upon changes internal to the neighbourhood itself. The focus of 
postindustrialism by contrast is upon changes in society at large which have imposed 
gentrification upon certain neighbourhoods. The coming of postindustrial society, it is 
held, has created a new middle class; whose novelty lies in the fact of its residing in the 
inner city, rather than with the old middle class in the suburbs (Ley 1980, 1987a).
Postindustrialism is appealed to by all sides in the debate. The principal difference 
between left and right interpretations is whether it represents a new stage in capitalist
18
development or the beginning of its end. The difference is essentially one of scale. The 
liberal right argues that the change in social organization which has brought about 
gentrification is a fundamental one. Social analysis should not therefore continue to be in 
thrall to nineteenth century concerns (cf. N.Smith & P.Williams 1986 p5). The form in 
which consumption is undertaken is held now to be of greater importance than that in 
which production is undertaken. The left interpretation of these changes is in terms of 
class composition and re-composition in a changing but still fundamentally capitalist 
society (Dickens and Savage 1987, Friedman 1977, Massey 1984, Meiksins 1986, and 
Walker 1984).
2.2.3 Postindustrialism and neighbourhood lifecycle as fundamental alternative 
hypotheses in the explanation of gentrification
Participants in the gentrification debate do not describe their positions on gentrification in 
terms of the definitions offered here. Nonetheless, it may be seen that ultimately they all 
fall into one of these two camps. Hamnett (1984), for example, identified 5 types of 
explanations for gentrification then extant in the literature. These were:
1) the impact of city size, and changes in the trade-off between preference for 
space and accessibility;
2) changes in the demographic and household structure of the population;
3) lifestyle and preference shifts;
4) changes in relative house price inflation and investment;
5) changes in the employment base and occupational structure of certain large 
cities;
(Hamnett 1984 p298)
Hamnett's 5 categories can be reclassified under the headings of the two definitions 
presented above: explanations 1 and 4 would come under 'neighbourhood lifecycle' and 
3 and 5, 'postindustrialism'. Explanation 2 could come under either heading, depending 
on whether the changes in demography or household structure are regarded as 
autonomous or as deriving from postindustrialism.
N.Smith, operating from an explicitly Marxist perspective, also offered 5 reasons for the 
occurence of gentrification:
(a) suburbanisation and the emergence of the rent gap;
(b) the deindustrialisation of advanced capitalist economies and the growth of 
white collar employment;
(c) the spatial centralisation and simultaneous decentralisation of capital;
(d) the falling rate of profit and the cyclical movement of capital;
(e) demographic changes and changes in consumption patterns;
(N.Smith 1986 p22)
Smith's reasons (a) and (d) are examples of 'neighbourhood lifecycle', whereas (b) and
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(e) are responses to the question of the existence of postindustrial society. Again (c) 
could fall under either heading depending on the causes attributed to the phenomenon in 
question.
To see how these models act as alternatives under both conventional and Marxist 
analyses of gentrification, it is useful to compare those factors discussed by N.Smith 
(1986, p22) and Hamnett (1984, p298) which it can be argued come under the 
postindustrial hypothesis (categories 2,3 & 5 for Hamnett; b,e & c for Smith):
Hamnett N. Smith
Changes in employment base De-industrialisation
Changes in occupational structure Growth of white-collar employment
Changes in demographic and household Demographic changes
structure
Lifestyle and preference shifts Changes in consumption patterns
Centralization and decentralization of 
capital
Where Hamnett refers merely to 'changes' and 'shifts', typical of the postulates of 
postindustrialism, N.Smith's categorization can be re-arranged into a definite sequence, 
which it is possible to subsume under the general heading of "centralization and 
decentralization of capital". However that sequence is one which would be not be 
opposed by the proponents of a postindustrial society (N.Smith and P.Williams 1986 p5- 
6).
N.Smith and P.Williams (1986 p4) identified 5 major themes in the gentrification debate:
(a) production-side versus consumption-side explanations;
(b) the question of the emergence of a "post-industrial" city;
(c) the relative importance of social structure vis-à-vis agency in the gentrification 
process;
(d) is there a new middle class and what is its role?
(e) what are the costs of gentrification now and in the future?
The first four of these themes also reduce ultimately either to questions of neighbourhood 
lifecycle or to the transition to postindustrial society. On the first theme, N.Smith and 
P.Williams argue that there has been a transition from lifecycle empiricist explanations of 
gentrification to ones involving a "wider framework" including changes in family 
structure, the role of women in the labour force, and the expansion of the educated 
middle classes. If their point is taken, however, then themes (b), (c) and (d) may be seen 
simply as elaborations of theme (a); that is, they reduce ultimately to either 
neighbourhood lifecycle processes or the transition to postindustrial society.
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The fifth theme, the costs of gentrification, does not address itself to accounts of the 
origins of gentrification, but the answer given will depend on the explanatory framework 
adopted. If neighbourhood lifecycle explanations are preferred, then the question will 
tend to be posed in terms of property values. If a postindustrialist perspective is 
preferred, the question will tend to be posed in terms of personal or social costs, 
including the costs placed upon those displaced. The assessment of costs is thus more 
likely to be optimistic in neighbourhood lifecycle, compared to postindustrial 
explanations.
As noted, choice of the explanatory device on which to rely has not been simply a matter 
of theoretical or political preference. The same explanatory frameworks occur in both 
Marxist and non-Marxist accounts of gentrification. Rather, the significant difference in 
whether neighbourhood lifecycle or postindustrialism was adopted as the basic 
explanatory framework appears to have depended more on geography than on political 
persuasion. To quote Mao Zedong, ideas do not "drop from the skies"; nor are they 
"innate in the mind". Rather "they are innate in social practice" (Robinson, 1973, pi). 
The planning systems in the UK and the USA have played important roles in framing 
theoretical orientations.
In the US and Canada, planning issues are framed in terms of how social changes may 
best be accommodated within physical structures, and planning decisions are 
implemented via land-use controls, namely zoning regulations. Urban planners assign 
socio-economic activities to different parts of the city, and as long as the building erected 
conforms to the use specified in the zoning ordinance, construction cannot be prevented 
(Grant 1982). If an area is zoned for single family dwelling, then buildings erected there 
must be occupied by single families only. Only single families are permitted to live in a 
single family area, unless the city passes a variation in the zoning ordinances (Zukin 
1982). Zoning variations however apply to a specified area, not to a specified building. 
They always therefore affect a whole neighbourhood, and are nearly always politically 
contested.
This planning environment, where subdividing a single family dwelling and letting it into 
multifamily occupancy is much more difficult than in the UK, is therefore very conducive 
to neighbourhood lifecycle interpretations of social change in neighbourhoods (cf. 
P.Smith & McCann 1981). If housing is no longer 'suitable' for the middle classes, it 
cannot simply be subdivided and let out for working class occupancy. Consequently, it 
becomes run down and eventually abandoned. It is not therefore the organic 
underpinnings of the neighbourhood lifecycle concept which explains neighbourhood
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decline but the planning context in which it is situated. Gentrification studies in the US 
and Canada continually discuss struggles over zoning ordinances, and thus the 
involvement of the city authorities in the gentrification process (N.Smith 1979b, 
Cybriwsky, Ley and Western, 1986, Mills 1988).
In the UK by contrast, planning issues are framed in terms of how existing physical 
structures may best be modified to respond to changing circumstances, with planning 
decisions implemented via physical development controls, placed on each building 
separately (Grant 1982). UK physical planning regulations do also determine the type of 
building which may be erected in any area, but they are much less specific about its use. 
Three buildings side-by-side may be required to look identical, but one may be a single 
family dwelling, the next subdivided into flats, and the third used as office 
accommodation. Since the planning philosophy in the UK is one of overseeing the 
adaptation of physical structures to accommodate social change, postindustrialism, where 
physical change also appears to follow social change, would appear much more obvious 
interpretation of neighbourhood change than in the US or Canada.
Since every building requires a development permit, changes in use of an existing 
building affect only its immediate neighbours and are rarely politically contested at local 
authority level. Political struggle over gentrification tends to be conducted in terms of 
plans for improving the residential environment, traffic schemes and the like, rather than 
with changes in land use policy (Ferris 1972, P.Williams 1976, Pitt 1977). The only 
major exception to this generalization is the case of the gentrification of London's 
docklands (A.Smith 1989). There however, gentrification is occurring on land 
specifically zoned for the purpose, the London Docklands Enterprise Zone. The 
emphasis in UK studies is on changes in the relative status of tenures, changes in tenure, 
and changes in financing of tenures as explanations of gentrification (Hamnett & 
Randolph, 1986, Williams 1976). Again, this tends to be taken for granted, and ascribed 
to differences in political or theoretical awareness. Nonetheless this is because the 
immediate problems of trying to secure a change in use of a building are nowhere near as 
severe as they are in the US or Canada. The planning context in the UK is equally 
important in setting the agenda for gentrification studies in the UK as that in the US or 
Canada. It is why UK gentrification studies tend to look at gentrified properties, 
whereas US gentrification studies look at gentrified neighbourhoods.
The gentrification debate still operates within the traces of the original context set by the 
Chicago school of urban sociology, even though explicit reliance on its principles has 
faded away. Their notion of social organization as human ecology always contained the 
metaphor of base and superstructure. The theoretical basis of neighbourhood lifecycle
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has been traced to the Burgess model of urban growth and residential differentiation 
(2.3.1 above). However postindustrialism also has its origins in a model of urban 
growth and residential differentiation. It can be traced to the Alonso model (Alonso 
1964). Alonso's model too can be traced to the concerns of the Chicago school of urban 
sociology. The debate on gentrification can then be interpreted as one over the best place 
to locate gentrification, with postindustrialism placing gentrification in the superstructure 
and neighbourhood lifecycle placing gentrification in the base.
Alonso's model of urban differentiation (Alonso 1960, 1964), describes residential 
differentiation in terms of the bid rent curves of rich and poor people, that is how much 
each group is prepared to pay to occupy a particular location. Bid rent curves slope 
down away from the city centre as the city residents, who are bidding to maximize their 
use of land, trade off land costs against the value of their commuting time, measured in 
terms of their wage rates. The shape of their respective bid rent curves means that poor 
people will tend to live in the centre of the city and rich people on the outskirts.
Inner city gentrification, of course, challenges the conclusion that such a pattern of
residential segregation by income with the poor in the centre and the rich in the outskirts
is the inevitable result of competition for urban land. However as Rose points out:
The problem with this line of critique is that to point out that the 
phenomenon of gentrification has confounded the predictions of land- 
market theorists about land values and land uses in the inner city as Smith 
(1982 page 141) does, does not amount to a critique of the theoretical 
underpinnings of land-market models.
(Rose 1984, p49 ftn 1)
Neoclassical land-market models are underpinned by the 'comparative statics' approach
to modelling economic change. Two equilibrium situations are considered, which differ
in one single characteristic, for example the presence or absence of a tax on land. One
equilibrium is called 'before' and the other 'after'. The presence in the one of the
characteristic under investigation (the tax) and its absence in the other is then held to
account for the differences between the two equilibria, and hence to account for change
over 'time' (imposing or removing the tax leads to a change from the one equilibrium to
the other - see Harcourt 1972 for a critique of this procedure). Gentrification would then
be explained by a change in the characteristics of the good to be maximized:
It is quite possible to model or predict that the inner city will be inhabited by 
wealthy people within a neoclassical framework. All that is needed is to replace a 
'space maximising' criterion with a 'free-time maximising' criterion (Harvey, 
1972). To do this it is not necessary to alter the underlying assumptions of 
consumer sovereignty and purely exogeneous changes affecting 'tastes and 
preferences'.
(Rose 1984, p49 ftn 1)
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Postindustrialism tries to account for precisely such changes in maximization criteria. 
Like neo-classical economics, it too is divided into 'before' and 'after' states: 'before' - 
industrialism, and 'after' - postindustrialism. There is the same exogenous change in 
'tastes and preferences'. 'Before', everyone wants to live in the suburbs, 'after' they all 
want to live downtown.
The consensus in the gentrification debate is that an explanation of gentrification depends 
on unifying neighbourhood lifecycle and postindustrialist approaches. In fact they 
already share a common perspective, that of neoclassical economics, and a common, 
positivist, epistemology (cf Rose, 1984 p47). Postindustrial explanations have made all 
the running in the gentrification debate subsequent to 1984. However, as might be 
imagined, the explanatory potential of both models is extremely limited: so limited in fact 
that it is surprising to see that they have continued to dominate the literature.
2.3 The debate since 1984: the rise of the postindustrialist consensus
As noted, the focus of postindustrialism is upon changes in society at large which have 
imposed gentrification upon certain neighbourhoods. The focus upon wider social 
changes as an explanation of gentrification is one to which both Marxists and 
conventional explanations of gentrification subscribe. However postindustrialism is 
often quite explicitly anti-Marxist in its intentions. The explanation of gentrification then 
becomes little more than a peg on which to hang a critique of Marxist theorizing in 
general and this critique is typically couched in terms of an advocacy of the importance of 
agency over structure.
The anti-Marxist proponents of the postindustrialist hypothesis of gentrification are led 
by David Ley who, with a number of colleagues at the University of British Columbia, 
Vancouver, Canada, established during the 1970's a school of 'humanistic geography' 
(Duncan & Ley 1982, 1983, Ley 1982, 1987b, Ley & Samuels 1978). 'Humanistic 
geography' is extremely concerned with the status of agency in social explanation, that 
human beings should be treated humanly. Ley has argued on a number of occasions 
(notably Duncan & Ley 1982, Ley 1982) that Marxism is in principle incapable of so 
treating its agents because of the ontological status of class in Marxism and the holistic 
claims this requires (Duncan & Ley 1982, p38) - what would now be described as its 
totalizing metanarrative (Connor 1989).
The postindustrialist interpretation of gentrification forms a very important part of this
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critique. Gentrification demonstrates most clearly the rise of a new middle class, both in 
the very public manner in which they consume their housing (Jager 1986, Raban 1974, 
Hamnett & P.Williams 1979 - cf. N.Smith & P.Williams 1986 p6), and also in the fact 
that, in espousing inner city locations for their pursuit of their public display of housing 
consumption, they buck the trend of up to 200 years of capitalist urbanization which has 
always associated new forms of housing consumption with new developments on the 
outskirts of a city (Hamnett 1984). This, they argue, has the gravest implications for 
Marxist social theory for three main reasons.
First, the continued existence of a middle class is fundamentally compromising for the 
status of Marxist explanation as a whole (Duncan & Ley 1982 p48). Further, the fact 
that there has been a rise of a new middle class contradicts the Marxist claim that capitalist 
society is in a process of evolution toward just two classes: capitalists and workers (Ley 
1982).
The second is that this class is defined, not in production, as Marxists would have it, but 
in consumption: as society makes the transition from industrial to postindustrial society, 
this class moves away from an concern with questions of production to those of 
consumption. Gentrifiers are, in this view, the shock troops in the shock of the new, the 
coming of postindustrial society (Mills 1988).
Third and finally, postindustrialists argue that their account of gentrification is one 
which, because of its emphasis on consumption issues, supplies a much needed 
emphasis on the role of agency in questions of social life, a role which Marxist 
explanations must inevitably disregard (Duncan & Ley 1982, Ley 1980, 1982, Hamnett 
1984 1991).
This interpretation of gentrification and its implications for the status of Marxist 
theorizing in urban analysis has been consistently challenged by N.Smith. For Smith, 
capitalism is above all a process of uneven development (N.Smith 1982, 1984). First 
World and Third World, metropolis and region, town and country, suburb and slum all 
stand in functionally connected but unevenly developed relations to one another. These 
relations are not static however, but continually evolving. Uneven development creates 
suburbs which depreciate in value as new suburbs are created (N.Smith 1979a, N.Smith 
& LeFaivre 1984). The creation of these new suburbs is itself predicated on the 
continued growth of wealth in the city, which translates into higher ground rents 
generally. Eventually a rent gap develops whereby the returns from the capitalized 
ground rent exceed the cost of redeveloping the buildings in the old suburbs (N.Smith 
1979a). Developers take advantage of this rent gap and the middle classes respond to the
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opportunities thus provided for them. In this account, gentrification is a child of 
capitalism, Marxist reasoning is still relevant and Marxist categories still apply (N.Smith 
1988).
Smith's arguments in favour of his position have evolved considerably since the first 
publication of the rent gap hypothesis (N.Smith 1979a, b, 1982, 1984, 1987a). At 
heart, however, they still depend on the non-Marxist notion of neighbourhood lifecycle, 
but seek to provide it with a Marxist motor. Consequently, the right's principal criticism 
continues to hit Smith's arguments hardest precisely at the point which he is most 
anxious to defend, namely that gentrification depends on changes in production relations 
and not on consumer taste. Hamnett (1984, 1991) accurately identifies the weakness at 
the core of Smith's arguments. If gentrification is to be explained in terms of the creation 
of a rent gap, and developers' exploitation of this, how is it that gentrification is only to 
be found in a few areas of a certain number of large cities? If uneven development is the 
characteristic feature of a globally encompassing capitalism, as Smith would argue, why 
is gentrification not occurring in more places than the few in which it actually is found? 
Smith has never provided an answer to this question to satisfy his critics on this point.
Criticisms of Smith's arguments were so cogent that the non-Smithian left felt compelled 
into recognizing their force and so developed a left version of postindustrialism. 
Ironically, this meant accepting the postindustrialist hypothesis and providing that with a 
Marxist motor.
The non-Smithian left began by arguing that Smith's problems lay in his eclecticism 
rather than in Marxism in general (Rose 1984). They argued, following A.Sayer (1982), 
that Smith's eclecticism betrayed the fact that gentrification is a chaotic concept.
Sayer defined the notion of a chaotic concept to refer to the outcome of generalizations 
about social practice. Generalization groups together phenomena with merely generic 
similarities, as in the example of 'small firms'. Theoretically informed abstraction, it is 
argued, would reveal a number of distinct types of small firm, which may have little or 
nothing in common with each other. This habit of mind, argues the non-Smithian left, 
characterizes Smith's thinking about gentrification. Gentrification is a complex of 
processes and phenomena which cannot usefully be discussed if they are all linked 
together under a unitary heading such as gentrification. Attention, they argue, should be 
concentrated on the production of gentrifiers rather than the production (or consumption) 
of gentrified housing (Beauregard 1986).
The production of gentrifiers approach has been welcomed as a point of contact between
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left and right (Hamnett 1991, Mills 1988). Since the focus is on gentrifiers, the right can 
focus on the consumption behaviour of these people, while the left can concentrate on 
their means of production; so that 'means of production of gentrifiers' can be used in the 
sense both of 'means whereby gentrifiers are produced' and 'means at the disposal of 
gentrifiers'. This claim of convergence permits the opportunity for the right both to 
isolate Smith within the Marxist camp, and to counter his criticisms of their position. 
Both Ley and Mills are quite skillful at employing Marxist arguments in support of their 
own positions. Mills (1988) for example relies considerably on R.Williams' arguments 
while at the same time managing to avoid all reference to the fact these arguments are 
addressed toward the development of Marxist reasoning (silencing "by a token inclusion" 
D.Sayer 1991 p5, cf. Chapter 6.4 below).
Smith's criticisms of the postindustrialists' arguments have accordingly been largely 
defensive (N.Smith 1987a 1987b). Ley (1987b, p468) characterizes Smith's position as 
an "adversarial patrolling of one's own territory". The postindustrial debate as it 
developed post 1984 has therefore come to form a consensus on three issues: that 
gentrification is postmodern; that the concept of gentrification is chaotic; and that attention 
should be concentrated on the production of gentrifiers. These elements are closely 
intertwined. Presentation of an effective criticism of them, however, requires 
disentangling them. Once these issues have been disposed of, we will be able to 
confront the fundamental presumption of the gentrification consensus, namely that 
gentrification represents a form of class constitution.
2.3.1 Is gentrification post-modern?
The idea that the postindustrialist explanation of gentrification is supported by arguments 
for postmodernism is particularly associated with the humanistic school of geography, 
with Vancouver, British Columbia, their favoured case study (Ley 1980, 1986, 1987a, 
Ley & Olds 1988, Mills 1988). In answering the question "is gentrification post­
modern?", I first show how their version of the original postindustrial thesis runs into 
difficulties over the status of consciousness and agency, from which they thought that 
post-modernism could rescue them. I then show what postmodernism means to the right 
in the gentrification debate. Their argument, as presently constituted does not support the 
claim that gentrification is postmodern. Nor is there any evidence from the wider debates 
to support this claim. Neither therefore can it be claimed that gentrification signifies the 
existence of a new middle class. I am not interested here in debating the basic issue of 
whether gentrification does represent a form of class constitution, still less the issue of
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whether a new middle class can be said to exist or not. Since the gentrification literature 
references these debates, they will of course have to be discussed, but in line with my 
strategy for dealing with the material, I am bracketing off these larger issues for 
discussion in Chapters 3, 4 & 5.
In his earliest account of social change in Vancouver, Ley argued that the development 
of the Vancouver economy had created a postindustrial city (Ley 1980). The transition 
had called forth a 'new middle class', which had found political expression in the liberal 
TEAM civic party. The main plank in the TEAM platform was a commitment to clean up 
(gentrify) the South side of False Creek. TEAM won power in 1976 and put these plans 
into action, thereby confirming the emergence of a new middle class in Vancouver, 
associated with the transition of the Vancouver economy to a postindustrial status. 
TEAM in fact lost control of the Vancouver City Council in 1980, and split up. Most 
TEAM members joined the conservative NPA. The NPA held power for 2 years, before 
losing control to the socialist COPE. The so-called new middle class therefore held 
power in Vancouver for only 4 years.
Ley's empirical evidence for the existence of a new middle class is weak (see also 2.3.4 
below). According to Ley (1987a, p45), the "new class" is composed of "young 
professionals", although there seems to be nothing particularly new about them as such, 
"architects, teachers, university professors and lawyers", the very occupational 
categories who were so prominent in the 'gentrification of the bourgeoisie' in the 
nineteenth century (Stedman Jones 1974, Hobsbawrn 1986). However, as "young 
professionals", the new middle class of 1970s Vancouver were also baby boomers. 
Their concentration in the ranks of TEAM seems to have been simply a matter of 
demographics rather than economics, i.e., the NPA represented the politics of an earlier 
generation, not the politics of a different class situation!. This is suggested in Ley's 
account of TEAM'S success:
Its momentum owed not a little to the spirit of the times in North America,
an era of protest and liberal social movements
(Ley 1987a, p45)
What was new about the Vancouver new middle class was that TEAM appeared, briefly.
! in British Columbia, as with many other Canadian provinces, political parties 
organized at the provincial/federal level do not organize at civic level - this means that 
contests over pohtical organization at the civic level tends to take place via the formation 
of new civic parties rather than through attempts at gaining power in a local branch of a 
party organized to pursue national and/or provincial issues also. A conservative voter in 
B.C. would, if consistent, vote NPA in civic elections. Social Credit in provincial, and 
Processive Conservative in national elections. These civic parties tend to be much more 
fissiparous than their corresponding national/provincial parties.
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to speak for them.
Despite these questionmarks over the historical evidence, Ley held, and continues to 
hold, so far as later publications are concerned, the view that TEAM were the 
representatives of a new middle class who left their mark on the postindustrial (later, post­
modern) urban landscape exhibited in the gentrification of False Creek (Ley 1986, 
1987a).
Walker and Greenberg (1982a) invited Ley to reconsider his interpretation of this history, 
pointing inter alia to Gershuny's (1978) argument that the post-industrialist thesis 
confused levels of output with levels of employment, and that social prosperity still 
continued to depend on productivity in the manufacturing sector. Ley (1982) responded 
so vigorously to this invitation that he succeeded in transforming the debate from one 
over his post-industrial thesis into one over Walker & Greenberg's Marxism. Walker & 
Greenberg's response in reply (Walker & Greenberg 1982b) consequently failed to pick 
up on the fact that Ley had only only one substantive defence to their original criticisms. 
This was his argument that post-industrialism does not make the all-inclusive claims 
which Marxists like Walker and Greenberg inevitably and erroneously imagine it to 
make, since the stock-in-trade of Marxist theorizing is the making of such all-inclusive 
claims. However, if postindustrialism is not to be understood as making the sorts of 
claims to universality as are made by Marxism, the question is immediately begged as to 
'where did the consciousness come from?' that so inspired TEAM and its new middle 
class constituency.
From the Marxist perspective, such a change in consciousness would have come from 
the changes in the forms of production associated with the transition to post-industrial 
society (could such a change be shown to have occurred). However, this option was not 
open to Ley, since postindustrialism stresses the importance of consumption over 
production. Ley could not argue either that this change was due to postindustrialism 
itself, since this would make Ley's account of the changes in Vancouver's political scene 
as totalizing as any Marxist's might be. Ley in any case had denied the relevance of 
economic evidence for assessing his non-totalizing account of social change during the 
transition to post-industrial society (Ley 1982).
Ley therefore was forced to rely on Maslow's (1954) concept of the existence of a 
hierarchy of needs, in which more refined consumption requirements only become 
apparent as wealth increases. It is not difficult to see that Maslow's argument has much 
in common with Marx's definition of subsistence, in its historical and moral component 
in particular. Accordingly, it suffers from the same deficiencies, namely that it confuses
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individual with social developments (see Chapter 5.5 below). As societies develop, new 
possibilities for production and consumption indeed open up (Pasinetti 1981), but it is 
not possible to infer from this that as individuals in any given society get richer, so their 
consumption preferences alter. Their consumption patterns may indeed change, but this 
is not the same thing as suggesting that their consumption preferences have altered (cf. 
Haddon's 1970 criticisms of Rex & Moore 1966). The shape of consumer preferences 
will only alter as the economy and society develops, not simply as it grows. However, 
as noted. Ley could not rely on this argument and at the same time claim that his 
postindustrial thesis was not all-inclusive and in this respect therefore fundamentally 
different from Marxism.
The only argument then left to Ley to explain the rise of liberal ideology in the 
postindustrial city, was therefore to infer that the post-industrial consciousness was 
always there and merely needed economic growth (rise in incomes) to help reveal its 
distinctive aspects. This strategy certainly helped him establish his claim that 
postindustrialism does not have the all-encompassing nature which, he maintained. 
Walker & Greenberg had read into his position, but only at the expense of creating 
another problem, not ever resolved by Ley.
If Ley's argument did hold, then he would then be in the same difficulties as those in 
which he regards Walker & Greenberg's as being, namely that history is sacrificed to 
theory. Ideology, Ley argued, reflects a "set of interests and values", which will be 
realized only in "distinctive historical and geographical moments" (Ley 1982 p36). This 
can only mean that those interests and values, and consequently the social circumstances 
to which they refer, are more or less constant throughout time. This itself could only be 
if there was no historical change. Ley's postindustrial account of gentrification is caught 
on the horns of this dilemma; either it is totalizing, or it denies the possibility of real 
historical change. This is of course to say nothing about the status of the argument that 
we really have moved beyond the era of industrial production into post-industrial 
consumption.
Ley's own criticisms of Walker and Greenberg may in fact be applied against his own 
position. He claims (1982 p36) to be interested in "evolving historical circumstances" 
and not "non-changing theoretical categories", unlike Walker and Greenberg. However, 
Maslow's arguments, on which Ley has to rely, are self-avowedly functionalist; and if 
any form of argument is vulnerable to the charge of commitment to unchanging 
theoretical categories and lack of interest in evolving historical circumstances, it is 
functionalism. Functionalism severely inhibits the formation of categories which can 
evolve with changing historical circumstances (Runciman 1969). All it needs is one
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example of a society which did not follow Maslow's hierarchy of taste, for Ley's 
argument to be faced with the classic functionalist dilemma: either having to define this 
society as somehow less than a society or not a society at all; or having to change our 
definition to fit this new example, in which case we would have no definition at all.
To argue against Ley and Maslow therefore is not to engage in a "knee-jerk" response: to 
argue that these authors are "acting as apologists for the status quo" (Dickens 1990 
pl77). The problem is not that these authors seek to argue that "what is in fact socially 
derived" is "natural or necessary" (Dickens, ibid.,). It is that, that "kernel of truth" or 
no, these self-avowedly functionalist explanations are tautological (Runciman 1969, cf. 
Chapter 7 below).
The advent of postmodernism helped rescue Ley from the horns of his dilemma. For this 
was a condition about which there was agreement (and disagreement) on both left and 
right. Thus for example the 'New Times' manifesto from Marxism Today (Hall & 
Jacques, 1989) explicitly linked the question of post-modernism to postindustrialism, 
and to a politics of identity realized through a politics of consumption (Hall, 1989 ppl21- 
122).
Ley (Cybriwsky, Ley & Western 1986, Ley 1987a, 1987b) therefore developed his 
original ideas to incorporate post-modernism into his thesis, but in a manner which 
preserved his original position, except that now the rise of the new middle class is 
described as part of a more general transformation, summed up as the change to post­
modern society. This thesis of a postmodern new middle class could then be coupled to 
Ley's attack on Walker and Greenberg's presumption that the postindustrialist argument 
involved the invocation of a total social change. Postmodernism's well-known aversion 
to 'totalizing practices' (Thrift 1987) was particularly appealing to the right (Harvey 
1987 makes this point). However, postmodernism was also attractive to those on the 
left, who wished to avoid the untoward associations of postindustrialism with the 'end of 
ideology' and the alleged redundancy of Marxism (Soja 1989). Once the debate took on 
this character, it was easy to overlook the fact that none of these questions addressed the 
problems of explaining gentrification.
In Ley's later writings therefore, the capture of the organs of city government allowed 
the new middle class to create a postmodern landscape in Vancouver (Ley 1986). False 
Creek South Shore was now described as such a landscape (Ley 1987a); a landscape 
which was, "the expressive landscape of liberal reform" (Ley, 1987a p44), "where the 
new class ideology would be writ large" (Cybriwsky, Ley & Western 1986, p i 13).
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However, Ley and his followers define modernism and postmodernism in very specific 
ways. Histories of modernism (Appleyard 1991, Howard 1991, Pinckney 1990, 
R.Williams 1990), include a very wide range of movements under this heading, but Ley 
reduces this tradition to a simple opposition between 'rational' modernism and 
'expressive' post-modernism (although York argues that much of what was described as 
"'rational' [in Modernist architecture] was in fact expressive", of function - 1980 p76). 
'Rational' modernism, according to Ley, is "bom of a universal logic and devoid of 
historical and cultural references". It displays "cultural agnosticism" and "an antipathy to 
historicism" (Ley 1987a, p49, p53). It is the architecture of a 'mass society' (Ley 
1987a). Modernist B.C. Place, on False Creek North Shore, the site of Expo 86, the 
Vancouver World's Fair (held in 1986), is expressive of a neo-conservative 'populist' 
ideology of mass culture.
By contrast, "central to post-modernism" is the "maintenance of continuity, of historical 
and cultural symbols" (Ley 1987a, p52). Postmodern developments in False Creek 
South Shore are marked by a concern for continuity with the past and a concern that 
historical allusions do not stray into "ersatz" and "parody" (Ley 1987a p47). (York 
1980 and Appleyard 1991 would strongly contest such views, as indeed do Ley and 
Olds 1988). The distinction between modernism and post-modernism in terms of an 
opposition between 'mass civilization' and 'minority culture' is a definition of a post­
modernism which is inherently conservative, with both a large and a small 'c' (Pinckney 
1990 p5 - see also Chapter 6 below). It is quite specific to the False Creek South Shore 
gentrification.
Just how specific can be seen from his assessment of the centrepiece of the Exposition, 
the sculpture Highway 86 . He describes this sculpture, "full of design jokes and 
parodies" (p53), in Ley (1987a) as a typical example of modernist mass culture. In Ley 
and Olds (1988) however, this designation is reversed, without any explanation or 
comment: " an essential postmodern idiom, familiar yet distant" (pl97-198). This later 
description of Highway 86, with its sense of irony and cool awareness of the ambiguities 
in the messages sent out by architectural symbols ( Blanchard 1985, cf Chapter 3 below), 
is a far cry from the description given in Ley (1987a), where
postmodern architecture ... aims to communicate intersubjective themes,
and to acknowledge local history and culture
(Ley 1987a p44)
In Ley & Olds' definition of postmodernism, the "narrow line dividing statement from 
overstatement, authenticity from ersatz and even parody" (Ley 1987a p47) is now 
completely obliterated. B.C. Place is no longer the modernist brainchild of an insensitive 
bunch of car dealers turned politicians based in the far away provincial capital of Victoria,
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B.c., but is now instead an example of postmodernist sophistication.
Such a flexible definition of post-modernism leaves Ley's "new middle class" in the 
lurch. 'Postmodernism' in Ley's hands becomes the expression, in one and the same 
artefact, of the ideologies both of liberal reformers and of their conservative opponents. 
"Ersatz and parody", which would be excesses of postmodernism in what is dubbed a 
liberal landscape on the South Shore, are characteristic of postmodernism in what is 
dubbed a 'conservative' landscape on the North. False Creek's South Shore's 
"sensuous landscape" is the "downtown skyline", "too good to be true" (Ley 1987a 
p49). On the other hand this skyline is composed of the very architectural symbols of 
Modernism, (the "megabuildings of a corporate society" - Ley 1987a p45) to which False 
Creek South Shore is, allegedly so resolutely opposed. Apparently, the lucky residents 
of this demi-Eden can have their cake and eat it. When Ley is discussing False Creek as 
an expression of a new class, post-industrial, post-modern urban landscape, his 
descriptions of False Creek South Shore do indeed celebrate the ideology he sees 
expressed there, just as Walker and Greenberg argued.
Ley's use of the terms modernism and postmodernism appear to be little more than 
convenient labels to be attached to any contrasted pair presently under discussion. 
Advertising passes for analysis. The condition of postmodemity loses all specificity and 
therefore cannot be held to account for gentrification, except in the tautological sense that 
if we do live in postmodern society, then all social and cultural activities undertaken in 
this society must by definition be postmodern.
But is society post-modern? Many would argue not (Baumann 1987, Connor 1989, 
Harvey 1989, Soja 1989, Cooke 1990, Dickens 1990, Giddens 1990, Graham 1990, 
Bondi 1991). Indeed York (1980) regarded post-modernism to have been the definitive 
early '70s  phenomenon; and finished by punk, which, he argues, was 
uncompromisingly modernist in style.
According to Appleyard, Post-Modernism, as an architectural style, declared itself 
concerned with the question of meaning, but was contingent on, and compromised by a 
property boom.
...Post-Modernism - not great architecture, but curiously exemplary of a 
short-lived phase of architectural thought.
(Appleyard, 1991, p 11)
Most theorists of the postmodern, read (and are happy to read) far too much into an 
architectural style. After all, the years of High Modernism were also the years of 
'Stockbroker Tudor' and 'By-pass Variegated', the years of the creation of suburbia
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(Oliver & al. 1981).
Many of the concerns which post-modernism claims and by which it defines itself in 
opposition to modernism, are concerns which were of great interest to the modernists 
(R.Williams 1989, Appleyard 1991, Howard 1991). Cooke (1990) quotes a use of'post­
modern' dating back over 30 years (Mills 1959). Cooke argues that
what is called 'post-modernism' is in fact a critique of 'modernism' in all 
its guises... Modernism and post-modernism are thus intertwined rather 
than irrevocably opposed.
(Cooke 1990, p331-332)
Giddens however would argue that the concept is a contradiction in terms
To speak of post-modemity as superseding modernity appears to invoke 
that very thing which is (now) declared to be impossible: giving some 
coherence to history and pinpointing our place in it.
(Giddens 1990 p47)
As noted, postmodernism has nonetheless held a certain attraction for the left. The 
analysis of 'New Times' is framed around a call for the construction of a left 'politics of 
identity', explicitly to arrest the slippage of meanings cited as the characteristic feature of 
postmodern society (Hall, 1989 ppl21). Yet as Howard (1991) and Appleyard (1991) 
suggest, these concerns over the links between capital, meaning and modem life are not 
new, but recurrent themes in twentieth century thought.
If Appleyard, Howard and York are correct, and that was what post-Modernism was, it 
is curious that it has taken social theory so long to theorize it. Massey (1990) is in no 
doubt why this is. For her, 'post-modernism', represents a solution to a crisis for 
intellectuals, shunted to one side by the Reagan-Thatcher years: the debate over post­
modernism is simply a way of "reclaiming the moment" (cf. Baumann 1987, Dickens 
1990). The characteristic 'condition of postmodernity', "space-time compression" 
(Harvey 1989), is particularly a crisis for rich whit male intellectuals "jetsetters writing 
about the jet set". The politics of consumption are only "important now that men do the 
shopping".
Both modernism and postmodernism, Massey argues, "make claims toward feminism". 
Modernism simply claims that "feminism should be on its side", female liberation is 
inherent in the modernist programme. Post-modernism, taking its cue from the pastiche 
and ambiguity of post-modern architecture, claims to celebrate diversity, to "allow other 
voices to be heard", to reject 'totalizing discourses'. In fact, its discourses are 
"dominated by white male heterosexuals" and is "fundamentally undemocratic". It 
allows other voices to be heard, but "it doesn't empower or explain variety" (see also 
Connor 1989). Bondi (1990, p i 63) has similar reservations about the claims of post­
34
modernism to provide space for feminist discourse. In fact, her doubts extend to doubts 
about postmodernism's claims to provide space for any discourse.
What postmodernism appears to do is to elide rather than deconstruct a
dichotomy between ideas and materiality.
(Bondi, 1990 pl62)
The thesis that gentrification is post-modern can therefore be rejected for three main 
reasons. There is no theoretical or evidential support for Ley's arguments for a 
postmodern consciousness which can be associated with a new, and gentrifying middle 
class. There is no evidence, from analysis of the history of Modernism and post- 
Modemism, of a change in social conditions at large. Finally, the feminist critique of 
postmodernist theory is, I believe, irrefutable. Ley's championing of postmodernism as 
the key to understanding gentrification may in retrospect be seen as the high water mark 
of postmodernism in gentrification studies.
Weak as they may be, the arguments for gentrification as postmodern have however 
maintained their currency in the gentrification debate because of their common 
philosophical basis with the 'production of gentrifiers' approach; namely a concern for 
the status of gentrifiers as active agents. This concern manifested itself in the realist 
critique of neighbourhood lifecycle with its conclusions that gentrification is a chaotic 
concept. Before turning to the production of gentrifiers approach in detail, I next look at 
these philosophical underpinnings. Again, it is important to stress, I am less concerned 
with whether the arguments for realism are sustainable in themselves, as with the use 
made of these arguments in the gentrification debate. I deal with realist claims to 
knowledge in Chapter 3.
2.5.2 Is gentrification a chaotic concept?
The argument that gentrification is a chaotic concept owes its origins to the power of 
Rose's critique of "mix'n'match" theorizing about gentrification (Rose 1984). Rose 
accepted Marxist emphases on the fundamental importance of "the production of 
commodities of gentrified dwellings" (Rose 1984 p50). Equally fundamental and 
important however, she argued, was the question of the production of the people who 
gentrified. In analyses such as N.Smith's (1979a, 1982), such questions were simply 
"added on afterwards" (op. cit. p51). "Marxist approaches to gentrification, therefore, 
now need to expand and clarify their theoretical and empirical terrain" (op.cit. p57). To 
help them in this task. Rose drew on A.Sayer's (1982) account of chaotic 
conceptualization in economic geography. Citing this article, she argued, that "the terms 
'gentrification' and 'gentrifiers', as commonly used in the literature, are 'chaotic
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conceptions' " (Rose 1984 p62). What was worse, they were also chaotic conceptions in 
"extant marxist literature" (ibid.), that is to say, in Smith's rent gap accounts of 
gentrification. Rose's article inaugurated the 'production of gentrifiers' approach of the 
non-Smithian left.
In using Sayer (1982), the advocates of the 'production of gentrifiers' approach felt that 
they could answer the criticisms of Marxist reasoning in urban analysis, as made by 
Duncan and Ley (1980 1981) and Ley (1980). The notion of chaotic conceptualization to 
which Rose staked her critique originates with Marx (1973, plOO), as Sayer himself 
pointed out. The problems that Ley & al. were criticizing were therefore not those of 
Marxism as such but of chaotic conceptualization. Sensitized to the danger of chaotic 
conceptualization, Marxist explanation could withstand such criticism. Having correctly 
identified the 'symptoms' however, I argue that Rose mistook their 'diagnosis'. 
Consequently, and by default, a theoretical closure (Pratt 1982) is in danger of becoming 
established on the basis of an unexamined development in the application of the term 
'chaotic concept'; unexamined since Sayer's later work (A.Sayer 1984, 1989, 1990) is 
never referenced in the gentrification debate.
In fact, the 1982 article was the only one of Sayer's writings which featured the notion of 
chaotic conceptualization. The article itself he admits (personal communication) was 
intended as a trailer for his 1984 book on realist methodology. The strength of his 1982 
article lay in its critique of empiricist generalization rather than its promotion of realist 
principles. Positivism led to chaotic conceptualization through empiricist generalization. 
The rational abstraction made possible by realism did not in principle suffer from those 
problems, as Sayer (forthcoming - i.e, Sayer 1984) would demonstrate. The article was 
almost too successful, however, taking on a life of its own. It is now the single most 
quoted reference in the geography literature (Whitehand 1991). Sayer has since found 
himself writing a number of (much less widely cited) articles (1989 1990), attempting to 
correct the inferences which he feels have been falsely drawn from his 1984 book, but 
which I suspect have been falsely drawn from his 1982 article; his book not having been 
read, or if read, read only through the perspective supplied by the 1982 article.
Consequently, the term 'chaotic conception' as introduced into gentrification studies by 
Rose (1984) by way of Sayer (1982) has itself developed a life of its own. Certainly, no- 
one in the gentrification literature who has used the term 'chaotic conception' has ever 
referenced anything other than Sayer (1982) as their authority for making this assertion. 
Beauregard (1986) quotes Rose (1984) and Sayer (1982) as the basis for his view that 
gentrification should be regarded as chaotic. Hamnett and Randolph (1986 pl21) quote 
Beauregard (1986) and Mills quotes Hamnett (1984), Beauregard and Rose as evidence
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o f  the consensus which exists on this topic
Rose argued, correctly according to the lights of Sayer's article, that chaotic conceptions
arose because "they internally combine 'necessary tendencies' with 'contingent
conditions' (for example the law of value combined with a particular housing stock at a
particular time)" (Rose, 1984, p62). In addition however, she took this to mean that
chaotic conceptualizations
obscure the fact that a multiplicity of processes, rather than a single causal 
process, produce changes in the occupation of inner-city neighbourhoods 
from lower to higher income residents.
(Rose, 1984, p62)
This illustration of the effects of chaotic conceptualization came to stand for the process 
itself, so that by the time Beauregard (1986) described gentrification as a chaotic concept, 
the principal criterion he used to justify such a claim was the complexity of gentrification, 
and not the circumstances under which its identification as an object of study took place. 
Furthermore, Rose went on to argue that, as chaotic conceptualizations, "the concepts 
'gentrification' and 'gentrifiers' need to be disaggregated" (ibid.). This came to mean 
that a multiplicity of gentrification-like phenomena existed, which chaotic 
conceptualization wrongly grouped together under the one heading:
"Gentrification" has, of course, been criticised as a "chaotic concept"
(Rose 1982, Hamnett 1984, Beauregard 1986), which aggregates a variety 
of contingently related processes under one unitary category according to 
commonsense definitions of the real object.
(Mills, 1988, pl78)
The clear implication then is that since the term 'gentrification' is a chaotic concept, there
is no such thing as gentrification in reality. However, as Warde so rightly points out,
The danger with nominating something as a chaotic conception is the 
tendency to imagine then that the phenomenon identified does not exist, 
whereas the real point is that our thinking about it is confused.
(Warde 1991, p223)
It is this tendency to imagine that gentrification does not exist which has inspired the rise 
of the production of gentrifiers approach. Use of the term 'chaotic conception', in this 
context, is danger of becoming little more than an epithet however, a means of ending 
discussion, not advancing analysis.
The confusion arises because the problem in gentrification studies is not 'chaotic
conception' but 'base-superstructure'. Rose argued that previous Marxist work on
gentrification studies had tended to replicate non-Marxist work, rather than
reconceptualizing the points at issue:
Fundamental economic processes are in this view to be theorised in 
traditional marxist terms. Everything else, and especially 'social 




As R.Williams (1977) shows, these problems aie characteristic of the use of the base- 
superstructure metaphor. Rose's critique of 'chaotic conceptions' in gentrification 
studies should therefore be interpreted as an implicit critique of 'base-superstructure' 
modes of thought in gentrification studies. I now turn to a discussion of this issue in 
Rose's article and N.Smith's commentary on it.
Rose’s complaint with Marxist analysis was its claim to universality, to be "the 
fundamental starting point for theoretical and empirical work on all aspects of 
gentrification..." (Rose, 1984, p50 emphasis in original). Rose goes on to argue in 
effect that, if Marxism is making such claims, it ought to recognize the wider changes in 
the reproduction of labour power which have been responsible for the production of 
gentrifiers (Rose 1984, p53). Lack of such recognition, she argued
produces a type of analysis which... prevents us from asking questions 
about the significance of changes in reproduction that 'gentrifiers' 
themselves are bringing about, although not necessarily under conditions 
of their own choosing.
(Rose 1984 p54, emphasis added)
In essence Rose appeared to be arguing for a recognition of the fact that gentrifiers 
gentrify because they can. No sooner was this point made however, than social change at 
large (postindustrialism), was brought in to explain the appearance of this new social 
group:
Marx's own analysis appeared to equate the reproduction of labour power 
with the individual consumption by the working class. This seems 
legitimate enough for the period of early factory capitalism, about which 
Marx was writing, when it was primarily unskilled workers which had to 
be reproduced, capable of work and forced to sell their labour for a wage. 
However, in the present-day context of advanced capitalism, the form  of 
consumption is no longer irrelevant to the reproduction of labour power.
The forms consumption take become key parts of the contingencies of 
social reproduction. This means that the actual work involved in 
reproducing people and their labour power, outside the commodity form, 
does 'make a difference'.
(Rose, 1984, p55)
In an ironic echo of the right's argument therefore, there was no agency then, but there is
now, and gentrification demonstrates this. Rose argues that, in Marxist theorizing about
gentrification (cf. Ley 1987b):
Gentrification appears as the only possib le  end sta te  for ... 
neighbourhoods, because of the immutable operation of the law of value in 
such built environments in the present phase of capitalism.
(Rose 1984, p53)
However her own argument falls into the same trap. By concentrating on the fraction of
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the middle class who gentrify, Rose's approach tends to define gentrifiers as people who 
gentrify because they must, not because they can: they have after all been produced as 
gentrifiers.
When Rose criticized the neglect of the "significance of changes in reproduction", she
used as an example, "marginal gentrifiers", who
may be able to work together to develop housing alternatives that would 
provide them with the same 'ontological security' (Saunders 1982) as 
homeownership [e.g., "nonprofit rental housing co-operatives"]
(Rose 1984 , p65 & ftn 14 ibid.)
N.Smith (1987a) argued that to come up with this notion of a "marginal gentrifier". Rose 
was forcing on 'chaos' and 'chaotic conceptions' meanings which they did not ordinarily 
possess. To take such a line however overlooks the fact that, in effect. Rose was 
arguing for the importance of the home as an alternative base for the foundations of the 
superstructure. For Rose 'widening the terrain' meant simply that the concept of the base 
should include housing consumption as well as production. Her strategy for overcoming 
the problems of base-superstructure is therefore only marginally different to that of 
postindustrialists, such as Ley, (and Saunders & P.Williams, discussed in Chapter 3). 
Neither strategy however addresses the real issue, which is how to overcome the 
limitations of base-superstructure modes of thought.
I agree with Rose's criticisms of Smith's arguments, therefore, but disagree with the 
conclusion she draws from these. The development of theory is not the same as the 
development of history. The 'form of consumption' has always been relevant to the 
reproduction of labour power. As Mills (1988) says, for a commodity to sell, "it must 
have use-value; and that use-value must be 'imaginable' - it must have cultural meaning". 
For Rose to try to set up this opposition between consumption as such and the/<9rm of 
that consumption would indicate that she still has not integrated the 'economic' and the 
'social', despite her intentions to the contrary. Rose begins her article by criticizing the 
way in which Marxist accounts have simply taken over organic or neoclassical arguments 
of neighbourhood lifecycle (Rose 1984, p47). However, having begun by criticizing the 
conceptualization of the gentrification 'base', neighbourhood lifecycle. Rose only 
switches the argument into the 'superstructure' of postindustrialism. Lack of attention to 
the problems of base-superstructure fatally compromises the production of gentrifiers 
approach.
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2.3.3 The production o f gentrifiers: a new way forward fo r  the non-Smithian left or a 
dead end?
Rose (1984) described Smith’s eclecticism as a mix'n'match approach to gentrification, 
since, she argued, his strategy was to accept non-Marxist categorizations of the 
gentrification process, and then seek to match them to Marxist accounts of economic 
development process. I would argue however that the non-Smithian left's production of 
gentrifiers approach is just as eclectic as Smith's. It accepts the right's assessment of the 
issues at stake in the gentrification debate, but seeks to give a 'Marxist' account of these.
Rose's criticism of neighbourhood lifecycle concepts in gentrification studies ended by 
asking
whether marxist theorising about gentrification should be limited to the 
specification of preconditions for the production of gentrified dwellings, 
without considering the production of the 'gentrifiers', the occupants of 
these dwellings.
(Rose 1984, p51)
Rose began her considerations by noting that
The social and the spatial restructuring of labour processes are shaping and 
reshaping the ways that people and labour power are reproduced in cities.
(Rose, 1984, p55)
She interpreted this general process as implying the creation of a class of gentrifiers, 
derived from the nature of downtown office work, in short, postindustrialism. Relating 
residential locational requirements to changes in the nature of office work processes, she 
argued, is a useful form of analysis. However, it does not go far enough, since 
questions of the reproduction of labour power cannot be confined to the workplace. Nor 
however are they reducible to consumption practices, as the postindustrialists would 
suggest "The crucial point here is that 'gentrifiers' are not the mere bearers o f a process 
determined independently o f them." (1984 p56 - emphasis in original), that is, gentrifiers 
gentrify because they can, not because they have to. However, having made these useful 
points. Rose then relied on realist principles to find a way forward:
Their constitution, as certain types o f workers and as people, is as crucial 
an element in the production of gentrification as is the production of the 
dwellings they occupy. They may or may not make the process happen in 
particular contingent situations.
(Rose 1984, p56 emphasis added)
The production of gentrifiers, in other words, involves the production of certain types of 
people with certain causal powers, which may or may not combine with particular 
contingently related situations to produce gentrified housing. However we never get to
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know what the character of these contingencies might be. Consequently the problems 
facing gentrifiers appear to be the same as for any immigrant to the city (Rose 1984 p63). 
In Chapter 6 , 1 shall argue that this problem is in fact the key to understanding how 
gentrification is a condition of modem life. However, to understand this means looking 
at gentrification in the context of modern life, not examining the characteristics of 
gentrifiers as though they were some kind of Other, by which modem life can be 
defined. Because it concentrates on the internal characteristics of gentrifiers as a group, 
who are already and otherwise known (cf. Chapter 2.1 above), the 'production of 
gentrifiers' approach begins from the wrong point. Gentrifiers as a social group are 
specified only through the fact that they gentrify; and who have, if not specific but 
unexplained causal powers, then certainly specific and equally unexplained demands, 
consumer preferences which are 'revealed' through gentrification. Despite its self- 
proclaimed concem with agency, gentrifiers must inevitably be portrayed in this approach 
as gentrifying because they have to, rather than because they can.
This point can be borne out by comparing two versions of the 'production of gentrifiers' 
approach, Beauregard (1986) on the left, and Mills (1988) on the right. Beauregard 
argues that three questions need to be answered to explain gentrification. First, how did 
potential gentrifiers come about? Second, what created potentially gentrifiable housing? 
Third, what caused the prior displacement of the gentrified?
Although gentrification is supposedly a chaotic process, the "characteristics of 
gentrifiers" remain "remarkably similar across specific instances of gentrification". 
Among these characteristics are situation "within the urban, professional managerial 
fraction of labor", delayed marriage and childrearing, and the adoption of styles of 
conspicuous consumption. Postponement of marriage and childrearing decisions owing 
to career responsibilities "facilitates this consumption, but also makes it necessary if 
people are to meet others and develop friendships" in "a lifetime of fluid personal 
relationships" (Beauregard, 1986 p44). If however relationships are indeed fluid over a 
lifetime, why would only certain areas of the city have drawing power? Beauregard 
recognizes that none of the desires and needs which he attributes to potential gentrifiers 
necessarily imply the selection "of an urban location over a suburban one" (Beauregard 
1986 p46), and he never provides a satisfactory answer to the questions he himself raises 
of
why a fraction of this group elects to remain in the city rather than follow
the trend of suburban out-migration... [and]...
why only certain inner-city areas with inexpensive housing opportunities
occupied by the powerless become gentrified.
(Beauregard 1986, p46, p50)
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The considerations which Beauregard lists as motivating gentrifiers would appeal to 
anyone looking for accommodation: "near central business districts... with amenities... 
architecturally interesting... inexpensive" (p46/47) - who would say no? Not that it is 
likely that such accommodation could ever be found - the list of site characteristics of 
places suitable for gentrification are so appealing, "access to a waterfront... hilltop 
location... spectacular view", that it would be a wonder such prime sites were ever 
overlooked in the first place (ibid).
It is worth comparing Beauregard's description of the characteristics of sites and housing
stock suitable for gentrification, with the following quotation from Raban on the history
of gentrification in Islington:
Enervated Georgian architecture suddenly becomes beautiful, after every 
architectural writer since their erection has glossed over them with a yawn. 
(Pevsner, writing about Islington in the London volume of the Penguin 
Buildings o f England sounds positively antediluvian today; he is bored by 
the most lovely and desirable squares in the whole city...)
(Raban 1973 p86)
There is no explanation offered in Beauregard's article as to what causes such switches in 
architectural fashion, so that previously disregarded housing suddenly becomes 
"interesting" . to particular fractions of the labour force. Ironically, therefore, 
Beauregard's theorising is exactly that kind of 'mix-n-match' analysis that Rose 
complained of. Beauregard has to rely on a threadbare psychologism to explain his 
gentrifiers' behaviour. The behaviour of potential gentrifiers is explained, not by 
reference to agency, as claimed, but to 'needs', 'desires' and 'inclinations', simply 
thrown into the account with no explanation of their theoretical or empirical status. As 
Warde comments " It is hard to be satisfied with such eclectism" (1991 p225). 
Furthermore, in Beauregard's account, psychological explanations become functionally 
necessary for the explanation of gentrification. Because gentrified houses have no net 
curtains in the windows, for example, they are functional to the desire for that public 
display of wealth characteristic of gentrifiers. But conspicuous consumption is not 
simply an aspiration of the better-off, as the example of Harry Enfield's famous comic 
character "Loadsamoney!" so aptly demonstrates (Mort 1989, pl61).
The central problem in the production of gentrifiers approach is the relation of 
'gentrifiers' (as a distinct group) whose production can be theorised, to 'gentrification' 
(as a chaotic concept) whose production cannot. Beauregard's strategy for dealing with 
this problem is to define each component of the gentrification "scenario" separately, and 
then bring them together in the final act. In fact, for the production of gentrifiers, he 
cannot do this, having to define them in the context of a sequence of gentrification, not of 
production of gentrifiers. His scenario has yuppies, as it were hanging round street
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corners and then local bars, and because of this behaviour precipitating a property market 
explosion, in which, because of the rising prices, they finally settle down and buy 
houses in the neighbourhood and become gentrifiers proper. Beauregard begins his 
account with an expressed concem for agency, but because he begins from the existence 
of gentrification as an accomplished fact, his account immediately denies agency any role 
to play in the process.
Gentrifiers have "peculiar housing needs", including the need for status and conspicuous 
consumption, which result in "the demand for a specific type of housing in a specific 
type of area" (p46/47). Rose (1984) made similar arguments. The concem for agency is 
little more than a cover for the fact that the reasons advanced as to why gentrifiers miist 
gentrify are so vague. They could cover almost any housing situation, or any 
consumption decision generally. This results from what appears to be the misconceived 
attempt to define agents outside of a process, the attempt to separate the essence of 
consumption from the specific form of that consumption; misconceived because of the 
error in imagining that because gentrification is a chaotic concept (which I would dispute 
anyway), which cannot therefore be defined, and which does not therefore exist. Trying 
to define 'gentrifiers' without defining 'gentrification', however is rather like trying to 
define a football player without defining football: outside of its context, the definition 
loses its point.
Rose starts with a "loose" definition of gentrifiers, never subsequently 'tightened up'. 
Nonetheless, although she allows a wider range of incomes and places in the labour 
market into her definition than others would allow (N.Smith 1987a), she does define 
what a gentrifier is for her purposes. Beauregard's initial definition of gentrifier appears 
to be quite a lot tighter, referring to an apparently coherent group of people. On the 
basis of his definition however, this group cannot in fact be differentiated from non- 
gentrifiers; there is in fact no definition, other than the evidence that these people have 
gentrified, or occupied previously gentrified housing. For Beauregard, this group of 
people are only "potential gentry" until they gentrify. Gentrifiers are social atoms with a 
couple of electrons missing from their 'housing' ring, which makes them highly reactive 
with gentrifiable housing. The 'production of gentrifiers' approach is dependent on 
giving its agents mysterious causal powers, which react with no less mysteriously 
contingent events to cause gentrification. However, it would be wrong to conclude that 
the problem lies with the idiosyncratic version of realism espoused by Beauregard et al. 
Rather it lies in the unwonted separation of all the elements in the gentrification scenario, 
in the liberal, rather than cultural materialist approach.
For Mills (1988), as for the liberal camp generally (cf. Ley 1986), there is subtle but
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significant change of emphasis. Postmodernism is here explicitly linked to 
postindustrialism, and the rise of a ’new class' (Mills, 1988, pl83). Mills makes it clear 
that this New Class is a new middle class (ibid.), and that gentrification is its identifying 
mark (Mills, 1986, p i86). In this perspective, the 'production of gentrifiers' approach is 
argued to have "developed out of a reaction against the Marxist work represented by 
Smith's rent-gap analysis" (Mills 1988 pl78 emphasis added). Whereas Rose saw the 
production of gentrifiers approach as a supplement to Marxist analysis, therefore, they 
suggest that it is an alternative, necessary because Marxist theory cannot cope with the 
existence of a middle class, and the transition to post-industrial society. Consequently, 
Smith's revised account (N.Smith 1987a), gentrification as an example of product 
differentiation, "still requires an active subject, a sociology and an anthropology of 
gentrification" (Mills 1988 pl79). An approach "which focuses on the 'production of 
gentrifiers' is an initial step in that direction." (ibid).
Rose argued that to look at changes in consumption practices in this manner was just as 
deficient a procedure as to concentrate on changes in production relations ("the mere 
bearers of a process determined independently of them" - 1984 p56). By arguing that the 
production of gentrifiers approach is a reaction to Smith's Marxist approach, the 
humanistic version of 'the production of gentrifiers' approach is situated firmly in the 
superstructure. Thus Mills argues: "as postmodern architecture is typified by its social 
ambiguity, so too are its New Class champions" (1988, pl85 emphasis added). Mills 
also urges that "the consumption style of gentrifiers [be treated] seriously as a reflection 
of cultural practice" (1988, p i 82, emphasis added). These uses of these subsidiary 
metaphors of typification and reflection (Chapter 2.1 above) are not just verbal slips. In 
Mills' article, R.Williams' discussions of hegemony are referenced many times without it 
ever being mentioned that for Williams, hegemony is always to be understood as a 
process of class domination (R.Williams 1977). It invests class relations in cultural 
forms. It is Williams' most powerful integrating concept, which enables the 
transcendence of base-superstructure metaphors altogether (Chapter 10 below). Instead, 
in Mills' hands, it is always referred to as "cultural" hegemony, as if style were all that 
mattered in questions of hegemony.
By failing to acknowledge the class connotations in Williams' use of hegemony, 
however. Mills' humanistic 'production of geographers' approach fails to escape the base- 
superstructure metaphor. In her account, economic change leads to social change and a 
new middle class which gentrifies. Housing production (for Rose, the necessary but 
not sufficient component of the 'base'), only features as a subject of architectural design 
and advertising copy and is analyzed only as 'postmodernist' symbol. The failure in 
Mills article seriously to consider economic issues, in particular the question of housing
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production, probably accounts for the tone of surprise in observations such as
In the present economic climate the motive of profitable investment 
becomes increasingly apparent in discourse on urban change. Investment 
potential is clearly a consideration both for 'producers' and some 
'consumers'... Explains one architect:
"They're marketing the units as a commodity... these days"
(ibid. - emphasis in original)
It is otherwise hard to believe that the proposition that housing is produced as a 
commodity in capitalist societies would appear as worthy of comment in an article 
published in 1988.
Postindustrialism, although it refers to a 'post-industrial' economic base, is not really 
interested in economic questions per se. In postindustrialism, as Mills' article shows, 
gentrification is a reflection or a typification of changes in the base. This 'base' is never 
very clearly specified. As noted above (2.3.1), Ley (1987b p286) calls 
postindustrialism a "widely used concept" and criticizes Smith (1987b) for raising a "red 
herring" even for asking from Ley for a description of what post-industrial society looks 
like. This is not simply an evasion on Ley's part. The question of the base really does not 
matter too much in the hall of mirrors that constitutes the superstructure. It is the idea of 
gentrification as evidence of change, of 'new (and post-Marxist) times' that interests 
postindustrialism.
N.Smith (1987a) in a wide-ranging and important response to his critics, both left and 
right, argued that there was no statistical evidence for the rise of a new class (the US 
Census and Conference Board report similar findings - International Herald Tribune 
May 26 1989 pl2). Smith implied that such evidence could never be found, but this was 
of only secondary imporatnce. According to Smith, there is no necessity for demand 
oriented explanations of gentrification at all. Even if "demand structures have changed" it 
does not "explain why these changed demands have led to a spatial reemphasis on the 
central and inner city (N.Smith, 1987, pl64). Smith's answer was to couple his rent gap 
analysis to the regulationist approach of Aglietta and others (Hamnett 1991) to provide an 
account of gentrification as a capitalist strategy of product differentiation. This strategy 
provides him with the anthropology Mills argued his account lacked. However, as 
Hamnett argues, it also allowed Smith to avoid confronting his "heart of darkness: 
locational preferences, lifestyles and consumption" (Hamnett 1991 p i 85).
Smith's criticisms of the right's treatement of demand issues are valid, but he is wrong 
thus to attempt to avoid the question of where middle class demand comes from. The 
problem is not, as Smith suspects, that concem for demand issues means conceding that
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a neoclassical theory of consumer sovereignty has any role to play in the explanation of 
gentrification, which from Smith's point of view would mean conceding that neoclassical 
explanations have a role to play in Marxist analysis. In fact, a concem for demand issues 
does not mean necessarily conceding anything to neoclassical economics at all. 
Neoclassical economics has in fact very little to say on how demands are formed and 
how demand is translated into purchases (Hollis 1981). The inadequacies of the right's 
consumer sovereignty oriented treatment of demand issues in gentrification studies mean 
that they too deny any role to agency in their explanations of gentrification. Instead of 
framing demand issues in terms of demand for accommodation in general, but only for 
gentrified property in particular (and therefore in terms of the characteristics of those who 
would consume it - Chapter 3 below). Accounts of demand in gentrification studies 
become circular: they succumb to a sort of commodity fetishism (Marx 1967, Chi.4), in 
which the property itself appears mysteriously endowed with causal powers. Gentrifiers 
have "peculiar housing needs", including the need for status and conspicuous 
consumption, which result in "the demand for a specific type of housing in a specific 
type of area" (Beauregard 1986 p46/47).
In this respect, the definitions arising out of the 'production of gentrifiers' approach are 
very similar to those of Rex and Moore's 'housing classes' (Rex & Moore 1966). Their 
concept of 'housing class' was criticised because it regarded current housing situation as 
though it were an achieved final housing situation (Haddon 1973), i.e., these housing 
classes were taxonomic groupings rather than substantive collectives (Barlow & Duncan
1988). In the 'production of gentrifiers' approach, 'gentrifying' is specified as a 
particular/orm of consumption; in other words, as a state of existence rather than as a 
process (N.Smith, 1987, pl60).
The 'can do otherwise-ness' of agency is lost in this approach, since the research goal by 
definition then becomes the discovery of why gentrifiers have to gentrify, not how they 
can. Consequently, they also appear in the analysis endowed a priori with powers not 
given to others. The 'production of gentrifiers' approach relies on 'structure', despite its 
apparent concem with agents because its argument mistakes Sayer's definition of 
causality as necessity. Gentrifiers have causal powers, and so, the 'production of 
gentrifiers' approach implies, they must gentrify. Rose complained that in mix'n'match 
theorizing, gentrification appeared as "the only possible end state" for neighbourhoods. 
Ironically, the solution she proposes, begins with that end state. Everything after that 
becomes a rationalization of why the gentrifiers are where they are.
There is in the production of gentrifiers approach a basic functionalism, one which is 
common to the entire gentrification debate, in that what is being argued is that the
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evidence of gentrification signifies the needs of gentrifiers to gentrify. The 'production 
of gentrifiers' consequently fails to come to terms with the question of agency. It has 
failed to breach the confines of the base-superstructure metaphor. The gentrified 
property is treated in this perspective as a simple 'expression' of the gentrification 
process, gentrification as an example of the rise to importance of the form of 
consumption over consumption itself (Boys 1989 makes a similar criticism in the context 
of the analysis of nineteenth century housing production). This 'consumptionist' 
approach fails to overcome the limitations placed on analysis by the 'base-superstructure' 
metaphor, since it does not recognize its self-imposed limits on the discussion of agency.
This is not to say that there have not been attempts to address the question of agency in 
gentrification analyses. This is the whole point of the 'production of gentrifiers' 
approach. However, none of those using this approach appear to have really considered 
what introducing the question of agency might mean for their conceptual frameworks. 
What we get from them seems to be a reinstating of the old behavioural 'imperfect 
optimizing' or 'satisficing' models of economic behaviour in which otherwise 
determinate outcomes were given fuzzy edges. However, the 'black boxes' of statistical 
indeterminacy were inadequate explanations of motivated behaviour, but simply 
attempted to replicate outcomes rather than model processes. In addition, they were also 
very precisely located, so that all they did was try to act as a cover for the inadequacies of 
the assumptions of the original, optimizing procedures. The attempts to justify the 
current conceptions of agency in the functionalist working back from outcomes to 
explanations using similar 'psychological' or 'cultural' black boxes as covers for lack of 
a better theoretical framework is a precise parallel of the behavioural economics 
approach.
Neither has there been any real examination of the relation between the processes 
presently relegated in gentrification studies to 'psychological' and 'cultural' explanations, 
and the processes conventionally regarded in liberal materialism as the important 
explanatory variables: the material production and reproduction of social life (see 
Chapters 3 & 10 below). In this respect therefore, the present state of gentrification 
analyses is not very far advanced along the road toward providing explanations of the 
phenomenon they seek to study. Only once these relations have properly been made can 
one examine how the interaction of consciousness, class or status situation, and the 
opportunities and constraints posed by the housing market in its present stage of 
historical development interact together to create gentrification.
47
2.4 Conclusion: Inevitability, history and agency in postindustrialism  
and neighbourhood lifecycle
The confusion that has arisen in the production of gentrifiers approach has been to 
confuse questions of 'base-superstructure' with those of 'chaotic conception'. The real 
problem, as Rose herself states, is not that the terms 'gentrification' and 'gentrifiers' are 
in themselves chaotic, but that these terms obscure 'chaotic conceptions’ of the 
underlying processes involved (cf. Warde 1991), conceptions such as, say, 
neighbourhood lifecycle or postindustrialism. The debate on gentrification to date can 
then be interpreted as one over the best place to locate gentrification, with 
postindustrialism placing gentrification in the superstructure and neighbourhood lifecycle 
placing gentrification in the base.
It is for this reason that Hamnett's query continues to haunt the gentrification debate, 
namely, why do some areas in some inner cities become gentrified and others do not? If 
neighbourhood lifecycle is the dominant paradigm in urban theory, why are not all 
neighbourhoods which have been constructed at a similar time, and which must therefore 
be at a roughly similar distance from the city, at the same stage of the urban lifecycle? 
Similarly, if we do now live in post-industrial society with the all wider social changes it 
invokes, it has to be asked why are all inner city properties not gentrified, instead of only 
some? Who has postindustrialism been for?
This tendency to 'overexplanation' demonstrates the difficulties these explanatory devices 
have with the question of agency. The reasons posited for the existence of gentrification 
in one part of the city cannot reasonably be claimed not to exist in other similar parts. 
Agency once again is seen to be no more than the 'unexplained variance' in the model. It 
is here that the post-structuralist argument for treating theory as the positing of a system 
of differences rather than universals is strongest (Chapter 5 below).
The argument that gentrification should be seen in the context of wider social changes is 
of course undeniable, so also is the argument that it should be seen in the context of the 
previous history of the neighbourhoods in which it occurs. Consideration of how 
gentrification is theorised must inevitably be predicated on theories of wider social 
change, but change obviously takes place over time, and through people altering the 
conditions in which they find themselves. However, studies of the gentrification process 
have tended to rely on one of two explanatory devices: the one a model of an historical 
sequence, which loses its historical character by being presented in a cyclical, inevitable 
form; the other a hypothesis of social change which in fact contains no historical process 
at all. Consequently, therefore, there is no real sense of historical time in these
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explanations, thus no real sense of historical change.
The Burgess derived neighbourhood lifecycle explanation employs a concept of 'cyclical 
time': stage 1 is followed by stage 2 and so on, but eventually stage 1 returns once more. 
Postindustrialism employs 'epochal' time, history divided into a simple 'before' and an 
'after', with the split depending on an idealist definition of the significant 'moment' and 
disregards questions of development before or after (Williams, 1977). It shares this 
outlook with the neoclassical economic orientation of Alonso. In both cases, the 
gentrified properties' previous history is not considered.
Given the lack of a truly historical perspective, it is hardly surprising that in both lifecycle 
and postindustrial accounts, the role of agency is minimal compared to structure. Agency 
is the process by which both agents and structures are produced and reproduced in 
historical time. The inevitability and predictability of gentrification in both types of 
account makes agency redundant as an explanatory variable in gentrification studies. 
Although the postindustrial thesis posits a new middle class whose emergence/existence 
is evidenced in the gentrification process, the emergence of this new class seems from 
examination of this literature to have been a peculiarly painless process. The only 
suggestion that gentrifiers might face difficulties comes in Rose's discussion of 'marginal 
gentrifiers' (Rose 1984). Even that could be subsumed under the general heading of 
difficulties faced by first time buyers, a literature which in this context goes back to 
Barbolet (1969). There are no struggles recorded in this academic literature, either over 
gentrifiable housing, directly, or over other issues which find expression in the market 
for gentrifiable housing; certainly not as compared with the struggles recorded for 
example by Pitt (1977) or Power (1973) over gentrification in Islington.
It is 'base-superstructure' which is responsible for these failings. Although the humanist 
right claims to be giving an account of gentrification which privileges agency above 
structure, as does the non-Smithian left, their accounts are in fact as heavily structuralist 
as those they mean to criticize. Consequently the grounds for claiming a consensus in 
the approach to gentrification are spurious. There is no meshing of structure and agency 
in this consensus. Instead, all we have is a compendium of different structuralist 
explanations which are all equally unacceptable. On all sides, there is the presumption 
that the question of agency has been addressed when, as I shall show in the next chapter, 
any possibility of the ability to do otherwise has in fact been completely ruled out of the 
picture.
Nonetheless, base-superstructure, along with functionalism and essentialism is only 
symptomatic of a deeper problem in gentrification studies. Why is it that the
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gentrification debate persists in this line of approach? I have suggested that the reason is
the fundamental insistence, on all sides, that gentrification represents a form of class
constitution. The only difference between left and right on this issue is the origins of this
class, and its implications for the status of Marxist theory. On the right, it reflects
changes in the economic base, and signals the end, or at least irrelevance of this theory,
on the left, the class is constituted via the process of gentrification itself. This
assumption has to the best of my knowledge only previously been questioned by
Caulfield (1989) who asks of both N.Smith and P.Williams, why does class constitution
take the form of gentrification?
Why don't resettlers accomplish these purposes in architecturally modernist 
structures built where the old neighborhoods are razed - why, instead, are 
these neighbourhoods gentrified? Or, why bother to settle in cities at all - 
why isn't class status constituted in some variant of the suburb? ... how 
do an affection for 'diversity', the past, and certain architectural styles 
come into the picture?
(Caulfield 1988 p621)
Caulfield's answer however takes for granted that the questions he asks of N.Smith and 
P.Williams can be answered once answers to the subsidiary questions he poses are 
found. In other words, he too subscribes to the idea that gentrification is a form of class 
constitution. It is however possible to interpret gentrification in another way, as 
constituting identity rather than class.
When one searches the literature for evidence of interest in this idea, one finds that, time
and again, the issue is raised, but dismissed, or at best treated as a cursory afterthought,
and treated badly. Beauregard for example writes that the fact that
there is a status to be gained from "home" or "apartment" ownership and a 
potential for high capital gains and tax benefits, not to mention the 
opportunity to express one's affluence and "taste" in physical 
surroundings, also contributes to the probability of gentrification as a 
solution to these problems.
(Beauregard 1986 p45)
None of the issues which might be raised when invoking concepts of "status", 
"potential" and "opportunity " in the explanation of social processes in capitalist society 
are problematized in Beauregard's account of gentrification however. It is simply taken 
for granted that these effects exist and may aid the gentrification process, but not that they 
might be in any way essential to it. They simply help guide the (produced) gentrifier to 
the gentrification solution.
Smith's concession to demand side explanations of gentrification also touches on the
question of identity and status
It is this question of cultural differentiation in a mass market which is most 
relevant to gentrification. Gentrification is a redifferentiation of the
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cultural, social and economic landscape, and to that extent, one can see in 
the very patterns of consumption clear attempts at social differentiation.
(N.Smith 1987a pl68)
Gentrification, on this account, is used as a means of social differentiation. But, 
crucially, that social differentiation is immediately reduced to class constitution. 
Gentrification, then is more than simply a mode of consumption of housing: it 
engenders'" that mode of consumption (ibid. emphasis added)
This argument is not so different from the 'production of gentrifiers' approach he is 
criticizing. In both cases, gentrifiers' demand is treated in terms of demand for gentrified 
property, a pregiven reconciliation of the causes with the effects. For Smith, these 
properties are produced by the rent gap, so in effect, he doesn't have to worry about 
demand issues at all ("It is not where this demand comes from that the question of 
gentrification turns on, but where it is expressed that matters" N.Smith 1987a p i69). 
For the production of gentrifiers approach, there is some non-observable object with real 
effects out there, directing the gentrifiers' footsteps in the direction of "architecturally 
interesting housing" (Beauregard 1986 p53).
In both cases, what is being argued is that there is an unexplained, and (given the 
theoretical framework) probably unexplainable divergence of taste and preference 
between the middle classes and the working classes. Smith indeed prefers to think of 
these classes as "fuzzy sets" (1987a p i62). The treatment of demand issues in the 
gentrification debate can therefore be expressed in the following way: the purchase of 
commodities is the means whereby different groups distinguish themselves from each 
other, thus the demand for gentrified property.
This argument may seem to be exactly like the one I am suggesting is missing from the 
literature, but there is this crucial difference: Smith's reduction of this 'demand to be 
different' to issues of class constitution implies that these people already know who they 
are on the basis of their class position, and that gentrification simply confirms their 
status, as members of a particular class ("the means employed by new middle class 
individuals to distinguish themselves from the stuffed-shirt bourgeoisie above and the 
working class below" - 1987a pl68). In his 'product differentiation' explanation of the 
origins of the demand for gentrification. Smith's argument reduces demand issues to a 
reflex, and thus depends on psychologism, on the gentrifiers' (definitive) need to exhibit 
their difference.
The 'humanistic' variety of the 'production of gentrifiers' approach fares little better. 
Ironically, as blue jeans turned into a new conformity, so does the
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landscape distinctiveness of the gentrified neighbourhood.
The 'discovery' of ever-ncw scarce commodities which can act as vehicles 
for status remains barely one step ahead of the mass market [jzc].
(Mills, 1988, p i 86)
In suburbia this is known as "keeping up with the Jones's", but, in the 'production of 
gentrifiers' approach, on this account of demand and agency, there seems to hang a 
whole theory of gentrification. In fact the convergence between Smith and his critics is 
so close at this point that, as noted above. Mills (1988) takes over his product 
differentiation argument, seeking to give it an anthropology. As Bondi puts it, the "new 
urban middle class" (op.cit.) involved in gentrification seeks to differentiate itself, not 
only from the elements of the middle class engaged in suburban or ex-urban strategies, 
but also
from the previous inhabitants of the urban environments that are colonized 
(Jager 1986; [P.] Williams 1986), as well as from contemporary working- 
class or underclass residents...
(Bondi, 1991, pl93)
In short, members of the new urban middle class seek to distinguish themselves from 
virtually everyone else with whom they come in contact. This however is one of the 
fundamental and distinctive problems of modem life, the problem of establishing identity 
in the face of mass society. It is this general problem, common to everyone living in 
modem society, which needs to be addressed first and gentrification analyzed as a 
particular instance only second. In identifying gentrifiers' needs with the demand for 
gentrified property, gentrification studies start from the wrong place. This failing 
accounts for why the search for the answers to the questions of the "where", "when" and 
"why" of gentrification tums into one in which reasons must be sought why other 
properties in the concentric 'zone of gentrification' are not, or have not yet, been 
similarly gentrified.
I have argued that the fundamental problem with gentrification studies is the insistence 
that gentrification be studied from the point of view that gentrifiers gentrify because they 
have to. In particular they have to have gentrified properties. This is true in a 
definitional sense but in no other. It is like saying that jockeys need horses. By contrast, 
I want to argue that people gentrify because they can. In taking this approach one can 
address the question of the peculiar needs of the gentrifier in a different and superior 
way. The deficiency in the gentrification debate, as it is presently constituted, is that it 
imagines this problem to be confined solely to gentrifiers.
It may seem odd that an ostensibly Marxist account of gentrification should diagnose the 
problems currently facing the gentrification debate as resulting from the reduction of the
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issues at stake to ones of class constitution. It is not that class issues are not important, 
and I shall show in later chapters how they do affect the process of gentrification, and its 
interpretation; it is simply that the way in which they are thought to be relevant to the 
gentrification debate at present hinders understanding of the issues at stake. The problem 
is that, in attempting to account for the origins of gentrification in class constitution, the 
"could do otherwise-ness" (Giddens 1987 p220) of agency is thereby denied. The 
explanation of gentrification is always sought in either gentrifiers' class-given need to 
give expression to their class-awareness by gentrifying, or, even if not knowing 
themselves to be a class, in their class-specific housing needs which can only be solved 
by gentrifying. Thus the insistence on class constitution being the basis of gentrification 
goes hand in glove with the insistence on demonstrating why gentrifiers need to gentrify. 
Consequently, as the next chapter will show, a very odd perception of gentrifiers is 
perpetuated by the literature. Chapter 3 investigates these themes.
53
54
3 Gentrification and its metaphors: essentialism and realism in
the analysis of housing consumption
3.1 Introduction
Thus far in this thesis, I have argued that all the arguments advanced in the gentrification 
debate are flawed because they begin from the fact of gentrification and then seek to find 
reasons why it had to occur. The postindustrialist consensus must then rely on some 
deus ex machina to account for the differentiation of this gentrifying "new urban middle- 
class", as Bondi puts it (1991 p i93), from other classes. This deus ex machina always 
presents himself in terms of this insistence that gentrifiers gentrify out of necessity. He 
creates in gentrifiers the need to gentrify. The desired explanation of gentrification then 
tends strongly to exclude agency. The conditions of occupation of a property are 
extended to the definition of the agent. Explain our gentrified property and hey presto, 
we have explained our gentrifier. We have also explained her away.
This chapter argues that this deus is in fact more of a diabolus; the argument that 
gentrification constitutes some form of class constitution can only be made by the 
invocation of sin. Gentrification is sinful because the consumption of gentrified housing 
is a form of fashionable display. Its frivolity offends the Protestant ethic of asceticism. 
Gentrifiers are sinners, and therefore fundamentally different to you or I. They are alien, 
bearers of the cancer of gentrification, eating away at the authentic inner-city of lively 
proletarians, leaving lifeless the areas they invade. These metaphorical representations of 
gentrification as sin and disease come about because of what Nietzsche calls a 
homesickness, a yearning to overcome the sense of loss that comes with development 
and change. Gentrification, as a phenomenon of the new middle class, is associated with 
bourgeois triumphalism (Dickens & Savage 1988). Explanations of gentrification 
therefore seek to expose the hollowness of those claims to triumph.
However, Nietzsche's arguments do more than expose the origins of the metaphors of 
sin and disease in which explanations of gentrification are couched. They provide a non- 
essentialist account of human behaviour which avoids the reductionism inherent in the 
psychological accounts which dominate the housing literature. Awareness (at the very 
least) of the the problems these can bring is vital if the current problems endemic in the 
gentrification debate are themselves to be overcome.
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3.2 Base-superstructure in the theory of consumption cleavages
The general consensus in the gentrification debate, that gentrification can only be 
understood by invoking a specific class-demand for inner city residence by a "certain 
segment" of the "service class" (Hamnett 1991 pl86), is supported by participants in a 
wider argument, sustained principally by P.Saunders and P.Williams, that housing, and 
especially housing tenure, be considered "a crucial structuring medium with respect to the 
individual, the household and society" (P.Williams 1987 p i54). In arguing for the 
importance of housing consumption as the basis for class constitution, gentrification has 
been cited by P.Williams as an example of a medium through which a particular class is 
able to constitute itself (P.Williams 1986, 1987 - see also Saunders 1984, 1988, 1989 
1990, Saunders and P.Williams 1988).
Saunders and Williams' work has recently been the subject of a useful review by Warde 
(1990). Warde argues that Saunders and P.Williams have sought both singly and jointly 
to integrate two separate but related themes, namely the social psychology of 
consumption as display, and the sociology of consumption cleavages.
In the expression which Saunders has now made famous, homeownership is held to 
provide "ontological security" (Saunders 1989 p i 86). As a form of tenure, 
homeownership is also a principal source of consumption sector cleavages. Society at 
large is, according to Saunders, moving from a market to a privatized mode of 
consumption (Warde 1990). People able to receive privatized modes of service provision 
benefit at the expense of those who do not. Saunders here draws on and extends the 
work of Dunleavy (1980). For Saunders, there is a clear political moral to be drawn. 
Since society is moving in the direction of privatized modes of service provision anyway, 
these should be given every encouragement, since these are what most people want 
(Warde 1990).
These arguments have not gone unchallenged. Dickens (1989), Duncan (1989), Murie 
(1989,1991), Somerville (1989), Sullivan (1989) and Warde (1990) have all taken issue 
with one or another of Saunders' arguments concerning the privileged position of 
homeownership in ensuring the benefits of a privatized delivery of consumption services. 
Areas of dispute have included: the financial benefits involved in homeownership 
(Duncan 1989, Murie 1991); the reliance on tenure divisions to signify consumption 
sector divides (Murie 1989, Sullivan 1989); disputes over whether the public/private split 
in service consumption matches the public/private split in the consumption of housing 
(Warde 1989); the ideological constructions underlying the distinction between public 
and private (Somerville 1989); and the social psychology of consumption (Dickens 
1989).
56
These arguments are all of varying degrees of interest within the terms of the argument 
posed by Saunders and P.Williams. However, to follow them would only be to remain 
within the terms of this argument. I wish to transcend the dispute altogether by pointing 
to two assumptions buried deep in the arguments made by Saunders and Williams. 
These are their failure to escape from the base-superstructure metaphor, and linked to 
this, an espousal of Protestant attitudes toward consumption (D.Sayer 1991). This leads 
to an implicit essentialism (Graham 1988, 1990, Resnick & Wolff 1987) in their attitude 
toward human nature (cf. Bhatti 1991). Analysers of gentrification as display analyze it 
with the same attitudes toward their topic as Protestants have toward sin.
The problems of Marxist theory which P.Williams and Saunders adddress in their
arguments lie in the base-superstructure metaphor, and not in Marxism as such (Frankel
1983 makes a similar argument in regard to Urry 1981 - cf. 3.5 below). As in Ley's
case, Saunders' and Williams' arguments have led them to reject Marxist theory entirely
(Saunders & P.Williams 1987). The type of work which they reject is described by
Williams in the following terms:
Work and the workplace have dominated our conceptions of the ways social 
relations and institutions are constituted and reproduced. All else, it seems, has 
been regarded as secondary and as a reflection of the primary relations established 
through work.
(P.Williams 1987 p i54)
The use of the reflection metaphor identifies this problem as being one of 'base-
superstructure'. Having identified this problem, P.Williams does not follow
R.Williams' route and rethink what is signified by 'base' in this metaphor. Instead, like
Rose (1984), P.Williams argues that the 'home' constitutes an alternative 'base':
it is essential to think beyond the workplace to other settings (or locales) where 
social interaction takes place and where social relations are composed and 
contextualised. There are clearly any number of these including the school, club 
and pub but there can be little doubt that the home must rank high amongst them 
and perhaps alongside the workplace as a key social setting.
(1987 pl54)
There can be no quarrel with these sentiments. However, to progress fiurther, it is 
necessary to analyze what is meant by 'home' and 'workplace' in the context of this 
argument, and not simply proffer 'home' as an alternative 'base' which stands in a quite 
untheorized relation to the original 'base', the 'workplace'. This P.Williams does not 
do. Consequently, his article begins with an assertion of the importance of the home as a 
theoretical equal to the workplace in the constitution of social relations, yet by its 
conclusion this equality appears to be only a recent historical occurence, in which the 
home has become "a real physical and social arena" and "an important constitutive force" 
(P.Williams 1987 p 203). What was allegedly a matter of theoretical importance tums 
out to be a matter rather of empirical significance.
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The implications are curious. They would suggest that P.Williams believes that the home 
is only a recent phenomenon, which is absurd, and clearly he does not hold such a belief. 
What he really is arguing is that it is the awareness of the importance of the home in 
constituting social relations which has grown rather than the importance itself. However 
the difficulties which P.Williams has at this point in his argument betray an idealist, or, at 
best a liberal rather than historical materialist, position (Comninel 1987), which the 
invocations of struggle - fighting and achievement - cannot hide. For P.Williams, what 
is important is not the 'home' as such (without stopping to ask what that might mean), 
but the idea of the home. Moreover, because the 'home' is hypostatised in this manner, 
the argument fails to come to grips with the historic and regional variations in the 
constitution not only of the home, but also of its occupants (Murie 1991).
This privileging of the home fails in its attempts to deal with the reductionism of 
explaining all social phenomena in terms of class relations established in production. 
P.Williams sets up home in opposition to workplace only as an alternative base, or 
source of reflections, thereby varying but not fundamentally altering the relation of 
source to reflector. Saunders and P.Williams fail to escape the limitations which they 
themselves correctly recognize in much Marxist work because they mistakenly identify 
base-superstructure with Marxism, admittedly an easy mistake to make.
3.3 G entrification and sin
Like Ley, Saunders and P. Williams also reject the notion that class consciousness arises 
in production. Instead, also like Ley, they must argue that it arises in consumption. 
Hence the significance of A Nation of Homeowners in stimulating class constitution via 
consumption cleavages. This of course throws a great deal of weight onto the concept of 
consumption. However, the notion of consumption which they espouse is a quite 
distinctive one, namely the Protestant asceticism described in Weber's Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit o f Capitalism and in his General Economic History (D.Sayer 1991). This 
notion carries with it a great deal of ideological baggage, which, I argue, vitiates the use 
of consumption cleavages as an explanation of why gentrifiers gentrify.
Weber developed his ideas after visiting the U.S. in 1904, and observing the behaviour 
of Protestant sects there. Warde (1990) places Saunders in a direct line from Veblen, and 
Veblen's intensely Protestant upbringing is well known. Admittedly Warde also places 
Bourdieu in that line also, and I do not wish to suggest that Saunders' religious leanings
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have any place, necessarily, in his arguments. Like all good ideologies, the ideology of 
Protestantism has become so pervasive as to be unnoticed.
I am not here interested in the merits of Weber's historical case as to the origins of 
capitalist development (D.Sayer 1991 provides a good discussion). Rather, I seek to 
demonstrate that Weber's analysis of Protestant attitudes toward consumption apply to 
Saunders' and P.Williams' arguments, and that it is this Protestant attitude which gives 
rise to the inherent essentialism of their position. By essentialism is meant theories of 
human behaviour which begin from some (idealist) premise as to the fundamental 
essence of human nature (Resnick and Wolff 1987, Graham 1989, 1990, Lovering
1989). I shall then seek to demonstrate the links between this (Protestant) essentialism 
and the argument that gentrification is in some way expressive of class constitution.
To steer the discussion of Saunders' and Williams' arguments about the nature of 
homeownership toward a discussion of Weber's analysis of Protestantism may seem an 
unusual direction to take, but, as I shall show, the parallels between Sayer's 
interpretation of Weber's analysis of Protestantism and Saunders and Williams' 
explanation of the meaning of the home are extremely compelling. Furthermore, this 
should not seem so strange when, as Somerville (1989) points out, Saunders and 
Williams' own position is itself Weberian. I shall argue that the problem with Saunders' 
and Williams' arguments is not that their analysis is Weberian, but that it is not Weberian 
enough. Thus, where Weber problematizes this attitude toward consumption (D.Sayer 
1991), Saunders and Williams take its existence for granted, as natural.
The Protestant ethic has particularly shaped the gentrification debate, as I now intend to 
show, through the Protestant attitude to sin. It is worth quoting D.Sayer's summary at 
some length here.
Protestantism... expected of its adherents, not the recurring (and, [Weber] 
maintains, the 'very human') cycle of sin, confession and absolution accepted by 
the older Catholicism, but a continual ethical 'probation'; 'the God of Calvinism 
demanded of his believers not single good works, but a life of good works 
combined into a unified system' ([Weber] 1974: 115). The godly were perpetually 
on trial. Morality is thereby abstracted from all particularistic contexts, becoming 
an ontological attribute of the subject rather than of his or her discrete actions, and 
it provides the basis upon which this new subjectivity is unified. Weber contrasts 
an ethic of good works in which 'particular actions [...] can be evaluated singly 
and credited to or subtracted from the individual's account', as exemplified in the 
Hindu doctrine of karma, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, and (in its practice) Roman 
Catholicism, with what he calls the 'ethic of inwardness' characteristic of 
Protestantism. In the former, human behaviour is 'more than a simple and 
uniform quality of personality, of which conduct is the expression'. A given 
action has to be located in terms of its intentio. In the latter, by contrast.
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individual actions are treated as being the 'symptoms and expressions of an 
underlying ethical total personality' and it is this total personality which becomes 
the object of ethical rigorism'. I ’he consequence is that 'religious good works 
with a social orientation become mere instruments of self-perfection' ([Weber] 
1968:271-2)
(D.Sayer 1991 pl21 author's emphases)
In this passage, Sayer (and Weber) make three key points. First, Protestant sin is no 
longer the unfortunate proof of a weakened postlapsarian human nature, the result of 
Original Sin, against whose effects one can continually strive, seeking to earn God's 
grace through a combination of faith and good works and thus combating that weakness: 
it is instead a revelation of the (immutable) character (ibid.) of the individual, who 
receives grace only by faith and God's favour. Second, those character revelations form 
part of a unified system, a social ordering of the elect and the damned. And finally, the 
individual is continually on trial, on show, on display.
In Protestantism, according to Weber, the godly are godly because God has made them 
so. But who the godly are, and who are not, is known only to God. Since godliness is 
granted by God alone, absence of sin by itself does not demonstrate godliness, but sin in 
any form reveals an essential wickedness, marking its perpetrator as doomed to eternal 
damnation.
Sinfulness may be expressed either in idleness or viciousness.
Labour - that formerly despised activity and estate - is now a duty, from which 
the wealthy are least exempt. This is a 'perfect' middle-class morality, in terms of 
which both the idle poor and the idle rich are equally deserving of condemnation.
(D.Sayer 1991 pl31)
More importantly for the purposes of my argument, claims to godliness could be made,
even if not proven, by reasoned and disciplined consumption.
Only the saved, it was reasoned, would prove spiritually capable 
of living the kind of disciplined life which would reap them such 
earthly rewards.
(D.Sayer 1991 p i 20)
Sayer shows how the links between labour and acquisition were made by Weber in the 
Protestant Ethic and how these were in turn shown to best advantage in the middle class 
home.
If labour is a calling, its fruits - property - are a trust. The entrepreneur is a 
steward of God's gifts, labouring to increase them for His glory... The Protestant 
idea of the calling gave 'the entrepreneur a fabulously clear conscience', so long as 
the profits of enterprise - a term like 'industry' itself, that is deeply imbued with 
moral resonance - were not idly dissipated in vainglorious self-indulgence. 
Weber notes that 'against the glitter and ostentation of feudal magnificence 
which... prefers a sordid elegance to a sober simplicity' Protestants 'set the clean
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and solid comfort o f the middle-class home as an idear... ([Weber] 1974: 170-1)
(D.Sayer 1991 pl32 - emphases added)
Earlier, D.Sayer argues, quoting Simmel, that the loneliness engendered by this
Protestant God, before whom one stands naked, without the intercession of priests, the
hierarchy of the Catholic church, or of the Catholic saints, led to the growth of
a protective cocoon, a newly constructed and (highly valued) 'domestic' realm 
which is counterposed to the impersonal world outside, mitigating the existential 
loneliness of modernity.... this model family's place in the social reproduction of 
the conditions under which capitalism has so far operated is much more pivotal 
than classical sociologies have been apt to recognize.
(D.Sayer, 1991, p i27)
This "model family's place... is much more pivotal than" Saunders' and Williams' 
sociology has been "apt to recognize" either. They too have accepted isolated (family) 
relations under capitalism as natural that which "Weber was emphatic, [was] 
substantively irrational” (D.Sayer 1991, p i29).
The second key point about the nature of sin in Protestant theology was that the character 
revelations thereby displayed formed part of a unified system, a social ordering of the 
elect and the damned. Translating this into the context of gentrification studies explains 
the origins of the notion of gentrification as class constitution. A new form of housing 
consumption has arisen. This not only reveals something peculiar (and distasteful), 
about the natures of those engaged in this form of consumption, but also must be 
interpreted as revealing a new social order, or at least a hitherto unexpected complexity to 
the existing social order.
Gentrifiers, in the eyes of the Veblen tradition, are notorious for putting their domestic 
arrangements on public display: no net curtains; see-through interiors. Hamnett is fond 
of quoting Raban's account of gentrification, "the knockers-through are here" (Hamnett 
& P.Williams 1979, Hamnett 1984). This is the third point, that the individual is 
constantly on trial, and therefore open to display. For in the Protestant world, sin is a 
matter of public determination and therefore very much in the eye of the beholder. It is in 
the combination of these three key points and the second two in particular, that Veblen's 
notion of conspicuous consumption is applied to the sin of gentrification.
In pre-modern times, identity was ascribed by birth and caste. In the modem world by 
contrast, identity is acquired. It is therefore inherently fluid, since it can only be acquired 
by recognition, by significant others (Park 1952, Goffmann 1971, Sennett 1977). In 
these circumstances all consumption is conspicuous, it enables others to recognize you. 
The only difference the possession of money makes is to the form of that conspicuous
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consumption. The more money you have the greater your discretion in the range of
consumption choices you can make (Chapter 5). However, in Veblen's account,
conspicuous consumption is both class specific and to be disapproved of, for good
Protestant reasons. Thus Wilson writes that
Veblen argued that conspicuous waste accounted for change in fashion, but he 
also believed in a 'native taste' (that is some kind of essential good taste) to which 
conspicuous wastefulness was actually abhorrent. It is abhorrent, he argued, 
because it is a 'psychological law' that we all 'abhor futility'...
... In Veblen's ideal world, there was no place for the irrational or non-utilitarian; 
it was a wholly rational realm.
(Wilson 1985 p52)
Wilson goes on to argue that, in writing on fashion, Veblen's ideas have remained 
essentially unchallenged. They have remained essentially unchallenged in the analysis of 
gentrification also. Bondi (1991) for example quotes with approval Jager's (1986) 
account of the aesthetics of gentrification, but Jager's account draws explicitly on 
Veblen, and is similarly disapproving to the point of condescension over those aesthetics, 
which he characterizes as the aesthetics of "kitsch" (Jager 1986, p87). N.Smith is 
similarly disapproving (N.Smith 1982 ftnl). This peculiarly sinful display however can 
only be comprehended within the Protestant tradition if it is simultaneously assumed that 
the gentrifiers' actions are not to be judged in themselves, but held to reveal characters 
essentially different from those of the observer; characters created moreover by 
circumstances outside of their control - the characteristics of the new service class 
(Hamnett 1991).
This Protestant assumption that different consumption practices reveal essential 
differences in human nature has led Bhatti (1991) to argue that Saunders' thesis leads to 
the conclusion that people who do not share the natural disposition to homeownership 
that Saunders claims for the vast majority must be somehow less than human. Bhatti's 
concerns should be taken seriously since he was Saunders' principal research associate, 
carrying out a large number of the interviews on which Saunders' (1989, 1990) thesis 
was based.
This demonization of 'others' than ourselves is of course age-old. It is one of the most 
important components of the definition of the self (cf. Dickens Chapter 2, 1990). Said 
(1978) demonstrates how much the West's definition of its own identity depended on 
Orientalism, a particular dehumanizing demonization of the Arab world and points further 
east. Shields has taken this argument one step further and argued that not only 
Orientalism, but "marginality" in general has been "a central theme in Western culture 
and thought" (1990 p276). Take as an example the advertisements for Dances with 
Wolves "In 1864, one man went to the frontier in search o f himself' (emphasis added).
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from  those forms. Yet this presumption lies at the heart of the insistence that 
gentrification is itself merely a form, namely, of class constitution. Only once the task of 
establishing the centrality of the importance of fashion to the understanding of 
gentrification has been carried out, will it then be possible to show how it is that 
gentrifiers gentrify because they can, and how this ability (effective demand) is translated 
into class-specific form, without conceding that this activity in any way involves class 
constitution.
3.4 Gentrification and fashion
Questions of identity and self-definition are usually regarded with the social science 
tradition as belonging to psychology (Dickens 1988). "Belonging" is the operative 
word, however, and it is peculiar how geographers are so deferential to psychology's 
claims in this regard, when they (geographers) are so concerned with the history of their 
own discipline's claims to knowledge - its marking off of intellectual territory and 
defining and redefining what is to be regarded as simultaneously geography and 
knowledge (Taylor 1976, Kemeny 1988, Whitehead 1991). Debates between different 
schools within psychology are recognized and referenced (Dickens 1989,1990), but the 
philosophical bases of psychology are seemingly never questioned. This is in spite of 
the by now well-known controversy within the discipline itself over Freud's doctoring of 
his evidence (Malcolm 1984), which, it is claimed, if true, calls the whole psychological 
project into question. That whole project, R.Williams (1977,1973b) argues, is any case 
flawed, insofar as its avowed purpose is to free the personality from the clutches of 
psychological repression. Williams argued that this meant attempting to reconcile the 
alienated (and definitively problematized) individual to (an equally definitively 
unproblematized) society. He argues that psychology is an essentially individualistic 
and bourgeois response to a social and socialist problem. That problem is how to 
overcome alienation. There is another problem implicit in this project, however, and 
Williams concentrates only on the first of them.
The psychological concept of alienation carries with it an assumption as to the real core 
of the human nature from which the defined self is alienated. To discuss alienation, it is 
necessary therefore to interrogate that assumption. This second problem, however, is 
not only the oldest problem in the book, it is one which is probably not capable of a 
solution. Psychology in itself cannot answer this question. Alienation is as much a 
philosophical and social problem as it is a medical one: even as a medical problem it has 
been socially constructed, as Foucault has demonstrated (Hebdige 1989, Foucault 1979, 
Sarup 1988). The development of personality is of course a legitimate area of study, but
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exactly the language of the gentrifier as urban pioneer as presented in N.Smith's (1986, 
1991) discussion of the frontier vocabulary of gentrification. Smith writes that the term 
'"urban pioneer'... conveys the impression of a city that is not yet socially inhabited" 
(1991, p87). That is to say, he disapproves of the use of such imagery. However, he 
then goes on to argue that it is in fact the gentrifiers who are in some way less than social - 
alien Space Invaders from another planet in a different but parallel economic universe 
who are playing Back to the Future in the inner city property market; reversing thereby 
the places of subject and object in the frontier vocabulary of gentrification, but not really 
escaping from the Veblenesque Protestant presuppositions underlying the debate.
Smith assumes that the frontier imagery is ideological and seeks to expose it as such by 
demonstrating its roots in class constitution. Ideological it may be, but what if it were 
nonetheless genuinely based in existential experience and gentrifiers really were in search 
of themselves? Then all that gentrifiers would be guilty of is expressing that search for 
identity in class-specific ideological terms, bad language rather than bad behaviour. In 
any case, frontier imagery in urbanization long predates gentrification (Chapter 10.5 
below).
One way of avoiding these problems is to interpret gentrification in terms of a more 
Catholic view of sin, namely to concentrate on actions rather than character. If everyone 
is engaged in strategies of self-definition via conspicuous consumption, then 
gentrification may be regarded as merely one such strategy out of many. The difference 
between gentrifiers and those they displace would be merely one of resources, not class 
character. Gentrifiers gentrify because they can, thanks to their greater access to money, 
not because they have to. There is no point in searching for the class character of 
gentrifiers, or for the nature of gentrification. Such searches lead only to the assumption 
that gentrifiers engage in gentrifying behaviour out of class generated and class-specific 
needs, needs which are peculiar to gentrifiers and alien to the rest of us. Simpler by far 
to argue that these needs, for shelter and for self-definition, are common to all, but to 
remember that needs are not the same as demand. In a capitalist society, the distinction 
between need and demand (availability of the resources required to fulfil needs) is 
crucial.
The purpose of making these arguments is to establish the importance of viewing 
gentrification in terms of fashion. In hne with cultural materialist principles, questions of 
fashion cannot simply be tacked on to the end of the analysis, as with N.Smith and 
Beauregard, but must be viewed as the necessary form in which the process is carried 
out. It is no good therefore searching for the nature of gentrification, supposedly lying 
behind or above or beyond the forms in which it is carried out. It is indistinguishable
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what is the nature of that personality? Psychology simply assumes, in an ironic reversal 
of Durkheim's sociology, that there is a core personality somewhere 'in there', but has 
no idea what its nature might be. Dickens (1989, 1990) recognizes this problem, but the 
strategy he adopts, to seek for an answer in sociobiology leads into the 'infinite regress', 
which Popper (1959) is so concerned to warn us against. Another strategy would be to 
question the necessity for the quest at all. To see how this strategy might work, I draw 
on Wilson's (1985) analysis of fashion and modernity.
Changes in fashion are rapid and unpredictable so that what is considered ugly and 
socially undesirable in one period is regarded nostalgically as a precious talisman of the 
'world we have lost' in the next. This applies to gentrification as much as to clothing. I 
have already quoted (Chapter 2.3.4 above) Jonathan Raban's ironic commentary on the 
reassessment of the "Georgian" square in Islington where he lived during the early '70s 
(Raban 1974 p86).
Academic writing on fashion too has been dominated by the implicit assumption that
something essential in human nature is revealed by forms of consumption (Wilson 1985,
p49). Wilson argues in regard to fashion, much as I have done in regard to
gentrification, that the underlying assumption is then that fashion "must therefore be
directly related to human biological 'needs'", that is, in functionalist terms (ibid.). Yet
when particular fashions cannot be explained in these terms, the irrationality that this
implies (from this functionalist perspective) leads to a tendency to
explain this 'irrational' behaviour in terms that come from outside the activity 
itself: in terms of economics, of psychology, of sociology. We expect a garment 
10 justify its shape and style in terms of moral and intellectual criteria we do not 
normally apply to other artistic forms... When it comes to fashion, we become 
intolerant.
(Wilson 1985, p49)
This intolerance has elective affinities with the Protestant attitude toward consumption 
and sin, discussed above. It rests in the same fruitless search for a definition of human 
nature:
underlying such arguments is a belief that human individuals do have certain 
unchanging and easily defined needs. The attempt to define and classify such 
needs has proved virtually impossible, however, and in fact even such biological 
needs as the needs for food and warmth are socially constructed and differentially 
constructed in different societies. The concept of need cannot elucidate fashion.
(Wilson 1985 p50)
Nor, Wilson argues, can the phenomenon of fashion be elucidated by the fight for high 
social status. She criticizes the allegations made by Veblen of the necessity for labels 
which announce high social status, and by those who have followed him in their analyses 
of fashion. In other words she is posing the same question of fashion historians that
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Caulfield (1989) poses of N.Smith and P.Williams, namely why does this existential 
need for labels of high social status take these particular forms, housing in Smith and 
Williams's case, fashion in the case of Veblen? However, unlike Caulfield, the answer 
she supplies begins by problematizing the fact that such a question should ever be posed 
in this way at all.
Wilson argues that the usual Veblenesque answers given in response to such questions, 
predicated on the belief that analyses of fashion should begin with the presupposition of a 
essential human natural core, including the need for display of high social status, "miss 
fashion's purposive and creative aspects" (1985: p59). Wilson argues that to clothe the 
body at all demonstrates in itself the "shifty identity" of the "psychological self'(Wilson 
1985, p59-60). "Dress is the frontier between the self and the n o t-s e lfY e t, "it marks 
an unclear boundary ambiguously, and unclear boundaries disturb us..." (1985 p2-3). 
Fashion in other words does not merely 'reflect' identity, it also constitutes it, and since 
fashions change, so can identity, hence the ambiguity. Wilson's analysis of fashions in 
clothing can be applied to consumption generally and specifically to the analysis of 
gentrification.
Miller (1987) and McCracken (1988) both argue that material consumption in general has 
a purposive and creative aspect. Material consumption of food, clothing, cars, housing, 
leisure and entertainment is intimately bound up with the question of identity and the 
creation and communication of meaning. The form this consumption takes cannot be 
separated from the concept of culture, which Miller argues should be seen in this instance 
as "the relationship through which objects are constituted as social forms" (1987 p ll) . 
This definition of culture complements R.Williams' definition of culture as the social 
forms within which material production is undertaken (R.Williams 1973b).
Gentrification is culturally informed and culturally bound material consumption and 
therefore is constitutive of identity, but within those parameters it is also fashionable. 
Robert Park argued that the goal of fashion was to be different, but not that different 
(Park 1931-1955 pp288-289). Fashion must on the one hand proclaim its novelty, but 
on the other cannot sunder all reference to previous experience. Fashion, like status 
generally, has to be recognized as fashion to be fashion. Gentrification as fashion has 
exactly these properties. It represents a new development in urbanization but does so via 
the consumption of old housing. It therefore confronts and challenges at the same time 
as it makes claims to recognition of status. The resultant ambiguity colours the 
responses of the commentators on gentrification.
They share in this ambiguity of response problems which Blanchard (1985) notes
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characterizes Engels' report on the Condition o f the working class in England in 1844, a 
report which Harvey 1974 recommends to modern Marxist analysts of urban process. 
Engels' difficulties are shared by many contemporary analysts on the left.
Blanchard argues that Engels' role as curious investigator into the conditions of the 
working class in England in 1844 contains an inherent insecurity because he attempts to 
render his personal experience as objective discourse (p62). Not only is Engel's position 
ambiguous in regard to the facts he describes, but he shares this ambiguity with the city 
itself (p64). Since he cannot hope to investigate all the aspects of the city, he cannot help 
but treat his experience of those parts of the city he does investigate as a synecdoche for 
the whole. Raban (1974) argues in fact that it is impossible to come to terms with the city 
in any other way. However, from Engels' point of view, if his description is merely 
metaphorical, then it cannot but undermine his claims to objectivity (Blanchard 1985 p64- 
65).
Engels regards the city as no more than a cover-up, its appearance an ideological cloak 
protecting the historical processes of capitalism from view. Consequently, he refuses to 
confront the question of individual consciousness. There is no need, since the 
investigator already knows what is going to be found behind the appearance. This means 
however, that Engels has no engagement with the people of the city, only with its 
structures. "If there are people there, he does not see them; he only sees signs o f their 
existence" (p67). They are only ciphers for the pre-known historical process which 
Engels is interested in elucidating, exactly as are gentrifiers in the production of 
gentrifiers approach.
Engels' narrative strategy, and his consequent failures to deal with his own place in the 
city and to interact with others, to see only signs of their existence, are the same failings 
which bedevil the gentrification debate. If these issues are not addressed, then the needs 
and motivations of others (including gentrifiers) have to be assumed. To assume that 
they can be so assumed, however is to deny the presence of ambiguity. If the city is 
inherently ambiguous, then this must be confronted directly. We must argue from the 
world to gentrification, not the other way round.
The role of fashion takes on a considerable importance in this ambiguous world. It 
fashions, literally, an identity for the consumer of the fashionable object. Miller argues 
that, at present, studies of culture and material consumption concentrate only "on the 
'genuine' cultures of leisure or poverty" (Miller 1987 p ll) .  The deficiencies in the 
definition of culture referenced in the decisions as to what is and what is not to be 
categorized as culture mean that "authenticity" in cultural studies is restricted either to the
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fine arts, or to the music hall:
Although on the surface such definitions appear to be evaluations of taste and 
style, they are always in effect dehigratidhs of those people who are associated 
with the 'other' material and expressive forms. One social group condemns kitsch 
& soap opera., .the other is appalled by the mass middle-class culture devoid of 
any true sense of [working class] 'history' or even of the present.
(ibid.)
Thus, package holidays to Benidorm bad: hop-picking in Kent good. Consequently, the
lives and living experiences of "around three quarters of Britons to-day" are written off
as being without academic interest, as being "inauthentic". Miller argues that this is
because the theories of culture employed by and large fail to recognize that
Culture... is always a process and is never reducible to either its object or its 
subject form. For this reason, evaluation should always be of a dynamic 
relationship, never of mere things.
(ibid.)
It is this failure to treat culture in the manner outlined by Miller which causes this 
denigrative attitude to the culture of gentrification as 'the aesthetics of kitsch' (Jager 
1986) and is the reason why the study of gentrification can so easily be treated as sinful. 
I shall argue in the next section that this attitude also permits gentrification to be 
conceptualized in terms of disease. In both cases, if and when the issue of fashion enters 
into the analysis of gentrification, it only contributes, in its confirmation of the essential 
frivolity of gentrification, to the sense of the essential worthlessness of gentrifiers. I 
shall argue in later chapters that by contrast the analysis of gentrification as fashion is a 
most important route into a proper understanding of the phenomenon.
3.5 Gentrification and disease
If the experience of the modern city is one of ambiguity, this only raises the question of 
what it is we are seeking to find in our investigations of urban phenomena. As the 
gentrification debate is presently constituted, descriptions of gentrification, like Engels' 
description of Manchester, are inherently metaphorical. They are synecdoches, in which 
the problems posed by gentrification illuminate the problems of modern life in general. I 
am arguing that the line of investigation be reversed. Before we can understand 
gentrification, we first need to understand the way we all live now, which means being 
at least aware of the metaphors in which we represent the experience of modem life.
There is of course nothing wrong with being metaphorical. Indeed, Blanchard (1985) 
argues that metaphor is one of the most important ways in which new meaning can be 
introduced into a language. Sarup (1988 p54) argues that they can in many cases have a
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liberating effect on thought and conduct. Metaphors make new meaning by applying a 
definition established in one context, to another context. Needless to say, because the 
other context is by definition different, the match of signifiers is not perfect, hence new 
meaning is created. But at the same time use of metaphor can obscure differences within 
the context to which the metaphor is applied and can imply that both contexts do contain 
something essential in common. As Sarup puts it
metaphors to a large extent shape what we think in any field. Metaphors are not 
idle flourishes - they shape what we do. They help to make, and defend, a world 
view. It is important that the implications of the metaphors we employ or accept 
are made explicit and that the ways in which they structure our thought and even 
our action are better understood.
(Sarup 1988 p55)
It is therefore of the greatest importance to be aware of the development of meaning in 
this way (cf. R.Williams 1976, 1977). The failure to examine the metaphorical 
framework within which gentrification is debated helps account for the failure of the 
gentrification debate to accomplish the tasks it sets itself, namely the explanation of 
gentrification within the context of a narrative of class constitution.
I have already argued that one of the underlying metaphors used in the gentrification 
debate is that of sin. I have also argued that use of this metaphor leads on to another, 
namely that of gentrifiers as aliens from another planet. Chapter 2.2 highlighted the 
organicism inherent in the concept of neighbourhood lifecycle, in particular the use of 
medical analogies ("triage" - Chapter 2.2.1) in early studies of gentrification-as-remedy 
for urban maladies, such as abandonment of properties (cf. also Chapter 9.5.1 below). 
The current consensus in the gentrification debate is to see gentrification less as the 
remedy, more as part of the problem (cf. Beauregard 1986 p37):
Far from being a cure for abandonment, gentrification worsens it.
Gentrification does not provide the cure for abandonment.... And if it did, the cure 
would be as bad as the disease, because gentrification is as inherently linked with the 
displacement of lower-income households as is abandonment itself.
(Marcuse 1986 pl54, 174)
Far from being the cure for the problems of the inner city, therefore, gentrification here is 
the disease which is causing those problems. The metaphor of gentrification as disease 
can be placed in a direct line of evolution from metaphors of gentrification as sinful and 
gentrifiers as aliens.
Disease, particularly leprosy and plague, has been used as a metaphor of the moral 
condition of society at least since Biblical times. In modern times, syphilis, TB, cancer.
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and AIDS have all featured as the social disease - the master-disease, that is, of 
contemporary society Sontag 1978, 1989). According to Sontag (1978), there are four 
aspects to the analysis of such a social disease, diagnosis as a disease, investigation of 
its causes, including the lifestyles of its victims, treatment and cure. The history of 
reactions to these master-diseases bears such strong parallels to the evolution of the 
gentrification debate that it is hard to avoid the conclusion that gentrification is analysed 
as though it too were a social disease.
Sontag (1989) argues that the first three varieties of these metaphor-diseases had in 
common the characteristics that they were (usually) fatal, they were incurable, and that 
they only affected particular individuals. In other words, they were not plagues (though, 
this metaphor always remained available for these illnesses, as in the case of AIDS). 
Consequently, attention focused on the characteristics of the types of individuals likely to 
succumb to such diseases and the environments in which disease was likely to occur, just 
as attention in the gentrification debate focuses on the types of neighbourhood liable to 
have population "vulnerable" to gentrification (cf. Beauregard 1986 p47ff.).
Syphilis especially directed attention toward the environment and lifestyles of its 
sufferers (Sontag 1978 p60). However, "syphilis was limited as a metaphor because the 
disease itself was not regarded as mysterious; only awful" (ibid.)while TB, cancer and 
AIDS have in turn been regarded as both awful and mysterious. This has allowed much 
more scope for the use of metaphor, in ways which the gentrification debate has precisely 
paralleled.
As Chapter 2 has shown, the unsolved mystery in the gentrification debate is why
gentrification only appears in certain areas of certain cities. The consensus in the debate
is that the reasons for this mystery lie in the fact that there must be "multiple gentrification
processes" (Beauregard 1986 p53), which theory must explain. This is precisely the
same conclusion as was reached in debates over research into TB or cancer ("The notion
that a disease can be explained only by a variety of causes is precisely characteristic of
thinking about diseases whose causation is not understood" Sontag 1978 p60); and
reached for precisely the same reasons:
TB was regarded as a mysterious affliction and a disease with myriad causes - just 
as today, while everyone agrees that cancer is an unsolved riddle, it is also 
generally agreed that cancer is multi-determined. A variety of factors ... are held 
responsible for the disease. And many researchers assert that cancer is not one but 
more than a hundred clinically distinct diseases, that each cancer has to be studied 




TB was demystified by the discovery of sulphur drugs and its role as master metaphor
for social malaise inherited by cancer. With gentrification, city and society too can suffer
from cancer. Analyses of cancer parallel those of gentrification in at least three different
ways. First, cancers are in some way related to the environment of the sufferer,
rendering him or her in some way vulnerable, just as the characteristics of a particular
neighbourhood render its inhabitants vulnerable to gentrification. Second, the despair
over the possibility of finding a non-chaotic explanation of gentrification (Chapter 2.3
above) leads to the arguments for concentrating on the production of the gentrification-
causing agents, the gentrifiers. Third,
it is diseases thought to be multi-determined (that is, mysterious) that have the 
widest possibilities as metaphors for what is felt to be socially or morally wrong.
(Sontag 1978 p60)
Gentrification as a cancer brings themes of sin, aliens and disease together in a single 
metaphor.
Just as TB and cancer were and are used to describe society, so also metaphors drawn
from economic thought were and are used to describe TB and cancer. TB was described
in terms ('consumption') suggesting that the body consumed itself through the reckless
waste of energy. "The language used to describe cancer" however
evokes a different economic catastrophe: unregulated, abnormal incoherent 
growth. The tumour has energy, not the patient; "it" is out of control.... Cells 
without inhibitions, cancer cells will continue to grow and extend over each other 
in a "chaotic fashion", destroying the body's normal cells, architecture, and 
functions.
(Sontag 1978 p 63)
The cancer of gentrification evokes the economic catastrophe of postindustrialism. The 
vigourous middle class invaders of formerly lively proletarian neighbourhoods destroy 
not only the normal cells (the displacees), the architecture of their dwellings, but even the 
functions they perform for the body of the city. N.Smith (1982 ftn 1) describes how 
gentrification has not revitalized, but devitalized the city, as no-one sits out on their 
stoops (steps to the house) anymore or plays in the streets. Rose (1984 ftn 6) claims that 
the detrimental effects of gentrification include disruption to the supply of the downtown 
city's support staff, thereby impairing the reproduction of the urban economy.
Until the recent past, the city itself was seen as a cancer (Sontagl978 p74). These days, 
the city, the urban environment, is seen as causing cancer, and this restores the 
opportunity to relate the cancer metaphor to those of the plague, especially when this can 
be linked to AIDS and its metaphors
Presently, it is as much a cliché to say that cancer is "environmentally" caused as it 
was - and still is - to say that it is caused by mismanaged emotions. TB was
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associated with pollution, and now cancer is thought of as a disease of the whole 
world. TB was the "white plague". With awareness of environmental pollution, 
people have started saying there is an "epidemic" or "plague" of cancer.
(Sontag 1978 p71)
AIDS has provided the perfect vehicle for linking cancer and plague, since the
consequences of infection by the HIV virus typically include cancers such as leukaemia.
Once plague metaphors can be brought in, the link between disease and sin is easily
made, as Sontag demonstrates in her discussion of AIDS as a plague. Once we have
plague, we have sin, and we also have aliens
One feature of the usual script for plague: the disease inevitably comes from 
somewhere else....there is a link between imagining disease and imagining 
foreignness. It lies perhaps in the very concept of wrong, which is archaically 
identical with the non-us, the alien.
(Sontag 1989 pp47-48)
AIDS, as Sontag points out, has a "dual metaphoric genealogy": as a cancer, it is
characterized as an invasion; as a plague, it is characterized as pollution (Sontag 1989
pl7). Both aspects of this dual metaphor are to be found in analyses of gentrification.
The original diagnosis of gentrification was as a back to the city movement, an invasion
of the inner city by formerly suburban residents. Once that theory was discredited (Palen
& London 1984), the aliens came from within:
cancer is the disease of the Other. Cancer proceeds by a science-fiction scenario: 
and invasion of "alien" or "mutant" cells, stronger than normal cells {Invasion o f 
the Body Snatchers, The Incredible Shrinking Man, The Blob, The Thing). One 
standard science-fiction plot is mutation, either mutants arriving from outer space 
or accidental mutations among humans. Cancer could be described as a 
triumphant mutation and mutation is now mainly an image for cancer...
(Sontag 1978 p68)
In the metaphor of gentrification as disease, cancer as mutation encapsulates the basic
notion of postindustrialism: gentrifiers as middle-class mutants, unnaturally strong and
vigourous social T-cell leucophytes, created by a carcinogenic environment, the
postindustrial city, invading formerly healthy, but now weakened, working-class
neighbourhoods, brushing aside their defences, and destroying them. Pahl's description
of the effect of middle-class settlement in the 'gin and Jag' villages of London's
commuter belt (perhaps the earliest examples of gentrification - Humphries & Taylor
1986), is couched in terms which continues to find echoes in the gentrification literature
(cf. P.Williams 1986 p71, N.Smith & P.Williams 1986c p223):
The middle-class people come into rural [working-class] areas in search of a 
meaningful community and by their presence help to destroy whatever community 
was there.
(Pahl 1975 p34 emphasis added)
There goes the neighbourhood.
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3.6 Nietzsche and homesickness in consumption analysis
Metaphors of sin and disease, and fashion as metaphor, the glazing of the shiftiness of
identity, are all attempts to comes to grips with the problem of modernity - the attempt to
carve out an identity in the face of mass society, the search for stability and meaning in
the face of an ever-changing increasingly impersonalized world.
The fear of depersonalization haunts our culture. 'Chic' from this perspective is 
then merely the uniform of the rich, chilling anti-human and rigid. Yet modernity 
has also created the individual in a new way - another paradox that fashion well 
expresses. Modern individuality is an exaggerated yet fragile sense of self - a raw 
painful condition.
Our modern sense of our individuality as a kind of wound is also, paradoxically, 
what makes us all so fearful of not sustaining the autonomy of the self; this fear 
transforms the idea of 'mass man' into a threat of self-annihilation. The way we 
dress may assuage our fear by stabilizing our individual identity. It may bridge 
the loneliness of 'mass man' by connecting us with our social group.
(Wilson 1985pl2-13)
The demand for gentrification however has not been discussed in this way in the 
literature. Instead, when demand issues are broached, they are construed in terms of sin 
against, or disease of, an essential eternal human nature. Connolly argues, following 
Nietzsche, that such constructions are also an attribute of modernity, a form of 
homesickness
the demand, the insistence that one realize within theory what one yearns for most 
in life. It becomes translated into presuppositions and assumptions one treats as 
the unquestionable standard by which all other elements in the theory are to be 
judged
(Connolly 1988 pl35)
Such characteristics are clearly obvious in the metaphors of gentrification. The homesick 
analyst yearns for a world without sin or disease. But even this homesickness 
constitutes an argument for viewing gentrification in terms of identity rather than class 
constitution. As Giddens (1990) argues, following Park (Chapter 6 below), identity 
cannot be achieved without a sense of loss, homesickness for the protective cocoon 
mitigating the existential loneliness of the model family (3.3 above).
Nietzsche's reasons for arriving at the conclusion that the problem of modernity is a 
problem of homesickness derive from his interpretation of the history of Christianity. 
Given the links drawn between gentrification and sin above, it is worth on these grounds 
alone pursuing his argument, since it confirms the problematic status of many of the 
assumptions employed in the argument that gentrification is a process of class 
constitution. However, the questions Nietzsche asks of philosophy go right to the heart 
of the problem of the modern condition, and thus to the heart of the issues raised by the 
gentrification debate.
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Connolly argues that both Marx and Hegel insist, as does Genesis, that the world must 
ultimately be "for us" (1988 p. 131); Hegel in the sense that its Spirit enables us to 
achieve a final realization of our true natures, and Marx in the sense that (its) nature is 
subservient to our will. In both their philosophies, all social structures and natural 
relations are capable of being rendered transparent, just as Engels imagined was possible 
in his description of Manchester (Blanchard 1985). In both sets of dialectics, opposition, 
antithesis is "dissolved into higher unities". Neither thinker, Connolly argues, are 
willing to concede that "every product and achievement engenders otherness as it realizes 
itse lf (1988 pl32). The "engendering of otherness" through gentrification is, I shall 
argue in Chapter 10, what keeps it at the forefront of interest despite its lack of numerical 
significance (Bondi 1991, Caulfield 1989, Hamnett 1991).
Similarly, in much the same manner as I have argued for the connection between
gentrification and sin, Connolly argues of Marx and Hegel that
Each is doomed to see vice, irrationality, incapacity, perversity or madness where 
otherness resides, and each constructs an ideal of order which reduces the forms 
of otherness it is supposed to transcend.
(Connolly 1988 pl32)
However, Connolly goes on to argue that it would be wrong to look upon these attitudes 
simply as an interesting but marginal residue of Christian ideology in a generally 
emancipatory political philosophy. He argues that "each advances a theory of freedom 
which supports suppression and subjugation" (ibid.) precisely because of these 
tendencies to interpret resistance to its projects as "irrationality, irresponsibility, 
incapacity or perversity" (ibid.), just as the Protestant tradition views fashion or 
gentrification. In fact, far from being marginal, this residue and its counter-emancipatory 
consequences is central to both Hegelian and Marxian philosophy. If we are to 
understand both the origins of gentrification and the opposition it generates, the residue 
and its consequences must be confronted.
Nietzsche traces these back to the origins of Christianity, which he analyzes through an 
inversion of the master-slave dialectic (cf. Sarup 1988). Christianity, the religion of the 
Roman slaves, has raised slave mentality to the status of a religion. It has created a 
morality based in resentment of servility, but which values servility above all else. Chief 
among the resentments of Christian morality is resentment of the human condition itself, 
which can best be tolerated "if humans can find some agent who is responsible for 
suffering, an agent who can become the repository of resentment" (Connolly 1985 
pl53). That agent is the subject of the Christian God. Whereas the Greek gods took 
guilt upon themselves in their interference in human affairs, the Christian God "demands 
that humanity assume responsibility for suffering and evil" (1988 pl58). Connolly goes
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on to suggest that part of the role of psychology is to substitute for the role of the priest, 
so abetting those demands, to
deflect resentment against suffering in life back into the self, manufacturing it into 
energy 'for the purposes of self-discipline, self-surveillance and 
self-overcoming'[Nietzsche 1969 111,16 pl28].
(Connolly 1988 pl58)
To undertake this task, psychology must presume a 'self therefore capable of self-
knowledge, ultimately transparent, "the last slumbering outpost of the view that the
world is a design" (1988 pl49).
The nature of the suffering to which Connolly and Nietzsche refer is "the problem of our
meaning, and we seek to give meaning to our suffering" (1988 pl53). However, we do
not simply subside into resentment, we employ reason to help us in our quest for
meaning. Nietzsche agrees that reason is necessary to life, but argues also that it is
"insufficient" (1988 p i54).
Suppose human bodies... and external nature... contain elements stubbornly 
opaque to human knowledge, resistant to incorporation into human projects, 
recalcitrant to assimilation into the modern model of selfhood. Under these 
conditions each worthy design we enact will subjugate some characteristics while 
releasing others create new resistances while dissolving previous ones, and 
engender new contingencies while taming old ones.
(Connolly 1988 pl32)
It is this "ontology of resistances", Connolly argues, which is Nietzsche's most 
important contribution to modern thought. Rather than viewing gentrification as a form 
of class constitution, following Nietzsche, we can view it as creating its own resistances, 
engendering otherness. Gentrification then is not a proxy for class struggles instituted 
elsewhere and continued in the gentrification process; it is not even a proxy by which 
debates over class struggle and its significance might be carried forward. Gentrification 
is irrelevant to those debates.
Nietzsche argues that reason and the knowledge it brings impose form on the world,
make it comprehensible and permit us to act within it. Reason and knowledge take the
form of a will to power "the will to give form to something and to fix it in its form
despite resistances it may offer" (1988 p i44).
Knowledge does not correspond to the real world; it arranges a world for us in 
which our existence is made possible...
(Connolly 1988 pl45)
Another way of putting this is to deny the premise that knowledge of the world is a 
preliminary to acquiring the power to change the world. Instead, argues Nietzsche, 
knowledge and power go hand in hand. It could be argued that Marx argues the same 
point in his famous thesis on Feuerbach: "philosophers have merely interpreted the
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world, in various ways; the point however is to change it." (Marx, 1975, p423). Here
. the difference between Marx and Nietzsche is the degree to which they believe the world
is susceptible of change, and whether the change can ever be finalized. Nietzsche argues
that the very imperative to change which Marx proclaims also engenders resistance to that
imperative. It is not that there are already in existence opposing forces, but that the will
to power itself creates the resistance to its purposes. It is the struggle between this will to
power and the resistances it engenders, even within the psychological self, which
provides the impetus to politics and change,
perhaps each [form of life] encounters resistance because no actual form of life 
speaks to every drive and tendency in the species. Perhaps each form of life has 
to suppress some appealing possibilities to enable others to be
(Connolly 1988 pl47)
Thus Nietzsche's ontology of resistances provides an account of personal motivation 
which does not depend on psychology, and thus avoids the problem of infinite regress. 
Instead, it points out the insistences and the ideological manoeuvrings which have created 
the psychological view of the self. "To be a subject is to have unity imposed upon the 
self which stirs up resistance and struggle within the self (the unconscious, insanity, 
perversity, depression, etc.)" (Connolly 1988 p i57 - cf. Giddens 1990). Nietzsche 
denies that the world is created according to a plan; things do not inevitably fit together in 
the last instance. The contingencies contained in each human life "are likely to collide 
with each other in various ways. Nor does this constellation of contingent dispositions 
contain, even when examined deeply, an essence which must be realized" (1988 pl63).
Human life is paradoxical at its core, while modern reason, penetrating into new 
corners of life, strives to eliminate every paradox it encounters. This is a 
dangerous combination, with repressive potentialities. It is dangerous to deny the 
paradox, either by ignoring the urge to unity or by pretending that it can be 
realized in life.
(Connolly 1988 p i39)
If it is alleged that there is some transcendental plan to the world then, Connolly argues, 
this creates a politics "in which that which does not fit into the organizational scheme is 
defined as objective incapacity, or irrationality, or sickness, or perversity, or 
irresponsibility or enemy" (1988 pl39). Here then we have the philosophical 
underpinning explaining the origins of the metaphors of gentrification as sin or disease, 
and gentrifiers as aliens or mutants.
This position may seem unacceptably nihilistic. I would argue not (see 3.7 below). If 
on the other hand it is conceded that there is no such transcendental plan to the world, 
then the restlessness of "the desire to find a home in the world" (1988 pl38), to make 
meaning out of the world, becomes more understandable. In the case of gentrification.
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this desire to make meaning by finding a home in the world exists both literally and 
metaphorically.
These observations on Nietzsche raise one final point which needs to be dealt with before 
leaving this review of the current state of gentrification studies. This is the question of 
realism and its claims to provide a philosophical foundation for the social sciences. 
Realists argue that the world exists independently of our theories of it (Pratt 1990). 
Nietzsche would deny this. So what? The gentrification debate has been strongly 
influenced by realist arguments, even if not in the way those making the arguments had 
hoped or intended. It has also suffered considerably from essentialist reasoning, 
characterizing gentrifiers as aliens and gentrification as sin or disease. This would lead 
one to the strong suspicion that these two conditions are in some way related. In what 
follows, I argue that they are. However, arguing that they are so related serves a further 
purpose, which is to justify the adoption of perspectives such as those derived from 
Nietzsche on the gentrification debate which may seem peculiar from the realist 
standpoint which dominates the current debate.
3.7 Essentialism  and realism in gentrification studies
The unexamined use of metaphor accounts for the essentialism inherent in the argument
that gentrification is class constitution. Graham (1990) provides an introduction to the
problem of essentialism in sociological debates on class, based on the work of Resnick
and Wolff (1987), She argues that the problem with essentialist notions in sociological
theory is that since the objects under investigation are presumed to be at root explicable
by a single cause, be it the economy or human nature, they
...become phenomena of the historical essence rather than uniquely and complexly 
determined historical moments.
(Graham 1990 p56)
She argues that to avoid this problem it is necessary to see the role of theory, not as
seeking the discovery of "truth by finding the essence or essences of social life", but as
producing "a particular knowledge" (p59)
That knowledge is specific, fragmentary, ephemeral and contradictory rather than 
universal, unified, cumulative and consistent. Like other processes, Imowledge is 
not the phenomenon of an essence. It does not correspond to, or mirror, an 
essential reality.
(Graham 1990 p59)
Such arguments can be seen as a direct response to Nietzsche's description of theory as 
homesickness: "the demand, the insistence that one realize within theory what one yearns
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for most in life". Fundamental to the essences invoked in essentialist theories is the 
notion that they are the "presuppositions and assumptions one treats as the 
unquestionable standard by which all other elements in the theory are to be judged" 
(Connolly 1988 pl35).
Such a position, denying any privileged position to scientific knowledge, may seem
unacceptably nihilist. Indeed this position does deny such a privilege to scientific
knowledge, because to do so would be to claim that the essence of scientific activity was
the search for truth. But this is because, as Nietzsche insisted, knowledge and power
cannot be separated (cf. Prigogine & Stengers 1984).
Power relations permeate the most ordinary activities in scientific research. 
Scientific knowledge arises out of these power relations rather than in opposition 
to them....
The power relations that open up a field of scientific practice are also relations of 
disclosure of truth. In working on the world we find out what it is like. The world is 
not something inaccessible on the far side of our theories and observations. It is what 
shows up in our practices, what resists or accommodates us as we try to act upon it. 
Scientific research, along with the other things we do, transforms the world and the 
ways it can make itself known...
(Rouse 1987 p24-5)
There is not much in Rouse's argument that would pose problems for a Marxist 
commitment to praxis as the test of theoretical adequacy. But there is a lot in the 
argument which poses problems for realist arguments, by which I mean the critical realist 
or transcendental realist arguments advanced by Keat & Urry (1975), Sayer (1984 
1989), Outhwaite (1987) and Bhaskar (1979 1986 1989).
The realist position to which Bhaskar holds believes that in principle power and
knowledge can be separated, that
power can achieve our motivation to achieve knowledge and can deflect us from 
such achievement, but it can play no constructive role in determining what 
knowledge is.
(Rouse 1987 pl4)
The realist separation of knowledge and power accounts for its failure actually to provide
an account of the success of scientific enquiry. The success of any actually existing
science does not require the postulates of realist ontology to account for that success.
The realist is trying to provide a scientifically respectable answer to a question that 
science has for good reason ruled illegitimate. Once we have given the best 
available scientific account of a phenomenon, there is nothing more to be said 
about why that account is successful.
(Rouse 1987 p i39 emphasis added)
However, the Nietzschean anti-essentialist account of the unity of knowledge and power
is able to provide a basis for the claims of scientific discourse to intellectual status,
namely the success of scientific methods in changing the world as we know it.
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Rouse wishes to move us beyond realism and anti-realism, and I raise doubts about the 
realist project here, not to engage in a fully fledged critique of realist philosophy, but 
merely to point out that realist objections to deprivileging the status of scientific discourse 
lose some of their cogency in the face of the ability of other perspectives than realism to 
provide an account of the success of science, in terms of practice rather than in theory. 
At the same time however, the criticism of critical realism should not be allowed to spill 
over into an attack on the status of science itself. It is a common tendency in post­
modernist thought, which also uses Nietzsche's arguments, to do just that (Sarup 1988, 
Giddens 1990). However, the latest revolution in scientific thought, chaos theory, is 
taken by many of its practitioners to be a vindication of Nietzsche's arguments both for 
an ontology of resistances and the inseparability of knowledge and power (Prigogine & 
Stengers 1984 pl28). As Rouse puts it
the turn from representation to manipulation, from knowing that to knowing how, 
does not reject the commonsense view that science helps disclose the world about 
us.
(Rouse 1987 p25)
R.Williams' arguments for the use of the concepts of hegemony and structure of feeling
also provide support for Rouse's Nietzschean position. Williams argued that the concept
of hegemony was important for Marxist analysis by pointing to a common habit in social
and historical enquiry:
In most description and analysis, culture and society are expressed in an 
habitual past tense. The strongest barrier to the recognition of human cultural 
activity is this immediate and regular conversion of experience into finished 
products... Analysis is then centred on relations between these produced 
institutions, formations and experiences, so that now, as in that produced past, 
only the fixed explicit forms exist, and living presence is always, by definition, 
receding.
... And then if the social is the fixed and explicit - the known relationships, 
institutions, formations or positions - all that is present and moving, all that 
escapes or seems to escape from the fixed and the explicit and the known, is 
grasped and defined as the personal: this, here, now, alive, active, 'subjective'.
(Williams, 1977 pl28)
It is to combat this "basic eiTor", the "reduction of the social to fixed forms", and the 
reduction of historical to epochal analysis, that Williams proposed the use of the concept 
of "structures of feeling" (ibid.).
Williams links the construction of hegemony to the processes of a tradition of selection 
(R.Williams 1977). Of all the events which have occurred in the past, a judicious 
selection is made in order to persuade the subjects of that hegemony that the present order 
of things is natural and ine vitable. However, this process of selection, and the objectives 
behind it are essentially the same as those carried out by social scientists. Of all the
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events which have occurred in the past, some are selected as significant, and used to 
persuade the reader that, given this structure of significant events, the outcomes which 
resulted were inevitable, given that the agents in the narrative made the choices 
(determined by the structure) that they did. Furthermore, being inevitable, given these 
choices, these outcomes appear natural, that is to say, we are convinced by the 
explanation offered for the events cited. Given that hegemony is about maintaining 
power, and social science about producing knowledge, it seems to me that Williams' 
arguments on hegemony bear out Nietzsche's argument that knowledge and power 
cannot be distinguished.
To continue this discussion would take us far beyond the realms of this thesis. As 
stated, the point of raising it is to demonstrate that to advance an interpretation of 
gentrification based on Nietzsche's arguments is not simply a case of intellectual 
dilettantism in need of Occam's razor, for two reasons. First it can be shown that such 
an interpretation can be supported by other literature. Secondly however that other 
literature also raises serious doubts about the usefulness of the realist paradigm which 
has dominated the gentrification debate. Even if these doubts turn out not to be fully 
substantiate, they nonetheless make it impossible, given the present state of the debate 
between the realists and their critics, to rely unreservedly on realist arguments to 
guarantee the scientificity of science. A fortiori therefore, we cannot rely on realism to 
provide a guarantee of the scientificity of the social sciences, nor therefore on realist 
methodologies to provide an adequate account of gentrification.
The failings in the application of realist explanations in the gentrification debate cannot 
therefore be laid solely at the doors of inexperience or ineptitude. Pratt's otherwise 
favourable article notes that a "key sticking point in the practical application of critical 
realism is research methodology", Sayer (1984) being no more than "a rather vague 
'recipe book' approach" (Pratt 1990 p254). I now wish to argue, on the basis of the 
arguments presented above, that realism is chronically prone to essentialism, no matter 
how much it seeks to avoid this, because of the realist principle that the world, including 
in particular the social world, exists prior to, and independent of, knowledge of that 
world.
Sayer (1990 p220) concedes that his work "tends to lack reference to needs". However,
when we look at what Sayer endorses as among the "important conclusions" of the
"critique of interpretative social science", we can see exactly why this should be so:
In interpreting sets of ideas which are inconsistent or at variance with actual 
conditions^ errors or illusions cannot be ignored without failing to show why 
actions produce the results they do. In other words, the attempt to restore or 
recover meaning inevitably slides into the reduction o f illusion, and hence into
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critical social science.
(Sayer 1989 p209 emphasis added)
Now, who is to say what the "actual conditions" actually are, and who is suffering from 
the illusion? It should be quite clear from the demonstration of the metaphors of 
gentrification presented in this chapter that this is not nearly as obvious as Sayer would 
appear to believe. I do not mean to imply that Sayer is saying the answer to these 
questions would be necessarily easy to find. But what he certainly is saying is that in 
principle, there is an answer, and it is fmdable.
Baehr (1990) terms such a position "substantive a priorism", and criticizes Bhaskar’s
tendency to adopt such a position (e.g., Bhaskar 1989). Baehr's criticism of Bhaskar
supports my criticism of Sayer. Bhaskar intends critical realism to be an emancipatory
project, but Baehr points out the dangers of the rationalism inherent in this approach
The idea of 'real interests' which critical realism depends on, is also notoriously 
difficult to untangle and constantly in danger of authoritarian definition [just as I 
have shown in the case of gentrification as sin and disease]. Another problem 
concerns social heterogeneity and incompatible desires:... what is emancipation 
to one person may be sheer hell to another
(Baehr 1990 p773)
The insistence that there is an answer, returns us to the problem of Engels' curious 
investigator and his constant pursuit of facts in an effort to reach a conclusion which he 
cannot quite bring off (Blanchard 1985 p64-65), and ignores the synecdochal quality of 
the data gained in such investigations. When would we know that we had enough facts 
to say what needs really were authentic and not illusory? It is to avoid being impaled on 
the horns of the dilemma of the insistence that there is an answer, but not ever really 
being sure of what that answer would look like, which accounts for the reason for the 
(admitted) lack of reference to needs in Sayer's work. A priori, you already know what 
those needs are, or ought to be. If the expressed needs do not coincide with the 'real' 
needs, then action is needed to reduce the illusion. Hence any serious engagement with 
the question of needs goes by the board. This is exactly the problem at the heart of the 
gentrification debate, but this time we see it in Sayer's own work, the heart of the 
inspiration for so much of that debate. Perhaps realism does work best as a critique of 
chaotic conceptions.
In Twilight o f the Idols, Nietzsche presents a critique of the concept of the real world as 
"the history of an illusion" and concludes by saying that when we have abolished the 
apparent world, we abolish the real world too (Connolly 1988 pl43).
What does it mean to say that the abolition of the real world is also the end of 
the apparent world? Is this another idealism (the real world is what its most 
consummate constituters take it to be)? No. The world of appearance has
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always been defined through contrast to the real world, to the world as it is 
knowable in itself. If the latter disappears, the world defined by contrast to it 
must too. They come and go together. If there is no Knower who can know 
the world in itself, then we must begin to think about the enterprise of 
knowledge differently.
(Nietzsche, quoted in Connolly 1988 p 143-4)
In the spirit of this injunction, Baehr concludes his critical comments on Bhaskar’s 
commitment to critical realism by arguing for an appreciation of the limits of rationality, 
in much the same terms as I have argued here: "the inherent opacity as opposed to 
transparency of much of our lives... the ethical irrationality of the world... our biological 
vulnerability" (p775), in short, precisely those issues which Nietzsche places at the heart 
of his philosophy.
At the same time however, Baehr does not wish his reservations as to the longterm 
validity of the realist project spill over into an endorsement of irrationalism. 
Consequently he ends by giving partial endorsement to realism. However, there are 
other options to choose from than irrationalism or realism, and for this I return to 
Graham’s article.
If science cannot be privileged on the basis of realist arguments, and has no privileged 
position anyway on the basis of the anti-essentialist arguments; and if there are no 
essences (including transcendentally real essences) for it to investigate, how can 
scientific activity proceed in any meaningful sense of the term? The first step in the 
answer is by reference to Rouse's emphasis on science as a practical activity, as first and 
foremost a way of acting, not a way of knowing. As a way of acting however, it is 
distinguishable from other ways of acting. Graham begins by arguing that the world and 
all its constituent parts form a constantly changing set of interacting processes. No 
process can be privileged above all others, but perspectives can be taken on those 
processes, and this is what scientific activity does:
In other words, theorists pick one or several processes as 'entry points’ into 
the infinitely complex and ceaselessly changing social totality. An entry point is 
a starting place in social analysis rather than an essence of social life. Starting 
with a particular entry point cannot give us a better understanding of the social 
totality than we would have if we started somewhere else. But it will give us a 
dijferent understanding, which produces different effects...
..Rather than discovering truth by finding the essence or essences of social life, 
theory produces a particular knowledge. That knowledge is specific, 
fragmentary, ephemeral and contradictory rather than universal, unified, 
cumulative and consistent. Like other processes, knowledge is not^the 




Although neither Graham nor Resnick and Wolff (1987) cite Nietzsche in their
arguments, it is clear that their position is an endorsement of Nietzsche's, as well as
constituting a cogent alternative to realist arguments. Nietzsche's emphasis is on
perspective rather than on truth: since knowledge and power are inseparable, there is no
truth, no 'reality', only reality-organizing perspectives, such as Park argues Darwin took
when developing the theory of evolution (Park 1936 - 1952 p i45, Chapter 6.2 below),
or as Blanchard suggests when he argues that the city "must be defined anew each time it
is investigated" (1985 p70), or as Prigogine and Stengers (1984) argue is from the
perspective of chaos theory. As Graham puts it:
Without a nonessentialist theory of knowledge, the quest for knowledge may 
become a quest for a singular truth.
(Graham 1990 p60)
Graham's conclusions endorse what 1 have been arguing in this chapter. People 
analyzing gentrification have basically disapproved of it. Consequently their realist 
analyses, admittedly value-laden but (ostensibly) objective nonetheless, have sought to 
demonstrate the truth of their prejudices. One of the most difficult prejudices for them to 
overcome has been their attitude that gentrification as fashion is irrational while at the 
same time insisting that it must be functional. The rationality of gentrification 
consequently escaping the analyzers' conceptions of what rationality must be, and 
therefore what gentrification's function might be, its analyzers are then happy to conclude 
that the rationality in gentrification is something alien, and its functions sinful and 
diseased. As I have said, the peculiar results of such prejudices cannot be laid solely at 
the door of realism, but I would argue that it has certainly contributed to the problem.
Is there, finally, a Marxist theory that fulfills the requirements insisted on by the critique
of essentialism in social theory? Graham endorses Resnick and Wolffs perspective, but
typically, does not claim that it is the only perspective that Marxism could adopt:
In Marxist theory of the kind practiced by Resnick and Wolff, the concept of 
class is the entry point to social analysis. This means that the concept of class is 
central to a particular Marxist discourse but it does not mean that it is central to 
social life... It is simply more important to a certain group of Marxists... they 
hope to draw attention to the neglected role of class in constituting society and 
to affect the ways in which class processes are understood, opposed and 
transformed.
(Graham 1990 p61)
As I demonstrate in the next chapter, I do not use class as the entry point to social 
analysis, for the reason that 1 believe that class analyses in general tend to the same a 
priorism that Baehr notes in Bhaskar and which I have argued is also present in Sayer. 
Instead, I use accumulation as the entry point.
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3.8 Conclusion
I have now concluded the first item on the agenda outlined for the remainder of this thesis 
in support of my contention that gentrification may best be explained in terms of personal 
rather than class constitution. This was to establish a framework for the discussion of 
identity and the need for self-definition which will not at base appeal to notions of 
essential differences between individuals. I have argued that the way to achieve this 
objective is to reject realist arguments currently dominant in gentrification studies in 
favour of a perspective based on Nietzsche, and to begin from the problem of making 
sense of modem life generally. The realist perspective presumes knowledge of the nature 
of modem society, just as the Protestant tradition assumes knowledge of heaven.
However, as I have also argued, the appeal to notions of essential differences between 
individuals is supported by discussions of class issues which similarly require that 
members of different classes do have essentially different natures. The argument that 
gentrifiers have essentially different natures to the rest of the middle classes draws 
support from such arguments. In the next chapter, I will discuss the limitations in the 
models of class stmcture used by the participants in the gentrification debate in order to 
show how the tendency to essentialism comes about. The lack of understanding of 
demand issues in discussions of agency carries over into lack of understanding of 
demand issues in class constitution.
84
4 Divisions in society - class or status?
4.1 Introduction
Among the implications of the consensus that gentrification represents a form of class 
constitution are the assumptions that, just as we all agree on what society is, we all agree 
on what classes are, and what the impact on explanations of class constitution would be 
if, for example, a new middle class was indeed discovered through the process of 
gentrification. The question of class has in consequence been de-problematized in the 
gentrification debate, despite the attention ostensibly given to questions of class in 
gentrification studies. The debate has been reduced to arguments over the appropriate 
interpretation of evidence gathered for the purpose of establishing whether this particular 
form of class constitution known as gentrification and the society it exemplifies is best 
explicable in Marxist or non-Marxist terms. The past two chapters have shown how the 
ostensible purpose of the exercise, to provide an explanation of gentrification, has 
suffered as a result.
However, an alternative explanation might be that the participants in the gentrification 
debates simply have not been very good at theorizing class constitution. With a better 
understanding of what class constitution entails, the insistence that gentrification is a 
form of class constitution might be justified. It is therefore necessary on both counts to 
address directly the debates on class constitution to which attempts at the explanation of 
gentrification have been staked as a prize.
4.2 Optimism and disillusion in the state of class theory
According to both Bell (1989) and Pahl (1989), the work of Marshall, Newby, Rose & 
Volger (1988) provides the best evaluation of the contemporary debates on social class. 
Marshall & al. undertook a large empirical research project on Social Class in Modern 
Britain as part of an international project initiated by Erik Clin Wright in order to obtain 
internationally comparable information on the class composition of different societies. 
They however took advantage of this opportunity to evaluate empirically the models of 
class formation provided on the one hand by Wright and on the other by Goldthorpe. 
This they are able to do by classifying and reclassifying the respondents in their survey 
(of 1770 people) according to the criteria deemed as relevant by Wright, Goldthorpe and 
the Registrar-General, thus providing a unique opportunity to compare the apparently 
incommensurable (Bell 1989).
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Their work discovered deficiencies in the arguments of both Wright and Goldthorpe, 
Wright's in his coding of occupational categories, and Goldthorpe's in his treatment of 
gender issues. Wright's classification, they feel, is simply out of date. Consequently his 
coding procedures produce a picture of increasing proletarianization in the modem 
workforce but this picture is not backed up by any evidence of changes in working 
conditions which might indicate proletarianization, such as increased work discipline, or 
less control over problem solving procedures. White collar work was not becoming 
deskilled with the expansion of the middle classes (p i36). Nor did they find any 
evidence of class dealignment in voting patterns, a crucial test of the contrary 
embourgeoisement thesis. Working class voters had not adopted middle class attitudes 
and aspirations. Labour did badly in the eighties, not because it was a class party, but 
because it was not very good at being a class party (p230ff.).
Goldthorpe, they argued, seriously underplays the importance of gender issues in 
structuring life chances. As Marshall & al. put it, to follow Goldthorpe in his dismissal 
of the importance of gender influences on life chances in the UK would be like 
dismissing race issues when assessing life chances in South Africa.
They were also able to comment on the Dunleavy - Saunders claim that sectoral 
consumption cleavages were of more importance than class, a claim of great importance 
in postindustrialist explanations of gentrification. Marshall & al. concluded that there 
was no evidence from their investigations to suggest that such cleavages exist (Marshall 
& al. 1988 pl83-184).
In general Marshall & al. found a remarkable stability in the class structure of British
society and in the importance of class to that society. By class, Marshall & al. mean
occupational categories. They found however that nearly 80% of people could think of
no other criterion for class identification. Furthermore, class was "by far the most salient
frame of reference employed in the construction of social identities" (pl48). Bell (1989)
finds this work greatly exciting, insofar as it is able to put many controversies in
sociological debates to empirical test. He goes so far as to say that the "carefully
empirically based paradigm" of Marshall & al.
takes over the others and makes them henceforth essentially unnecessary. For 
me at least the dedication of SCMB [Social Class in Modem Britain] to John 
H.Goldthorpe and Erik Olin Wright is deeply ironic for this book is writing 
them out of sociological history.
(Bell 1989 p789)
As far as Bell is concerned,
SCMB is a real tour de force of class analysis. It represents the very best
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sociology produced in Britain and is of the highest international standard.
(Bell 1989 p792)
Nonetheless, problems remain, as Pahl's reaction to the same volume testifies. Bell 
regards the superiority of the work of Marshall & al. to lie in their practice of class 
analysis, letting others argue about theoretical rationales: Pahl's doubts surround the very 
practice of class analysis itself.
Pahl doubts concern the basic sociological concept of "structure-consciousness-action 
[SCA]", which, he notes, is to sociology what the concept of the labour market is to 
economics; is used at all levels of aggregation, from analyses of squatters to international 
blocs; and in both Marxist and non-Marxist contexts. Pahl's doubts are all the more 
piquant since Bell credits him with having made a significant contribution to the thinking 
of Marshall & al. on just these matters. Pahl explains the SCA model in the following 
terms:
The basic idea is that there is something inherent in the social and economic 
circumstances of categories or classes of people that leads them, apparently with 
deterministic logic, to acquire radical consciousness of their oppressed, 
deprived or exploited situation
(Pahl 1989 p711)
As the past two chapters have shown, this acount of the belief system underlying SCA 
fairly well summarizes the attitudes of the participants in the gentrification debate, 
whereby structure (- new middle class or capital logic) —> consciousness (- aesthetics of 
kitsch) —> action (- gentrification). Pahl's article has stimulated considerable debate 
within the pages of t h e ( e . g . ,  Crompton, 1991, Marshall 1991, 
Mullins 1991). Nonetheless, Pahl's central reservations stand (Pahl 1991).
Ultimately, Pahl argues, this model derives from Marx, even its neo-Weberian variants. 
In fact, SCA is the heritage of the denial of the salience of demand issues in Marxian 
theory (cf. N.Smith's avoidance of demand issues - 2.3.4 above), due to Marx's 
definition of subsistence in terms of the reproduction of individuals rather than of society 
as a whole (Redfem 1987, 1992). With Marx's definition, workers have no more choice 
in their reproduction strategies than they do in productive labour (Pasinetti 1977). 
Different classes may receive different bundles of subsistence and therefore their 
lifestyles may be different, but these differences flow directly from their different 
relations to the structure. Therefore their actions are determined directly by the structure. 
Pahl argues that the traditional (mis)use of SCA is to romanticize the underclass: their 
social and economic circumstances leads them to acquire radical consciousness of their 
ability to exploit their situation.
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The concomitant to romanticizing the underclass is of course to disparage the pretensions 
of the overclass, which is where the analogies of gentrification as sin and disease arise. 
In fact the logic of SCA applies equally as well in the case of the postmodern new middle 
class, their social and economic circumstances leading them to acquire radical 
consciousness of their ability to exploit their situation, and gentrify. The bias in favour 
of the underclass is due to tradition, not inherent in the model, as Pahl points ou t What 
is inherent and problematical is the inherent assumption that the model itself is 
unproblematical:
Those who use this model rarely recognize that the links in the chain S - C - A 
have not been adequately theorized. The model is seen as unproblematical 
when... it is based on notions of a theory of action which, in practice, does not 
exist...
(Pahl 1989 p712)
This, it can readily be seen, is the basic problem underlying the insistence that
gentrification be discussed in terms of its impact on theories of class constitution. The
SCA model within which those theories are couched is itself seen as unproblematical,
and leads to a theory of action which is based on some unalterable attribute of the class
position involved, and which consequently is inexorable in its nature. Pahl pleads for
recognition by sociologists that
what matters is not whether there are shifts in occupational prestige or in the 
distribution of earnings and wealth but how such putative shifts work out in 
terms of consciousness and action...
(Pahl 1989 p713)
The two previous chapters have demonstrated that participants in the gentrification debate 
have singularly failed to show how the shifts in the class constitution of society have 
worked out in terms of consciousness and action. The models they have adopted have 
had the effect of ruling out the operation of consciousness altogether. They have reduced 
their accounts of gentrifiers' behaviour to a sinful and diseased alien reflex. They share 
the same problems as those sociologists "who busy themselves with allocating 
individuals, households, occupations or distinctive employment relations into 
categories":
...stuck at the stage of analysing structure, the S of the model, which may or may 
not have consequences for consciousness and action.
(ibid.)
"Those who wish to make the concept of class do some work for them would 
presumably like to fit it into the SCA model by using it to define the S..."(Pahl 1989 
p713). However
There is evident danger of circular reasoning so that socioeconomic conditions 




Trying "to make the concept of class work" results also in circular arguments for the 
participants in the gentrification debate, generalizing from gentrification to society. 
Gentrification is taken to herald the coming of post-industrial society, because in post­
industrial society, consumption, that is, gentrification is the defining characteristic. But, 
as Pahl argues
Analytical distinctions related to a putative class structure are of interest only if 
they lead to greater understanding. The reason why sociologists concern 
themselves with embourgeoisement or proletarianization is not because they are 
simply interested in refining a classificatory scheme, but because these social 
processes, if they exist, are assumed to lead to significant social change through 
evolutionary or revolutionary processes.
(Pahl 1989 p713)
Unfortunately, as Chapter 2 has shown, participants in the gentrification debate have 
often concerned themselves with gentrification, precisely because of its supposed 
significance in judging the adequacy of one classificatory scheme or another. 
Consequently the understanding of gentrification has not been particularly far advanced. 
To justify this lack of understanding, we are instead presented with reasons, such as 
chaotic conceptions, why we will never have a satisfactory explanation of gentrification.
Not only is there a problem with the sterility inherent in the bias toward categorization for 
categorization's sake, but the shift to postindustrial modes of explanation has also created 
a problem with the process of categorization itself. Ley only moved in on the 
gentrification debate following his criticisms of structural Marxism. Similarly Rose's 
discussion of gentrification sought to use it as a means whereby the uneven development 
of Marxist theory might be overcome. The current state of the gentrification debate and 
its implicit characterization of the actors in the gentrification process bear out exactly 
Pahl’s observations on the consequences of a commitment to explaining social 
phenomena in terms of class:
[Post-industrialism] shifts the argument away from the categorization of 
individuals, families and households by their attributes to a categorization 
according to their attitudes and values. It would obviously be convenient if 
there were a congruence between the two, so that social attitudes could be read 
off from economic positions. Since that does not seem to work empirically, 
traditional class analysts are in more than a little trouble...
(Pahl, ibid.)
SCA, in other words, represents the terms of the consensus in the gentrification debate.
The debate revolves around the question of which account of S is the most plausible. It
has never got on to consciousness or action. Pahl concludes that
class as a force for political and social change is problematic, since the links in 
the SCA chain are inadequately theorized and there is little empirical indication
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that the model has much relevance in practice. Secondly, as a classificatory 
device, class does little to help us understand the lifestyles of the privileged and 
adds notliing to the brute facts of poverty when considering the other end of the 
social structure. Finally it is apparently well nigh impossible to operationalize 
the concept in order to make international comparisons.
(Pahl 1989 p715)
Pahl refutes any suggestion that he might be thought to be "arguing out sociological 
theory from urban and regional analysis" (p719), or that capitalism can ever be anything 
other than a class society. But, he insists, for all practical purposes, "it is difficult to see 
what, specifically is added to the analysis" by invocation of class and class 
consciousness. Pahl concludes by calling for consumption to be taken seriously in 
sociological analyses - and hopes to provoke serious debate "instead of flaccid 
neologisms huddling under the umbrella of postmodernism" (p719).
These criticisms of sociology by one of its major practitioners, in part in reaction to what 
Bell, another of its most distinguished figures, has called the very best of British 
sociology, evidence a deep-rooted problem in the practice of sociology. Pahl’s 
comments are particularly evidenced by the characteristics of the gentrification debate. 
This is both a challenge and a cause for optimism. The optimism is caused by the fact 
that the criticisms of the gentrification debate conducted in the first two chapters are borne 
out by Pahl's comments on sociological analyses generally. There is support in the 
literature for the lonely position denying the relevance of class to gentrification and vice 
versa. The challenge then is to devise a model of social organization and change into 
which an account of gentrification can be placed, since it is clear from Pahl's comments 
that sociological theory will not be of much help. There is no space here to provide such 
a model. However, I have outlined the framework of such a model elsewhere (Redfem 
1992 - see also Chapter 5 below).
4.3 SCA and the debate on the middle class
I rely in this section on the work of Sarre (1989), whose textbook summary of the 
principal features of the sociological aspects of class analysis, may be taken as a model of 
the standard sociological discussion of the issues at stake in class analysis. This model 
provides a useful illustration from sociology of those problems of SCA which Pahl 
identified. It therefore demonstrates the necessity for radically re-addressing the question 
of the role of class and class analysis in gentrification studies. It should be noted that the 
remarks in this section are therefore addressed at this model itself, not at Sarre’s 
treatment of it.
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Gentrification involves the displacement of so-called working class from residential areas 
by so-called middle-class people. In the sociological literature, there seems to be little 
doubt as to what constitutes the working class (see below). The problems appear to arise 
when considering the middle class. Sarre for example begins his review of the middle 
classes in contemporary Britain with a discussion of the problems in defining the middle 
class, but when he comes to review the working classes, he simply launches into a 
discussion of the arguments about whether and how they might be said to suffer from 
erosion from above and below. The question of the definition of the working class does 
not arise. The clear implication is that this question is quite unproblematical. As far as 
Sarre is concerned, they are manual workers, though we only find this out in his 
discussion of the problem of defining the lower middle class.
Since the middle class must, by definition, be distinguished from the ruling class above, 
and the working class below, definitions of all classes are in theory equally 
problematical. However, as Sarre illustrates, most attention has concentrated on the 
middle classes. This is because in sociological theory generally, not just in debates on 
gentrification, the continued existence of the middle classes poses a major problem for 
Marxist theory:
because of the influence of the notion that Marx had defined only two classes in 
capitalist societies, and that the intervening classes would gradually polarize into 
eiüier the bourgeoisie or, more likely, into the proletariat. A typical traditional 
Marxist response would be to conclude that even senior managers were 
employees, and hence workers, and that their failure to recognize the fact was 
the result of 'false consciousness'
(Sarre 1989 pl03)
The problem of the middle classes however only arises because of SCA. It operates in 
this particular context in reverse mode; instead of referring consciousness and action to 
the effects of structure, it infers structure from action and consciousness. Sarre's 
traditional Marxist responds to the existence of the middle class by arguing that even 
senior managers are employees "and hence workers" (op. cit., emphasis added). The 
resultant false consciousness results precisely because according to the precepts of the 
SCA paradigm, the consciousness of senior managers ought to be determined by their 
structural location. Since senior managers, if they are part of the proletariat, are 'hence' 
workers, so also, 'hence', according to the traditional Marxist, they ought to identify 
with workers in general. The obvious implausibility of such a situation is clearly 
apparent and this is the foundation of the doubts about Marxist class analysis.
Sarre in fact argues that there are two reasons why the middle classes pose a problem for 
Marxist theory: as well as "their intermediate position between bourgeoisie and 
proletariat", there is also the problem of "their heterogeneity" (1989 pl02). This would
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imply that the working class is comparatively homogenous in character and 
unproblematical to define. Sarre mentions three ways in which the middle class is 
heterogeneous compared to the working class: new kinds of middle class occupation, 
such as social worker, differentiated hierarchies of power and responsibility; people with 
the same occupational qualifications appearing in different employment situations - 
solicitors for example, who might be self-employed in partnerships or as state or private 
sector employees.
There appears however no convincing reason why any or all of these characteristics
should be the peculiar possession of the middle classes.
When the criteria used to indicate a new middle class are applied to the working 
class., differences appear within it [the working class] which are as great as 
those between what are supposed to be discrete and complete new middle and 
working classes.
(Barbelat 1986 p567)
The working class in the standard model is defined by and large only in order to give 
point to the definition of the middle classes, but the more this definition of the working 
class is examined the more impoverished this strategy seems.
This false opposition implied in Sarre's account between the essential characteristics of 
the work situations of the middle and the working classes ("using [class] to define the 
S..." Pahl 1989 p713) exemplifies just how deep run the problems posed for sociological 
analysis by SCA.
If people do react differently to the same set of external events, according to the model, 
they must therefore be in different structural situations. If not, they would all react in the 
same way. Their consciousness, their frame of reference, would not otherwise be 
different. Structure determines consciousness and consciousness determines action.
Wright's two accounts of class constitution fall into just this SCA loaded trap of 
attempting to interpret contingently different reactions as differences in structural situation 
rather than as contingently different experience (consciousness) within the same 
structural situation.
Wright originally argued that the middle classes occupied contradictory class locations in 
capitalist society (Wright 1976, 1980, also Carchedi 1977; the concept was first 
developed by Poulantzas 1975), because they acted as waged supervisors of waged 
labour. They were therefore said to be located in both the working and capitalist classes. 
Although these ideas were well received whan they first appeared (cf. Massey 1984), 
Wright (1985, 1986) came to the conclusion that this definition should be abandoned.
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The defining characteristic of the middle class on this account was domination. The 
middle classes dominated the working classes but they did not exploit them, and of 
course exploitation is the key to defining classes in Marxist theory. The emphasis on 
domination, a Weberian concept, seriously undermined Wright's intention to combat 
Weberian sociology using an account of the middle classes which was compatible with 
Marxist principles (Low 1990 p i 102).
To return the question of exploitation to the centre of the definition of the middle class, 
Wright then argued, following Roemer (1982), that the middle classes possessed assets 
which they exploited on their own behalf. In particular, they were able to exploit their 
skill assets and the organization assets to their own enrichment, while the capitalists 
continued to exploit their labour power for profit (Wright 1986, p i 19-121). The middle 
classes could therefore be divided into two types: those who while exploiters on some 
dimensions are themselves exploited on others; and those who neither exploit nor are 
exploited (Wright 1986, pl26 - see Figure 4.1 below).
Fig. 4.1 Wright's map of class locations in capitalist society 
Assets in the means of production




































source: from Sarre 1989
Wright hoped by this typology to meet what he considered to be the basic challenge in
Marxist class analysis, namely
the conceptual problem of nonpolarized class positions within a logic of 
polarized class relations.
(Wright, 1986, p i  15)
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The problem of course only arises if it is accepted that a theoretically distinct middle class 
does exist and that the task confronting theorists is therefore to theorize it. Meiksins 
(1986) argues that if Wright’s position is accepted one is then confronted with the 
problem of explaining what the middle class does, the familiar problem of functionalist 
explanation.
To modify Marx's two class theory of society is to modify also Marx's theory of 
capitalist accumulation. Carchedi (1986) argues convincingly that 'exploitation' in 
Wright refers to exploitation in distribution, rather than in production; Wright's definition 
of the middle class is therefore incompatible with Marxist theories of class.
As Carchedi notes, demonstration of this incompatibility would amount to a big "so
what?", were it not for the fact that the criteria chosen by these commentators cause the
historically grounded and dynamic features of Marx's dialectic to be replaced by static
ahistorical categorizations of class functions (Carchedi 1986). Carchedi quotes
Luxembourg to make this point
he moves the question of socialism from the domain of production into the 
domain of relations of fortune - that is, from the relation between capital and 
labour to the relation between rich and poor.
(Luxembourg 1970 p65)
On the question of the actual status of the middle classes, Meiksins argues simply that
the crucial question for class analysis must be: Do the workers perform surplus 
labour?' and What is their relationship to the capitalist class?'
(Meiksins, 1986, p i 13)
His answer is that the middle class do perform surplus labour and that therefore they are
part of the working class.
To argue that the existence of the middle classes does not require modifying Marx's 
"logic of polarized class relations" (Wright loc. cit.) is not inevitably to be reductionist 
about the matter. This apparent reductionism exists in the eyes of base-superstructure 
rather than Marxism. The only reason Wright needs to introduce his extra dimensions of 
exploitation is because of his adherence to SCA. It is inconceivable to Wright that two 
persons in the same structural situation could react differently to the same circumstances. 
Consequently, their structural situations must be different in ways not previously 
uncovered, hence the dimensions of asset exploitation. Consequently, Wright's 
classifications tend to be ad hoc in character, since the organization of employment is 
changing all the time (cf. Carchedi 1986). As noted above, Marshall & al. cast grave 
doubts on the picture of the class structure which results from employing Wright's
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classification procedure.
Savage, Dickens and Fielding (1988 p 470) have nonetheless argued that Wright's (later) 
definition of the middle class fits their empirical findings as to the characteristics of a new 
service class, "the main growth class in contemporary Britain". This is somewhat 
surprising, since the service class concept has been championed in recent years by 
Goldthorpe, and Marshall & al. found that Wright's classifications had very little to do 
with Goldthorpe's.
The service class is composed of those working in the higher reaches of state and TNG 
bureaucracies, providing "'key' services on behalf of the owners of capital" (Savage & 
al. p458.). According to Savage & al., the concept was first outlined by the "Austro- 
marxist Karl Renner in the 1950's". It has recently been elaborated by Lash & Urry as 
well as by Goldthorpe (Savage & al. p458). Mills (1988) and Bondi (1991) have both 
invoked its existence in their contributions to the gentrification debate. It is therefore 
necessary to examine this concept in some detail.
In terms of its provenance, the service class theory owes more to Weber than Marx
(Dickens and Savage n.d., Sarre 1989). In common with most Weberian definitions of
class, "the precise definition of the service class is rather vague" (Savage & al., 1988
p459.). Regardless of its provenance, it still betrays the characteristic problems of SCA.
Sarre for example writes that
More recent discussions of the concept of a service class seem to continue to 
accept the contradictions between services for capital and state bureaucracies, 
without explicit discussion of how these two aspects are to be brought together.
(Sarre 1989 pl06)
Equally necessary however is explicit discussion of why these two aspects should be 
seen as contradictory in the first place. Why should jobs in these two different areas of 
employment be contradictory from the point of class formation? Sarre does not say. He 
goes on to argue that the the case for the existence of a service class "is best left as 'not 
proven'" (1989 pl07).
So, it may be asked, does the service class exist, in spite of its members' disparate 
actions (as exemplified by their record of disparate voting behaviour, indicating non­
uniformity of consciousness)? If it does, the reply might be, so what? What does the 
labelling of this group of people as new service class add to the analysis? Abercrombie & 
Urry (1983) argue for example that the new service class has distinctive causal powers, 
though they are not necessarily manifested.
These powers are to restructure capitalism to maximise the separation between
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conceptualisation and execution, hence de-skilling the labour force and 
maximising the educational and research requirements of the service class itself.
(Sarre 1989 pl06)
This seems a very weak argument. It is the new-class-as-aliens argument in a different 
guise. The new service class, on this account, comprises people with distinct causal 
powers waiting for the opportune moment (contingency) to exercise them, all the time 
insinuating themselves into particular, key, occupations, reminiscent of aliens in U.S. 
science fiction films from the Cold War era.
It is not of course the members of this class or any other which have such powers. The 
powers they possess come to them by virtue of the jobs they hold. In the current state of 
capitalist development, there are a certain number of occupational categories, which we 
may call service class if we so wish, but the powers possessed by occupiers of these 
categories come to them by virtue of their position within a capitalist hierarchy, not by 
their powers as a class. If I accept money, either from an employer, or from the state in 
welfare benefits, I too accept the authority of the institution paying me to control my 
actions, although the extent of the control is a matter of negotiation and compromise. I 
have to obey my employer's instructions, or the instructions of those my contract says I 
am to report to. If I am claiming welfare, I may not work, but must look for work, and 
must report periodically to an officer of the state that I am obeying those instructions. 
Nonetheless, in capitalist society, labour must at all times be free to switch occupations 
(Nuti 1971, Indart 1990) and this limits the ability of my employer to control my actions. 
The pursuit of profit by capitalist institutions is tempered by the requirements of 
producing, reproducing and also retaining a labour force capable of achieving that goal.
To repeat again Pahl's question: What does labelling of different occupations as working 
class or new service class or middle class add to the analysis? It can only be that in so 
doing we can predict certain consequences from knowing what are the class positions of 
these occupation; that is, we can thereby read off consciousness and action from these so- 
called structural labels. Yet as both Sarre and Pahl in their different ways have indicated, 
this is clearly impossible.
Neither can we argue the other way, and say that the action of a person who has accepted 
an occupational position which could qualify them as a member of the new service class 
has demonstrated thereby the particular consciousness which characterizes a member of 
the new service class (Barbelat 1986 makes a similar point - see 4.5 below). Such an 
argument would exemplify the circular reasoning Pahl warns of whereby socioeconomic 
conditions produce 'classes' which are then used as an explanation of those same
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socioeconomic conditions. The SCA model applied to the case of the middle class 
repeats in a wider context exactly the same problems of over-explanation to which 
theories of gentrification are so notoriously prone. It also tends towards essentialist 
explanations of human behaviour, as demonstrated by the tendency to treat the new 
service/middle class as aliens. The critique of essentialism therefore may be seen as 
paralleling Pahl's criticisms of SCA, a possibility 1 examine in the next section.
4.4 Essentialism  in class analysis
1 have already discussed Graham's (1989) introduction to the critique of essentialism in 
Chapter 3 above. Here, 1 wish to examine its relation to Pahl's criticisms of SCA. 
Graham argues that in a nonessentialist Marxism, the notion of class should be seen 
simply as a point of entry into social analysis. "This means that class is central to a 
particular Marxist discourse but it does not mean that it is central to social life." (1989 
p61). This statement can be interpreted as an endorsement of Pahl's criticisms of SCA, 
since the implication of SCA is that class is central to social life, because consciousness 
and actions are determined on the basis of class position. On the other hand, Graham 
goes on to argue that "myriad effects" of the "role of class in constituting society" is 
"neglected", and that non-essentialist Marxists hope to draw attention to this role and "to 
affect the ways in which class processes are understood, opposed and transformed" 
(1989 p61). In other words, it would appear that they hope to place class at the centre of 
social life, presumably with desired (revolutionary) effects on consciousness and action.
So what does Graham understand by class? She defines class as "the process of 
performing, appropriating and distributing surplus labour" (1989 p61), but this, it 
appears, is not a social, but a theoretical process: "The class process... is constructed as 
a theoretical concept and deployed in Marxist theoretical and empirical work" (1989 p61). 
Graham’s argument appears as ontologically cautious as Bhaskar's is ontologically bold.
For a more fully worked out position on non-esentialist notions of class, 1 return to
Resnick & Wolff (1987), on whose position Graham bases her arguments. They argue
that Wright and others, trying to establish a multi-dimensional Marxist theory of class,
merely exchange one essentialism, politics, for another, economics. Resnick & Wolff
therefore set themselves this question
is it possible Marx formulated a theory of class... that is not economic 
determinist, not otherwise essentialist, and not limited to a two class approach?
(Resnick & Wolff 1987 p i 15)
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Their answer is yes. Resnick & Wolff accept the basic two-class division of producers 
and appropriators of surplus labour. This "fundamental" (p ll8 ) division consists of the 
various forms Marx describes, primitive communist, slave, feudal, or capitalist. Apart 
from this fundamental division however, they also employ another concept, namely 
"subsumed" class divisions (pi 18). Subsumed class processes "refer to the distribution 
of already appropriated surplus labour or its products" (pi 18). Resnick & Wolff quote 
from Marx to give examples of such subsumed class positions. In this manner. Resnick 
& Wolff attempt to substantiate their claim that Marxist theory does support a complex 
notion of class.
The problem with their demonstration of a complex Marxian model of class and income
distribution is that it is hard to see what it achieves. As they outline the typology of
contemporary social classes based on their arguments, Resnick & Wolff tell us for
example that the job of managers is to "manage the enterprise’s appropriation of surplus
value" and that without the efforts of managers in this regard, "industrial capitalists
would not realize surplus value" (pl75). Again Pahl's question arises: what specifically
is added to the analysis by dressing this description up in (subsumed or fundamental or
non-) class categories? Not much, it would appear.
The sociologists' insistence on bringing class into the analysis raises 
expectations about what is to be gained from paying attention to such analysis 
which, if not satisfied, results in the scornful dismissal of the subject for being 
overcommitted to meaningless jargon....
Theory in much sociological reporting is in danger of becoming a conventional 
appendage - rather like the marxist-leninist preamble to technical papers 
published by Soviet social scientists in the days before glasnost and perestroika.
(Pahl 1989 p717)
The critique of essentialism in Marxist class analysis runs into difficulties when it 
attempts to produce class analysis of its own. The problem however lies in the 
commitment to class analysis itself. The attempt by Resnick & Wolff to produce a non­
essentialist class analysis founders because they still phrase their account within the 
context of SCA. Even if classes can be defined in non-essentialist terms, their analysis 
still makes class itself essential. Why else do Resnick & Wolff feel the need to present 
this plethora of classes?
The question comes down to what we expect class analysis to achieve. I would argue 
that economic classes must by definition have economic interests. These interests should 
be identifiable from the manner in which members of those classes receive the 
wherewithal for their sustenance - their income in capitalist societies. But to say this is
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not to say that members of a class defined on the basis of similar categories of income 
will necessarily see their interests in the same way. Take for example Marx's opinion 
that "if all the members of the modern bourgeoisie have the same interests inasmuch as 
they form a class against another class, they have opposite, antagonistic interests 
inasmuch as they stand face to face with one another (1847 - 1966 p i07) or the 
discussion of the struggles between the industrial and the financial bourgeoisie contained 
in the Eighteenth Brumaire or the Class Struggles in France or the distinction between a 
class-in-itself and a class-for-itself (Marx EPM 1844). Urry (1981) on the other hand 
would see such an argument as unacceptably reductionist. For Urry, classes do not 
relate to abstract economic positions but only exist at the level of civil society. But Urry 
takes this position because he wants to read consciousness and action off from those 
class positions. It is not reductionist to say that class relates to economic interests, 
however, unless we have also made a prior (and a priori) commitment to SCA.
The whole domestic labour debate (Allen 1983, Allen & Wolkowitz 1986, Matthews 
1984, Johnson 1989, Walker 1989) places itself in difficulties because it also makes this 
commitment to SCA. The debate seeks to establish whether it can be shown that 
unwaged domestic labour is a commodity, in the hope that this would then force 
recognition of patriarchal structures of capitalism, in which unwaged female labourers 
would constitute a distinctive class, etc., etc. But again, one is entitled to ask with Pahl, 
what does labelling unwaged domestic labour as a class add to the analysis, in this case 
of patriarchy (cf. Massey 1989)? If it is to advance the argument that unwaged domestic 
labour is just as worthy a topic of study as waged factory labour, why not simply 
advance the argument on its own merits? The answer lies in beholdenness to the 
imperatives of SCA. If the actions and the consciousnesses of this group of women are 
different to those of other groups of women (and men), then, it seems, we must find a 
class to put them in and consequently then define its relation to the structure (see also 
Chapter 5).
Low (1990) takes a position similar to the one advanced here. Commenting on the
problems both Urry and Resnick & Wolff run into in trying to apply their particular
definitions of class to the analysis of given situations, s/he argues that:
'Class' is the term given by Marxist theory to a cluster of very fundamental 
social rules structuring work and property relationships. If we take this step we 
should reserve the term 'class' for that cluster alone. It would therefore be 
incorrect to talk of 'consumption classes' or indeed of a 'service class'.... 
Rather we should say that capitalism... has constituted many different 
organized groups and social strata, but the fundamental work and property 
relationships remain unchanged.
(Low 1990 p i  108)
Pahl too would agree with this
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Modem capitalist society is based on an inherent conflict of interests between 
capital and labour and each in turn, is fractioned within itself. This I take to be 
axiomatic. My purpose in casting doubt on the practical usefulness of class is 
not to say that the concept does not have value at a higher level of analysis in 
comparative and historical sociology. However, its frequent incantation is often 
misplaced and otiose and the concept has been debased through inappropriate 
and uncritical usage.
(Pahl 1989 p717)
It is important to note that neither Pahl nor Low are antagonistic towards Marxist 
analyses of class as such, though I have chosen to highlight their problems in the course 
of this discussion. The same criticisms could be made of Weberian class analysis. Even 
though there are considerable ontological and epistemological differences between the 
Weberian and Marxist theories of class, they are nonetheless theories of economic class 
(D.Sayer 1991). Members of Weberian classes are as commited to economic interests as 
are members of Marxist classes. The question is not one of Weber vs. Marx; it is SCA. 
The question naturally arises therefore, if not class, what?
The answer I propose is status. I shall argue that the same structural (class) conditions 
are experienced in different ways by different groups and individuals. These can be 
accounted for in terms of status. Differences in status then account for the differences in 
political allegiance and all the other differences this symbolizes among the proletariat. 
This would appear to mean a shift from Marx to Weber, despite the fact that the criticisms 
of SCA apply equally to Weberian as to Marxist class analysis. As this chapter unfolds 
however, I intend to show that this is not necessarily so.
4.5 The new middle 'class' as a status group
As Sarre points out, Weberian practitioners of sociology have often used the concept of 
status in challenging Marxist class theory. According to Sarre, the sharpest challenge of 
these challenges could be found in the work of Frank Parkin (1979). This challenge was 
not particularly effective; according to Sarre, Parkin's work "both affirms what it wishes 
to deny... and fails to demonstrate what it asserts" (1989 p94). On the other hand, it 
might be assumed from a Marxist point of view that status is simply a matter of ideology, 
and therefore epiphenomenal to, or in some way simply derivative of processes of class 
structuration. It is therefore worth considering the Weberian concept of status to see if in 
fact either of these assumptions need be the case.
Weber argued that class situation depended on two related criteria: market situation was 
one, but this was only important insofar as it affected life chances (Barbalet 1986,
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D.Sayer 1991). These two criteria make for difficulties in utilizing Weber's notion of 
class because the first, market situation, is essentially a definition in terms of inputSy 
what you bring to the market, while the second, life chances, is a definition in terms of 
outcomeSy what you get from the market. The problem is that one's current market 
situation not necessarily the same as one's highest achievable situation. If the boss's son 
is sent to leam the ins and outs of the family business in the traditional manner by starting 
out on the shop floor, his current market situation is the same as his co-workers, but his 
life-chances, where he is likely to end up, are considerably different (Runciman 1990). 
This may seem obvious, but it was the fatal flaw in Rex & Moore's (1966) use of 
Weberian theory in their notion of housing classes (Haddon 1970). In fact, as Barbalet 
points out,
when a new middle class is defined in Weberian terms its class nature tends to 
be displaced by an understanding of its characteristics for status group 
formation. Accounts of a new middle class which point to the peculiarities of 
its employment market outcomes are as applicable to treatments of its nature as a 
status group as they are to its class nature.
(Barbalet 1986 p561)
For example, the service class is supposed currently to be characterized by increasing 
'social closure', in other words, its ranks come more and more to be filled by the 
children of its existing members; the service class thus comes more and more to form a 
class for itself as well as in itself. Savage & al. (1988) dispute this view; but the fact is 
that social closure is a criterion in the formation of a status group, not an economic class. 
The significance of closure in such studies "should be seen in the identification of status 
groups within classes rather than of social classes themselves" (Barbalet, 1986 p573)
Barbalet also points to the fact that "Status groups, but not classes were distinguished by 
Weber... in terms of their different patterns of consumption" (p561 emphasis added). 
Also, according to Weber, education, "functional and work class differences are as likely 
to lead to status distinctions as they are to class differences" (ibid.). The implications of 
Barbalet's discussion are far-reaching. Once it is appreciated that what are described in 
the sociological literature generally as well as the gentrification literature in particular as 
class differences are in fact status differences, then the myriad problems of essentialism, 
aliens, sin and disease can be overcome. Such an outcome requires more than simply a 
change in nomenclature however. It is not as if these analogies only exist if one wishes 
to be pedantic. These authors' use of 'class' where they mean 'status' is no mere slip of 
the pen. Barbalet writes that
The contradictory treatment of class and status in Weberian theory is less visible 
than it might otherwise be because of the demise of status as an analytical 
category in neo-Weberian writing on stratification. This is not a resolution of
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the problem, however, as the class concept has been forced to encompass what 
had traditionally been regarded as both class and non-class factors. While it has 
Gverloaded the class concept, neo~Webcrian theory has failed adequately to 
consider aspects o f social reality which cannot be equated with class divisions
(Barbalet 1986 p562 emphasis added)
This confusion of class and status is of considerable theoretical import since the common 
complaint of anti-reductionist and anti-essentialist Marxist discussions of class is exactly 
the same as that which Barbalet complains about in neo-Weberian discussions of class; 
namely that the concept is overloaded, and cannot adequately consider aspects of social 
reality which cannot be equated with class divisions. The situation is comparable to 
Rose's (1984) complaint of mix'n'match theorizing in Marxist studies of gentrification - 
only in this case it is not a non-Marxist theory of gentrification which has been taken over 
wholesale and dressed up in Marxist clothes, it is a whole (and misconstrued!) theory of 
social structure which has been acquired. The self-imposed problem of providing a 
Marxist account of the neo-Weberian middle classes is like a cuckoo in the nest for 
Marxist theory. It has been deposited from elsewhere and demands and receives copious 
attention, without those administering to it ever stopping to question where it came from 
or why they have to devote so much attention to it. The greatest irony is that these so- 
called middle classes, for which Marxist theory has been charged with finding a 
theoretical rationale, do not, according to Barbelat, even have a legitimate parentage in the 
context of Weberian class theory.
However, Barbalet goes on to argue that Weberian status theory is of hardly any more 
use than is its class theory. Parkin and others "have complained that Weber's notion of 
status has been (illegitmately) reduced to mere 'prestige' by some of his followers. Yet 
there is little in Weber's discussion o f status which goes beyond prestige" (p562 
emphasis added). In fact "the significant aspects of social reality" which Barbalet argues 
"cannot be equated with class divisions", equally cannot "be apprehended through the 
Weberian conception of status" (p562). If we accept therefore the force of the argument 
that questions of status have been unduly neglected in contemporary sociology, this does 
not, according to Barbalet, encumber us with an concomitant commitment to Weberian 
sociology. However, it does encumber us with a commitment to some account of status. 
In Chapter 6 therefore, I sketch out how such an account and how it may be reconciled 
with the Marxist theory of classes.
An account of the formation of status groups is not enough however. To use status as an 
independent variable or axiom in this account would simply be to substitute status for 
class in the SCA model. Group consciousness, be it of class or status, is always the 
consciousness of the individual as a member of that group. Status, high or low, is the
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status of an individual as a member of a group. A large part of Blanchard's (1985) 
criticisms of Engels turns precisely on his (Engels') failure to come to terms with this 
question of the relation of personal to collective consciousness. Consequently, having 
outlined in the remainder of this chapter how status groups might form (and it is a matter 
of complete contingency as to whether any status groups may form at all), in subsequent 
chapters I shall outline how status as a member of a group relates to selfconsciousness of 
status as an individual in society. For the present however it is sufficient to note the 
implications of Barbalet's arguments for the conduct of the gentrification debate, which 
demonstrate conclusively that the whole debate is misplaced.
To recap, the gentrification debate is one in which all sides accept the proposition that 
gentrification is a class issue. However, as D.Sayer argues, the term 'class' has two 
senses: one is internal, intrinsic to selfconsciousness; the other "a matter of mere 
'accidental' circumstance rather than inherent being,... something which is extrinsic to 
the essence of personality" (1991 p69). It is in the first sense that the English obsession 
with class is concerned - U or non-U accent and behaviour (Mitford 1956) "in sum, 
those relations. Max Weber analysed in terms of status" (D.Sayer 1991 p69). However, 
Sayer argues, it is in the second sense that class is a distinctly modem phenomenon and 
of concern to Marxist theory. The second sense is of course that in which class is a 
purely economic attribute. It is this sense that Marxist theory only recognizes two 
classes, works such as the Eighteenth Brumaire notwithstanding. Whether the 
proposition is that gentrification has created a new middle class, or that this new middle 
class has created gentrification, if the creation of this new middle class can be linked to 
economic processes, then Marxist theory is in trouble; hence the vigour with which the 
gentrification debate is conducted (Hamnett 1991).
However, Marxist theory is only in trouble, as Barbelat makes quite plain, if we slip, 
illegitimately, from the use of 'class' as economic class to the use of 'class' as social 
class, invoking status considerations. If we cannot tie the existence of gentrifiers and 
gentrification to economic class issues (in other words, if gentrification is not a class 
issue, in the strict Weberian or Marxist sense of that term), then we cannot use their 
existence as a proxy by which to debate the competing claims to knowledge made by 
Weberian and Marxist theories. That it is illegitimate to use Weber's or Marx's theory of 
(economic) class as though they applied to social class, or status groups, should be clear 
from the problems of SCA, namely the way in which the actions of gentrifiers becomes 
explicable only in terms of aliens, sin or disease. Even in Weber's own sociology, the 
axes along which class and status differentiation occur are supposed to be quite separate. 
Conceptualizing divisions in society in terms of status as well as class avoids these 
problems, and provides the sociological rationale for the argument that gentrifiers
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gentrify because they can, not because they have to. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 will 
demonstrate the economic rationale behind such behaviour.
4.7 C onclusion
This chapter has now carried out the second of the agenda outlined for this thesis in 
Chapter 3.2 above, namely "to establish a framework for a discussion of class issues 
which will not... require of members of different social classes that they have essentially 
different natures". The argument has proceeded by demonstrating and problematizing the 
standard sociological model, SCA, endorsing the concept of status as a means of 
mediating between structure and agency, and then showing how the concept of status can 
be introduced into a Marxian theory of class.
This interpretation of Marxist principles permits the defence of the economic focus of this 
thesis and, in doing so, provides a powerful endorsement of the principle that gentrifiers 
gentrify because they can. It obviates SCA in Marxist models of society, and in a 
manner superior to that of Resnick & W olffs strategy for dealing with the problem. 
Gentrifiers do not have to gentrify because of their class position because class position 
only determines behaviour in the sense in which R.Williams uses 'determine': setting 
limits, not dictating actions. In capitalist society, individuals produce and reproduce 
capitalism at the same time as they produce and reproduce themselves via the acquisition 
and circulation of money. The outcomes of this productive and reproductive process 
however are open and must be continually negotiated, revised and updated. Within the 
broad limits of the necessity to acquire money in order to exercise agency, a whole range 
of strategies may be pursued. The necessity to acquire money and the conditions under 
which this money is acquired (the internalization of the rules - the moral order - of 
capitalism) does however explain a particular set of strategies to ensure a secure supply in 
the everchanging world of capitalist production: the search for centrality in the 
accumulation process and status group formation - closure - in order to secure this 
centrality (Chapter 6.6 below). Status group formation cannot however be reduced to 
labour market segmentation. Status groups incorporate several labour market segments.
There is the danger that simply to substitute status for class in discussions of social 
differentiation would leave the analysis stuck within the confines of the SCA model. In 
fact, status cannot simply be substituted for class. The crucial difference between status 
and class is that status is not only acquired, it is also ascribed; there has to be social 
consensus on status matters where none need exist on class issues - class considered in 
the internal and external aspects discussed by D.Sayer (1991 and 4.5 above). Status
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norms are internalized by group members and upheld in other contexts. Although 
closure, the fundamental principle of status group formation, is directed toward 
monopolization of job opportunities in the context of the capitalist accumulation process, 
strategies for status group formation are not only pursued in the context of paid 
employment.
So far however, these contexts have not been specified. They cannot be specified 
without understanding how status itself is constructed. So far this question has not been 
addressed. To understand gentrification in terms of clashes between status groups, it is 
necessary to understand how status is acquired and ascribed. This is the object of the 
next part of this thesis.
Having, therefore, sundered the links between housing and class constitution, and 
between class constitution and identity, the next item on the agenda is to forge a link 
between housing and identity.
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5 Structure and agency in the modern world
5.1 Aims and issues
I argued in Chapter 2 that much of the gentrification debate has ostensibly been dedicated 
to a clarification of the problem of structure versus agency in social theory. Dominated 
on the one hand by the structure-oriented neighbourhood lifecycle model of N.Smith's 
rent gap, and on the other by the agency-oriented postindustrial model of the production 
of gentrifiers approach, the issue of gentrification has been extremely conducive to the 
holding of such a debate. However, Chapters 3 and 4 have shown that the 
conceptualization both of the agents and the structures of gentrification have been quite 
inadequate to explain its occurence: hamstrung by the presumption that the problem of 
structure versus agency must be considered in terms of the context set by SCA; by the 
fact that students of gentrification basically disapprove of the activities of gentrifiers; but 
principally by the fact that gentrification is used as a synedoche for modem society.
I begin in this chapter by problematizing the fact that there is a debate over structure 
versus agency at all. The point I wish to stress is that concern over the very question of 
structure versus agency is itself a peculiarly modem phenomenon. The modemity of the 
question of stmcture versus agency has not been recognized by the participants in the 
gentrification debate, and this has considerably undermined efforts to conceptualize 
behaviour in the gentrification process.
This of course implies that research strategies should be based on the presumption that 
gentrification is a phenomenon of modemity, which means providing a definition of 
modemity. I argue that the fundamental condition of modemity is concem with meaning. 
It is this concem which has led gentrification so often to be used as a peg on which to 
hang debates on stmcture and agency.
I argue that the insistence on treating agency seriously is often quasi-religious in nature. 
I argue this point in some detail, because the problem of modemity bites very deep, 
deeper than most people might think. The lack of appreciation of the religious 
imperatives involved in theorization in social science is partly responsible for the 
characterization of gentrification in terms of sin. Making this first point, furthermore 
paves the way for the second, namely that the inclusion of demand issues into cultural 
materialism provides a materialist basis for taking agency seriously. The assumption that 
gentrifiers gentrify because they have to not only means that demand issues in 
gentrification are by-passed, but so also is agency, despite the ostensible concem with 
the status of agency that fuels much of the debate. Furthermore, it shows that a concem
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for demand issues need not be the heart of darkness for a Marxist account of 
gentrification, as it is for N.Smith (Hamnett 1991, cf. Chapter 2 above).
5.2 The question of agency and the problem of meaning
In this section and the next, I want to show how the problem of agency is a problem of 
modemity. Understanding how the two are linked will help understand how the 
problems of postindustrialist accounts of gentrification arise, and more importantly, how 
they may be solved.
Concepts of agency are crucial to the problem of explaining social life. They give 
meaning to actors' behaviour (Runciman, 1962, p8). Without some account of agency, 
the role of human behaviour in explanations of social life would be reduced to that of an 
automaton responding to social or biological forces or needs. Most accounts of human 
behaviour are very reluctant to deny the role of agency in this way. The status of agency 
in explanations of social life has however become a political question as much as a 
philosophical, psychological or sociological one. Many historical or dialectical 
materialist Marxist studies have been reluctant to emphasise the role of agency in 
capitalist society. Invocation of agency implicitly concedes that human beings have some 
autonomy of behaviour.
Many Marxists have been reluctant to concede that this is possible in a capitalist society 
which proclaims freedom of choice but which in fact coerces people into alienating to the 
will of another the very thing which demonstrates their humanity, namely their creative 
capacity, their ability to make decisions about how to intervene in nature, their labour 
power. Only the advent of communism will restore the ability of human agents to 
display agency and hence humanity. Real agency is not possible under capitalism. 
Those, such as the self-styled humanists, who insist on apotheosizing the role of agency 
in contemporary society only do so for ideological reasons, they support the capitalist 
slogans about freedom of choice, or are too proud and wilfully refuse to admit publically 
what they know to be the case, that the only freedom of choice they have is in the 
furnishings of their prison walls.
Such criticisms made of humanists and others on the right contain a large element of 
truth. The right holds to such positions in large part because of their fear that, without an 
account of social life which did proclaim its meaningfulness, their own lives would not in 
fact have meaning. Such fears should not be belittled (Lasch 1991 p241), but 
nonetheless avowals of the importance of agency arise because those making these
108
avowals could not accept a theory which denied their belief that their own lives ^  have 
meaning.
This is a summary of a debate condensed to the point of caricature. However, the point I 
seek to make is not the question of whether left or right is correct in this matter, but to 
illustrate the fragility of meaning in modem life and the centrality of the problem of 
meaning in judgements about the adequacy of social theory. If we are interested in 
explaining social process, then there is no reason in principle why we should not accept 
the principles of the positivist social science of the sixties, the attempt to explain all 
human behaviour by means of mechanical analogies (Haggett 1964); except that we do 
not like to think of ourselves as mechanical analogies. Positivist social science buckled 
under the weight of calls for relevance (D.M.Smith 1977), but what this really meant was 
that positivism did not explain ourselves to ourselves in terms in which we were happy to 
see ourselves; just as today we are extremely reluctant to accept descriptions of ourselves 
as mere carriers of 'selfish genes' (Dickens 1990).
The succession of theories of social organization which have been adopted in the 
geography and social science literature generally are only partially explicable in terms of 
the career strategies of young Turks (Taylor 1976). The success which each successive 
paradigm has had in launching its ideas is also explicable in terms of the general 
dissatisfaction with the handling of the problem of meaning in the previous literature. 
Each new paradigm has been looked to as the one to restore meaning to life, dominated 
by inexorable structural forces seemingly indifferent to our individual fate. This 
continual attempt within social science to make our lives mean something is no less than 
the general problem of modernity: how to come to grips with the apparent 
incomprehensibility of the conditions of all of our lives. I have already said that 
gentrification should be regarded as one such attempt to make meaning, but the 
problematical status of meaning in social life affects the very thoughts and language we 
use to conceptualize and describe gentrification.
The belief that our lives do have meaning and that our social theories must not only 
describe that belief but also demonstrate its fundamental truth must be recognized for 
what it is: in Nietzsche's terms, an insistence, a homesickness (Connolly 1988). This is 
not to deny the proposition that our lives do have meaning; to make such a denial would 
be equally insistent. What is interesting however is the way in which and the extent to 
which our social theories have taken the place of religion in our lives. A few years ago, I 
commented on Harvey's tendency to use religious allusions in his arguments (Harvey, 
1987, Redfem 1987). I now believe that this was more than simply a rhetorical excess. 
It is fundamental to understanding what social science is about. This should not surprise
109
us. Marx more than once (in particular in the course of his famous remarks on religion 
being the opium of the people) spoke of bringing explanation of social life down to earth 
from heaven.
Questions of agency in social science are closely tied to a central area of religious 
concem, namely morality and moral philosophy. Evaluation of explanations of social 
processes are therefore rarely made on the evidence provided, but on the implications 
such explanations have for the status and the meaning of human life. Evaluations are 
made on pre-given and quasi-religious criteria of belief. Since questions of morality are 
inextricable from social science thought however, we ought to confront them directly. 
Many of the long standing problems in Marxist thought, problems which impinge 
directly on the gentrification debate are created by the refusal of Marxist thought to face 
just this issue. If we do not appreciate this, we will fail to understand the depth of the 
insistence that gentrification is about class constitution.
5.3 Meaning, morality and choice
Alexander argues that the problem of modemity is the central theme of sociology (cf. 
Appleyard 199 lp5). In contrast to the early (artistic) Modernists:
The great classical figures of modem sociology were... more worried about the 
costs of modemity than they were confident about its gains. In varying degree, 
they viewed modemization as an emptying out of meaning. Throughout the 
writings of Marx, Weber, Simmel and Durkheim we find assertions, and 
suggestions, that at the end of this modemizing process only hard and impersonal 
stmctures will be left.... Industrialization and secularization, it seemed, had 
produced more harm than good. The first allowed stmctures to develop that were 
impervious to human will; the second prevented the new society from being 
meaningfully understood.
(Alexander 1989 pi)
These early worries, continues Alexander, were discounted for by the experience of
progress and its promise of material gain. The experience of two World Wars, not to
mention other horrors, meant that these worries never really subsided. As we near
another fin  de siecle, they appear to be revived. Sennett gives a typical account,
because so much social life which does not have a meaning cannot yield these 
psychological rewards [of "warmth, tmst and openness of meaning"], the world 
outside, the impersonal world, seems to fail us, seems to be stale and empty.
(Sennett 1977, p5)
Similarly Giddens (1990) describes the fundamental characteristic of modemity as 
"specifically opaque, in a way that was not the case previously" (Giddens 1990 pl46). 
This opacity in the stmctures of everyday life paradoxically requires us to place our tmst
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in abstract and expert systems such as transportation or banking systems.
Modemity turns out to be enigmatic at its very core and there seems to be no way in 
which this engima can be "overcome" [in Nietzsche's terms]. We are left with 
questions where once there appeared to be answers... A general awareness [that 
history has neither purpose nor goal, and neither do our own personal histories]... 
filters into anxieties which press in on everyone.
(Giddens, 1990 p49)
The relation of questions of the meaningfulness of life to questions of structure and 
agency has long been debated, but in terms of moral philosophy and theology rather than 
sociology.
In pre-modem times, the question was posed in terms of Original Sin. 'Stmcture' was to 
be found in God's plan, 'agency' in the Fall of Man. To illustrate this point I compare 
Oilman's account of Marx's philosophy with Tillyard's account of mediæval cosmology.
Oilman (1971, 1976) argued that Marx's philosophy should be seen as a system of
internal relations, derived from Spinoza by way of Hegel. His arguments had
considerable influence in the development of Harvey's Marxism (Harvey 1973), and
provided the counterfactual by which A.Sayer (1982) presented his case for realism.
Oilman summarized Marx's philosophy as a
conception of reality as a totality of intemally related parts, and [a] conception of 
these parts as expandable relations such that each one in its fullness can represent 
the totality.
(Oilman 1971 p8)
The philosophy of intemal relations which Oilman finds in Marx can be also be found in 
Elizabethan and mediæval cosmology. Then it was known as 'The Great Chain of 
Being' (Tillyard 1943 - 1960 Ch.3). At one end of this chain lies the earth, and at the 
other, God. 'Man' is intemally related to all the other links in the chain and can therefore 
represent the totality of the cosmos in minature: a microcosm, he incorporates on the one 
hand the highest stages of development of the mineral, vegetable and animal kingdoms 
over which 'he' is lord; on the other, he displays intimations at the lowest stage of the 
heavenly Kingdom above, of which 'he' is a vassal. The essential difference between 
the Elizabethan and Marxian systems of intemal relations is that the existence of God 
gave the Elizabethan picture immanent meaning.
A.Sayer, in his first presentation of critical realism, argued against applying this
philosophy of intemal relations to an analysis of social world.
If everything is intemally related to everything else then the concept does not help 
us say anything about specific stmctures.
(A.Sayer, 1982, p70)
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oilman argued that although all reality was intemally related, this did not mean that
nothing was distinguishable. The problem of individuation, of distinguishing one thing
from another, is one which is basic to any ontology and could be successfully
accomplished within a philosophy of intemal relations (Oilman Chapter 1, Appendix 1
1971). Sayer strongly disagreed:
if we try to... assert that [Oilman's] book is intemally related to the stars then the 
silliness of these... pretences detracts from the evident sense of the... statement 
[that there is "an asymmetric intemal relation between Oilman's book and Marx's 
book"].
(A.Sayer, 1982, p70)
Such criticism of Oilman's philosophy of intemal relations may seem intuitively plausible 
and even self-evident. From Tillyard's account, however, Sayers' argument would seem 
less evident to an Elizabethan or a mediaeval, and indeed Oilman argued that to begin 
from the opposite premise, that all reality was not intemally related, was then to beg the 
question of how the non-related parts could ever affect or interact with each other.
D.Sayer and Frisby may also be cited in support of Oilman's comments on individuation. 
Their comments on difference also support the post-structuralist approach to theorization 
(5.4 below):
Central to [Marx's] conception of society is an important point... Because it is 
relational, it is integrally a system of differencesj and those characteristics which 
mark individuals as social are therefore ones which also differentiate them as 
individuals in definite ways: for instance as a master or a servant, husband or wife. 
This means that society is not homogeneous. It is rather, in Marx's words, a 
contradictory unity.
(D.Sayer & Frisby, 1986 p96)
Comparing Oilman's "realism" to Althusser's "nominalism", Outhwaite also supports 
Oilman's interpretation of Marx's philosophy (Outhwaite 1983, p46). Althusser's 
'stmcturalist Marxism', highly influential in the Anglophone literature in the early to mid­
seventies (Pickvance 1976, Castells 1977), is still very much the bogeyman of the social 
sciences (cf. Harvey's reaction to the charge that he was Althusserian - Harvey 1987), 
although a revival of sorts is under way (Resnick & Wolff 1986, Graham 1990). Yet the 
contrast between Oilman and Althusser is instmctive, illustrating once more the way in 
which social science explanation is judged in terms of its ability to give meaning to our 
lives. The development of A.Sayer's arguments for realism can be interpreted as an 
attempt to steer a middle course between Oilman and Althusser. Sayer's objections to 
Althusser's position may be used for the purposes of comparison with Oilman.
Althusser's most notorious argument was for a 'theoretical anti-humanism' (Althusser & 
Balibar 1970, Callinicos 1976). Humans were mere bearers of structures, no more than
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ensembles of social relations. Now, while it could be argued that the accompanying
concept of 'over-determination' (Chapter 2.1 above) can be read as an attempt to give
meaning to a structuralist account of social life (Resnick & Wolff 1987), for A.Sayer
even a theoretical anti-humanism involves an unacceptable loss of ontological status:
... in stressing the way in which actions take place within social relations and are 
rule governed and constrained by conditions not of the actors' own choosing, the 
activity of the agents and their skills were ignored [by 'structuralist' approaches], 
so that it appeared that the conditions did the acting.
(A.Sayer 1985 p88, emphasis added)
Meaning, in other words, is given to the structures, and this is unaccceptable:
Actors are not mere 'dupes', 'automata', or 'bearers of roles', unalterably 
programmed to reproduce...
At worst, the 'subjects' were 'written out' altogether, producing a 
dehumanizing social science.
(ibid.)
To make this point (that theories are evaluated on the basis of their accounts of human 
being) is not to belittle Sayer's reasons for making such a judgement, nor those of the 
many other writers who would support it (e.g., E.P.Thompson 1978, Giddens 1987). It 
is to reinforce the argument that 'agency' and 'meaning' are closely correlated, that 
emphasis on this correlation is historically contingent upon the 'emptying out of 
meaning', associated with modernism and the death of God, and that we look to social 
science to restore this meaning to us, where once we looked to religion. It is because 
social science has this role in our lives that the conviction that gentrification is explicable 
in terms of class is so deeply held. This conviction may be expressed in terms of a 
syllogism. Social science explains our lives to us; social science is dominated by 
controversies over class, derived from SCA; to be explanations, therefore, explanations 
of gentrification must invoke class.
The orthodox Marxist argument is that it is capitalism which robs its bearers' lives of all
meaning. In capitalist social relations, the lives of human beings are significant only as
labour-power for capitalism. Their lives have no other meaning. Therefore analyses of
modem life should begin from class because capitalism is predicated on class
exploitation. It is capitalism which denies its bearers their humanity, an Althusserian
would argue, and Marx's theorizing accurately captures this sad fact:
The ultimate or minimum limit of the value of labour-power is... formed by the 
value of the physically indispensable means of subsistence...
It is an extraordinarily cheap kind of sentimentality which declares that this method 
of determining the value of labour-power, a method prescribed by the very nature 
o f the case, is bm tal...
(Marx, 1967, p277, emphasis added)
For Marx, therefore, it appeared to be quite literally a waste of time to concern oneself
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over the question of agency (Lukes, 1987 p6). Marx was not concerned with giving 
meaning to 'modem' life, and so making it more bearable. He was concerned only with 
overthrowing it, as the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach makes clear (3.6 above). 
Complaints that in their arguments, Marx or Althusser treat human beings as though they 
were automata, dupes, &c., ought to be addressed to the capitalist system, not to them. 
A.Sayer's argument, it might be added, is mere moralizing. It depends on treating 
human beings differently in theory than they are in practice. In this respect, Althusser 
and Oilman are in agreement:
when Marx describes the worker as degraded, this is what he sees, in fact as well 
as in judgment.
(Oilman 1971 p50)
If this is Marx's argument however it must be rejected. It depends on the presumption 
that what is 'seen' is already ''and o t h e r w i s e * [from theory] as the basic reality of 
the material social process", a classic presumption of base-superstructure modes of 
thought (R.Williams 1977 p97, see Chapter 2.1 above). This presumption undermines 
the case for social revolution Engels tries to present in his Condition o f the Working 
Class in England in 1844, (Blanchard 1985). In any case, as Lukes points out, such an 
argument
... leaves untouched the question... both of marxism's general rejection of 
morality and its actual (if unsystematic and largely unacknowledged) moral stance.
(Lukes, 1985, p26)
Oilman, considering the possibility of a Marxist ethics, notes that
An ethic assumes... that there is a possibility that one could have chosen 
otherwise.
(Oilman, 1971 p46)
Questions of morality are predicated on choice, in particular the choice between good and
evil, but choice, according to Giddens is also the conditio sine qua non of agency:
to be a human agent is to be able to 'act otherwise'.
(Giddens 1987 p220)
The refusal to deal with questions of morality in Marxism is therefore not one which can 
be justified either by appeals to science, history or to the imperatives of political practice. 
Questions of morality cannot be excluded from social science discourse, even Marxist 
discourse; they are inextricably bound up with the meaningfulness of human activity 
(Hampshire 1959, Runciman 1962).
In denying the possibility of choice or difference, Marxism, especially its scientific 
socialist varieties, slips into idealism, because the meaningfulness in behaviour is 
conceded, but attributed to the structures rather than to the agents. However, 
interpretation of the meaning of stmctural transformation depends on the pre-existing (but 
illicit) guarantee of correspondence between explanation and outcome (otherwise
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known). Consequently, even the claims to scientificity are undermined. The 
conclusions of the analysis are implicit in the premises. The analysis itself becomes an 
elaborate tautology, an explanation of why the described outcome had to have occurred 
as it did.
Williams argued that this was a recurring problem with the use of base-superstructure 
modes of thought (R.Williams 1977). Chapters 2 and 3 have shown that this is also the 
precise situation which bedevils the gentrification debate. Since all sides in the debate 
succumb to the same tautology, the problem is not solely restricted to Marxism. 
Williams’ arguments for cultural materiahsm show that it is not inevitable. Nonetheless, 
it is not an easy problem to get round. The remainder of this chapter considers strategies 
by which this might be achieved.
5.4 Post-structuralism and gentrification
Admitting the possibility of choice means accepting the existence of variety, of 
difference. How to theorize this? As Chapter 2 showed, the claims of post-modern 
theory "to empower or explain variety", that is, to account for agency have engendered 
considerable dissent (Massey 1990). If the claims for postmodemity are wishful 
thinking however, is there anything that can be rescued from the debates on postmodern 
theory? Probably three things. The first and most important is the problematization of the 
condition of modernity itself, and this has been the principal focus of this chapter.
Cooke argues for two further considerations which should be taken into account. If
postmodernism is parody, then that should be given its due because its "ironic treatment
of history" means that
it uses history creatively to criticize, amongst other things, modernism's loss of 
contact with popular consciousness.
(Cooke 1990, p337)
The same thing of course could be said for Joyce's Ulysses (Ellman 1986 Howard, 
1991). The project is worth pursuing, but it is not new (Howard 1991p21).
The second, and most important, point is that even if modem urban theory is 'totalizing', 
it is, or should be, theorizing, "not a universalistic system, but a system of differences" 
(Cooke, 1990, p332). Strictly speaking, this is a position derived from 
post-stmcturalism (Giddens, 1987 ch.4), but Cooke expands this position into a post­
modem urban theory
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not as a project in itself but a form of reading for absences, a deconstruction of the 
ways of seeing and acting which first developed with the onset of early modem 
urban policy but which have now themselves become exhausted and in need of 
further democratization and renewal.
(Cooke 1990 p342)
This idea that the effects of structures are felt in absences rather than presences is worth 
very careful consideration. The 'production of gentrifiers' approach in effect makes this 
fundamental error of theorizing presences, the presence of a gentrifier in its gentrified 
house.
The proposition that we think in terms of differences rather than universals seems at first 
sight a bizarre one. However the poststructuralist argument is that is only in differences, 
that distinguishable characteristics, and therefore information, meaning, can be created, 
not lost. This is quite a different conclusion from those drawn by the post-modernists.
The consequence of theorizing in terms of universals is to deny the possibility of choice 
in human affairs. Gentrifiers, in the universalist perspective (shared by both left and 
right in this debate), gentrify because they have to. Anything which the gentrification 
debate has to say about gentrifiers or gentrified neighbourhoods applies equally as well to 
the rest of the middle class or to the rest of the inner city. Because they theorize in terms 
of universals, they are unable to explain the existence of differences between one section 
of the middle class or one area of the inner city and another. The irony then is that the 
major problem for these theories of why gentrification occurs is to explain why 
gentrification does not occur, in those areas of the inner city to which the explanations 
offered by these theories apply, but in which there is no sign of gentrification.
Because gentrifiers have to gentrify in the universalistic perspective, the question of the 
availability of the means to do so becomes irrelevant; while in the difference perspective, 
the problem of the means, the technology, becomes key to explaining the social changes 
brought about by gentrification. Exploring the means by which gentrification is made 
possible is the focus of the second half of this thesis (Chapters 7-10).
The arguments for post-stucturalism are epistemological rather than sociological. 
Espousing a post-structuralist position therefore does not imply also endorsing claims 
about or for postmodern society. As has been seen, there is no evidence even for 
presuming that there is a postmodern condition which gentrification could be 
symptomatic of. Therefore there is no reason for basing research strategies into 
gentrification on the presumption that it is. However, these arguments do not affect the 
vital importance of post-structuralism in guaranteeing theorization which admits the
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possibility of choice as a matter of principle, rather than as a concession, as the 
unexplained variance in an explanation, to be reduced in subsequent refinements of our 
models. Having made this argument for theorizing in terms of differences, however, it is 
necessary to show how it may be applied in a cultural materialist context.
5.5 Conclusion: demand and agency in cultural materialist perspective
Chapter 1 described cultural materialism as a radical attempt to place the question of 
agency at centre stage. As this chapter has shown however, attempts to address the 
question of agency have rarely done so on materialist lines. Consequently, the status of 
agency in social analyses has remained largely unresolved. Both those who would 
evince a concern for agency and those who would deny the validity of those concerns are 
able to marshall arguments which effectively criticize the opposing position. However 
the current state of the gentrification debate, ostensibly (and often ostentatiously) 
concerned with agency, bears witness that the result has been a stalemate - hence the 
consensus that a synthesis of the two alternatives is required (Hamnett 1991). This 
stalemate may be avoided by reconsidering the role of subsistence (and therefore 
demand) in Marxist economic thought. Adopting this strategy admits material evidence 
of the existence of agency, which can also be linked to materialist accounts of structural 
transformation.
Marx argues that capitalism is characterized by the existence of profit (as a category of 
income), and that profit depends on exploitation in the labour process. Exploitation 
arises when workers have to sell their labour-power, alienate their creative faculties and 
place them at the disposal of the capitalists, but are then only paid the value which they 
require to reproduce their labour-power, not the total value of the work which they 
perform for the capitalists. Knowing the value of labour-power enables the rate of 
exploitation to be calculated. Therefore some definition of subsistence is required to put 
a figure on the value of labour-power. However, Marx operationalizes this definition in 
terms of the reproduction requirements of the individual labourer (1967, p277). The 
unavoidable implication of this is that each individual labourers must consume what is 
provided for her or him by their capitalist employer (Pasinetti 1977). They are unable to 
exercise choice, agency, and therefore consciousness in their consumption decisions, in 
effect in their lives outside of the labour process. Since they are also unable to exercise 
agency in the labour process, the exercise by the working classes of any form of agency
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is ruled out a priori by Marx's particular definition of subsistence. Marxists tend to 
alternate between 'economism' and 'voluntarism' as their basic political strategy for 
fashioning conditions for a revolutionary transformation of society (e.g.. Fine & Harris' 
criticisms of Poulantzas 1979 p56). The a priori denial, in Marx's definition of 
subsistence, of the operation of independent working class consciousness is, I argue, the 
reason why.
Reliance on some definition of subsistence cannot be lightly abandoned, however, since 
abandoning this definition would also mean abandoning the notion of exploitation in the 
labour process and therefore denying the centrality of class and class relations in capitalist 
society (though it must be noted that this is precisely the strategy followed by rational 
choice Marxism - Roemer 1982,1986 cf. Mouzelis 1990). By shifting the focus of the 
definition of subsistence from the individual to society as a whole, it is however possible 
to retain the concept of subsistence (and thus retain the concept of exploitation), while at 
the same time permitting workers to make meaningful decisions about what they wish to 
consume. At the level of society as a whole, subsistence can be defined as the minimum 
amount of commodities which must be sold or otherwise consumed if the total labour 
power in the system as a whole is to reproduce itself from day to day and year to year.
Defining subsistence at the societal level leaves it a matter of complete indifference, for 
the purposes of the reproduction of the capitalist system, as to who consumes the 
commodities, as long as they are all consumed and the surplus value they embody is 
realized. In other words it is a matter of complete indifference for the purposes of system 
reproduction whether some workers get more money than others, or if some workers get 
no money at all. Conversely however, it becomes of the utmost importance to ensure 
that those goods which are produced are sold, since it is no longer possible to rely on the 
assumption that since every worker is receiving just that quantity of goods and services 
which permits them to reproduce their labour power on a daily basis, every good and 
service produced for sale to the workforce will be sold. This is of course the situation 
with which capitalists and workers are confronted every day: "have we/they made the 
'correct' decisions about which goods and services to produce or to consume?". 
Capitalists are constantly posed with the problem of what to produce next - which they 
may well get wrong: the basic principle of effective demand (Pasinetti 1974). But, I 
argue, it is precisely this scenario which is ruled out of the picture by the assumption of 
subsistence defined at an individual level.
Keynes (1937) forcefully makes the point that, only in a lunatic asylum, would anyone 
regard money as a store of value, were it not for the fact that we do have and do make 
choices about where, and most importantly if, we spend our money. The
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post-Keynesian approach to the problem of the value of money is to explain it in terms of 
the unknowability of the future. While accepting that explanation, I would wish to widen 
it. We all are forced to work for money, but once we've got it we can spend it on what 
we like, and the more money we have, the wider the range of choices open to us. Money 
is therefore a prime medium by which agency is empowered. Money is also however a 
prime medium through which agency is expressed. It is of course not the only means of 
providing a material demonstration of the existence of agency. As I argue in Chapter 6.5 
below, the separation of means and ends which underlies any definition of agency can 
often also be seen spatially as well as imagined conceptually. It is not the use of a tool 
which indicates awareness of the separation of ends and means: birds and primates may 
be observed using sticks and stones to obtain food. Rather, it is the transport of a stick, 
stone or other implement to the place where the food is to be obtained which 
demonstrates that separation of ends and means which Marx argues distinguishes the 
worst of architects from the best of bees (Marx 1967 p284).
Money nevertheless has a great importance in the demonstration of agency for two 
reasons: the fact of its value is also a materialist (rather than an idealist) argument for the 
existence of agency; and its role as the medium through which capitalist society is 
structured (and capitalist social structures produced and reproduced) enables the relation 
of structure to agency in a capitalist society to be specified.
Money dominates capitalist society. Accounting for where it comes from and where it 
goes, is the fundamental structuring mechanism of that society. Such accounting is the 
basis of the impetus to rationalization which Weber regarded the fundamental 
characteristic of modem life (D.Sayer 1991). Although money has value, value is of 
course also dead labour in the capitalist accumulation process. As the medium of social 
structures, money is the material expression of the social processes of selective tradition 
which create not only social structures, but also hegemony (and social science; cf. 
Chapters 2.3.3 and 3.7 above).
Money does not just have value for the capitalist however, it has value for everybody. 
The fact that it does have value, moreover, makes for a materialist and non-essentialist 
argument for the existence of agency, not simply because I buy beer and you buy wine 
(though that is still a valid argument) but principally because the fact that it does have 
value is a materialist demonstration of the ability of human beings to conceptualize the 
future (Keynes 1937) and themselves in it - and so distinguish the worst of architects 
from the best of bees. Marx's definition of subsistence however rules out the use of 
money as a store of value and contradicts his assertions about architects and bees. As 
proletarians, whatever we were to spend our money on (and we would have to spend it.
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we couldn't just hold on to it), it would be because in some way we had to spend it in 
that way. We would not therefore be able to separate means and ends, be able to do 
otherwise': (employee) architects would not be materially distinguishable from bees. 
Marx's definition of subsistence is the legacy inherited by SCA which underlies the 
assumption that gentrifiers gentrify because they have to.
By contrast, redefining subsistence at the social level provides a cogent rationale for 
arguing that gentrifiers gentrify because they can. Under this redefinition there is no 
necessary link between our (common) class position and the amount of money we may 
receive. Consequently, there need be no commonality in our feelings towards the system 
that rewards you handsomely and me outrageously. S does not determine C; 
consequently it cannot determine A. One can therefore be fundamentalist over the 
question of class and class relations - to insist that class can only be defined in relation to 
formal position within the economy - without being reductionist - without, that is, 
reducing behaviour to a reflex of class position; adopt, in other words, N.Smith's 
position on the importance of structure without denying Ley's concerns for agency, in 
fact giving real meaning to Ley's concerns. The domestic labour debate provides a 
useful illustration of the point.
The domestic labour debate is explicitly about the relation of waged labour to unpaid 
activity, a vital but implicit theme in the gentrification debate. Furthermore, it impinges 
on many of the arguments I present in Chapters 8 and 9 regarding class and gender 
relations in the gentrification process.
Much of the impetus in the domestic labour debate as well as the gentrification debate 
comes from the presupposition that to be fundamentalist about class is to deny the 
validity of other areas of experience. This presupposition depends implicitly on 
accepting Marx's restrictive definition of subsistence, which allows for no possibility of 
self-expression. Using the system level definition of subsistence, it is possible to 
develop an economic framework which gives expression to D.Sayer's observation that 
"what is most socially consequential in capitalism is not the class relation on which it 
rests, but the wider 'abstraction' of sociality and subjectivity entailed in the generalization 
of the commodity form which this relation makes possible" (1991 p90). If there is 
patriarchy, or if there is racism, their effects are experienced by Abercrombie, Hill and 
Turner's "sovereign individuals of capitalism" (1986), created through the reduction of 
social relations to exchanges of abstract labour. To argue, as do Matthews (1984) and 
Johnson (1989), that class is inherently a patriarchal concept because women's labour is 
only accounted as being of value when women "enter the male world of paid work" 
(Johnson 1989 p682) is surely to put the cart before the horse. Patriarchy is inherently a
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class concept because it is through class relations that patriarchy is experienced. 
Although Johnson is being ironic when she writes that
class is inapplicable to women except when they enter the masculine economy either
as potential or as actual paid workers
(Johnson 1989 p682) 
she in fact encapsulates the point precisely, as Massey (1989) points out.
The bottom line in these debates on the operation of patriarchy (or racism) in capitalism is 
that women's (or ethnic minorities') actual or potential capacity to labour is not 
adequately recognized or compensated. But to argue this is to concede the fundamentally 
capitalist principle that recognition ought to be in the form of financial compensation for 
what then immediately becomes abstract labour, performed by sovereign individuals of 
capitalism. In Wage Labour and Capital Marx criticizes the trades unions for marching 
behind banners displaying demands for better wages when they should be displaying 
demands for the abolition of the wages system. When it comes to the question of 
domestic labour, the same point stands. To argue, as Massey puts it, from "classes as 
historically constituted social phenomena" to "class as a concept... confuses two issues 
and fails to make the conceptual point it is [sought]... to establish" (1989 p693).
As Massey argues, the whole point about capitalism is that it makes for "a very partial 
view of society" , in which "the whole area outside paid work and the preparation for 
paid work is omitted from consideration" (1989 p693). But it does not seem to me that 
the solution is to treat those areas outside paid work (including, not least, gentrification) 
implicitly as though they were in principle analyzeable as paid work, an implication 
which, I repeat once more, is based on an acceptance of Marx's definition of subsistence. 
Defining subsistence in terms of the requirements for the reproduction of the labour- 
power of each individual worker rules out the possibility of workers being able to 
exercise consciousness in a form which is not completely determined by their place in the 
economic structure. It is this definition of subsistence which underpins the SCA model. 
Consequently, as I have shown, we are presented with the spectacle of people who 
would in other situations applaud Marx's opposition to Utopian socialism, actually 
making assessments of arguments within Marxism on the basis of idealist and essentialist 
presuppositions about human nature (5.3 above). In Chapter 6 ,1 develop a sociology of 
consciousness in which the relation of the experience of waged labour to the expereince 
of those activities which take place outside paid work is more adequately theorized.
As for this chapter, viewing agency in terms of choice and demand satisfies the desire to 
place agency at centre stage. To do so however, demand (and hence economic theory) 
must be incorporated into the premises of any explanation of social life, and that
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explanation must therefore be founded on the theorization of difference. In other words, 
this chapter provides a philosophical underpinning for the insistence that gentrifiers 
gentrify because they can. Chapter 7 looks at the economic issues in more detail. In the 
meantime, having argued that the value of money provides material evidence of 
consciousness, agency and structure, it is still necessary to provide an account of how 
that consciousness is created under the particular conditions of modernity. Chapter 6 
provides that account.
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6 Robert Park & the dialectics of modernity
6.1 Introduction
Since Chapter 2 ,1 have been arguing that the problems in explanations of gentrification 
betray a deep-rooted crisis in sociological theory generally. The gentrification debate, not 
unnaturally, tends to obscure these problems. If they were clearer, they could be 
resolved more easily. The deep-seated nature of these deficiencies has meant that it has 
been necessary to provide a reconstituted theory of structure, consciousness and agency, 
before an explanation of gentrification can be provided which avoids the problems of the 
accounts of gentrification analysed in Chapter 2.
Chapter 5 begins this work by exposing the homesickness which lies at the heart of most 
discussions of agency in gentrification studies and proposes instead a materialist 
conception of agency in capitalist society in which money is the medium of structure, 
agency and therefore consciousness. It is argued that this permits one to be 
fundamentalist about class without being reductionist about behaviour or motivation. 
Now while it is prefectly correct to argue, as Massey (1989) does, that a fundamentalist 
position on class cannot provide an account of social life which comprises the totality of 
human experience, the answer is not to dilute the specificity of class, but to derive an 
account of consciousness which includes the experience of class but is not reducible to it. 
This is the larger purpose of this chapter. This also means of course providing an 
account of social life into which gentrification can be fitted, and not, as in the 
gentrification debate, the other way round.
Specifically however, in terms of providing the basis for an explanation of gentrification, 
this chapter also completes the last part of the agenda set out in Chapter 3 for overcoming 
the problems identified in the gentrification literature: to break the presumed link between 
housing and class constitution; to distinguish between class and status, thus allowing the 
mediation of consciousness in reactions to class situation; and finally to establish a link 
between housing and status which does not surreptitiously re-establish a place for class, 
or more precisely, which preserves the autonomy of individual consciousness in the face 
of structural determinants. This chapter argues that such a link may be established by 
means of the works of Robert Park. It therefore calls for a revival of interest in Park's 
work.
However, although it strongly recommends that attention be paid to Park's writings, this
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chapter is not about Robert Park, it is about modernity, the social context in which 
gentrification occurs. Chapter 4 concluded by promising that this chapter would 
demonstrate a link between housing and identity. However, why housing should have 
such a role at all is a question which also needs to be answered, and this chapter 
addresses this issue also. Saunders (1989 1990) has generated considerable debate over 
whether or not owner-occupied housing does provide ontological security (cf. Beyond A 
Nation O f Homeowners conference 1991). However, this debate has concentrated on 
the qualities which make owner occupation a privileged form of housing tenure, and not 
so much on the qualities of housing itself. The fact that housing does have such a role, I 
shall argue in 6.4 below, is one of the features which makes gentrification a phenomenon 
of modernity, and, I shall argue in Chapter 10, the feature which makes it such an object 
of controversy.
Having argued for the past three chapters that the state of the gentrification debate reveals 
serious difficulties in the very heart of sociological theory which have acted to the 
detriment of attempts at explaining gentrification, the works of Robert Park may not seem 
the most obvious place to start rectifying the situation. In the next section, I attempt to 
justify why one should think of using Park's work to discuss the problems of modernity.
6.2 Confronting the received wisdom on Park and the Chicago school of 
urban sociology
When pec^le think of the Chicago school of urban sociology, they do not think of Robert 
Park; they think of Ernest Burgess and Louis Wirth. They may cite Park's name, but the 
representative icons of the Chicago school are Burgess' concentric zone model and Louis 
Wirth's picture of Urbanism as a way o f life (Burgess 1925, Wirth 1938). Park's works 
are cited only in support of the propositions contained in these two great statements, or 
viewed as inspiration for the other famous works of the Chicago school: Anderson on 
The Hobo (1923), Cressey on The Taxi-Dance Hall (1932), Reckless on Vice in Chicago 
(1933), Thrasher on The Gang (1927) or Zorbaugh on The Gold Coast and the Slum 
(1929).
If Park's work is examined at all, examination is interested less in exposition of Park's 
ideas than with identification of the influences on Park's thought (Saunders 1981, 
Gottdiener 1985, Dickens 1990) and inevitably then either with how those influences 
came to affect subsequent development of the Chicago School (Matthews 1977, Bulmer 
1984, D.Smith 1987). Almost nobody, it seems, interests themselves in Park's work for
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its own sake, as they do for example with Marx or Weber. Consequently, no-one is 
looking to see how Park's work might be made relevant to contemporary thought, as 
they do with Marx, Weber or Durkheim. Park is regarded as a considerably influential 
thinker, but not as a particularly original one. Therefore his work tends to be reviewed, 
as Carter put it "faute de mieux" (1972 pl61), used simply as a vehicle for continuing 
discussion of some other thinker or ideas in which the reviewer may be interested. The 
inadequate treatment of Park's ideas in the conventional wisdom is my justification for 
using Park's writings, not as preliminary to a discussion of later debates or authors in the 
sociology literature but as the principal basis for my account as to how identity, status 
and housing may be linked.
The only comparisons I shall be drawing is with Marx and Raymond Williams, and this
only for the purposes of demonstrating that the ideas of Park and Marx are
complementary. The complementarity lies in their treatments of the development of
consciousness. Marx may be said to discuss the development of consciousness in social-
historical terms, whereas Park discusses it in personal-historical terms. Park's account is
not a psychological one however. What he seeks to present is a sociology of
consciousness. Williams argues that such an approach was once available, as
a seminal element in the period of classical sociology... [However the] 
general tendency within bourgeois sociology has been a reduction of the 
sociology of consciousness to the 'sociology of knowledge'.
(R. Williams 1977 pl38)
It is as just such a sociology of consciousness which Park's work needs to be 
appreciated.
Park's work is rarely described as a dialectic (e.g., Ballis Lai 1989). Turner (1967) and 
Matthews (1977) are the exceptions. Yet it is clear that the famous 'invasion' 
-'succession'-'assimilation' sequence (Park, 1934 - 1952 ppl60/161, 1928 -1967 pl99; 
1936 -1952 p75; 1914 -1967 p i 14,1936 -1952 pl45) corresponds to an Hegelian triad 
of Being, Negation and Becoming (Kainz 1973). Turner argues that Park's dialectic fell 
apart in the hands of his followers who, "rendered static" many of his "characteristically 
dynamic ideas" (1967 p.ix). This has been a common problem in the development of 
sociological thought. Raymond Williams (1977) argues that the reason terms such as 
community and society, or culture and civilization are brought into the language, and 
come to have such overlapping meanings is that each began life as a term for an active 
process - society referred to the act of sociation, community to the act of communion and 
so forth.
Gradually however, the active sense of each term was lost, and the concept rendered 
static. But the experience of this active sense was so powerful, each time the active sense
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began to be lost from the current description, another term would be coined to try to 
encapsulate Aat lost active sense. Thus the immediate active sense of society comes to be 
replaced by community, culture is extolled in opposition to civilization. Yet these 
replacement terms themselves come to be burdened with the same abstracted 
characteristics and separated in their meaning from the active constitutive processes they 
were supposed to convey. In many ways, one might argue, the concept of locality 
similarly tries to capture the immediacy implicit in the original active senses of society 
and community. All of these attempts, Williams argues, were trying to deal with a 
common problem, and in as much as the attempt has continually to be repeated, they deal 
with a common error, namely a radical separation of individuals from each other, of "the 
subjective as distinct from the objective; experience from belief; feeling from thought; the 
immediate from the general; the personal from the social" (R.Williams 1977 pl29).
Thus for Durkheim, for example 'society' becomes something 'out there', separate from, 
"or at least radically distinguishable" from "the inner world" of the 'individual' 
(R.Williams 1983K p248 - cf. D.Sayer 1991 p65). The inner world itself is something 
which is to be separated from the natural world outside. Consequently, aesthetics and 
psychology become for Williams the "two great modem ideological systems" (1977 
p i29). By extension, as the other, and equally erroneous side of this separation of actual 
lived experience into personal and social, would stand sociology. Rather than talk of 
social structures, which immediately concedes the reduction of the social into the fixed, 
and the separation of the personal, agency, from the social, structure, Williams prefers to 
talk of 'pressures', 'limits', 'determinations' and 'formations' (1977 passim).
Park's dialectic strives to overcome these pressures toward the separation of the personal 
and the social, as described by Williams. However in his attempts to apply this dialectic, 
it is clear that Park did not recognize the active process of development of meanings, the 
"habitual" slide into a "past tense" (R.Williams 1977 pl28) to be present in the terms of 
his dialectic. Thus, in Park's writings, society and culture, bearing the active sense, are 
opposed to community and civilization, bearing the fixed sense; or more generally, the 
social is opposed to the biotic. The relation between the first and the second terms of 
these couples embodies the tension between the active and the fixed senses in which we 
are habitually disposed to think of social relations.
However, Williams' argument that "it is the reduction of the social to fixed forms that 
remains the basic error" (1977 pl29) needs to be qualified slightly. It is not so much the 
reduction which remains the error, as lack of awareness of the tendency toward such 
reduction. If D.Sayer is right to argue that in modem life "reification is a social process, 
not a mere category error" (1991 p65), then the reduction of the social to the fixed is a
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result of social pressures which must be equally as insistent as the desire to maintain the 
active sense of these now-fixed terms. If the need for a means of expressing the active 
senses of society, or community is so strong that new words are continually being coined 
to meet this need, then so also must be the social pressures towards such reduction. 
These social pressures, argues D.Sayer, are constitutive parts of the condition of 
modernity. The tension which Saunders (1981 p79) notes in Park's dialectic is not 
therefore to be seen as a source of weakness, but an implicit recognition of these tensions 
between the active and the fixed; in Park's words, between the bohemian and the 
philistine.
Therefore the terms society and community, culture and civilization, social and biotic, in 
the form in which Park uses them, should be seen as his implicit recognition of some of 
the most problematic issues in the explanation of social life to its participants. Also, as 
dialectical couples, they must be regarded as being inherent in each and every situation 
being described or examined. One cannot be described without invoking the other. Thus 
Saunders is wrong to describe Park's account of the relation of community to society in 
terms of a temporal sequence rather than a dialectical relationship (Saunders 1981 p56). 
The crucial mediating concept in all these accounts is the relation of the individual to 
society, as expressed in the processes of acculturation and integration, identity and status 
(6.2 below). Nowhere does Saunders, nor indeed any of the other reviews cited in this 
chapter, discuss this vital aspect of Park's thought.
One school of sociology which has continued to claim Park as an intellectual forebear, 
and which has suffered much from accusations of being "inept", "undeveloped", and 
"befuddled" (Rock 1979 pp 220, 238) is symbolic interactionism. Rock's account of 
symbolic interactionism rejects such accusations and lays charges of its own against what 
Rock calls macro-sociology; charges which bear consideration when evaluating the 
strength of the criticisms made of Park: "Interactionism discards most macro-sociological 
thought as an unsure and over-ambitious metaphysics" (Rock 1979, p238). This is a 
strong claim, but one which is at least partially vindicated by Pahl's doubts about SCA 
(Pahl 1989, Chapter 4 above). If Rock's arguments are taken together with Williams', 
the reasons for Park's making the methodological decisions he did become much clearer, 
and the macro-sociological traditions rejection of Park's work far less convincing.
Rock accuses the macro-sociological tradition of beginning from the reduction of the
social to the fixed form and then attempting to turn round and explain the social in terms
of the fixed form, and falling down in the attempt:
[Orthodox sociologists] have been unsure whether a precise demarcation can 
exist between culture and social organisation, or whether an autonomous realm 
of structure exists...
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Interactionists would assert that social organisation is not what the 
macrosociologists believe it to be. They would further assert that the 
separation of social organisation and culture is a perilous and probably absurd 
exercise. After all, a culturally uncontaminated example of social organisation 
would be a most implausible entity. To the Martian, all social life would be 
equally baffling. It would not happily resolve itself into an opaque culture and 
an intelligible structure. Rather, tx)th would be in need of symbolic decoding. 
There can be no easy devaluation of interactionist ontology as a mere lack of 
appreciation. Neither can problems be met by appeals for greater clarity or 
conformity.
(Rock 1979 p220/l)
It is clear that Rock and Williams share many of the same concerns. Although Williams 
rarely discusses sociology, the arguments Rock makes from within the symbolic 
interactionist perspective are comparable to Williams' reservations about the "new and 
displaced forms of social analysis and categorization", with their spurious opposition to 
"the 'human imagination', the 'human psyche', the 'unconscious', [and] with their 
'functions' in art and myth and dream" (R.Williams 1977 p i30).
Clearly however, some distinctions must be made in descriptions of social change and
process, or no change or process could be observed at all, the problem of individuation
(Oilman, Chapter 1,1971). However, according to Oilman, individuation does not mean
separation of the (so-called) internal and external, which are always internally related. In
fact, it is possible to argue that Williams and Rock are arguing for an awareness of the
dialectical relation of the so-called internal and external factors in any context, and that
this is what Park's dialectic attempts to provide.
Park's loose dialectic of theory and data was an effort to place the questions 
raised by the confrontation of classical theory and modem experience in a 
problematic context, where the premises would not dictate the answers.
(Matthews 1977 pl91)
In reducing the social to fixed forms, it may be argued that macro-sociology does indeed 
let "the premises... dictate the answers". This, after all, was the burden of Pahl's 
complaints about SCA. The apparently Darwinian language in which some of Park's 
ideas are expressed should not be allowed to distract from the seriousness and the quality 
of the attempts Park made to confront this central problem for theories of social process 
and change.
The organization of the remainder of the chapter is therefore as follows. First an outline 
of Park's dialectic as a sociology of consciousness, then an outline of its 
complementarities with Marx's, using Raymond Williams' arguments that human 
ecology should be the basis of socialist practices, followed by an account of the role of
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space and spatial relations in a dialectic of socialization and social change in modem life. 
Once this account has been developed it is then possible to understand the significance of 
housing in defining status in conditions of modernity. Gentrification on this account will 
have significant effects on the constitution of status, not class. Furthermore, far from 
being post-modern, it is quintessentially a product of modernity. This proves once more 
the paucity of the postindustrialist explanations of gentrification. However, simply to 
say that gentrification is a product of modernity is not enough. Modernity provides the 
context only, within which gentrifiers exhibit their ability to gentrify because they can. 
Chapter 7 will then show how gentrification may be specified within this context, that is, 
without invoking changes in social organization or class constitution.
6.3 Park's dialectic - basic principles
Park’s dialectic begins with a consideration of the fundamental bases of human 
behaviour, that is a search for the fundamental social element (Park 1927 - 1955). His 
considerations do not lead him to sociobiology, to find the social element in the 
'instincts' of human beings. "Even if they may be said to exist", these instincts 
"themselves are in a constant process of change through the accumulation of memories 
and habits", (Park 1925, 1926 - 1952 pl74), that is, through the development of 
consciousness.
The fundamental human element is not instinct but the tendency to act itself, the 'attitude' 
(ibid.). The tendency to act is however formless in itself. In order for actual actions to 
occur, it must go through what may be interpreted as a typically Hegelian sequence of 
Being, Negation, and Becoming. This sequence is repeated again and again in wider and 
wider contexts from the growth of a child into adulthood (1929 - 1952 p203) or the 
socialization of an immigrant into a new society or the development of personality types 
(1931 - 1955 p263), through the relation of communication and consensus, community 
and society, civilization and culture (1936 - 1952 p i57/8), to social change, migration 
and war (Park 1941-1967). It is in this context that Park's ecological metaphors of 
dominance (1934 - 1952 ppl60/161), invasion (1928 -1967 pl99), succession (1936 - 
1952 p75) and assimilation (1914 -1967 p i 14; 1936 - 1952 pl45) must also be placed.
Park describes the determination (that is to say, the negation of the formlessness) of an 
individual's attitudes in terms of a dialectic between self-consciousness and other's 
attitudes (1925 - 1952 pl74). Park quotes on numerous occasions Dewey's aphorism 
that society exists "in and through communication" (e.g.. Park 1925, 1926 - 1952
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p 174/5). Communication gives form to attitude and attitudes form self-consciousness
and self-determination.
The formation of the attitude is a synthesis of experience and ambition, in 
which the ego surveys its past, reflects upon it, and projects itself into the 
future.
(Park 1931b- 1950 p358)
Attitudes are the processes by which the tendency to act is continously transformed into 
actual actions, which thereby generates further experience (Park 1931-1955 p274).
Each stage in the ongoing process of socialization therefore takes place through and with 
the acquisition of experience, in particular through communication. Communication gives 
form to attitudes, attitudes form self-consciousness and the acquisition of 
self-consciousness leads to self-determination. The dialectics of socialization can then be 
presented as a dialectic of naivety, nonconformity and self-consciousness (1929 - 1952 
p203).
Communication also presupposes a "universe of discourse", in which compromises are 
made and decisions are reached over actions to be taken (Park 1925,1926 - 1952 pl73). 
This "universe of discourse" which comprises communication and socialization contains 
two opposing and contradictory poles; on the one hand consensus, but on the other 
conflict or competition. Although these two poles may be isolated for descriptive 
purposes, all actual social relations, expressed in the communications and interactions 
one individual has with another, contain and express both these elements (Park 1929 - 
1952pl78/9).
By referring us to habit, custom and mores. Park appears to collude in that habitual 
slippage into the past tense which Williams decries. But it would be wrong to suggest 
that this is the category error which Williams suggests. As I have argued above, this 
habit and its associated category errors arise from social processes, not simply from 
poor conceptualization. Park's account of the struggle for status therefore is not some a 
priori idealist teleology. The struggle for status is inextricably intertwined with alienation 
and self-consciousness.
The fact of communication implies the existence of other individuals/persons who are 
themselves aware of the ultimate incommunicability of their experience, and thus aware 
also of their separate, alienated status. Alienation is not to be construed simply in terms 
of self-consciousness and the awareness of an ultimately incommunicable isolation; a 
world of "brooding, subjective inscrutable egos" (Park 1929 - 1952 p203). As with 
Hegel, socialization is inextricably linked to alienation (Kainz 1973). The ensemble of
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gestures an individual acquires in the course of socialization goes to make up that 
individual's character, the role that that individual plays as a person. Alienation is 
therefore objectified in the concept of the 'person'. Reflecting on the fact that "is 
probably no mere historical accident... that the word "person" in its first meaning is a 
mask". Park comments
In a sense and insofar as this mask represents the concepts which we have 
formed of ourselves, the role we are striving to live up to, this mask is our 
"truer se lf , the self we should like to be. So, at any rate, our mask becomes 
at last an integral part of our personality: becomes second nature. We come 
into the world as individuals, achieve character, and become persons.
(Park 1927 - 1967 pl91)
Since therefore "the individual's status is determined to a considerable degree by 
conventional signs - by fashion and by 'front'..." (Park 1916 - 1952 p47), status itself is 
the objectification of alienation.
For Park, self-consciousness is therefore not so much a state of bliss for we instinctively
strive as one which is visited upon us and which is inherently problematical:
Our self-consciousness is just our consciousness of [our]... individual 
differences of experience, together with a sense of their ultimate 
incommunicability...
(Park, 1925, 1926 - 1952 pp 175)
Park describes this form of consciousness as a "subjectivity" which " is at once a 
condition and a product of human life." (1927 - 1967 pl90). Williams' and Sayer's 
descriptions of the historical specificity of this subjectivity means that this should be 
more properly understood as a condition of modem life (R.Williams 1973b, D.Sayer 
1991 cf. also Connolly 1988, Giddens 1990). This presentation of the conditions of 
modernity as universal and transhistorical is a weakness in Park's work, but this 
weakness takes nothing away from his account of the processes of socialization under the 
conditions of modernity (6.4 below).
Self-consciousness is therefore consciousness of our alienation from each other. Park
comes very close to defining the condition of humanity in existentialist terms - to be
human is to strive to overcome alienation, but never to succeed since this would mean
that the striving would cease and therefore the quality of human-kindness be lost. Unlike
the existentialists however, Park concentrates on the social rather than the personal
consequences of this condition:
This world of communication and of "distances" in which we all seek to 
maintain some sort of privacy, personal dignity and poise is a dynamic world, 
and has an order and a character quite its own...[in which] ...the conception 
which each of us has of himself is Hmited by the conception which every other 
individual, in the same hmited world of communication, has of himself and of
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every other individual...
The consequence is - and this is true of any society - every individual finds 
himself in a struggle for status: a struggle to preserve his personal prestige, his 
point of view, and his self respect. He is able to maintain them, however, 
only to the extent to which he can gain for himself the recognition of everyone 
else whose estimate seems important... From this struggle for status no 
philosophy of life has yet discovered a refuge.
(Park, 1925,1926 - 1952 p 176/7)
The acquisition of status is not shorthand for high social status. On the external, or extra­
personal, level, status is the social validation of the person, the individual-in-society, the 
bearer of social relations. At the personal level, the acquisition of status is a moral issue, 
in the sense of internalizing the mores or customary obligations inherent in interpersonal 
communication (Park 1931b - 1955 p267). At the same time, status is part of an 
individual’s self-conception, or the projection of action into the future (cf. Chapter 5.5).
Just as action results in the development of an individual, so also it results in the
development of society:
Societies are formed for action and in action. They grow up in the efforts of 
individuals to act collectively. The structures which societies exhibit are on the 
whole the incidental effects of collective action.
(Park 1929- 1952 pl81)
Action tends to the development of social structures, and social structures in turn impose
their characteristics upon the acting members of that society:
The same forms which co-operate to create the characteristic social 
organization and the accepted moral order of a given society or social group 
determine at the same time, to a greater or lesser extent, the character of the 
individuals who compose that society.
(Park 1927 - 1967 pl88)
Habitual actions become recognized as gestures, "since what one does is always an
indication of what one intends to do" (Park 1927 - 1955 p i 8). As habitual actions
develop into customary modes of behavior and moral regimes, societies develop into
organized structures capable of reproducing themselves intergenerationally. The
development of social structures consequently follows a similar Hegelian dialectic:
Institutions are always... the accumulated effects of tradition and customs 
they are always in the process o f becoming what they were predestined to be, 
human nature being what it is, rather than what they are or were.
[They therefore] seem to be... a product of the type of dialectical or rational 
communication which is the peculiar practice of human beings.
(Park 1939 - 1952 p246 emphasis added, p258)
To summarize. Park’s dialectic of socialization is an account of struggle between the 
pressure to conform (being) and the determination to be an individual (negation) (Park
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1929 - 1952 p203). Socialization leads to the formation of a person, defined, 
foreshadowing Althusser, as an individual-in-society ("The individual represents the 
human being outside of society. The person represents the individual in society" Park 
1950 p20). It involves a dialectic of alienated, objective being (simple unmediated 
attitude and self-consciousness - the result of experience); negation (determination of 
attitude by others); and becoming (the self-conscious determinate person - a synthesis of 
self-consciousness and determined mediated attitude). However, society (and all its 
structures) is itself created and recreated through these same processes. There is no 
dividing line between the social and the psychological, either in theory or practice.
The struggle for status (the dialectic of status) deals with some of the most important 
themes in Western philosophy since Hegel. Furthermore, since his account of social 
change derives from the same principles as does his account of human nature. Park's 
dialectic avoids many of the problems of the unwarranted separation of a whole way of 
life into separate idealist categories, problems which have bedevilled sociology before 
and since. Park's dialectic therefore gives us a very useful way of approaching the 
question of status, which, while it can make use of Weber's insights, does not owe 
anything to Weber's views on social organization. Nor does it owe anything to Marx. 
However, it should be clear, from what has so far been seen of Park's dialectic that, in 
principle it ought to be reconcilable with Marx's. I shall argue that the difference 
between the two dialectics is one of foci of interest, not of fundamental differences in 
ontology or epistemology, and that therefore it is worth trying to reconcile the two. 
Achieving such a reconciliation not only strengthens both but also means that the last 
piece of the jigsaw may be put in place, namely a sociological account of the development 
of consciousness which includes the experience of class but which is not reducible solely 
to class considerations. It gives us the conceptual apparatus necessary to construct the 
link between housing and status so as to understand why on the one hand gentrifiers 
gentrify because they can, and on the other why this expression of free will is so bitterly 
resented.
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6.4 Mobility, marginality and consciousness
The motor of Park's dialectic, and why I term it a dialectic of modernity, is not urbanism, 
but 'Progress’. Progress breaks up the "cake of custom" (Park 1928 - 1967 p l9 7 ,1943- 
1955, 1944-1950), on the one hand releasing energy for social change, but on the other 
promoting social disorganization, as the habits, customs and mores of the community are 
broken. What Park calls Progress is of course the condition of modernity (cf. 5.2 and
5.3 above, and D.Sayer's account of Weber's views on Progress - 1991 pl48ff.). It is 
in this context that Park's account of the formation of the person is sited. What is 
particularly intriguing about this account is the way in which it anticipates themes and 
concerns to be found in R.Williams' work, the influence of mobility on modem 
consciousness.
The impact of Progress in the experience of the modem city means that society is indeed 
normally in a state of flux. The impact of mobility on the dialectic of experience and 
ambition is consequently one of the most common themes in Park's work (cf. Park 1925 - 
1952 p92/3). Mobility not surprisingly therefore plays an important role in Park's 
account of the development of the marginal man, perhaps Park's most original 
contribution to sociological thought.
Some justification is required for retaining the terminology of marginal 'man' and not
marginal 'person'. In dealing with this issue, I rely on D.Sayer's conclusions to this
problem of gender blindness in the 'classics'. He argues that it is better to let the sexist
language stand than to defer to modem-day sensibilities (cf. Love 1986):
To imagine this deficiency can be remedied by changing the gender of 
pronouns is to efface even more thoroughly that world of feminine experience 
sociology has so conspicuously neglected. It silences by a token inclusion, 
ofa kind that Marx and Weber might recognize as paradigmatically modem...
(D.Sayer 1991 p5)
In Park's writings (and Williams' also - see below), it must be understood that the 
marginal man is precisely that - a man. Although in many situations the processes of the 
development of consciousness may be the same or very similar across genders, there is 
no account in either author of how gender may affect the outcomes of the development of 
consciousness. To remedy this deficiency could be a very important topic for future 
work, but not in this thesis, as I shall argue in Chapter 9 that gender issues are not 
important for the explanation of why gentrification occurs - which is not to say that they 
are not significant in its processes or effects. Furthermore, as argued in Chapter 5, in 
explanations of gentrification, SCA raises its hoary head over gender issues just as much
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as over class. Accounts of diseased and sinful alien space invaders playing back to the 
future in the inner city are denounced for not taking into consideration the experience of 
Ms. diseased and sinful alien space invader in the process (cf. Bondi 1991). The gender 
blindness is rightly denounced but while the proposed remedies fail to deal with the 
problem of SCA, they will achieve little more than a change of pronoun in the way that 
SCA handles the issues.
Park develops the idea of the marginal man through an account of the effects of 
migration: of the individual into a new society; and of the impact such immigration makes 
on the host society. The effect of immigration on the host society is summed up in the 
famous dominance-succession-assimilation triad.
Conditions of stability result in a society of philistines "whose life-organization is taken 
over from, and stabilizes in the patterns which [they find] in the society around [them]" 
(Park 1931a - 1955 p262). Placed in such a society, the new migrant, unaware of the 
customs and mores of the people around him will initially display the naivety of a child. 
The immigrant, being unaware of the mores of the host society, presents a constant living 
challenge to them. To be naive therefore is to be alien (Park 1931 - 1955 p286). Until 
the mores of the society have been assimilated by - taken into the psyche of - the 
immigrant, and the immigrant thereby assimilated into - made more like - the host society 
(Park 1914 -1967 p i 14), the immigrant will be denied the status of a person by the native 
members of the host society. From the point of view of the host society, assimilation 
presents itself as a question of establishing social control. Turner (1967 p.xi) argues that 
this was Park's central concern.
What presents itself to the host society as the preservation of order presents itself to the 
immigrant as a struggle for status, for recognition as a person. The "fundamental 
struggle for existence" (Park 1939 - 1952 p i20) is no more nor less than the struggle for 
existence as a person, i.e., for status (Park 1941a - 1967 pl59). Unlike the child, who 
similarly seeks, or rather learns to seek recognition as a person, the migrant brings to the 
new society, the memories and experience of the old, in which such status had already 
been won. The immigrant is a marginal man, standing on the margins of two cultures.
Park uses the example of the 'emancipated Jew' in nineteenth century Germany to 
illustrate both the problems and the promise inherent in the situation of the marginal man:
He was a man on the margin of two cultures and two societies which never
completely interpenetrated and fused. The emancipated Jew was, and is,
historically and typically the first cosmopolite and citizen of the world...
The conflict of cultures as it takes place in the mind of the immigrant, is just
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the conflict of "the divided se lf , the old self and the new. And frequently 
there is no satisfying issue of this conflict, which often terminates in a
profound disillusionment..j ..........................
... the restless wavering between the warm security of the ghetto which he 
has abandoned, and the cold freedom of the outer world in which he is not yet 
quite at home is typical. A century earlier, Heinrich Heine, tom with the same 
conflicting loyalties, struggling to be at die same time a German and a Jew, 
enacted a similar role. It was... the secret and tragedy of Heine’s life that 
circumstances condemned him to live in two worlds, in neither of which he 
ever quite belonged.
(Park 1928 - 1967 p205/6)
The emancipation of the migrant may see a return to the naive moment in the dialectics of 
socialization into the new society, but nevertheless some integration into its mores does 
occur (Park 1928 -1967 p2(X)/201). In effect, a new person is created. The migrant 
becomes "in the process not merely emancipated, but enlightened." (Park 1928 -1967 
p201). It is this enlightenment, painful as it may be, as old securities are abandoned and 
new insecurities encountered, which is the precondition for change in the society to 
which the migrant moves. The ideology of a society or social group is an "integral part 
of its social structure..." (Park 1939 - 1952 p247/8). To change a society’s ideology is 
also therefore to change its social order. With the onset of immigration, the host society 
is forced to change the definition of who is and who is not a person in that society, to 
change the definition of who is and who is not an alien. With this change in ideology, as 
immigration proceeds, the social order must therefore also change.
However Park also argues that the replacement of one social order by another can be 
understood without reference to migration at all, through another aspect of his dialectic of 
socialization, succession. Succession occurs intergenerationally as the compromise 
(synthesis) between being and its negation, naivety and non-conformity, experience and 
ambition is worked out over and over again in the processes of socialization (Park 1938 - 
1952 p236). Park’s concept of succession is therefore reminiscent of Giddens’ theory of 
structuration (Giddens 1987, Thompson 1989).
If social change does occur through succession, however, then in significant respects we 
are all ’marginal men’, standing in the margins between a fixed past and an undetermined 
future. The marginal man is not for Park a person located on the margins of one society; 
whatever that might mean. Nor is the marginal man to be thought of as an outcast, 
redundant or low-life person of little or no status in society (cf. Perlman 1975). The 
marginal man represented for Park not only the typical problem of modem society, that is 
to say, the effects of migration in all its ramifications, but also the promise of its solution.
The character of the marginal man is a consequence of the experience of modernity, and
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so is his situation, between the past and the future, in the indefinite present which
Williams (1973b p357) argued is the experience of the modem city. Park himself argues
that the present is experienced as a tension, and that this tension tends to the breakup of
those same habitual actions which he argues underpin social structure.
The fact that men can look back with regret to their past and look forward with 
lively expectation to their future, suggests that there is, ordinarily, in the lives 
of human beings an amount of tension and sustained suspense which tends to 
break up established habits and to hold those habits not yet established in 
solution. During this period of tension and suspense when overt action and 
eventual habits are in process, activity is directed less by previous habits than 
by present attitudes.
(Park 1931 -1955 p274)
If the tension Park describes does ordinarily exist in the lives of human beings, then the 
society in which they live must be ordinarily in a state of flux: it must be a modern 
society. Conditions of stability promote a lack of self-consciousness as the ideologies 
generated in stability become evermore taken-for-granted (cf. mediæval Japan in Park 
1931b -1955 p289). The implication of this, of course, is that the intense self- 
consciousness which Park describes so convincingly is not simply part of the human 
condition, but is in fact a condition of an unstable, highly mobile, society.
The conclusion that the conditions of modernity make us all marginal men need not
simply be a matter of inference from Park's work. R.Williams also makes use of the
concept in very similar ways to Park (R.Williams 1973b p201, p213, p223 cf. also
Chapter 10.4 below). In particular, Williams too stresses the importance of immigration
in the creation of the marginal man (cf. Pinckney 1989 pl4). Where Park describes the
fortunes of the marginal man in terms of his personality, however, Williams describes
them in terms of his class situation. However, the concerns which Park considers to be
central to sociological enquiry, namely the exercise of social control, become
problematical in Williams' account for exactly the same reasons - mobility and the
destruction of the mores.
It was... in the break-up and mobility of the post-feudal society, that a new 
ideology decisively appeared. It at once organized the response to poverty... 
and... it linked poverty to labour in new ways, so that the harrying of what 
was called vagrancy, itself the result of a socially created disturbance and 
mobility, became, in its turn, a social duty... the biggest problem of this 
system was always its treatment of an inevitable and natural mobility.... The 
idea of settlement, and then of paternal care, was counterposed to that of 
mobility, of the wandering 'sturdy rogues', the free labourers.
(R.Williams, 1973b pl05/6)
Much of what Williams has to say in regard to the question of the relation of mobility to 
the marginal man is to be found in his analysis of the works of Thomas Hardy. Williams 
argues that Hardy’s Wessex is in reality
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that border country so many of us have been living in: between custom and 
education, between work and ideas, between love of place and experience of 
change.
(R. Williams 1973b, p239)
The contrasts which mark the border country have persisted since the sixteenth century 
"in a long crisis of values" (R.Williams, 1973b pl06). Insofar as the border country is 
indeed one in which "so many of us" live, and insofar as the concept applies across 
genders, we are all marginal men, just as Park seems to imply.
Chapter 4 argued that we are (nearly) all members of the proletariat. Here I am arguing 
that experience of the marginal man stands for the experience of everyone living under 
conditions of modernity, confirming Shields argument that "'Marginality' is a centred 
theme in Western culture and thought" (1990 p276 - Chapter 3.3 above cf. Chapter 10 
below). Marginality is the characteristic condition of modernity. Chapter 5.5 argued that 
Marx’s limited account of the experience of everyday life outside of the immediate 
context of capitalist production ought not to be supplemented by the unncessary 
expansion of the categories of class into areas outside of that context, but by 
incorporating Marx's account of the moulding of consciousness in that context into an 
account of the formation of consciousness across "a whole way of life" (R.Williams, 
1961 p63). Given that the conditions (marginal and proletarian) characterize the daily 
experience of most of us. Parks’s account of the development of the consciousness of the 
marginal man would appear fill that lacuna.
As I have shown. Parks’s dialectic is specifically concerned with the formation of 
consciousness. Marx, however, describes (in his 1859 Preface, cited in Capital I) only 
how consciousness is shaped', he emphatically does not describe how consciousness is 
created:
My view is that each particular mode of production and the relations of 
production corresponding to it at each given moment, in short, the ’economic 
structure of society’, is ’the real foundation, on which arises a legal and 
political superstructure and to which correspond definite form s of social 
consciousness' and 'that the mode of production of material life conditions the 
general process of social, political and intellectual life’.
(Marx 1976 pl75 ft35 emphasis added)
As Blanchard (1985) argues, the experience of class can only be experienced personally. 
The parallel experience of marginality and proletarian status make for a potentially fruitful 
linkage between personal and collective experience. Park argues that the experience of 
the stmggle for status of classes in capitalist society is experienced by its members in the 
same fashion as that of the marginal man. The processes whereby individuals struggle 
for status are the same processes by which individuals are brought to terms with their
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status, as they reconcile their ambitions with their achievements. Marx's dialectic is 
described by Park as "a struggle of economic or functional classes for social status in a 
social hierarchy" (Park 1943a - 1950 p304). The struggle for status in this instance takes 
place in the context of an otherwise derived social hierarchy, the hierarchy of class in 
capitalist society. Classes of people who are partially but permanently excluded from the 
"imaginary community of the nation" (Hall 1989 p9) struggle to be recognized as 
individuals-in-society by other classes. Friedmann's (1977) concepts of central and 
peripheral labour become very important here (6.6 below). Like the marginal man in 
modem society, the proletariat is both partly included and partly excluded from capitalist 
society (cf. Cleaver 1979). Like the marginal man, the proletariat also not only 
epitomizes the problems of its society, but also provides the promise of its dissolution 
(Marx & Engels 1848). Parks's account of the development of the consciousness of the 
marginal man provides a useful complement to Marx's account of the shaping of that 
developed consciousness through the experience of the capitalist production process.
Equally importantly. Park's account of the formation of the consciousness of the 
marginal man thus permits the incorporation of questions of space and spatial relations 
into a dialectic of social change which, I shall argue below, is superior to anything 
currently on offer in the literature. This then permits a discussion of the social origin and 
estimation of use values (such as housing) and their relation to exchange value. It is then 
finally possible to show the importance of a sense of place in the constitution of identity, 
which is to say in the constitution of status as a person within the context of the capitalist 
mode of production. It is these three characteristics of the development of consciousness 
in modernity, I shall argue, which lend gentrification its potential for social conflict.
6.5 The social dialectic of space
65.1 Society and space
Many attempts have been made to incorporate space and spatial relations into Marxist 
thought. Perhaps the most important attempts have been made by Henri Lefebvre, who 
has been a significant influence on the two authors considered in detail here, namely 
Harvey and Gottdiener (Harvey 1982, Gottdiener 1985). Lefebvre's approach is to seek 
ways of incorporating space and spatial relations into Marx's dialectic of production, and 
both Harvey and Gottdiener have developed this approach in significantly different ways.
Harvey's most extended attempt at incorporating the effects of space and spatial relations
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into Marxism is contained in The Limits to Capital (1982). Here the effect of space and 
spatial relations is treated essentially as a context which, although created by the 
processes of capital accumulation, in its turn limits the conditions under which that 
accumulation may be carried on. This approach to the influence of space and spatial 
relations is one which in its essentials is followed by the localities approach, although 
usually the focus in locality studies is less economistic than in Harvey's; instead the 
emphasis is on social process in general, however this may be defined in the course of 
the study (cf.Duncan & Savage 1989).
Harvey's argument follows closely the outlines of capitalist development sketched out in 
the Communist Manifesto of 1848. The 'spatial fix' to problems of capital accumulation 
created by investment in the built environment in one generation comes to represent a 
barrier to continued accumulation for later generations. In other words, space and spatial 
relations become no longer compatible with the productive forces they have helped to 
develop and turn into fetters of production. N.Smith, Harvey's disciple, follows this 
line of argument in his rent gap theory of gentrification (Chapter 7 below).
In Harvey's account, while space and spatial relations may affect the outcomes of the 
dialectic between capital and labour, the capital-labour dialectic remains itself 
fundamentally aspatial. The role of space in the system is in effect as one of the relations 
of production. Gottdiener argues that space should instead be treated as a force of 
production. Compared with Harvey's system, Gottdiener tries to push back the question 
of space and spatial relations into the Marxist dialectic itself. In his Lefebvrian account, 
Gottdiener distinguishes between social space, the home of use values and abstract 
space, the home of exchange value. Capitalism pulverizes social space, which is 
replaced by abstract space. Gottdiener demonstrates in all sorts of ways how neglect of 
space and spatial relations leads to economism or functionalism in Marxist thought. To 
make space a force of production, Gottdiener argues, would solve these problems.
In order to make space a force of production, Gottdiener argues, Marx's aspatial dialectic 
of production should be translated into spatial terms. However, even supposing this can 
be achieved in the terms in which Gottdiener proposes, space would remain an output of 
production in Gottdiener's just as much as in Harvey's work, rather than an input, which 
calling it a 'force' of production would imply. A successful translation of a word or 
concept depends on preserving as many of the properties of the original as possible. If 
therefore, the original concepts suffered from functionalism or economism, then their 
translations, even if successfully accomplished, will do so too. If we want to introduce 
space and spatial relations into Marxism, it is necessary to push the frontiers of space 
much further back than simple translation of Marx's dialectic into spatial terms will
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allow.
The approaches of Harvey and Gottdiener to space, either as a relation or as a force of 
production respectively, can stand for the full range of contemporary positions, Marxist 
or otherwise, on the role of spatial relations in social structures, the point being that they 
begin at the social level. An already theorized set of social relations is adapted to take 
spatial considerations into account A good example of this is the set of essays collected 
in Gregory & Urry (1985). A.Sayer's essay is typical of the approach: "Space makes a 
difference, but only in term of the particular causal powers and liabilities constituting it" 
(1985 p52). The causal (social) powers predate (in theoretical terms) the space they are 
supposed to constitute.
Similarly, Paasi, in a review of the various approaches to "the new regional geography", 
one of the bases of locality studies (Duncan and Savage 1991), notes that these 
approaches all
arise from the fact that space (and time), its symbolic and ideological 
dimensions as well as its material basis (nature, economy etc.) are essentially 
social categories.
(Paasi 1991 p240)
But essentially social as opposed to what? The approaches Paasi summarizes perpetuate 
an unwarranted division between the social and the individual. If space and spatial 
relations are as important in constituting the person as Park argues, then to attempt a 
reconciliation of an unnecessarily sundered relationship between the social and the spatial 
is to repeat in another context the attempts at the reconciliation of Marxism and psycho­
analysis, which Williams so rightly criticizes.
These authors make the same mistake as Marx in his 1859 Preface^ imagining that the 
formation of consciousness is non-problematical, and that what is important is how it is 
shaped by the labour process. Yet everyone brings different experiences to the labour 
process, experiences acquired through their being in different places at different times to 
everyone else. There is therefore, no guarantee whatsoever that they will react in the 
same ways to experience of the same objective circumstances in the labour process - 
communication discussion and consensus is required to produce a common attitude to 
this experience. What they have forgotten is Marx's purpose in constructing a dialectic of 
production in the first place.
Marx concentrates on creating a dialectic of production because production demonstrates 
that separation of means and ends which distinguishes the worst of architects from the 
best of bees. However, what is demonstrated by the ability to separate means from ends 
is self-consciousness, the ability to conceptualize oneself as separate from one's
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environment, to survey one's past, reflect upon one's present, and project oneself into 
the future (Park 1931 - 1950 p358). Self-consciousness is implicit in creativity. In 
Park's dialectic the questions of space and spatial relations enter into the very ways in 
which human is distinguished from animal existence, because mobility itself is an 
indispensable aspect of the creation of self-consciousness: "Mind is an incident of 
locomotion" (Park 1925c - 1952 p93). The questions of space and spatial relations are 
fundamental to his definition of the humanity of human beings.
The role of space and spatial relations therefore cannot be added in to the dialectic of 
capital and labour once this dialectic has been established, nor can this dialectic be 
translated into spatial terms, as though these terms were "empty boxes" (Harvey 1982 
p?) waiting to be filled up by Marx's categories of political economy. Human beings do 
not spring forth fully clothed in all their humanity, only to have this stripped from them 
in the capitalist labour process: they have first to acquire this humanity - status as human 
beings. The labour process shapes consciousness, space and spatial relations are 
fundamental in creating it.
Treating Park’s dialectic as complementary to Marx's adds another string to the Marxist
bow. It frees it from the confines of SCA. It is no longer necessary to trace each and
every difference between social groups to differences in the conditions of their
participation in the labour process. Nor does it mean a tacit abandoning of Marx's
thought either. The conditions of modernity, with its associated mobility and anonymity,
is nowhere better summarized than in the Communist Manifesto itself:
Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social 
conditions, everlasting uncertainty, and agitation distinguish the bourgeois 
epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of 
ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions are swept away, all new-formed 
ones become antiquat^ before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, 
all that is holy profaned...
(Marx & Engels 1848 - )
In arguing that Park's dialectic is a dialectic of modernity, this condition of life has to be 
seen as, in a sense, the 'external' counterpart to the 'internal' dialectic of class struggle in 
the labour process. I shall return to this point in 6.5.2 below. For the moment, it is 
enough to re-emphasize that both dialectics are mutually implicated one in the other: there 
is no question of the one being theoretically prior to the other.
I wish now to fill out some of the implications of the effects of space and spatial relations 
in the development of status, implications which will be seen to have the greatest 
influence on the question of gentrification.
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6 S 2  Place and status
It has already been argued that the necessity for communication arises from the
experiences gained through mobility. Communication depends on a system of mutually
intelligible, i.e., conventional signs (cf. R.Williams 1977 p40, also below). However,
for signs to become conventionalized, there must be a certain stability of association also.
Society is, to be sure, made up of independent locomoting individuals. It is 
this fact of locomotion, as I have said, that defines the very nature of society.
But in order that there may be permanence and progress in society, the 
individuals who compose it must be located; they must be located, for one 
thing, to maintain communication, for it is only through communication that 
the moving equilibrium that we call society can be maintained.
All forms of association among human beings rest finally upon locality and 
local association.
(Park 1925 - 1952 p93/4)
However all forms of association among human beings are also ones which are 
inextricably implicated in the struggle for status. The fact that all forms of association 
among human beings also rest finally upon locality and local association, means that a 
'sense of place' may be understood as a realm of experience acquired either in 
socialization or in the maintenance of status.
'Status' is in other words 'place', place in society (" 'This is a white man's country.'
'The Negro is all right in his place ' " - Park 1943a p310 emphasis added). The hobo is
someone who has given up his place in society, preferring the open road. In his case,
there is no synthesis of the negation of mobility with the being of place:
The trouble with the hobo is not lack of experience but lack of a vocation. The 
hobo is, to be sure, always on the move, but he has no destination, and 
naturally he never arrives... The hobo seeks change solely for the sake of 
change; it is a habit and like the drug habit, moves in a vicious circle. The 
more he wanders, the more he must.
(Park 1925c- 1952 p93)
A 'sense of place' results from the experience of socialization and constitutes part of this
personal dialectic of experience and ambition. The question of a 'sense of place' is
regarded by existential Marxist geographers as fundamental to the alienated human
condition (Samuels 1978) for precisely these reasons.
As long as man is thus attached to the earth and to places on the earth, as long 
as nostalgia and plain homesickness hold him and (fraw him back to the haunts 
and places he knows best, he will never fully realize that other characteristic 
ambition of mankind, to roam freely and untrammelled over the surface of 
mundane things, and to live, like pure spirit, in his mind and in his 
imagination alone.
(Park 1 9 2 5 c- 1952 p91)
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The issues of a sense of place have long been of interest to geographers, in particular 
humanistic geographers (Ley and Samuels 1978) who have taken their lead from authors 
such as Tuan (1974) and Buttimer (1980). These geographers have tended to concentrate 
on rural landscapes as expressions of cultural forms, rather than locales of socialization. 
Thus Tuan for example, when looking at 'environment and topophilia' (1974 p i 13 ff) 
discusses the relation of concepts of paradise to the environmental contexts in which they 
are formed, and the way these concepts became translated into artistic forms, notably 
landscape painting. Landscapes demonstrate the potency of universal myths.
These associations are carried over into discussions of urban milieux, as for instance in
Tuan's discussion of neighbourhoods in cities and suburbs. Although neighbourhoods
are defined in experiential terms as "the district in which on& feels at home" (Tuan 1974
p215), this experience is defined either exclusively in psychological or in aesthetic terms -
the two great modem ideologies:
a metaphysical or psychological 'community' is assumed, and 
characteristically, if only in abstract structures, it is universal; the middle terms 
of actual societies are excluded as ephemeral, superficial, or at best contingent 
and secondary... A direct connection... is forged between intense subjectivity 
and a timeless reality... There is a language of the mind... and there is this 
assumed universal language. Between them, as things, as signs, as material, 
as agents, are cities, towns, villages; actual human societies.
(R.Williams 1973b p295)
Williams' study of The Country and the City is an extended critique of the capacity of 
English literature to convey a sense of place in an adequate fashion. Often, he argues, 
nostalgia has instead been allowed to apotheosize the relations of class and appropriation 
that have created the place in which socialization occurred (an "obscuring vision of easy 
settlement" - R.Williams 1973 pl05). Jackson is therefore right to be wary of "the more 
indulgent and idiosyncratic aspects of the humanistic study of 'sense of place'" (1989 
p i85). He seeks instead to use Williams' concept of 'structure of feeling', arguing that 
it shares the meaning of a 'sense of place' but goes "well beyond it in several key 
respects" (1989 p39). In practice, however, this means that Jackson does not discuss 
sense of place at all. This is a damaging omission.
A better translation of a 'sense of place' into the language of Williams' concepts is as a 
"knowable community" (R.Williams 1973b p202ff.). Williams' accounts of knowable 
communities in Austen, Eliot and Dickens connects exactly with the entwining of 
socialization, place and status, which lies at the heart of the concept of sense of place. 
Knowable communities are defined by status. Admission to the community is in itself a 
mark of status:
Neighbours in Jane Austen are not the people actually living nearby; they are 
the people living a little less nearby who can be visited. What she sees across
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the land is a network of propertied houses and families, and through the holes 
of this tightly drawn mesh most actual people are simply not seen. To be face- 
to-face in this world is already to belong to a class. No other community, in 
physical presence or in social reality, is by any means knowable.
(R. Williams 1973b 203)
As Williams makes clear, all communities are in some sense defined in this way. 
Socialization is socialization into a community. It means the acquisition of status and 
status means recognition as a person. Recognition therefore is inevitably selective, and 
depends on familiarity, and local association. It is the conjuncture of these processes 
which result in the creation of a sense of place.
A sense of place is, as Williams suggests, liable to be affected by nostalgia. Williams 
has a habit, commented on by Cosgrove (1984), of implying that there is a ’real' history, 
or structure of feeling, discoverable behind the obscuring visions of easy settlement. 
Consequently there is a tendency in Williams’ writings to see these nostalgic visions as in 
some way ’false’. Though this tendency is often understandable, it is nevertheless a fault 
in Williams’ work which the development in his later writings of the notions of 
hegemony and counter-hegemony ought to have rooted out (cf. Chapter 5.3 above). A 
sense of place is not simply to be dismissed as sentiment. Even if it is only experienced 
as sentiment, it is still of the utmost importance to people’s ’psychological well-being’, 
or ’ontological security’, their sense of who they are.
The processes of socialization, which include a sense of place, may be summarized 
simply as "learning from experience". To talk of "learning from experience" in this 
context is however to suggest that the most important relationship that human beings 
have is with their memories (Wamock 1987 ch.6). Socialization and the social 
construction of identity means that human beings define themselves in terms of 
relationships. This is normally understood in terms of relationships with other people, 
and, particularly in capitalist society, with possessions as they mediate interpersonal 
relationships (cf. 6.6 below). But the relationship with their memories exists on a 
deeper, often subconscious, level, and which colours their relationships to other people 
and their reactions to fresh experiences. The most traumatizing effect of amnesia is not 
knowing who you are. Relationship is not static, but a process, therefore an ongoing 
engagement between the subject and the object.
Wamock denies however that her arguments mean endorsing a psycho-analytical or 
psychological approach to the analysis of the relationship between identity and memory 
(Wamock 1987 Chapter 4). Wamock argues that the importance of a sense of place in 
the constmction of identity arises through the comparison of the present experience of the
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place, with the memory of the former experience of the place. Wamock uses
Wordsworth's return to Tintem Abbey to illustrate her argument:
The existence of his memory-images retained during the five years between his 
visits, allows him to explore his own continuous existence and to seek 
meaning in the emotions that are now, on a return to the same place, so 
powerfully experienced, yet so changed.
(Wamock, 1987 p85)
Particularly in conditions of modernity and mobility, where meaning has to be sought out - 
and Wordsworth's Prelude is regarded by Williams as important for being one of the 
earliest recognitions of the problematical nature of this condition (R.Williams 1973b 
p280) - a 'sense of place’ is one of the most important of the memorial associations 
which affect or influence personal assessments of identity. Indeed the problem of the 
past, and thus of memory in retrieving this past, is one which, Williams argues, 
pervades all areas of thinking about society and social processes and change (1977 
pp128/129 - see also Redfem 1992).
That sense of place which Wamock finds in Wordsworth's poetry is important to 
Wordsworth precisely because he returns to Tintem Abbey bearing new experiences 
compared to those with which he last observed it. Both location and mobility are 
fundamental to the creation of consciousness through socialization, and the outcome of 
socialization is to establish status as an individual-in-society. A sense of place is of the 
utmost importance in this process, both as outcome and as constitutive effect. The 
recognition of place confirms not just identity, but identity as a person with status in 
society. If that also means identity as a person with status in that place, if there are other 
people around who grant you recognition, then a sense of place is experienced in an 
affirmative manner. If on the other hand there is no-one around to validate your status as 
a person, the experience of that place is liable to be nostalgic, even resentful. It is in 
these varying reactions to the ability of place to confirm status that the controversies over 
gentrification arise.
However, before this issue can be discussed, what needs finally to be shown is how 
'places' are created. This, it may be noticed, is the fundamental difficulty facing locality 
studies (cf. Duncan & Savage 1989), of indeed of any regional description (cf. 
Cosgrove 1984) - the question of defining boundaries of 'natural areas'. In what 
follows, I shall argue that Park's theory of value, which also arises out of the same 
processes of socialization of the individual and change in the society can be used to deal 
with this problem. This does not pretend to be a complete answer to the problem, nor do 
I argue that this is necessarily the only solution to the problem of regionalization, on 
which there is a vast and venerable literature, beginning in this context with Alihan
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(1938). It does however have the advantage of being consistent.
6 J .5  Space and the formation o f values
Earlier I argued that attempts to reconcile the spatial and the social were misguided: 
theorization should begin from the consideration of both together. To apply this principle 
to the problem of regionalization, keeping in mind the need to begin from the 
presumption of changeability, calls for a discussion of Park's theory of value.
Park's theory of value grounds both use and exchange value in individual experience. 
Personal values are grounded in the experience of culture, while economic values are 
grounded in the experience of civilization. The development of experience is part of the 
dialectic of socialization and social change. The placing of experience in the context of a 
dialectical process of growth and development provides an explanation of the dynamics 
underlying and undermining regionalization - the social dialectic of space.
The differences in the contexts through which experience is mediated, culture or 
civilization, allow for a distinction to be drawn between place and space, and for the 
possibility of conflict between them. Thus, in this social dialectic of space, an account 
can be given, not only of a sense of place, but also of how this can be forced into 
consciousness, to paraphrase Williams' expression. To introduce this discussion, I 
return to Park's definition of the attitude.
As outlined in 6.2 above, the transformative effects of communication on individuals in 
the processes of socialization means that the ultimate reduction possible in social analysis 
is to the attitude, or tendency to act, which for Park is the "social element" in all forms of 
sociation (Park 1925 - 1952 pl74). Although similarities in attitudes arise from similar 
experiences, it is the interaction of attitudes which creates consciousness. 
Communication implies the existence of others with whom it is not only possible but 
necessary to communicate, and who are also therefore possessed of differing attitudes.
An attitude is more than just a tendency to act, however, important though this is. It is 
also "the state of mind of the individual to-wards a value" (W.I. Thomas, quoted in Park 
1931 - 1955 p278). Values, as in Marx, are properties of objects rather than people 
(Park 1931 - 1955 p279). The effect of vesting value in an object is to create a social 
object, an object with meaning. Furthermore, the existence of values indicates the 
existence of interests, the recognition of the separation of means and ends:
Interests are directed less to-ward specific objects than to-ward the ends which
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this or that particular object at one time or another embodies. Interests imply 
therefore the existence of means and a consciousness of the distinction of the
difference between means and ends. .............................
(Park 1916- 1952 p26)
So where Marx takes labour to be the evidence of the distinction between means and ends 
as the material proof of the existence of consciousness and thus of human being, and 
labour therefore as the value of that proof, Park takes value itself to be the proof of 
consciousness, rather as, I have argued, money can be so regarded. The existence of 
values provokes, or tends to provoke, action. Park therefore regards activity in general, 
rather than simply productive labour as evidence not only of consciousness, but also as 
evidence of the value of an object (Park 1927-1955 pl4/5, 1931-1955 p274). 
Socialization terminates in the formation of an attitude. In this manner, value is linked to 
status and so to the dialectics of socialization.
Park therefore does not confine the production of values to the labour process:
The economic process, so far as it can be distinguished from the production 
and distribution of goods, is the process by which prices are made and an 
exchange of values is effected. Most values, i.e., my present social status, my 
hopes of the future, and memory of the past are personal and not values that 
can be exchanged. The economic process is concerned with values that can be 
treated as commodities.
(Park 1920/1921 - 1955 p238)
Park is not interested in economics as such; that is, he is not interested in establishing a 
set of propositions about the derivation of a set of relative prices, level of output and 
income distribution. Rather what interests him is economics as a social activity. It is not 
what is written on the labels which interests him but how labels come to be attached to 
objects at all. It is in this light that economics arises out of the same processes as the 
necessity for socialization. Although Park is not interested in economics as a discipline. 
Park’s work ought to be of the utmost interest to economics, including Marxian 
economics, as it provides a most useful explanation of a most neglected topic in 
economics, namely the genesis of use-values in those same processes. This explanation 
in turn explains the importance of place and the reasons why the boundaries of places’ 
are so liable to change.
The distinction Park makes between economic values and personal values is in effect 
equivalent to the conventional economic distinction between exchange value and use 
value. Economic value is clearly exchange value. Personal value may be regarded as use 
value, but the connection is not as straightforward to make as that between economic 
value and exchange value.
To estimate something of personal value is to hold an opinion of i t  To hold an opinion
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is to have an attitude, and to have an attitude is to have experience (Park 1924 - 1950 
pl57). The validation of experience through its communication to others may cause us to 
change our opinion of the experience. Nonetheless experience is, as Park (1924 - 1950 
p i52/3) points out, the result of action not speculation, so it is grounded, not in what we 
think we do, but what we actually do do. Experience may be personal and unique. It is 
nonetheless concrete.
Park, citing Nietzsche’s early mentor Schopenhauer, argues that our experience is itself 
gained from projection of our will into the world. Hence not only do we leam from 
experience; we also gain experience from learning, together with all that acquisition of 
experience implies:
The world in which men live is, on the whole, the world in which they have 
learned to live. Things take form and substance as we leam how to behave to­
wards them. Our habits and our attitudes are the subjective aspect of the world 
we know. What things mean for us is determined in the final analysis by the 
events in our personal history. The subtleties of the modem mind are reflected 
in the complexities of the modem world. The child at birth knows nothing of 
space and time, and has so to speak, no world at all, because it has no habits, 
no attitudes and no objects.
(Park 1931 - 1955 p274)
It is then the relation of attitudes to social objects which is constitutive of the reality of 
those objects:
The significance of objects for individual men and women is, in the final 
analysis, what gives them the character of reality. For things are not real 
because they exist, merely, but because they are important. The study of 
attitudes, as it tums out is a study of this importance - the importance which 
objects have for different individuals, and groups of individuals, and the 
conditions under which this importance is acquired.
(Park 1931 - 1955 p284)
In fact insofar as they have meaning, importance for individuals, space and time may be 
regarded as social objects themselves, and attitudes towards spaces and times the 
measure of their importance.
The meaning which a social object bears as the subject of an individual’s attitude or 
opinion of it, its personal value, must also be validated by others’ attitudes towards the 
object; just as the different experiences of individuals provokes a need for their validation 
through communication and the processes of socialization. It is in this process of 
validation that economic values arise: ”It is the different meanings and values that objects 
have for different individuals that makes trade and provokes discussion” (Park 1931 - 
1955 p279).
The money or market value of a commodity - a social object bearing economic value.
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which results from trade and discussion, expresses a universal consensus as to its price. 
There can be no such universal consensus over the personal value, the sentimental or 
cultural value, of a social object to any person or social group in society. However, even 
if a social object's personal value is assessed differently by different individuals, it is the 
common experience, the consciousness in other words of the fact that the social object in 
question does also possess personal value for others, which can render personal value 
both social and concrete. The communication of experiences, in other words, the dialect 
of socialization, is the way in which personal, use, values become social use values, 
cultural or social artefacts or objects. Paradoxically, therefore conflict can create 
awareness among numbers of people that a particular object bears personal value not only 
for them, but for others; that is, conflict can create social awareness of personal values. 
Just as experience is grounded in action, and transmitted through communication, so also 
therefore with personal values, which though still personal, may yet be held collectively.
Impersonal economic value is also at first expressed in an individualistic manner. 
Consensus is reached as to what the economic value actually is, because attitudes to the 
objects of trade, which belong to the sort of rationalistic, calculating individuals which 
Weber describes as produced in conditions of modernity (D.Sayer 1991), are 
disinterested and rational. There is no social solidarity resulting from the creation of 
economic value. It is socially necessary labour time, the necessity of society at least to 
reproduce itself from one period to the next which grounds economic values. However, 
socially necessary labour time cannot be established in advance; it can only be revealed 
through experience or given by tradition, although it represents an objective condition 
(Redfem 1991).
If the formation of exchange values is grounded in this dialectic of social experience, the 
formation of use values are grounded in the equivalent dialectic of personal experience. 
A use value is the concrete synthesis of a dialectic of experience and ambition. It 
represents an objective compromise between what we want and what we get.
To say that a use value represents an objective compromise between what we want and 
what we get, is to employ the notion of an opportunity cost. Use value is in this way 
linked to exchange value, since an object loses its usefulness if its opportunity cost is too 
high. Usefulness depends on the level of development of society, since opportunities 
foregone depend on the existence of other consumption choices. It also therefore 
depends upon the disposition of labour between the various branches of the economy, as 
society discovers in the course of its own dialectic of experience and ambition what can 
and cannot be produced under current conditions. One can, for example, estimate the 
socially necessary labour time involved in putting a man on the moon, but cannot claim
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thereby that putting a man on the moon is socially necessary. Use values therefore are 
not necessarily universal in nature, but are normally related to particular stages of 
development, considered both socially and personally. It is only as we describe them in 
more and more generic terms, food, clothing, shelter, for instance, that they become 
more universal in character.
To speak of society, use values (and opportunity costs) as being products of a dialectic of
experience and ambition is in fact to say that life itself is an ongoing synthesis in a
dialectic of experience and ambition. Both society and use-values are means by and
through which life is carried on:
As a matter of fact, man and society present themselves in a double aspect.
They are at the same time products of nature and of human artifice. Just as a 
stone hammer in the hand of a ["so-called" - ibid.] savage may be regarded as 
an artificial extension of the natural man, so tools, machinery, technical and 
administrative devices, including the formal organisation of government and 
the informal "political machine" may be regarded as more or less artificial 
extensions of the natural social group.
(Park 1920/21, 1924 - 1955 p215)
Insofar as use-values and social relations act as extensions of the individual-in-society, 
then they have the same social function. They come into existence as a consequence of, 
and are maintained via the same processes as the individual develops into a person, 
namely this dialectic of experience and ambition, as I have called it here. Insofar as some 
of these extensions of the individual-in-society are not extemalizable, not alienable, but 
attributes intrinsic to our conception of ourselves, so some values are not tradable, 
therefore not reducible to labour values. The objectification of self, in the form of a 
person with status, is itself a social object. Insofar as other people, as social objects 
themselves, provoke a tendency to act, they too have value.
65.4 Culture, place and marginality
The way in which objects become social objects invested with meaning, extensions of 
the individual-in-society, does not simply parallel the dialectics of socialization, it is the 
material form of that dialectic. Park analyzes this aspect of his dialectic through the 
concepts of 'culture' and 'civilization', which are the material counterparts to 'society' 
and 'community' respectively. Culture embodies the mores, associated with customary, 
expected forms of behaviour. "Culture grows up in situations calling for collective 
action" (Park 1950 p20). It holds a social group together, and its possession 
characterizes an individual as a member of that group. Civilization embodies the ethos 
of trade. Civilized communities bring people together "not because they are alike, but
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because they are different, not for collective action, but for trade" (Park 1931a - 1950 
pl3). The experience of space and time and the values placed on this experience is 
mediated through these two conditions.
'Culture', as the material equivalent of 'society', is the 'internal' moment in the dialectics
of socialization. Social objects, the objects of social science, are first and foremost
cultural phenomena, with attitudes formed towards them which are conceptually prior to
those formed in the economic process. These objects are not pre-given in some idealist
fashion but are created in the processes of everyday life:
Cultural phenomena are essentially "somebody's" phenomena. They are 
objects as given to the experience of individuals belonging to our social group, 
and activities formed by these individuals as appearing to them... The sphere 
o f... investigation is not a world independent of realities such as might be 
known to some ideal subject; it is a world of data, given to concrete 
historically determined human subjects and of actions which these subjects 
actually perform upon the objects of their existence.
(Znaniecki, 1927, quoted by Park 1931 - 1955 p279)
The relation of culture to civilization, which Park adapts from Tonnies' GemeinschctftI 
Gesellschaft distinction is mediated through mobility, though mobility is only the 
proximate cause of the transformation. The root cause lies in whatever causes mobility to 
increase. A "sacred society" is immobile, whereas the "thing that characterizes secular 
society, on the other hand is its mobihty" (Park 1931a - 1950 p i3). The transformation 
of personal values into impersonal values takes place as interests replace sentiments, 
culture gives way to civilization, society to community, and the space of socialization 
gives way to the abstract space of commerce and trade (Park 1950). Park makes it clear 
that he does not see these two types of social organization as arranged in a temporal 
sequence, but as simultaneously affecting the course of individuals' lives. The claims 
that people make upon each other in the course of communication even while 
conducting matters of trade are at least in part based upon the mores. Culture and 
civilization are in other words to be regarded as existing in a dialectical relation one to the 
other. Sacred personal cultural values are determined by the moral order extant in the 
cultural society, whereas profane impersonal civil values are determined by the 
rationalistic calculations of the civilized community.
Park's description of the differences between culture and civilization, are, as I have 
argued, best regarded as attempts at relating material production to the 'internal' and 
'external' aspects of his dialectic, rather than an attempt at relating an actual historical 
transition from mediæval to modem society. Culture and civihzation are moments in the 
dialectics of socialization as well as of social change. The transformation of personal into 
impersonal values occurs in the course of people's personal histories, as well as in the
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histories of their societies.
There is always the conflict between the sacred order which we to preserve 
and that order based on trade which brings about the co-mingling of strange 
peoples and through which people become detached from their cultural 
moorings...
We live more or less in both of these orders and in these we get the character 
we call human.
(Park 1950ppl8,21)
Since we "live more or less in both of these orders", it may be seen once again that we all 
live more or less the life of the marginal man. Furthermore, the social dialectic of space 
is essentially a dialectic between these two orders.
Park argues that the most important difference between the characteristics of culture and 
civilization is that whereas culture is centred on the group, civilization is centred not only 
on commerce but on territory. The political ethos of culture is nationalistic and 
solidaristic; that of civilization, patriotic and libertarian (Park 1950 p 19/20). The 
mediation of experience through culture and civilization not only explains the genesis of 
personal and economic values, therefore; it also links these to place and space. A place is 
a cultural phenomenon, constantly subject to undermining by the forces of civilization. A 
region may be said to comprise both moments of this material aspect to Park's dialect, 
culture and civilization.
'Place' is constructed through the dialectics of socialization; like all personal values 
therefore it is an extension of the individual-in-society, and therefore also it is a validation 
of the status of the individual-in-society. Because place has personal value, no two 
experiences of a place are identical for even any two people who value it. What is 
collective in the nature of the experience of place is the shared consciousness that the 
place has personal value for others. Your sense of place is validated in the sense of place 
which others have of the same place, which is not to say that your sense of place depends 
on their validation. As Wamock's example of Wordsworth's ruminations on Tintem 
Abbey demonstrates, what is so important about the sense of place is the memory traces 
it provokes which confirm your own history to you. A 'place' is a locale of 
overlapping, never coinciding personal experiences: this is why it is so notoriously hard 
to define a locality.
For Park, not surprisingly given the emphases of his dialectic generally, mobility breaks 
down this sense of place. Mobility, in dialectical fashion, affects both the place and the 
person. Not only does mobility undermine the cultural associations of a particular place, 
because local associations inevitably break down because of mobility; but also mobility
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takes a person away from the place where their status is the most obvious and therefore
requires the least effort to maintain:
Under these circumstances [of mobility], the individual's status is determined 
to a considerable degree by conventional signs - by fashion and "front" - and 
the art of life is largely reduced to skating on thin surfaces and a scrupulous 
study of style and manners.
(Park 1916- 1952 p47)
Conversely of course in an immobile society, change in status requires the greatest of
effort. In a mobile society, not only is positive law, traffic rules, required instead of
natural law, the mores, but news is also. Park makes great play of the connections
between mobility and communication: "Mobility depends, not merely on transportation,
but upon communication" (Park 1916 - 1952 p27) - as a former newspaperman. Park
was fascinated by the sociological significance of news in modem society (Park 1956).
The media by which news is transmitted - newspapers, radios and telephones (and of
course TVs today!) -
are merely devices for preserving the permanence of location and of function 
within the social group, in connection with the greatest possible mobility and 
freedom of its members.
(Park 1925c - 1952 p93/4)
Place may be important in the validation of status, but without keeping up with the news
of a place, the sentiments which underlie a sense of place are liable to degenerate into
unfulfilling nostalgia. Park is as careful as Williams not to confuse an ongoing sense of
place with nostalgia:
In a real sense we live in the world only when we keep up with the news of 
the world[l] If a person lives in a foreign country for any length of time with 
the expectation of returning to God's country, meaning his own, he is subject 
to disillusionment.
(Park 1950 p23)
Mobility is associated with land values, and land values with the news. The highest land 
values occur at the areas of greatest mobility of population, which are also centres of the 
news - the areas where the stock exchanges are located (Park 1925 1926 - 1952 pl68 
pl71. Park 1950 p23).
By linking place and value to the dialectics of culture and civilization, and thus of 
socialization. Park's dialectic of space is therefore a genuinely social dialectic also. 
Park's dialectic provides a basis both for understanding a sense of place and for 
understanding why such places are so hard to define, in other words for understanding 
why regionalization is so complex. The propositions of his dialectic, moreover is itself 
entirely compatible with Marx's, looking at the subjective aspects of the processes of 
capitalist accumulation, while Marx treats more of the objective aspects. Park's language
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may sound quaint at times, but it still has much to offer which is relevant to today's 
debates.
Park's association of personal value with place is for example paralleled by Gottdiener's 
distinction between the "use value of social space" and the "exchange value of absolute 
space" (1985 p i 65). However, although Gottdiener criticizes "political economy 
variants of Marxism" for not taking this distinction into account, he provides no account 
of the dialectics of socialization and status and the role of space in this.
Blanchard (1985) also argues that experience of the modem city can be classified 
dichotomously. He applies the Freudian concepts of 'identification' and 'association' to 
the classification of urban experience. Identification in the Freudian sense lies at the 
basis of Marx's definition of the equivalent form of value - the linen recognizes itself in 
[identifies its value in] the coat - Capital / .  Association can be interpreted in terms of 
personal or use value. Park's interpretation of use values as extensions of the individual- 
in-society mean in effect that objects bearing personal value are actually identified with 
the individual - individuals see themselves in the objects that they possess. This, as 
D.Sayer (1991) so effectively argues, is in effect Marx's view of social relations under 
capitalism (6.5 below).
As ever, an interesting light can be thrown on Park's arguments by considering 
Williams' work, in this case Williams' discussions on the connections between language 
and subjectivity. Williams makes a distinction between signals and language in a manner 
exactly parallel to Park's descriptions of the differences between economic and personal 
values or space and place, when these are regarded as comprising the external and 
internal moments in a social dialectic (R.Williams 1977 p40).
Language, including the language of place, is a result of the internalization of signs and 
signals, which are nonetheless simultaneously available for use by others, so that they 
not only have personal meaning, but are also the means of interpersonal communication 
of meaning. As an inner sign, language helps constitute and give expression to personal 
values. By language of place, I mean no more than the meaning a place has for a person. 
If a place has meaning for someone, some process of communication must be occurring, 
even if this is simply an interior dialogue between experience and ambition. Like 
language generally, the language of place is capable both of being internalized and of 
continually being available in social and material ways, just as a place constitutes both an 
inner sign and a socially manifest signal. Economic values are price signals. They may 
be recognized but they need not be internalized. They are collective facts, fixed, 
exchangeable, easily imported and exported.
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The real parallel however is not between language and place, but in the tensions between 
the inner and material aspects of both language and place, "a relationship lived as a 
tension but experienced as an activity" (R.Williams 1977 p40). The tension in the 
relation between the inner and the material aspects of language lived as practical activity 
which Williams describes is one which has been alluded to many times in this chapter, in 
the descriptions offered of modem society by both Park and Williams. It is the tension 
of modernity, the tension between the inner and material experience of capitalist 
accumulation; where all that is solid melts into air, all that is holy profaned. If we wish 
to discover the social conflicts at the heart of the controversy over gentrification, it is with 
this tension - the tension afflicting the spatial extensions of the spatially constituted 
marginal man - standing on the margins of capitalist civilization and local culture - that we 
must begin, not with class.
6.6 Conclusion: Gentrification, mobility and modernity
So far in this chapter, I have attempted to construct a link between place and status, 
which, though relevant to Marxist analysis of the conditions of capitalist society, did not 
depend on Marxist accounts of class and class struggle to explain those links. Instead, I 
have attempted to develop Park's sociology of consciousness along lines suggested by 
R.Williams' arguments for cultural materialism, so as to construct an alternative link 
between place and status. In the previous sections, I have shown how the development 
of this consciousness is conducted simultaneously in spatial and social terms, leading to 
the development of a sense of place. I have also shown how the same process which 
creates a sense of place in the course of socialization, namely the acquisition of 
experience through mobility, also gives rise to the circumstances which can undermine 
that place. Mobility, according to Park, is the only way in which new experience may be 
gained. Mobility also means that the experience thereby gained is different for all. 
Hence mobility lies at the root of the need for language and of self-consciousness (Park 
1925, 1926 - 1952 pl73). The fact of locomotion is therefore a crucial aspect in the 
processes of socialization, from which society, culture and civilization are derived and 
through which they are maintained (Park 1925c - 1952 p92/3). Mobility is the 
quintessential attribute of civilization, and civilization is the antithesis of culture and a 
sense of place.
Mobility, in the sense in which Williams describes it, may be taken as the defining 
characteristic of modernity. How else might we characterize the effect of all that is solid 
melting into air? The marginal man is the characteristic personality of this modernity. For
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Williams, it is the unwilled (and unwilling) separation of areas of experience which 
mobility brings which is the root cause of marginality. However, mobility, in the sense 
in which Park describes it, is a transhistorical characteristic of human beings, much as 
labour is for Marx. According to Marx, it is the conditions under which the labour 
process is conducted, which are historically unique in any epoch. It is the buying and 
selling of labour power that makes capitalism historically unique. We can think of 
mobility in the same terms, a transhistorical characteristic of human beings experienced in 
specific and historically unique ways.
In this respect, I have argued that much of what Park has to say on the impact of mobility 
on consciousness and socialization is implicitly an analysis of the impact of modernity on 
consciousness. Modernity may be defined as the subjective experience of capitalism, 
including, but not restricted to, the immediate experience of the labour process. Both 
Park and Williams see mobility as the hallmark of that experience. Neither however see 
mobility as a cause. Instead, what "underpins the transitory, fleeting and contingent 
experience so many have seen as the hallmark of the modem condition" is the alienation 
peculiar to capitalist society (D.Sayer 1991 p88). Williams is explicit on this point, while 
Park’s theory of alienation is expressed in much more personal terms.
For an analysis of this experience, Marx’s account of the definite forms of social
consciousness which correspond to the capitalist mode of production is appropriate for
this purpose. D.Sayer (1991) has shown how Marx's account of the creation of abstract
labour in the development of capitalist relations of production stands for a general
abstraction of the social from the personal, with the consequence that:
The social world of capitalism has become something we inhabit - Durkheim’s 
society sut generis - rather than some ways we are, and it is this estrangement 
of the real content of social life that grounds the abstractions which come to 
stand in for it: modernity’s representations (which is to say, its 
re-presentations) of both society and self.
(D.Sayer 1991 p88)
The abstraction of the social from the personal creates a profound subjectivity in the
individual: it is just this interiorized subjectivity which Connolly (1988) argues is the
principal focus of Nietzsche's philosophical enquiries.
The subject is unified in terms of personal biography, but dislocated from any 
social integument; ... Modernity constitutes individuals as subjects not 
through, but in opposition to the real sociality which concretely defines and 
differentiates them.
(D.Sayer 1991 p87)
One consequence of that subjectivity is a profoundly altered attitude to space and place. 
The archetypically modem novel is Joyce's Ulysses, and what is modem about it is its
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representation of the stream of consciousness of the subjective individual of modernity:
The consequent awareness is intense and fragmentary, subjective primarily, 
yet in the very fofifi of its subjectivity including others who are now with the 
buildings, the noises, the sights and smells of the city, parts of this single and 
racing consciousness...
... the fantasy of the Oriental city begins from the smell of bread in Boland's 
van, but each sight or sound or smell is a trigger to Bloom's private 
preoccupations. Under the pressure of his needs, the one city as it passes is as 
real as the other.
This is the profound alteration. The forces o f the action have become internal 
and there is a no longer a city, there is only a man walking through it.
(R.Williams, 1973b p292, emphasis added)
The subjectivity, and mobility, of the modem individual apparently tends therefore to the
utter abolition of place. However, this subjectivity of this modem and mobile individual
also results from living on the margins of culture and civilization. As I have argued, this
tension between the apparent abolition of place and the continuing pressures to invest
places with meaning as a consequence of the very same processes of socialization is an
essential component of the "profoundly contradictory" experience of modemity, where
Individuals are perpetually riven between 'personal' experiences and public 
identifications, differences which cannot be represented, and representations 
which deny difference.
(D.Sayer 1991 p89)
This account of the subjectivity of the modem marginal mobile individual provides the 
basis of the distinction of the social space of use values from the abstract space of 
exchange values for which Gottdiener was only able to make an assertion.
Underlying this subjectivity is the fact of social relations taking the "fantastic form of
relations between things" (Capital I  p72) - commodity fetishism:
It is this alienation of the social, in which human beings' collective capacities 
manifest themselves as the attributes of material things, which is in [Marx's] 
view the ground of modem individualism.
People appear to be independent of one another because their mutual 
dependency assumes the unrecognizable form of relations between 
commodities. ... individuals appear to be self-sufficient monads only because 
the social relations which really link them - and give them their concrete 
identities... - do not appear to tiiem as such, as relations of persons. They 
assume, on the contrary, 'the fantastic form of relations between things'...
(D.Sayer 1991 p64)
However, these "things", social objects constituted by meaning, also bear the tensions of 
modemity. Even as commodities, in which form they mediate social relations, they still 
bear use values.
The duality of the commodity is clearly the template for [Marx's] analysis of a
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wide variety of other bourgeois social forms: in particular, of those forms 
which both individuality and community assume within modem capitalist 
societies. In both instances concrete particularity is masked in abstract 
generality, with a resulting mystification. The qualitative and particular 
differences which concretely make individuals who they are, appear 
inessential to them, while the generic equality which appears to characterize 
their subjectivity is abstract, formal and illusory. ...
(D.Sayer, 1991 p79)
Included in these things, mediating social relations in which "concrete particularity is 
masked in abstract generality" are those things which can constitute places and spaces 
simultaneously: buildings, streets, parks.
I have argued that explanations of gentrification currently extant are flawed since they 
attempt to use gentrification merely as a starting point for reflections on modem society. 
This thesis reverses the order of exposition, beginning with modemity and then placing 
gentrification in this context so defined. Since, in modemity, "social relationships are no 
longer palpably the foundations of individuals' identities" (D.Sayer 1991 p88), and are 
instead mediated through things, public representations of status become all the more 
important to the construction of those identities. In Chapter 3, I argued that this 
condition underlay the importance of fashion in conditions of modemity, and that 
gentrification could usefully be understood in those terms. Housing as a use-value is an 
extension of the individual-in-society, and as an extension of the individual in-society, it 
is also a status symbol; as indeed are all items of consumption in modem capitalist 
society. As I have argued above however (6.3), the usefulness of use values depends on 
the state of social development, because as extensions of the individual-in-society, they 
are also extensions of an individual's status. Use values are not trans-historical verities. 
In opposition to Saunders' arguments (reviewed in Chapter 4 above), it is therefore the 
modemity of modem society which makes housing a status symbol, and and owner- 
occupied housing in particularly prized status symbol, not any characteristics or qualities 
innate to housing or the tenure. However, housing's role in establishing status does not 
of its own explain the basis of the conflicts which arise over gentrification, nor does it 
explain why these should be represented, even by the participants in these conflicts, as 
class stmggle.
What is peculiarly modem about a modem city, which puts yet further difficulties in the 
way of the articulation of what Sayer calls the "collectiveness of disadvantage, the 
sociality of subordination" (1991 p89) is residential segregation, whether by function, by 
race or ethnicity, or by class or status. In no other respect is a modem city more unlike 
its predecessors (Shevky & Bell 1955, Abu-Lughod 1969, Peach 1975). Not only is 
residential segregation an aspect of modemity, but without residential segregation.
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gentrification could not occur, or more precisely, could not be experienced in the way in 
which gives it its (so-called) class character. The effect of residential segregation is to 
extend the status bound up in the consumption of the use-value of housing to a whole 
area, to a particular place.
Gentrification is almost always associated with the identification of a place as a place, 
even before the place is itself recognized as such by its current inhabitants. P.Williams’ 
account of gentrification in Islington (1976), or Zukin's account of gentrification in New 
York (1982) bear witness to this important aspect of the gentrification process. The 
creation of London's Dockland (Short 1989) as an identifiable region is only the latest 
example. Before the advent of the LDDC, no such region existed in the popular 
imagination and each area composing the Dockland was seen as a separate entity. If a 
generic title were applied to the area at all, prior to the creation of the LDDC, it would 
have been as London docklands, the (grammatical) differences in the qualification, 
capitalization and number are slight but very telling. Nor, given the importance of 
mobility to a sense of place, can it be seen as accidental that the first conflicts which took 
place in Islington between the gentrifiers and those they were to displace, took place over 
the introduction of a traffic control scheme (Pitt 1973).
The counterpart of segregation is succession. If residential segregation extends the status 
immediately derived from the consumption of housing to the place - however defined - 
in which that housing is situated, then the conflicts which arise over gentrification are 
conflicts over the appropriation of particular areas for such purposes.
With residential segregation, fashion is at the same time extended fi’om the consumption 
of housing to whole areas. Individuals belonging to one status group find that their 
social spaces of use values have become transformed into abstract space of exchange 
values. Sacred places of socialization become secularized and trivialized as fashion 
accessories. The realization is forced into consciousness that the "possession of things 
[including places] appears accidental and extrinsic to who persons are" (D.Sayer 1991 
p89). Culture is replaced by civilization, to become eventually, possibly a place of 
socialization once more, but for different groups of people with cultures of their own (cf. 
Raban 1974). Gentrification undermines the ontological security of the inhabitants of a 
place by permitting gentrifiers to turn it into a new place, of their own.
It is here that the resistance to gentrification begins, not in the grinding of the gears of the 
SCA-based machinery of class struggle. Resistance to gentrification is resistance to the 
derangement of the personal and the social in modemity - resistance to the "unbearable 
lightness of being" (D.Sayer 1991 ppl52, 155). However, to argue for the importance
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of status in gentrification studies, and conversely to deny the importance of class, in 
particular as this is theorized by SCA models, is not to deny either the salience of 
capitalism, or that tensions and pressures for change exist in a society dominated by 
status considerations. The experience of modemity is one of a constant and unresolved 
tension; a tension which derives from the fact that the experience of socialization and 
acquisition of status is continually undermined by the reduction of all social forms, status 
and meanings to the calculus of exchanges of abstract labour.
This argument, it might reasonably be objected, completely overlooks one of the most 
common arguments advanced against gentrification, namely that by converting housing 
from working class multi-occupancy to middle class single family occupancy, it reduces 
the supply of working class housing available in working class areas, causing even 
greater pressure on the non-gentrified working class housing nearby. Resistance to 
gentrification therefore begins with working class people organizing to safeguard the 
availability of housing for themselves and their children, and not in some airy-fairy 
notions about modemity, and tensions between place and space in the constmction of 
personal identities.
There is of course no question that middle class homes are under-occupied, sometimes 
considerably so, by comparison with working class homes, and that therefore the 
displacement caused by gentrification places pressure on working class accommodation 
elsewhere (LeGates and Hartman 1986). Just how much pressure is open to question of 
course (cf. Chapter 9 below), but no matter how much pressure there might be, I would 
still argue that this housing stock argument is a rationalization of the status conflicts 
which arise in gentrification.
Assume for the sake of argument that there was a sudden difference in fertility, in which 
half of all working class families suddenly decided to have 10 or more children each (and 
there were no racial or ethnic differences among the working class which could be held 
accountable for this). This differential increase in fertility would place just as much 
pressure on working class housing stock and pose as many difficulties in safeguarding it 
for future generations of the working class as even the worst displacement through 
gentrification. It is highly unlikely however that the pressures caused by increased 
numbers of children would lead to conflicts between the prolific and the non-prolific in 
the working class; though it might well lead to them having to suffer lectures from Sir 
Keith Joseph. Instead demands would be made for the government to do something 
about providing more housing. This is of course the left's response when the traditional 
white working class complain about immigrants (with their large families) coming over 
here, taking their jobs, ruining their neighbourhoods, 'swamping' their culture -
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undermining their status.
The only difference between the two cases of immigration - ethnic and gentrifying - 
which could account for these differences in response is that the middle-class immigrants 
are assumed to be able to look after themselves, whereas the foreign immigrants are 
assumed to have immigrated here out of political or financial necessity. While clearly, 
the accuracy of both assumptions need not be in doubt, the fact that the interpretation of 
the validity of the working class verbalization of this response is treated with such respect 
in the one case and such disdain in the other betrays an inconsistency of response in the 
two cases. One the one hand, of course, it tacitly concedes the argument that gentrifiers 
gentrify because they can (and in so doing fall into sin). To avoid such a concession, it 
might be argued that the housing crisis forces middle-class people into gentrifying and 
thereby forces them into conflict. However, this argument merely confirms what the 
'affect on supply of working class housing' argument itself overlooks, that the problem 
lies in the lack of housing, not in middle class usage of what is available.
What is of greater interest is however not so much the inconsistency of the left's position 
in regard to immigration as what this inconsistency represents: the articulation of what is 
clearly a status conflict in the language of class. Despite all the arguments advanced in 
Chapter 4 against the misidentification of class with status, the double hermeneutic of 
social science ensures that this misidentification continues as a social process as well as a 
category error. Again, this is a consequence of modemity. D.Sayer argues that "class is 
itself ?i distinctly modem category" (1991 p69), and that "the immediate experience of 
social reality" is status rather than class "while those forms in which our sociality is 
represented conceitedly obscure the relations which actually constitute it, class above all"
(p88).
This is because, under conditions of modemity, class
... presents itself as a matter of mere accidental circumstance rather than 
inherent being, as something which is extrinsic to the essence of personality.
The point is not merely that - as Marx recognizes - capitalism offers more 
individual mobility than previous forms of society. It is rather that class does 
not seem to define the individual in the same way. There is an apparent split 
between the 'private individual' and the 'class individual', which is predicated 
on the 'accidental' nature of that which makes individuals members of classes - 
their property in 'things' extemal to themselves. In principle anybody may 
own property, just as all are free to stay at the Ritz Hotel.
(D.Sayer 1991 pp69-70)
This split between the private and class aspects of self-consciousness and sociality 
"compromises the identity of both bourgeoisie and proletariat" (D.Sayer 1991 p71). In
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particular, the "individualizing division of labour, which is constitutive a relation of
capitalism as class itse lf means that the modem world "is an atomistic, fissiparous kind
of place, and social identities are abidingly fragmented and contradictory" (ibid.), while
"individuality is experienced as non-social, 'purely' personal. ..." (1991 p88)
Nowhere is this derangement of the personal and the social more evident, for 
Marx, than in class. The latter in fact emerges as a highly problematic 
category. ...
Class in short is not the same kind of immediately experienced social reality as 
Stand [status]...
(D.Sayer 1988 pp88, 89)
The language in which the conflicts over gentrification are expressed is the language of 
status dressed up as the language of class (Chapter 10 below), because in conditions of 
modernity this is the form in which our sociality is represented, and which, ironically, 
obscures the actual class basis of that experience; what Sayer calls the split between the 
private and the class individual, and what Park and Williams call the situation of the 
marginal man. As noted in Chapter 5, Sayer suggests that it is this situation, not class, 
which is "most socially consequential in capitalism" (D.Sayer 1991 p90/91). 
Consciousness is not moulded simply by relation to (economic) structure, as the SCA 
model would have us believe. It is rather the interaction between the economic and non­
economic activities of individuals-in-society in pursuit of their daily goals, an interaction 
experienced as a constant tension between these activities, which both moulds and creates 
individual and class consciousness in capitalist society - the consciousness of the 
marginal man and of the proletariat both.
In Redfem (1992), I argue that the working class/middle class division is one of status 
based on centrality in the capitalist labour process; status which is continually in danger 
of being undermined under the centrifugal pressures of capitalist accumulation, where all 
that is central is rendered peripheral, if possible. Central status has to be fought for, 
continuously, in positional, not simply confrontational, struggles, (such as the 
'gentrification of the bourgeoisie' - 2.3.1 above). If this is so, then the so-called class 
conflict over gentrification would appear to be indeed as Park described Marx's account 
of class struggle, "the struggle of economic or functional groups for social status in a 
social hierarchy" (1943a - 1950 p304). The language of class used in the conflict over 
gentrification and the arguments about displacement derived from this, are consequent 
upon the experience of modernity and its tensions between place and space in the 
construction of personal identities.
The gentrification debate raises many issues. However, the inadequacies of the standard 
sociological model, within which these issues are discussed, are so profound that it has
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been necessary to indicate in some detail an alternative picture of the links between 
consciousness, agency and structure; before gentrification can be explained, it is 
necessary to describe the context in which it occurs. Having described this context, 
however, it still remains necessary to demonstrate the specific circumstances which make 
it possible for gentrifiers to behave in the ways they do (and this is the purpose of the 
next three chapters). To fail to demonstrate the specificity of gentrification within this 
larger context would be to fall into the trap of the postindustrialists, making modernity 
rather than postmodemity into the Protestant god of the new middle class.
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7 The 'Rent Gap', Domestic Technologies And The Theory of 
Rent
7.1 Alms and Issues
In Chapter 2 ,1 argued that explanations of gentrification fall by and large into one of two 
categories, which I termed neighbourhood lifecycle or postindustrialism. To this point in 
the thesis, I have, in effect concentrated on postindustrialism. Chapter 3 uncovered the 
metaphors of postindustrialism. Chapter 4 linked them to Pahl’s criticisms of SCA, and 
Chapters 5 & 6 outlined an alternative model of the context in which gentrification could 
be sited. However, as was made clear (should have been made clear!) in Chapter 6, the 
explanation of the links between status, place, mobility and marginality in the experience 
of modernity does no more than provide this context. If as was argued, the experience of 
modernity was to live on the margins of two cultures, in an indefinite present, as 
subjective individuals inhabiting society - the iron cage of modernity - rather than society 
being particular aspects of what we are, then this is an experience which affects us all, 
gentrifiers included. Though modernity provides the context in which the gentrification 
process is carried out, modernity itself cannot be the explanation of the causes of 
gentrification, nor either can capitalism.
Having ruled out postindustrialism as the explanation of the causes of gentrification, it 
remains the work of this chapter to investigate the alternative hypothesis, neighbourhood 
lifecycle. It concentrates on one particular version of this hypothesis, the 'rent gap' 
theory outlined by N. Smith in his many contributions to the gentrification debate (N. 
Smith 1979a, 1979b, 1982, 1986, 1987a, 1987b, N. Smith & Lefaivre 1984, Schaffer 
& N. Smith 1986, N. Smith & P. Williams 1986, P. Williams & N. Smith 1986). 
Indeed it would not be overstating the case to argue that without Smith's vigorous 
defence of the rent gap explanation of gentrification, there would hardly have been a 
gentrification debate at all.
Urban theory has traditionally been concerned with how developments at the centre of the 
city have worked themselves out toward the periphery, with the connection between 
changes in the centre of the city and changes at its edge made via the theory of urban rent. 
From Ricardo onwards, the role of rent has been theorized as securing the 'highest and 
best use' of land and the co-ordination of land uses in the accumulation process (Haila 
1990). Smith's 'rent gap' hypothesis is an attempt at showing how the workings of the 
urban land market by itself produces gentrification (N. Smith 1979a, 1979b, 1982, 
1987a, 1987b). This has the advantage of avoiding the 'consumption functionalist'
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perspective of the 'production of gentrifiers' approach; but, in common with that 
approach, it too gives no role to demand.
Accounts of the theoretical bases of the rent gap are given only in N. Smith (1979a) and 
N. Smith (1982). The original formulation was presented in Smith (1979a), as a 
conclusion to a discussion as to whether or not gentrification represented a "back to the 
city" movement. Smith argued that gentrification did represent a "back to the city" 
movement, but "by capital, not people" (Smith 1979a, p547). In presenting Smith's 
arguments here, I ignore the problems of 'base-superstracture' as presented in Chapter 2, 
and of SCA as presented in Chapter 4. Nothing I shall present here detracts from those 
problems, but I wish to highlight here a different, though related, set of issues. Before 
going any further, it will help to know what we are talking about
Figure 7.1 Smith's rent gap model
$ Rent gap = PGR-CGR 
where
PGR = Potential ground rent 
P = Price
CGR = Capitalized ground rent 





(source: after N. Smith, 1979a Fig. 2 p544)
In its original formulation, the rent gap arises as the result of the operation of 
neighbourhood lifecycle processes, in particular, 'filtering down'; though it could simply 
be the result of upward revaluation of potential land values through comparisons of 
alternative uses for a site. Gentrification occurs when the rent gap is "wide enough" (N. 
Smith 1979a, p545)
166
Smith (1982) contained two modifications to his argument. First, the rent gap was 
conceptualized in terms of a "devalorization cycle" instead of a "depreciation cycle":
Depreciation refers strictly to changes in price, whereas devalorization is a 
deeper economic process implying the loss or negation of value as a necessary 
part of the valorization process.
(N. Smith, 1982, pl47, ftn3)
Second, the account was placed in the wider context of the necessity for 'uneven
development' in the course of capitalist accumulation. "Gentrification is part of a larger
class strategy to restructure the economy" (N. Smith, 1982, p i 53). However, despite
these wider, and deeper, references the processes described appeared much the same:
Essentially, the valorization of capital invested in an inner city built environment 
leads to a situation where the ground rent capitalized under current uses is 
substantially lower than the ground rent that could potentially be capitalized if 
the land use were changed. This is because devalorization leads to physical 
decline which in turn lowers the market price of the land on which the 
dilapidated buildings stand. When, and only when, this rent gap between 
actual and potential ground rent becomes sufficiently large, redevelopment and 
rehabilitation into new land uses becomes a profitable prospect and capital 
begins to flow back into the inner city market
(N. Smith 1982 pl49)
Devalorization" and "uneven development" appeared as little more than mantras to be 
chanted throughout this account, which could easily fit into a neoclassical analysis of 
gentrification processes (Hamnett, 1984, p311). This "mix'n'match" theorizing was the 
focus of Rose's (1984) critique, reviewed in Chapter 2 above.
7.2 The rent gap and its metaphors
72.1 Functionalist reasoning in the rent gap hypothesis
The obvious criticism to be made of Smith's approach is what we might call its 'rent
logic', its reductionist approach to the question of the causes of gentrification. Hamnett
made just this criticism (Hamnett 1984). He argued that
in order to explain satisfactorily the central questions of why gentrification 
occurred where and when it did, it is necessary to explain first its concentration 
in a limited number of large cities, second, its rapid growth in the late 1960's 
and early 1970's, and third its specific areas of occurrence in cities. Smith's 
theory helps explain only the third of these.
(Hamnett, 1984, p310)
The first two questions could only be answered by considering employment and
demographic changes which Smith had "resolutely" dismissed (ibid. ), because he had
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categorized all the explanations on offer into just two types, "the cultural and the
economic" (ibid.). Worse yet, from Hamnett's point of view. Smith then argues that
both these two types of explanation share a common perspective: "an emphasis on
consumer preference" (N. Smith, 1979a, p539 quoted in Hamnett 1984, p311).
Hamnett flatly contradicts Smith on this point ("This is quite simply incorrect." -
Hamnett, 1984 p311). Against Smith's dismissal of "the changing occupational and
demographic stmcture of the population" (1984 p311), Hamnett asserts their importance,
quoting Braverman (1974) and Kumar (1978) as having
convincingly made the case that changes in occupational structure are central 
elements of the capitalist mode of production... Deferred child-bearing can also 
be interpreted as a response to rapidly rising house prices. Thus even in terms 
of Smith's own materialist frame of reference his analysis is both deficient and 
partial... In consequence. Smith is only able to explain in general terms the 
occurrence of gentrification in certain areas of cities. He is entirely unable to 
explain why gentrification has occurred in the type of cities at the time it has.
(ibid.)
It may not have escaped the reader's attention that Hamnett is criticizing Smith for a 
procedure so far followed in this thesis, namely for reducing the various types of 
explanation of gentrification to two and then arguing that, as defined, they share a 
common perspective. Before proceeding further, it is as well to address this point. I 
would argue that Hamnett's criticism is misplaced.
As was noted in Chapter 2.3.3, Hamnett argues that 5 factors must be taken into account 
when considering gentrification, namely: city size; demographic and household structure; 
lifestyle and preference shifts; house price inflation; and employment base and 
occupational structure of certain large cities (Hamnett 1984 p298). However, having 
listed them, Hamnett does not explain how they relate to one another. Instead of 
theorizing how these factors may relate to one another and then using gentrification as an 
example of how they interrelate, he uses gentrification as the sole nexus through which 
the postulated factors are related. Although Hamnett's criticisms of Smith are well taken 
therefore, his explanations of gentrification suffer from the problem that they are all 
"theoretically unconnected with each other" Warde (1991 p225 - although Warde 
inexplicably states that Hamnett distinguishes six, not five, factors). Their only links lie 
in the gentrification phenomenon itself. Consequently, though Hamnett asserts against 
Smith the importance of employment and demographic factors, his conclusions as to how 
each factor adds to the total understanding of gentrification is extremely tentative 
(Hamnett, 1984, p304-305). These end with a "synthesis" "of the various explanatory 
factors", which, where it is not quite vague, is no more than a reflection of what is 
immediately obvious:
it would appear that changes in the demographic and employment structure have
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led simultaneously to a growing concentration in certain large cities of young, 
relatively affluent and highly educated childless households, frequently with 
one or more city-centre workers with a strong preference for accessibility. 
They have faced (and partly created) a structure of housing supply and rapidly 
rising house prices which, if it has not actually necessitated inner-city residence, 
has certainly pointed strongly in that direction.
(Hamnett, 1984, p305)
This "synthesis" merely summarizes the phenomenon; it does little more.
Hamnett and Smith in fact share a common perspective, namely that of base- 
superstructure. In much the same manner as Rose (1984), Hamnett is able to point to 
the problem of base-superstmcture but is unable to identify it as such. Consequently, he 
does not escape its confines. Thus, he argues in criticism of Smith, "to... write off 
material changes such as the changing economic and demographic structure of the 
population as ‘cultural' factors is as untenable" as their categorization as 'cultural' is 
"erroneous" (1984 p311). Hamnett therefore endorses Smith's belief that while 'the 
material' is clearly important, 'the cultural', equally clearly, is not. To force a distinction 
between materiality and culture in the way that Hamnett does, even in his criticisms of 
Smith for doing the selfsame thing, is clearly to subscribe to the validity of 'base- 
superstructure' modes of thought. Hamnett was undoubtedly correct to criticize Smith's 
writing off of cultural factors. However, Hamnett's dispute is not with Smith's assertion 
that the cultural is by definition unimportant, just that Smith should not have labelled 
particular factors as cultural and ther^ore unimportant.
Smith however responded otherwise to Hamnett's criticisms. He accepted "Hamnett's
(1984) critique of earlier work (Smith 1979)":
for conflating a variety of lifestyle and demographic arguments under a 
somewhat grab-bag concept of consumption-side and consumer-preference 
explanations.
(N. Smith, 1987a pl63)
However, he did not accept fully the implications drawn by his critics: in particular, he
wanted nothing to do with the 'production of gentrifiers' approach, which had developed
out of the criticism of his earlier work (by Rose as well as Hamnett). This reformulation
of Marxist analysis. Smith argued, posed dangers of its own, notably reliance on some
form of consumer-preference model, "no matter how watered down" (ibid. )
... the conundrum of gentrification does not turn on explaining where middle 
class demand comes from.
(ibid. )
Rather, it depends on where it is expressed, i.e., "in the central and inner city" (op. cit. 
pl64):
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In this context, I would defend the rent-gap analysis (Smith, 1979) not as in 
itself a definitive or complete explanation but as a necessary centerpiece to any 
theory of gentrification.
(N. Smith, 1987a p i65)
Thus Smith’s concession to his critics was not that great. While he accepts their 
criticisms, he does not accept that they touch his central hypothesis. He interprets the 
criticism not as a problem of conceptualization but rather as a problem of expression, of 
the enthusiasms of youth. If not the complete story, the rent gap remains the "necessary 
centerpiece" to any theory of gentrification. Smith was on fairly sure ground at this 
point, for as I show below, his rent gap arguments are not overly affected by either 
Hamnett’s or Rose's criticisms. There is however a more fundamental criticism than 
those currently extant in the literature, to which I shall now turn.
Despite the refinements and concessions Smith has made over the years in his arguments 
surrounding the rent gap, it remains a tautologous proposition. Gentrification occurs 
"when the gap is wide enough" (N. Smith, 1979a, p545), "it is most likely to occur in 
areas experiencing a sufficiently large gap between actual and potential land values" (N. 
Smith, 1987b, p464). Ley, probably Smith’s most persistent critic, comments 
unfavourably on the fact that
almost ten years after its first presentation it still has not been made empirically 
accountable... Smith... has no empirical results of his own to report.
(Ley, 1987 p466)
However, even he does not appear to notice the tautology that lies at the heart of the 
concept of the rent gap. This criterion of ’sufficient wideness’ is enough to save the rent 
gap hypothesis from any empirical criticism. The proof of 'sufficient wideness’ lies in 
the pudding of the gentrification phenomenon - no gentrification, rent gap 'insufficiently 
wide'.
Runciman (1968 p40) argues that "tautologies have proved a perennial weakness of 
functionalism". I shall follow through the implications of Runciman’s observations 
below. First I shall deal with the principal potential objection to my argument that the 
rent gap hypothesis is impervious to empirical criticism, namely Clark's (1988) study of 
the rent gap in Malmo, Sweden.
Clark argues that Smith’s definition of "capitalized land rent" is ambiguous and would be
better split into two terms "actually realized land rent", which continues to decline, and
capitalized land rent proper
namely the valorization of future land rent income by the sale of land............
This is more in line with the generally held meaning of the term, and if it is
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capitalized land rent we are talking about, the evidence here suggests it usually 
rises during a period prior to redevelopment. Indeed, it only makes sense that 
the sellers of dilapidated properties try to appropriate part of the 'actually 
realized land rents' expected to materialize in the near future
(Clark, 1988, pl88)
The difference between the two accounts can be seen by comparing Figure 7.2 below 
(Clark 1988, Fig.7 pl47) with Figure 7.1 above. In Smith's account the rent gap 
continues to widen indefinitely. In Clark's account, the rent gap closes immediately prior 
to gentrification.




Rent gap = PLR - CLR 
where
PLR = potential land rent 
CLR = capitalized land rent 
BV = building value
PLR - broken line 
(= PGR in Fig. 7.1) 
CLR - solid line 
(= CGR in Fig. 7.1)
BV (= HV in Fig. 7.1)
(source: after Clark, 1988 p253)
I do not seek to dispute Clark's careful empirical investigations of a rent gap in Malmo. 
Nor do I wish to debate his principal conclusion, namely that the "empirical evidence of 
these studies supports the view outlined by Neil Smith" (Clark, 1988, p252). Nor even 
do I wish to dispute Clark's "marginal" deviations "from Smith's conceptual scheme..." 
(ibid.). What remains at issue is that none of Clark's empirical findings and marginal 
deviations rescue the 'rent gap' hypothesis from the problems of functionalism. If the 
gap does start to close immediately prior to gentrification, this is because the capitalized 
ground rent component represents expectations of future revenues from redeveloped
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land. His revised version is therefore as self-fulfilling as Smith's original formulation - 
no expectations, no closure, no gentrification.
If gentrification occurs when the rent gap is wide enough by definition, then the 
proposition that the rent gap causes gentrification is no longer an empirical one. Instead 
it is functionalist. To paraphrase Runciman (1968 p40-41), what in fact we want to do 
(and by Smith's definitions are prevented from doing) is to consider empirically what is 
or is riot done by those institutions and individuals which have a (pecuniary) interest in 
the existence of a rent gap; this is of no use at all if what we mean by the rent gap 
depends upon the generative or adaptive results of what it does (in this case, 'generates' 
gentrification).
Far from being a necessary centerpiece to any theory of gentrification, as Smith insists, 
the rent gap hypothesis is not, strictly speaking, an hypothesis at all. It describes a 
condition of the gentrification process, but if it is a description, it is not an explanation. 
It is not an hypothesis because it is incapable of being falsified.
Another problem of functionalism, particularly relevant in light of the criticisms made in 
Chapter 2.4 of explanations of gentrification in general, "is that it is incapable of 
accounting for historical change" (Runciman, 1968, p ll3 ) . Whether therefore, 
gentrification explanations are oriented toward consumption-side or production-side 
accounts, they share a common perspective, namely functionalism. Smith therefore is 
justified in defending his position against the Hamnett/Rose criticism but only to the 
extent that they cannot offer a fundamental critique since they share so many of the same 
presuppositions with Smith. As Runciman (ibid.) argues however, the questions begged 
by a functionalist account may in fact prove useful in really explaining the phenomenon it 
describes. In this case the question begged by the existence of a rent gap is what 
generated it. Smith's answer, as I shall show below, is inadequate.
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7 2 2  The 'circuits* metaphor
Smith, following Harvey, argued that the built environment acted as a repository for 
investment capital when opportunities elsewhere, in "the broader economy", were limited 
(N. Smith 1982,pl50). An electrical metaphor, of capital 'flowing' through various 
investment 'circuits' was employed. The built environment represented one such circuit, 
'switched' on in response to crises in the 'primary circuit', i.e., the circuit of industrial 
capital. This switching of investment into the built environment revives the profit rate, 
enabling the industrial circuit to be switched back on again. Harvey based this metaphor 
on Desai (1979), though Desai's 'circuits', of commodity, productive and money capital, 
(themselves based on Capital Vol. 2) are in fact representations of the different 
'moments' in a single circuit of capital as value-in-process.
Smith argued that, in general, growth in the industrial circuit outstrips growth in the built
environment circuit. This growth fuels land values throughout the urban area, but these
are not reflected in rents of developed land (returns from the built environment circuit)
because the value of the activity currently undertaken on this land cannot afford these
higher rents. This differential growth accounts for the growth of the rent gap. The rent
gap therefore is symptomatic of a crisis in the built environment circuit, a crisis resulting
from the barrier to accumulation posed by the longevity of fixed capital in the built
environment. Gentrification, which is just one part of an overall restructuring of space,
including downtown redevelopment, condominiums, harbour malls "and so on",
represents the closing of that gap.
with falling rates of profit in the major industrial sectors, financial capital seeks 
an alternative arena for investment, an arena where the profit rate remains 
comparatively high and where the risk is low. At precisely this point, there 
tends to be an increase in the capital flowing back into the built environment...
The underdevelopment of the previously developed inner city, meaning the 
systematic lack of capital investment in those locations, brought about the rent 
gap, and this, in turn, laid the foundation for a locational switch of capital 
invested in the built environment, simultaneous in part with a sectoral switch.
(N. Smith, 1982, pl50)
The circuits metaphor and the notion of rent as a barrier to the flow of those circuits is 
therefore central to Smith's advocacy of the rent gap as the necessary centerpiece to any 
explanation of gentrification. The dynamic relation of flows to barriers also strongly 
implies that Smith sees gentrification as a circular process. Whereas the inner city once 
was a barrier and now is profitable, so the suburbs will act as a barrier until the inner city 
becomes a barrier once more.
In what follows I shall argue that the fundamental problem with Smith's circuits
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metaphor is that it does not recognize the specificity of different sectors of production. 
Haila notes of this metaphor, that to regard the built environment circuit as a repository of 
investment capital passively responding to crises in the industrial circuit denies the real 
estate sector's "own dynamic" (Haila, 1990, p291). Haila's criticism is an implicit 
recognition of the failure of the circuits metaphor to distinguish between different sectors 
of production. There is only one path at any time by which capital can flow through the 
circuits. Consequently, if capitalism is to have a crisis, then on this account, it will have 
them in all sectors at once. The circuits metaphor undermines the possibility that a barrier 
could arise in any one sector independently of all the others. It thereby undermines the 
possibility of the switching of the flow of capital from one sector into another. Smith's 
circuits metaphor does not therefore alter the ex post facto nature of his arguments for his 
rent gap theory.
Plausible though Smith's account sounds at first, the changing status of the built 
environment with respect to the resolution of crises undermines it. At the outset of his 
account, the built environment is presented as a repository for capital unable to flow 
elsewhere due to crises clogging the industrial circuit. By the end, however, the built 
environment forms an attractive investment opportunity in its own right because o f 
successful growth in the industrial circuit.
Smith seems to be aware that there is a problem, revealed in the immediate retreat from 
certainty: "it is at precisely this point that there tends to be an increase in capital flowing 
into the built environment (1988 p. 150 emphasis added). This tendency is a result of 
the growth of awareness in the investment opportunities provided by the built 
environment because of successful growth in the industrial circuit The precise timing of 
the switch depends however on the development of a crisis in the industrial circuit. 
While it can be argued that the perception of favourable investment opportunities in the 
built environment follows on from the crisis in the industrial circuit, it cannot at the same 
time be argued that the crisis arises from the barrier posed by the existence of fixed 
capital in the built environment unless conditions in the two circuits are identical.
If the conditions in both sectors are identical, no distinction can therefore be drawn 
between them. Consequently, if the rent gap arises as a result of a crisis in both the built 
environment and industrial circuits, then the 'circuits' metaphor is unsustainable. 
Similarly unsustainable is the implication derived from the circuits metaphor that 
gentrification is a cyclical process. The debilitating effects of over-reliance on metaphors 
to explain gentrification is not a prerogative of postindustrialist approaches to gentrification.
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7 2 3  Rent as a barrier
Smith's view of rent as a barrier, which lies at the heart of his rent gap theory, is inspired 
by Marx's definition of absolute rent (Marx 1959, 759-761), where Marx is held to have 
argued that rent does indeed form a barrier to accumulation. To confront Smith's barrier 
argument therefore is to confront the debate on Marx's theory of rent. The literature on 
this is enormous (Howard & King 1975, Malone 1986 and Haila 1989, 1990 provide 
good summaries), and to do it justice would take this thesis far beyond what is required 
for the demonstration that gentrifiers gentrify because they can. Aside from a few 
remarks in 7.3 below, my position on this debate is contained in Redfem (1991).
The rent gap is a gap between rents for a plot of land calculated on the basis of two
different uses. Smith (1979a) distinguishes between 'capitalized ground rent' and
'potential ground rent'.
Ground rent is the claim made by landowners on users of their land; it 
represents a reduction from the surplus value by producers on the site. 
Capitalized ground rent is the actual quantity of ground rent that is appropriated 
by the landowner, given the present land use .. .
Potential ground rent is the amount that could be capitalized under the "land's 
highest and best use"
(N. Smith, 1979a, p543)
In the case of owner occupancy. Smith argues,
ground rent is capitalized when the building is sold and therefore appears as part 
of the sale price
(ibid. )
As noted above, Clark (1988) argued that Smith's use of the term capitalized ground rent 
is "ambiguous", which seems to have been a polite way of saying "wrong". What is 
wrong about it however, as far as Clark is concerned, is its reference in Smith's account 
to present, rather than future income. The error does not alter the 'structural quality' of 
this form of rent, namely its ability to intercept, on the landowner's behalf, the flow of 
surplus value to the land user. As an interception of surplus value, capitalized ground 
rent therefore has an impact on accumulation.
Smith argued further, that this impact was negative. Capital fixed in the built 
environment resolved one immediate accumulation problem (e. g. N. Smith 1979a, 
p541 ,1982, p i50), but stored up another for the future. The built environment creates a 
barrier to further accumulation because of the long turnover period of capital invested 
there. Haila identifies this attitude toward rent, a barrier to accumulation, as a specific 
phase "of consensus in the 1970s" (1990 p278) in the modem history of rent theory.
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The physical structure must remain in use and cannot be demolished without 
sustaining a loss, until the invested capital has returned its value. What this 
does is to tie up whole sections of land over a long period, in one specific land 
use, and thereby to create significant barriers to new development
(N. Smith, 1982, pl49)
New developments therefore take place elsewhere, in particular in the suburbs: "It is this
spatial shift of capital investment that led to... the rent gap":
To summarize, the investment of capital in the central and inner city caused a 
physical and economic barrier to further investment in that space. The 
movement of capital into suburban development led to a systematic 
devalorization of inner and central city capital, and this, in turn, with the 
development of the rent gap, led to the creation of new investment opportunities 
in the inner city precisely because an effective barrier to new investment had 
previously operated there.
(N. Smith 1982, pl49)
There can be no question that the new investment opportunities in the inner city arose 
precisely because an effective barrier to new investments had operated there, but Smith's 
argument is undeniable precisely because it is post hoc, ergo propter hoc. The question 
which must be posed is, can the characteristics of that barrier be defined without recourse 
to a circular argument?
Smith argues that the cause of this barrier is the slow physical decline of the building 
stock. However this decline is described in terms of devalorization of capital, in other 
words not in physical but in value terms (N. Smith, 1982 pl49). Smith justifies this by 
reference to Marx's definition of productive labour, which he links to Marx's definition 
of productive consumption (N. Smith, 1979b, p i64). However the meaning Marx 
gives to 'productive' when referring to productive consumption is different to that used 
when referring to productive labour, and Smith confuses them.
'Labour', for Marx, is an active process of consumption of raw materials in the creation 
of new products (Marx, 1967, p290). The consumption of raw materials for this 
purpose is productive consumption. This can be accomplished whether or not labour 
itself is productive, that is, productive of surplus value. Smith quotes Marx's example 
of the jobbing tailor patching a capitalist's trousers. The tailor is paid out of the 
capitalist's income, i.e., out of surplus value. The tailor's labour is therefore not 
productive, since it generates no surplus value on its own account. However, raw 
materials, cotton thread, needles, labour power have been used up in the production of 
the use value of the patches. This consumption is therefore productive.
Smith's belief that capital can be productively consumed is also erroneous. Productive 
consumption is indeed the basis of the formation of constant capital, but only when the 
means of production are used up in the creation of a use value for sale as a commodity.
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i.e., in productive labour. Therefore, when Smith argues that
the physical structure must remain in use and cannot be demolished without 
sustaining a loss, until the invested capital has returned its value.
(N. Smith, 1982, pl50),
he is wrong to link this to the physical depreciation of the building. The building 
certainly can be demolished, at any time, only provided that the rentals from the building 
replacing it cover the cost of any unrealized value from the building which is demolished.
Admittedly Smith is always able to argue that it is not the physical condition of the
building which counts, but the rent gap between its present and its highest and best use.
Even ignoring the problem of functionalism in the rent gap hypothesis overall however,
there is a constant suggestion in Smith's writings that this gap will only appear when the
physical deterioration of the building has reached an advanced stage, one at which its
present value is minimal
The steady devalorization of capital creates longer term possibilities for a new 
phase of valorization, and this is exactly what has happened in the inner city .. .
this devalorization cycle for housing [consists of] five stages: new construction 
and first phase of use, landlordism, blockbusting and blowout, redlining, 
abandonment
. . .  devalorization leads to physical decline, which in turn lowers the market 
price of the land on which the dilapidated buildings stand.
(N. Smith, 1982, pl47, ftn3, pl49)
Smith here falls into the same trap which Marx argued befell Ricardo
Those economists who like Ricardo, regard the capitalist mode of production as 
absolute, feel... that it creates a barrier itself, and for this reason attribute the 
barrier to Nature (in the theory of rent), not to production
(Marx, 1959, p242)
Smith's barrier argument succumbs to this same problem. The physical attributes of the
building stock are made the reason for the long turnover time of the capital invested in
them. The pace at which the building deteriorates is made to determine the rate at which
the capital is released in the form of rent income to the owner of the property. Howard
and King write that Ricardo
attributed rent to the intrinsic qualities of land itself: "the labour of nature is paid 
not because she does much, but because she does little. In proportion as she 
becomes niggardly in her gifts, she extracts a greater price for her work".. .  It 
would be difficult to wish for a better example of commodity fetishism, 
attributing to the properties of inanimate objects phenomena which are in reality 
the product of social relationships.
(Howard & King, 1975, p i 15)
Buildings, like all other commodities in productive consumption, transfer their value as 
constant capital via the services they provide to the services produced through their use.
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But this does not imply a rate of physical deterioration, i.e., a loss of use value, 
concomitant with that transfer of value as capital. If productive consumption is not to be 
linked with physical deterioration how should it be treated? Correcting the errors in 
Smith's interpretation of productive consumption paves the way toward an understanding 
of the causes of the rent gap.
For Marx (1967 p317), capital comprises two equal aspects, the labour process,which 
creates it, and the valorization process, which realizes it. The means of production and 
labour power are to the labour process as constant and variable capital are to the 
valorization process. Both aspects are different moments of the dialectic of capital as 
value-in-process.
As value-in-process, capital cannot be consumed, it can only be transferred from the 
means of production and labour power to commodities. Consumption of the use value 
inherent in the commodity is accompanied by the enhancement of labour power, i.e., 
variable capital is enhanced by the transfer of constant capital. The money transferred in 
payment for the right to consume that use value is the price equivalent of the value 
transferred from the commodity (which may be an item for productive or unproductive 
use) to labour power in the course of its consumption.
Once sold, it is the commodities' use values, not their values, which are productively 
consumed. A consumer of a use value looks at the commodity bearing that use value as a 
source of use value only (n.b., I am dealing here only with the question of the consumer 
q m  consumer: the question of how to deal with the investment potential of a property is 
discussed in 7.3.3 below). Smith was incorrect therefore to state that a mortgage 
represented the productive consumption of capital (1979b pl64). It is as money, the 
universal commodity, that a mortgage advance is productively consumed, not as capital. 
The mortgage is capital for the mortgage finance institution, but a commodity for the 
mortgagee.
The productive consumption of a mortgage is virtually instantaneous. Its use value is to 
enable the purchase of the property for which the mortgage advance was made. By 
contrast, the productive consumption of the property will typically be over many years, 
during which time its building services contribute to the reproduction of the labour power 
of its occupiers. The productive consumption of this use value may continue long after 
the proportion of the value of the constant capital transferred to the value of the labour 
power enhanced has fallen to a very low level.
The value of a house is transferred as constant capital via the housing services it provides
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to the labour power reproduced in that house. The 'devalorization' of the property arises 
because wage rates rise, as part of the general increase in productivity of the economy at 
large, i.e., of social labour. Consequently, the proportion of constant capital utilized in 
the reproduction of labour power, the value transferred in productive consumption from 
the house, necessarily falls.
This fall in the flow of value of building services is only contingently related to the 
physical deterioration of the house as such. The theory of capital vintages assumes an 
historical sequence of more and more productive machinery coupled with rising real 
wage rates. Machinery of a particular vintage is scrapped when the rising wage rates 
mean that the value of that vintage's output is entirely absorbed by wage costs. The 
scrapping, in other words, is entirely due to economic, not physical, reasons (Harcourt 
1972).
Capital vintage theory was developed as a defence of neoclassical concepts of capital, but 
the principle, I would argue, is nonetheless applicable to the analysis of the origins of 
the rent gap. Buildings are scrapped (or abandoned) because the rising productivity of 
social labour reduces the contribution of their services to the reproduction of that labour 
to a minimum, not because of their physical condition. To paraphrase a well known 
proposition in economic development theory, the rent gap arises not because buildings 
are exploited, but because they are not exploited enough.
7.3 Domestic technologies and the rent gap
73.1 Domestic technologies: the missing factor in explanations o f gentrification
How then are buildings' potential to be exploited? By "doing them up", etc. Builders 
working on converting an old building into something new is such a familiar sight, that 
the very fact that such activity can take place at all is taken for granted. I shall argue in 
this section that to do so is to overlook completely the importance of what I term 
domestic technologies, the capability of investment in domestic property. In permitting 
the improvement of existing property, domestic technologies are responsible for creating 
the possibility of gentrification. As such, their development needs to be studied closely. 
Yet the question of domestic technologies is almost completely absent as a question for 
analysis in gentrification studies.
Following Du Vail (1988), domestic technologies may be defined as covering food 
production, preservation, cooking facilities and utensils, clothing, cleaning, water and
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waste disposal, heating and lighting. Du Vail traces developments in these technologies 
from Neolithic times onwards. As Cowan (1983) and others have shown, modem 
developments in these technologies have led to the devolution from the home of clothing, 
food production and, to a certain extent, food preparation. While these are extremely 
important from the point of view of gentrification studies (Chapters 8 & 9 below), the 
key developments only occur after the introduction of piped water and sewage, and 
especially external energy sources, gas and electricity, into the home. The term 'domestic 
technologies' is therefore taken in this study to apply particularly to cooking, cleaning, 
water and waste disposal, heating and lighting insofar as the operation of these 
technologies depend on piped water, sewage, gas, and/or electricity.
The closest any of the literature comes to acknowledging the importance of domestic 
technologies is Hamnett's (1973) examination of the use of Improvement grants as an 
indicator o f gentrification in inner London. Hamnett however does not problematize the 
creation of the possibility of improvements. There are similar passing comments on 
improvement grants in N. Smith (1979b pl70). These comments are however made in 
the context of a discussion of the role of the state in the gentrification process. N. Smith 
(1987a p i67-69) refers to consumer durables in passing, but only as part of a discussion 
of suburbanization, not of gentrification.
The question of domestic technologies is dismissed by Smith because of his opposition
to the demand-side explanations of Ley et al. On the consumption functionalist side, the
existence of the possibilities of home improvements simply serves as a peg on which to
hang arguments about class distinctions on the basis of conspicuous forms of
consumption. Smith's error is in imagining that theirs is the only way in which the
contribution of domestic technologies can be analyzed. He actually sums up their
approach extremely well.
gentrification and the mode of consumption it engenders are an integral part of 
class constitution... they are part of the means employed by new middle class 
individuals to distinguish themselves from the stuffed shirt bourgeoisie above 
and the working class below
(N. Smith, 1987a, pl68)
The possibility of gentrification is not problematized but taken for granted in the
postindustrialist approach, so that the discussion can move on to the meaty business of
class. So for example, P.Williams comments that
style and the income which makes it possible can in turn be traced to 
developments around the mode of production, changes in the class structure, 
and residential differentiation; in other words, it is not an autonomous response 
but one that mirrors continuing social tensions and conflicts.
(P. Williams 1984, p219 - emphasis added)
It is worth adding the emphasis to the last quotation because it brings out the close
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connection between the neglect of domestic technologies and the adoption of 
'base-superstructure' metaphors in gentrification analysis. As argued in this chapter and 
in Chapter 3 above, these metaphors are pervasive in gentrification theory. The 
functionalist tendency to discuss gentrification in terms of results, of achieved housing 
situation (cf. Runciman 1968, quoted in 7.2.1 above), and not in terms of means is, I 
have also argued, closely associated with 'base-superstructure' theorizing.
Once pointed out, the relevance of domestic technologies to gentrification is obvious, yet 
the lack of attention paid to this issue is amazing. The only reason can be the 
functionalism associated with the use of 'base-superstructure'. It is noteworthy in this 
regard that Ley (1986) makes no reference to domestic technologies out of a total of 35 
variables in his correlation exercise searching for the causes of inner city gentrification 
in Canadian cities.
It is possible that the participants in the gentrification debate genuinely do not consider 
domestic technologies as worthy of attention. But without electricity or household 
appliances for cleaning, cooking and heating, what good does it do to spend money on 
repairing the structure of a house which can only be run with the aid of these 
technologies, or with the aid of servants? If they do hold the view that domestic 
technologies are not worthy of attention, one purpose of this chapter is to show that this 
would be a mistake.
7.3.2 A model o f gentrification
Without the possibilities offered by domestic technologies, gentrification as I have 
defined it, the return of middle class people to dwellings originally constructed for 
middle class occupancy, could never have taken place. The change in tastes supposedly 
represented by gentrification is secondary to the production of changing opportunities for 
consumption.
Now while it is quite true that domestic technology can be invested across the complete 
age range of housing, it is also trae to say that the impact on the flow of housing services 
from the building will be the greater the older the property.
The more modem a house, the more likely it is that it has already incorporated into its 
design, features which would represent a significant improvement in amenities if applied 
to an older house. In these more modem houses, there would be a smaller difference 
between the level of housing services currently provided by the property and the 
maximum level of housing services it could provide after investing domestic technology
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in it. In short, assume (as do the neighbourhood lifecycle models) a Burgess type city in 
which growth takes the form of concentric circles, each of which contains more modem 
housing than the previous circle. This assumption is for the sake of ease of exposition 
only, no essential features hang on it.
If an investment of domestic technologies in an existing property is being assessed in 
terms of the gross returns over the interest payments required to finance the investment, 
then, cet. par., one would expect to find the oldest houses capable of being renovated, 
being renovated first. Then further investment would follow in later, better-built, 
houses.
This argument therefore also suggests that gentrification is a subset of home 
improvements. It offers a reason why attempts to define gentrification have proved so 
difficult. This is because the requirement for the financing of the improvements which 
would categorize them as gentrification is a secondary consideration to the decision to 
improve. Gentrification tails off into improvements to the property which can be 
financed out of current income, and which do not therefore require a change in 
occupation.
An economic model of gentrification as a subset of home improvements is then fairly 
simple to construct. As any display of mathematical symbols in a text devoted to social 
issues invariably invokes cries of economic determinism - usually from people who are 
perfectly happy with SCA-based determinism in their accounts - it is as well to specify at 
the outset exactly what the development of this model is intended to achieve.
This model seeks to show what are the financial limits and constraints on behaviour in 
the context of gentrification. It is therefore deterministic but in the sense in which R. 
Williams defines 'determine' (1977, 1983K) - if  such a course of action is taken, then 
this consequence must follow. In realist terms, if such and such contingently related real 
objects (2Ü 2 + O2) are brought into contact with each other then the consequences 
(2H2O) are inevitable.
If this defence against charges of economic determinism still fails to convince, if the 
explanation of the determinants of the gentrification process presented here still seems to 
privilege economic explanations overly, my final argument is that, under capitalism, life 
really is like that. Money and money flows both structure social relations under 
capitalism and are the medium through which capitalist society interacts. Under 
capitalism, to repeat D. Sayer's words once more "Reification is a social process not a 
mere category error" (1991 p65).
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Let
q flow of housing services from a modem (or fully improved) dwelling -
assumed constant at any time x
q flow of housing services from an unimproved (or only partially improved)
dwelling at time x.
q -q  benefits from improving dwelling
Let costs of improvement I be some function of q - q so that 
I = I(q - q)
Assume interest rate i constant at any time x so that 
i = Ï
Then the profitability of investing in the dwelling r is given by
q - qr =
I(q-%
If r  > i improvements mav be undertaken. If r < i , mortgage finance institutions will 
not finance investment. Better returns can be had investing elsewhere.
These relationships are graphed in figure 7.3 Note that the boundary between 
improvements and abandonment will shift to the left bringing the possibility of 
improvements to older houses as either the interest rate falls with respect to the profit 
rate, or the investment function falls with respect to the decline of housing amenities with 
housing vintage q = q(x, t) (which would have the effect of raising r with respect to i). 
Investment will proceed up to the point where the gross returns expected from the 
investment just match the cost of financing the investment. As the rate of interest moves 
up and down with respect to the expected rate of return from such investments, in other 
words as (r - i) rises and falls, so the volume of investment carried out will rise and fall. 
This much information can be gleaned simply from looking at the graph.
Figure 7.3 (and Figure 7.4 also) is a graphic representation of the argument that as the 
productivity of social labour has increased, so also has the flow of housing services from 
each successive vintage x of the housing stock. This increase is shown by the 'S’ 
shaped curve q = q(x, t). The value of the flow of housing services in this case is the 
rate of transfer of value from the house-as-constant-capital to the occupants. As houses 
become more 'modem', they have incorporated in them a greater quantity of use value.
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Consequently the value of the flow of housing services also rises.
Figure 7.3 Relations between investment, profitability and interest rates affecting 
decision as whether to modernize an existing property.
I ( t , t )
q(t)$ ,r ,i
q = q(x. t)
abandon modemize/gentrify
If however, houses are able to have incorporated into them the latest improvements in 
technologies, then the value of the flow of housing services will be the same, regardless 
of the age of the house. This constant value is given by the horizontal dashed line q(t). 
The area between the two curves, q(x)dt, represents the size of investment required to 
raise the unimproved flow of housing services up to the current level.
Having defined the conditions affecting the decision to modernize or to abandon, the next
step is to define the conditions affecting the issue of whether this can be financed by the
present occupiers or if they would have to be replaced by occupiers on higher incomes; in
other words whether these improvements can be financed without displacement or only
with displacement. To understand why displacement even comes into the question of
financing housing improvements requires a preliminary discussion of the conditions
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under which housing finance is undertaken.
As defined above, profitability is only measured in terms of the increase in flow of 
housing services over the costs of obtaining that increase, and not in terms of what the 
likely resale price would be. The difference between the two measures of profitability are 
important for understanding gentrification. The possibility of a discrepancy between the 
costs of increasing the flow of housing services and realizing those costs upon sale 
means that mortgage finance institutions never invest in a property itself. They invest in 
its owner, in particular in its owners’ future income prospects. Their only interest in the 
property itself is a security against those prospects being unrealized, through death, 
illness, unemployment, or change in financial circumstances.
Because it is viewed as a security, mortgage finance institutions are only interested in 
improving a property if they can be sure that they can get their money back should they 
be forced to foreclose. Mortgage finance institutions' investment decisions are therefore 
based primarily on occupiers’ incomes, and only secondarily on speculative estimates on 
the growth of property prices (at the micro level - at the macro level, they of course 
depend heavily on the assumption that property prices will rise - see Boddy 1980). P. 
Williams (1976) gives an example from Islington where some property improvements 
were undertaken with private finance. Representatives from mortgage finance 
institutions were then invited along to see the results. Only once they were convinced 
that the property stood a chance of being resold at its rental value were they prepared to 
begin lending, and then only to people with sufficient incomes to justify the risk of the 
investment.
If mortgage finance institutions could be sure of getting their money back in resale of a 
property if they had to foreclose, then the question of housing improvements being 
contingent on the prior  displacement of the existing occupier would not arise. An 
existing occupier could borrow the money to improve the house and sell it on to a 
’gentrifier’, thereby pocketing the increase in value of the property for herself.
I put ’gentrifier’ in quotes here because it is not certain whether this transfer of 
ownership would constitute gentrification. The essence of gentrification is that property 
improvements take place through prior displacement. Gentrifiers, by virtue of their 
higher incomes, are able to invest what is for them a comparatively small amount of 
money in order to obtain considerably enhanced housing services from the property, 
which the displaced person could not, because the mortgage finance institutions were not 
prepared to invest in her.
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Let mortgage outstanding, H, be some function of the purchase price
(the remarks on the behaviour of mortgage finance institutions mean that H could also be defined 
as a function of income - hCTe I choose to use income as the parameter rather than the variable);
then
H = H (q )
Y = income of occupier
a  = maximum mortgage/income ratio (a constant, usually around 2.9:1)
Then if
H + I < aY  home improvements possible without displacement 
H + 1 < aY  improvements can only be financed through replacement of 
existing occupier by a higher income occupier.
The cutoff point is then obviously H + I = aY.
The problem of assessing the cutoff point is then a routine one of maximization under 
constraint. It is to maximize q - q for a given Y, Ÿ.
In fact since q is fixed at any time x, the problem may be simplified as 
min q
aŸ = H (^  + I(q-^r u ti n  v q; -r n^  - q;
subject to I  {(q-q))/{I(q- q)) ^  i
Alternatively, for given a q, the problem is one of finding the maximum income which 
would permit an occupant to finance improvements of a given size:
max a-i{H (^  + I(q-
subject to q - q = K an arbitrary constant
That is, find the maximum income which could finance H(q) + I(k ) without 
displacement
Figure 7.4 shows how given an arbitrary income, Ÿ, what the maximum q - q  might be 
before displacement becomes the only method of financing improvements to a property
of vintage T.
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Figure 7.4 Determination of cutoff point between displacement and home 
improvements:









It is possible to refine the model still further. Replacement of the existing occupier by 
one of higher income need not of itself constitute gentrification. There should be a 
certain disparity between the incomes of the gentrifiers and the incomes of the displacees. 
Gentrification is then a subset of displacement-financed improvements and a sub-subset 
of home improvements.
Let
Yg be the incomes of the gentrifiers 
Yd be the incomes of the displacees, and
Yg = |i Yd , where p, ^  1. Assuming gentrifiers' incomes at least 30% higher
than displacees, p >1. 3).
The conditions under which gentrification, displacement, or home improvements will 
occur are now
(H +1) > p  aYd yields gentrification
p a  Yd > (H +1) ^  aYd yields displacement without gentrification
aYd > (H+1) yields home improvements without displacement
This complicates only slightly the form of the problem to be solved. The only difference 
is to the form of the budget constraint
min q
paYd = H(q) + l(q-q)I  .u i n w -r n c  
subject to {  {(q-q)) /{I(q-ÿ)  > i
The dual similarly is
max Yd = (pa)-l{H(q) + l(q-q)}
subject to q - q = K
That is, find the maximum income which could finance H(q) + 1( k ) without being 
displaced by gentrification. The problem
m axYd = (a)-i{H(^ + l(q -^ )
subject to q - q = K
is now to find the maximum income which could finance H(q) + 1(k ) without non- 
gentrifying displacement, as when a newly married working class couple purchase a 
house from working class 'empty nesters', moving into a retirement cottage.
Posing the problem in this way brings out the fact that the gentrification factor, p, is not a
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rent gap, but an income gap. The rent gap accounts for displacement, not for 
gentrification. Clearly, |i will always be arbitrary, but for good reason. One person's 
yuppie is another person's ghastly nouveau riche. However, because it is arbitrary, it 
does not mean to say that it is meaningless. I shall explain the social bases of |i in 
Chapter 8.
Finally, government subsidies, in the form of improvement grants might be considered. 
Let these be some function (within limits) of the investment required. Then G = 0(1) and 
the cutoff point (simple case) is now
H+1 - G = aY , where I < I*, and I* is the upper limit on government
grants.
Since G = G(I), this can be expanded in Taylor series (Pasinetti 1974 pp49-50) to yield a 
multiplier style equation
aY  - H = (1 - g') I
where g' - the rate of change of size of grant with size of I - may be interpreted as the 
government's propensity to disburse improvement grants! Taking the existence of 
government grants into account, the cutoff point between home improvements and 
displacement is
{
H +1(1 - g') = aY, I< I*  
H + 1 = aY, I > I*
The existence of government subsidies affects the model in two ways. The effect of 1 +
g' on aY  is effectively to increase its size, thereby making it more likely that home
improvements can be undertaken without displacement. This effect is also seen in the 
increase in the size of mortgage H which can be obtained for a given income.
H ( l - g ' ) - i + I  = ( l - g ' ) - i a Y ,
The model of gentrification presented here is intended to clarify the definition of 
gentrification, and its relation to investment, income, home improvements and 
displacement. It helps explain why gentrification has been regarded as a chaotic 
conception. The boundaries separating gentrification from displacement-led 
improvements, and separating displacement-led improvements from home improvements 
generally are extremely variable, depending on size of the investment required, and the 
relative incomes of those seeking to make that investment, the current occupiers or the
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potential displacers/gentrifiers. Even if the vertical dashed lines in Figures 7.3 and 7.4 
did set the current boundary between gentrification and displacement, they are always 
moving left or right as interest rates rise and fall, and depending on the relative incomes 
involved. They also move left and right depending on the flow of housing services 
inherited from the past, that is, on the shape of q = q(x, t). At a certain point the precise 
age of the building becomes unimportant. The fact that gentrification of the (17ih 
century) Spitalfields area has occurred subsequent to the gentrification of (19tb century) 
Islington is evidence that the relations graphed in Figures 7.3 to 7.5 do not constitute an 
economistic model to be interpreted in a mechanistic manner. The current housing 
situation of gentrifier and non-gentrifier can only be explained historically.
Second, it gives economic meaning to the criterion of 'sufficient wideness'. 
Gentrification will only occur when q - q ^ K, and k is such that H + I - G > 
|xaYd. The fact k and p, are arbitrary constants however shows that wideness itself is 
not consequential in terms of explaining gentrification. 'Sufficient wideness' can only be 
defined with reference to relative incomes and interest rates, and must therefore be 
defined anew each time these change - which means every time. Effectively therefore, as 
I argued in respect of Smith and Clark's accounts of gentrification, how wide is wide 
enough can only be discovered after the fact. The model presented here therefore is not 
intended as a causal explanation of gentrification. However, it does seek to illustrate the 
importance of (in fact the very existence of) domestic technologies as the primary 
enabling factor in the explanation of gentrification.
73.3 Domestic technologies and the rent gap
The rent gap is defined as the difference between the rental in current use and that which 
could be obtained in a (so-called) higher and better use. Figures 7.3 & 7.4 describe 
such a rent gap but one which does not suffer from the functionalism inherent in Smith's 
accounts of circuits and barriers. The rent gap is created by the difference between the 
flow of housing services obtainable from an "unimproved" and an "improved" property. 
It does not occur as a result of the physical deterioration of properties, but because these 
properties can be improved. The buildings' use values may well have remained constant 
and their value completely amortized. Gentrification does not (automatically) occur when 
the gap is "wide enough", but only when conditions in the finance markets permit.
What distinguishes gentrification from home improvements or simple displacement is that 
this particular form of improvement can only be financed if there is a substantial change
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in the owner's income, however that change of occupancy may be accomplished.
This begs the question, why would anyone want to finance such an improvement in 
such a drastic way? To answer this question, it is necessary to address the issue of what 
gains may be made from the ownership of housing. This issue has been the subject of 
much debate in recent years, with Saunders (1984, 1989,1990) and Murie (Forrest & 
Murie 1987, Forrest, Murie & P. Williams 1991) leading protagonists. The purpose of 
this debate has been to establish empirical evidence for Saunders' proposition that capital 
gains from home ownership lay the basis for a new form of class division in society 
based on consumption cleavages rather than on production relations. I have already 
discussed Saunders' arguments in Chapter 3 above. Here, I am only interested in the 
question of whether or not capital gains can be made from domestic property ownership.
Duncan (1989a) argues against Saunders that no overall capital gain can readily be 
identified with owner-occupation, when housing prices are deflated both for inflation in 
the general price level and for improvements in housing quality, to obtain a "pure 
housing price" (p ll) . Kleinman (1991) argues that owners do in general make capital 
gains but that, because of flaws in Saunders' methodology, it is difficult to estimate from 
Saunders' figures what the size of those gains might be. Kleinman argues that the gains 
"capture part of the increase in real wealth, by virtue of the fact that we live in an 
imperfect world of disequilibrium, not smoothly adjusting markets" (p2).
Despite Duncan's problematization of the "house price assumption", his conclusions 
nonetheless seem implausible. As is by now well documented, the building industry in 
Britain is very backward and labour intensive compared with the rest of the British 
economy, and indeed with building industries throughout Europe, though not North 
America (Ball, 1983, Duncan 1986, 1989b). On Marxist, or any other, economic 
principles, we should therefore expect to see the unit costs of new construction rise with 
respect to the general price level. As Duncan himself writes "cost levels in the stock as a 
whole are fundamentally affected by the costs of new build." (Duncan, 1986 pl5 , cf. 
Ball, 1983, Chapter 4). If the pure price level has remained constant, it would contradict 
such an expectation, since it would imply a rate of improvement of labour productivity in 
construction equal to the national average, over the period for which figures are 
available. Since it is generally recognized that there has been no such improvement, then 
there must be a problem with either Duncan's data or his methodology.
Duncan's pure price index deflates first for price increases, and then for cost increases 
due to quality and quantity improvements. If labour costs represent a rising proportion 
of housing costs, compared to the national average embodied in commodity production.
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then deflating for quality and quantity improvements would also tend to downplay the 
significance of the relative increase in the quantity of labour embodied in the house. This 
would tend to downplay the potential of any capital gain from the ownership of domestic 
property.
The question at issue is the capital gain to be made by ownership of a particular vintage 
of the housing stock, when the possibility exists that subsequent technical progress can 
be embodied in it. The problem with Duncan's 5% sample survey of building society 
mortgages in the UK which he uses as the basis for his raw house price data, is that it is 
composed of mortgages advanced on all properties, not just on new construction. 
Consequently, it confuses the average with the margin. It implicitly averages technical 
progress, quality and quantity improvements, across the whole housing stock. Again, 
this therefore underplays the potential gap between current replacement cost and the sum 
of historic costs and investment in domestic technologies.
These problems extend to Duncan's estimation of the costs of improvement and 
maintenance. The median age of an extant mortgage is 7 years. This is an average for 
the entire stock, but nevertheless implies that the median length of residence in new 
construction is 7 years (Duncan has therefore in effect averaged curve q around a 
horizontal line intersecting q at a point where 7 < t - x < 14 ). If there is a greater 
tendency to improve second hand property compared to new construction, then the 
estimates of these costs should only be applied to second-hand mortgages, ie. , on 
mortgages over 7 years old.
The precise length of time before new construction is traded in is of course unimportant 
compared to the main point that the costs of improvements etc should be placed against 
the older, rather than the newer stock. To include this in the costs of all mortgages 
advanced is again to engage in an averaging procedure which would tend to counteract 
the effects of any historic trend. Unit housing prices would be higher than average 
prices, but would not vary from the average in the long run.
These points may be illustrated by considering Figures 7.3 and 7.4 once more. The 
shape of the historic building cost curve, q, represents the effect of quality and quantity 
improvements embodied in later vintages of the housing stock. It standardizes for the 
relative cost increases in the construction industry compared to the national average costs 
per unit of output. If relative cost increases are taken into account, then the possibility of 
capital gains from the application of domestic technologies to existing housing occurs, 
and therefore the possibility of gentrification also. This possibility is shown by curve q' 
graphed in Figure 7.5.
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Fipire 7.5 Capital gains from investment in the housing stock
jjrice level set by relative costs o f new production
capital gains from 
bringing housing 
service output up 
to modem level
rising relative cosi
due to relative decrease in productivity
investment o f domestic 
technolog ie s^ ——-^ labour embodied in new production
costs
date ot construction (.modernity, distance)
specific housing 
stock vintage
The market value of the building can be accounted for as the sum of the historic cost q, 
plus any the value of any investment in domestic technologies, plus any capital gains 
arising because of the relative increase in the cost of new housing q*. These unearned 
increases in the market value over the supply price should be accounted under the 
heading of rent
As accumulation and urban development proceeds the value of land at any location will 
rise independently of any other considerations. Ball (1983) makes this the centrepiece of 
his explanation of the backward state of the British building industry, since this unearned 
increment in land value is appropriated by the builders. Builders are therefore under less 
pressure to rationalize the labour process in the building industry, hence its state of 
relative backwardness compared to other sectors of the economy. Consequently as well 
as taking into account the rent on the unearned value of the building, as in Figure 7.5, for 
a full account of the contributions to a rent gap, the unearned increment in the value of the 
land must also be considered.
Although this last observation might seem obvious enough, in fact Ball (1985) argues 
strongly against proceeding in this fashion. He argues that ground rent and building rent 
cannot be distinguished from one another in practice and so should not be distinguished 
from one another in theory either. Ball would deny that the rent gap argument therefore
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on the grounds that the relevant categories of rent do not even exist. They do not exist, 
Ball argues, because Marx's theory of rent, which in any case suffers from Marx's 
failure to solve his transformation problem, was designed to apply only to the agricultural 
context, and cannot be translated into the urban context. Having already noted Clark's 
criticisms of Smith's definitions of rent, and having argued that Smith's 
conceptualization of rent in terms of flows and barriers is faulty, it might therefore be 
possible that Ball has a point. It might well be that the reasons for the deficiencies in 
Smith's rent theory lie not in particular errors in Smith's application of Marx's categories 
to the problem of gentrification, but are instead inherent in any attempt to apply Marx's 
theory of rent to the urban context. The debate on the theory of rent in other words raises 
isssues lurking in the depths of the gentrification debate, which have not so far been 
discussed in this thesis, and which are not properly dealt with in the rent gap literature 
either.
The four questions normally debated consider (i) what role rent plays in the accumulation 
process; (ii) whether Marx's categories of rent were correct, or at least correctable; (iii) 
whether these categories can be associated with particular forms of class struggle (does 
the presence of, say, absolute rent signify a struggle between capitalist and landlord, 
whereas monopoly rent signifies a struggle between landlord and worker - H. Smyth 
1986); and (iv) whether these categories, which were developed in the analysis of 
agricultural rents, can be applied to the urban context or not.
What answers are given to this last question obviously depend to some degree on the 
answers given to the first three. Ball (1985, 1987, 1989), as noted, argues that Marx's 
categories are incorrect in significant respects, that they cannot be associated with 
particular form of class struggle and that they most definitelycannot be applied to the 
urban context. Haila (1989, 1990) argues equally vigorously that Ball is incorrect. 
Clearly therefore, even to touch upon the issue of rent when dealing with the rent gap or 
gentrification issues in general is to stray into a minefield. My attempts at disposal of 
these mines is undertaken in Redfem (1991). My conclusions on these four issues are 
first that since the rent is accounted in terms of money, it acts like all other forms of 
money as both rule and resource, and so it plays an essentially co-ordinating role in 
accumulation. To the extent that a co-ordinating role must involve the setting of limits, 
rent can under certain circumstances act as a barrier. However, this barrier effect is 
contingent, it is not inherent in the nature of rent itself, as Smith's interpretation of 
absolute rent as a barrier seems to imply.
Second, Marx's categories of absolute, differential and monopoly rent are essentially 
correct. Absolute rent is best understood as an intersectoral version of Marx's category
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of differential rent II, which is differential rent arising from different organic 
compositions of capital in the output of a particular sector. Absolute rent is then this 
principle extended to the case where different sectors are considered. In the intersectoral 
case, money itself is the 'no-rent' sector.
Differential rent I is basically Ricardo's differential rent arising from either 'the original 
and inexhaustible powers of the soil', or from location. Absolute and differential rent 
account for how the rent arises in the context of the accumulation process. Monopoly 
rent, which an interception in the circular flow of income from capitalists to workers and 
back again, accounts for where the rent goes, that is who receives the benefits of the 
absolute and differential rent.
Thirdly therefore, absolute, differential and monopoly rent cannot be associated with 
different specific forms of class struggle. A landlord, or anyone else with something to 
rent out, a video, say, or a power tool, receives a monopoly rent, and as long as that rent 
is paid and the landlord's income therefore secure, the landlord is quite indifferent as to 
who pays. Finally therefore, these categories of rent can be applied to the urban case, 
despite Ball's objections. For the purposes of analysis of the gains to be made from 
gentrification, the two relevant categories are absolute and differential rent. Monopoly 
rent is not a relevant category in this context.
Figure 7.6 shows how this rent is divided between the various relevant components of 
Marx's categories of rent, namely absolute rent, which arises because of the 
backwardness of the building industry, and differential rent. As noted above, differential 
rent may be divided into two categories, DRI, deriving from location on the one hand and 
DRn, deriving from quantity of capital invested per plot on the other. Therefore a third 
curve q", intermediate between q and q', has been added, to show how the differential 
rent splits between DRI and DRII.
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Figure 7.6 Accounting for capital gains in gentrification, using 1831 property as an 
example
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Curves q, q' and q" are flows, so the area between the lines represent the total sums of 
costs and rents for each category. The "1831 vintage" is taken as an example. In terms 
of labour embodied, the 1991 supply price of the 1831 vintage is the sum of the 1831 
labour inputs, the historic cost, plus the 1991 investments in domestic technologies 
which bring the flow of housing services up to 1991 standards. The market price is 
higher than the supply price because the lack of growth in productivity in housing 
construction compared to the rest of the economy means that the proportion of labour 
embodied in new construction has risen relative to the rest of the economy. The organic 
composition of capital embodied in new production is lower than the remainder of the 
economy. This means that the market price of new, 1991, housing pays an absolute 
rent, which fully accounts for the difference between its supply price and its market 
value. The market value of new housing consists entirely of labour embodied plus 
absolute rent. However, pre-1991 housing vintages also yield differential rent compared 
to new construction, since the historic costs within the sector are lower.
Differential rent I, Ricardo's differential rent, arises out of the "original and indestructible 
powers of the soil", in the urban case, relative location. Differential rent II arises out 
from the differing proportions of capital invested in different vintages of the housing 
stock. Differential rent I therefore may be taken to account for ground rent, whereas 
differential rent II accounts for building rent. The graph does suggest however that a 
proportion of that ground rent is also to be accounted as absolute rent.
To repeat, the lines on the graph represent flows and the areas between the lines represent
196
total rents paid in each category. Moving from right to left on the graph, that is, when 
comparing later and later vintages, alters the relative proportions of each component of 
ren t Thus, compared with "1831", the "1951 vintage" has a higher historic cost, 
requires a smaller investment of domestic technologies to bring its services up to 1991 
standard, and pays a smaller differential rent but a higher absolute rent As noted earlier 
the 1991 vintage pays, this year, no differential rent at all. Its rent is arrived at entirely 
by comparison with other sectors of production, i.e., is all absolute. In 1992 however, it 
will begin to start yielding differential rent. Thus the proportions of absolute to 
differential rent change from year to year.
However when capitalized, the common market value of all the vintages is also a 
monopoly rent, a deduction from the general social pool of surplus value. Thus the same 
property yields qualitatively different rents from year to year, and also from the 
perspective adopted, even though nothing has altered in the class relations between 
capitalist, landlord and tenant
Figure 7.6 just shows how the rent arising from the increase in the market value of 
existing housing is distributed among the various categories of rent. It does not answer 
the question of who actually gets this rent. Figure 7.7 shows the standard method of 
analyzing the distribution of rent amongst the different actors in the urban land market.
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Figure 7.7 graphs the increase in land values which occur as land is brought into 
development. The solid black curved lines ti, t'l represent the rent trajectories, the rate 
of increase in land rents determined by the course of the accumulation process that would 
occur in the absence of speculation in land development. If speculation in land is 
permitted, a developer, seeking a 'normal' return on investment, would purchase the land 
at time to (t*o). Time to is determined by the holding costs of the land and is calculated 
from the formula:
normal return = appreciation + (agricultural) rents - taxes
i.e.,
iVd = dVd/dt + Ra-xVd
yielding
dVd/dt + Ra = xVd + iVd = Vd(x+i)
So dVd/dt, the rate at which Vd - the value of land to the developer - appreciates, is given 
by X + i, the holding costs of the land. This is shown graphically in Figure 7.7 by the 
slope of the lines to and t*o, which have gradients of x + i.
This at any rate is the theory. In fact of course, a developer cannot guarantee that the rate 
of appreciation and future costs of the land holdings will be those predicted from the 
current levels of x and i. This is why the developer is referred to as speculating in land. 
Depending on just how successful the timing of the land purchase or lease turns out to 
have been, the developer will get more and the agricultural landowner will get less of the 
rent increase. This division of the surplus between the developer/speculator and the 
agricultural landowner does not however affect the division of the surplus into categories 
of rent. Marx’s categories of rent are important for accounting purposes, not for 
analyses of class struggle. Suggestions, in the current debate on rent theory that they 
should so be used and criticisms of the application of Marx's rent theory to the urban 
context based on such suggestions both seem equally misplaced.
I have argued that the boundary between displacement and home improvements is set 
where the interest rate falls below the gross returns to be realized from the investment, 
that is, when the return to be made from investing in the owner is less than the return to 
be made in the money markets. Certainly at this point, no mortgage finance institution 
would be interested. The graph does suggest however, that all investment in domestic 
technologies, including gentrification, is carried out with an eye to future gains from the 
investment. In other words, the rationale underlying gentrifiers' behaviour is common to 
all investment decisions, and not the peculiar demand functions of alien space invaders.
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This argument touches on the thorny question of whether homeowners view their 
property primarily as a consumption good or as a capital good, and consequently whether 
researchers should view domestic property as a consumption good or as an investment 
good (e.g., Saunders 1990). In one sense, the question is misplaced. As long as the 
consumption of domestic property is financed by mortgage finance institutions, the 
treatment of a house as an investment good is inescapable both on the part of the owners 
and the researchers, despite any other attitudes they may harbour toward the social 
meaning of the home. In another sense however, the very posing of the question 
demonstrates that the experience of homeownership, like everything else, lies in the 
margins between culture and civilization.
Therefore, in arguing that the ability of gentrifiers to gentrify lies in their ability to take 
advantage of domestic technologies and the rising real value of new construction to 
improve existing properties, I do not mean to suggest that gentrifiers' motives are solely, 
primarily, or even secondarily financial. However, if they wish to get financing to carry 
out these improvements, their mortgagors must be convinced of the capital gains to be 
made, or the investment will not take place. P.Williams (1976) documents quite clearly 
the necessity, and the difficulty, of persuading mortgage finance institutions to lend 
money on Islington properties prior to the onset of gentrification there (7.3.2 above). 
Others have pointed to the opening of the Victoria line station at Highbury Comer. It is 
obviously important to bear in mind the limits set by the mortgage finance process, and 
by the availability of suitably tenured housing stock in particular locations. However, 
these are secondary contingent issues related to timing rather than cause. The origins of 
gentrification should be sought in the development of domestic technologies rather than 
in any of the functionalist accounts reviewed above. These arguments entirely take for  
granted the existence of domestic technology, as the means by which a house is to be 
renovated. In this neglect of domestic technologies they however follow a general trend. 
Saunders (1989,1990) contains no reference to this aspect of the history of the home.
Similarly, the possibility of gentrification which is opened up by the existence of 
domestic technologies does not of itself guarantee that the process will occur. Domestic 
technologies cannot be considered without attention to the contexts under which they 
were developed and introduced. Not to pay attention to these issues would be to 
exchange technological determinism for functionalism.
I have argued that Smith's defence of his version of the rent gap does not save his 
theories from functionalism. In what way therefore is this version any different?
There are four reasons why this argument is an improvement on Smith's. First, as I
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have been stressing in the explanations of Figures 7.3 to 7.5, the argument deals with 
potential, not process. Money is the crucial medium of structuration in a capitalist 
society. It is both rule and resource. The model and the graphs show how the 
parameters of action are set. If someone wishes to exceed those parameters, they will 
either find themselves bankrupt, or more likely find it impossible to raise the finance to 
accomplish their plans for their property.
Second, Smith’s argument fetishizes rent, giving it a causal power which it does not 
possess. His metaphors of barriers and circuits similarly fetishizes capital, and the 
functionalism of his arguments is consequential on this. Third, Smith’s argument, like 
all neighbourhood lifecycle explanations, implies that gentrification is a cyclical process. 
The organic analogies in which, as Chapter 2 showed, these explanations are rooted lead 
also into functionalist arguments. The arguments presented here lay the basis for arguing 
that gentrification is not a cyclical, but a one-off occurrence. In the next chapter I argue 
that the circumstances surrounding the investment of domestic technologies in the current 
housing stock are such as to make it unlikely that gentrification process is anything other 
than historically unique and therefore non-cyclical.
Finally, even if these arguments were functionalist, they nonetheless serve to direct 
attention to-ward other testable, that is to say, explanatory, hypotheses. In Chapter 1 ,1 
argued that these were the only benefits to be drawn from functionalist statements. The 
explanatory hypothesis I draw from this exposition is that the key to understanding the 
occurrence of gentrification is the development of domestic technology.
7.4 Conclusion
The way to overcome the functionalism inherent in Smith’s account of the role of the 
rent gap in gentrification is to problematize the causes of the rent gap rather than its 
effects. The causes of the rent gap, I argue, arise from the same reasons as that which 
creates the possibility of there being a second-hand market in housing at all: the existence 
of domestic technologies and the possibility of investing them in an existing property.
I have already suggested that the issues involved in gentrification may best be understood 
by reference to capital vintage theory. Capital vintages were originally proposed as a 
means of dealing with the criticism of the concept of ’disembodied technical progress’ 
found in neoclassical models of economic growth (Harcourt 1972). Disembodied 
technical progress meant that all machinery in use could be continuously improved by the 
application of the latest developments in technical knowledge. It was a guarantee of the
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perfect foresight of rational econonaic man, and thus of a technological explanation of the 
determinants of income distribution, namely marginal productivity theory. If all 
machinery incorporated the latest technology, the same rate of profit could therefore be 
obtained on each and every unit of 'capital'. A unique relation could then be held to exist 
between the technology employed in any process, its 'capital intensity', and the profits it 
generated.
The concept of "embodied technical progress", incorporated in vintages of capital was 
proposed by neoclassical economists to counter the criticism that the assumption of 
disembodied technical progress is clearly implausible as well as tendentious. Embodied 
technical progress could only be introduced into the production process in successive 
rounds of investment and could not be transmitted across the stocks of machinery 
wholesale. However implausible and tendentious was its use in the case of capital 
theory, the concept of disembodied technical progress appears much more plausible in 
the case of the housing stock under the present historical circumstances. Gentrification 
then appears as a transitional phenomenon associated with the transition in the housing 
stock from embodied to disembodied technical progress, associated with the development 
of domestic technologies. When the Victorians talked of "improvements", they meant 
knocking down and building again from scratch.
If it were not possible to embody technical progress in the existing stock, there would be 
no capital gains to be made. Gentrification would not occur. Once the gains to be made 
from bringing the value of the housing services in the existing stock up to the level of the 
most modem buildings have been made, therefore, the gentrification process should 
cease. Subsequent improvements ought to occur at the same rate over the whole stock. 
Even if new buildings do continue to set the prices for the older stock, incorporating both 
quality improvements and relatively increasing labour values in the course of 
construction, the gap between old and new will never be as dramatic again.
Smith's rent gap theory implies however that gentrification is a cyclical process. Barriers 
appear in the built environment and are overcome by gentrification, only to arise as 
barriers once more. Through gentrification, the value of the built property is periodically 
brought back into line with its site rental value. What this argument overlooks however, 
is that while indeed ground rents have risen compared to the value of the property, 
traditionally this has led, not to gentrification but to further subdivision of the property 
(as in the Alonso model)
There is no city in Europe, I believe in which house-rent is dearer than in 
London, and yet I know no capital in which a furnished apartment can be hired 
so cheap... and what may seem extraordinary, the dearness of the house-rent is 
the cause of the cheapness of the lodging... A tradesman in London is obliged
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to hire a whole house in that part of the town where he and his customers live.
His shop is on the ground-floor and he and his family sleep in the garret; and 
he endeavours to pay a part of his house-rent by letting the two middle stories 
to lodgers. He expects to maintain his family by his trade and not by his 
lodgers. Whereas at Paris and Edinburgh, the people who let lodgings have 
commonly no other means of subsistence; and the the price of the lodging must 
pay, not only the whole rent of the house, but the whole expense of the family.
(A. Smith 1776- 1977 p221)
A. Smiths's argument is pertinent to this discussion precisely because the historical 
conditions under which he made it did not include the slightest perception of the need for 
a vacuum cleaner or an automatic dishwasher. N. Smith's rent gap argument makes the 
mistake, to paraphrase Ricardo, of assuming that gentrification occurs because the 
ground rent is high, rather than explaining the height of the rent by the fact that 
gentrification can or does occur, because of the possibilities offered by domestic 
technologies.
The existence of domestic technologies capable of being invested in an existing housing 
stock is only the means, a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for gentrification to 
occur. Other conditions also need to be met, the first, already noted in Chapter 6, is for 
there to be residential segregation by status, and for residential segregation to carry the 
marks of status. The second is the private ownership of property and investment in 
construction carried out for profit rather than to meet a need. Third, private financing of 
domestic property improvements is itself predicated on the existence of domestic property 
and the means to improve it. These contingencies together constitute what Ball (1983, 
1985) calls 'structures of provision'. This concept is particularly useful since it 
emphasizes the fact that buildings are not simply a 'reflection' of demand, Zeitgeist etc, 
but an interpretation of that demand (Boys 1989), by speculative builders operating under 
specific economic conditions. These were, and still are, the exploitation of rising land 
values rather than labour in the production process, the methods of financing speculative 
building, and the tenures under which the properties were occupied.
Finally, there must exist different income levels among house owners, otherwise there 
would be no displacement. All of these conditions are historically contingent, which in 
itself argues against the circumstances which helped create gentrification ever occurring 
again.
Within the context of these capitalist structures of provision of housing, a second set of 
contingencies help determine whether gentrification will occur. The existence of 
available domestic technologies and an available housing stock do no more than permit 
the possibility of 'home improvements'. It does not of itself imply that these 
improvements, if carried out, will be accompanied by a change of occupation. This will
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only occur if the costs of improvement are so great that mortgage finance institutions 
decide that they can only be mediated through a new occupier with a substantially higher 
income than the former. The question as to what is 'substantial' and what not, is as I 
have already argued, impossible to say. There is no real boundary between displacement 
and gentrification. The one fades into the other.
Nonetheless, while these contingencies affect the specifics of the process, gentrification 
itself could not take place in the absence of domestic technologies. Therefore, even 
taking into account all these qualifications, to argue that the explanation of gentrification 
lies in the the ability to invest domestic technologies to an already existing structure only 
pushes the burden of explanation on to the qualities of these technologies themselves, 
just as the postindustrialist argument for concentrating on the production of gentrifiers 
pushes the burden of explanation on to the qualities of the gentrifiers, with, as I have 
argued, disastrous consequences for their claims to account for gentrification. However, 
as I shall show in the next chapter, such consequences can be avoided in accounting for 
the qualities of domestic technologies which make gentrification possible.
To account for the particular qualities of domestic technologies which permit them to act 
as the basis of gentrification, the contingencies in the development of domestic 
technologies must also be considered. This means investigating why their provision 
took the form they did, together with developments in domestic labour associated with 
their introduction. The available forms of domestic labour, performed by (mainly 
female) servants in the nineteenth century and housewives in the twentieth, greatly 
affected the forms of housing provision. An account which places the explanation of the 
causes of gentrification in the introduction of domestic technologies into existing houses 
must therefore include in its account the forms under which the original housing was 
provided. It is the possibility of investment of domestic technologies in a housing stock 
originally built to be operated by servants which permits the 'recolonization' of that stock 
by the middle classes, and which fuels the 'rent gap'.
It will be the purpose of Chapter 8 to bring out the importance of the role of domestic 
technologies in the evolution of domestic labour and the forms this took. This account 
will only indicate the development of the supply factors in gentrification however. It will 




8 Domestic technologies and the pre-conditions for 
gentrification
8.1 Aims and Issues
Having argued in Chapter 7 that the causes of gentrification are to be found in the 
application of domestic technologies to existing structures, I want to show in this chapter 
how the development of those technologies has taken place in the context of the themes 
developed in Chapters 5 and 6, and show how the relation between domestic labour and 
domestic technologies created the preconditions for gentrification to occur.
8.2 The unique nature of the impact of domestic technologies on the 
gentrification process
Chapter 7 showed how gentrification was a consequence of embodying technical 
progress in existing structures via investments in domestic technology, thereby creating a 
secondhand market in housing. Despite all the qualifications made in the course of this 
demonstration, the argument could still be considered technologically deterministic. The 
purpose of this chapter is to show that this is not so. If domestic technologies do play 
such a central role in the gentrification process, this is for sound sociological reasons. 
Before detailing the specific history of the impact of domestic technologies on 
gentrification, it is necessary to show what these sound sociological reasons are. If, 
therefore, the purpose of this chapter were simply to present a history of domestic 
technologies, this section would logically come after that history had been recounted. 
However, in the context of the thesis as a whole, it is necessary to change the natural 
order of exposition in order to demonstrate from the outset the relevance of that history to 
the processes of gentrification. The purpose of this section is to show how the historical 
context ever arose in which domestic technologies could have had such an impact. The 
circumstances surrounding the creation of this context are unlikely ever to be repeated. 
This fact in itself makes it likely that gentrification is a never-to-be repeated occurrence. 
Once the present phase of urban renewal is played out, of which gentrification is a part, 
the history of gentrification, in which domestic technologies play such an important role, 
will be over.
However, this means that much of what I have to say in this section on the history of 
domestic technologies will have to be taken on trust for the moment. For the same 
reasons and with the same caveat applying, I shall also leave till later substantive
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discussion of gender issues in the development of domestic technologies and 
gentrification. Once this context has been established, the history of the development of 
domestic technologies and their impact on gender relations and gentrification can be 
placed in i t
Before the advent in the late nineteenth century of domestic supplies of first, gas and 
later, electricity (8.6 below), developments in housing design were few and far between, 
and changes in the layout of domestic interiors even fewer. Chimneys began to be 
incorporated in housing design ftom the fourteenth century and glass windows from the 
sixteenth century. Developments such as these were often the rediscovery of design 
concepts familiar to the Romans (Du Vail 1988). The invention of the corridor in the late 
eighteenth century was one of the first genuinely new developments in interior design 
since Roman times (Thornton 1985). Even a great palace such as Versailles has no 
corridors, hence no private bedrooms, nor indeed private rooms of any kind (Mitford 
1966).
The history of developments at Versailles in fact provides a useful perspective from 
which to elucidate the social contexts into which domestic technologies were introduced, 
and on which they were to have such an impact. Historians of the development of 
domestic technologies have concentrated on the implications of these technologies for 
changing gender relations. In what follows, I wish to argue that their implications for 
changing class relations have been equally, if not more important
Louis XTV's Versailles was a vital part of the last seriously successful attempt to justify 
monarchy as priest-kingship. The claims of Divine Right however put claims of their 
own upon the person of the King: from the moment he woke (le petit levéej where his 
courtiers squabbled over the right to hand the King the royal chamber pot and then to 
bear the royal excrement from the King's presence) to the moment he retired for the 
night, the body of God's magistrate the King was on continuous display (Mitford 1966). 
Such an utterly public life was abandoned by his successor and great-grandson, Louis 
XV, who built a new palace. Le Grand Trianon, in the grounds of Versailles, an 
imposing mansion, but still a recognizably private house. Louis XVI and Marie 
Antoinette continued the trend to privacy and domesticity with the construction first of Le 
Petit Trianon, and then of Le Hameau - the hamlet, still within the grounds of Versailles. 
The changing domestic arrangements of the last rulers of the ancien regime in France 
foreshadow the trends toward the separation of social activity into public and private 
spheres which has continued for the next two centuries.
Along with all its other separating effects (Chapter 6 above), the transition to a capitalist
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mode of production brought with it a well-documented separation of public and private 
spheres of activity (cf. Daunton 1983, Mackenzie & Rose 1983, Saunders 1986, 1989, 
Boys 1989). Also, the interior designs of houses became more and more complex. As 
part of this separation, different rooms came to be assigned different functions and the 
differentiation became ever more complex, with for example the separation of dining 
room from kitchen, the sitting room from the drawing room, leading with unconscious 
irony to the creation of a living room, from which nearly all the activities necessary to 
the sustenance and reproduction of living were banished. The great mediæval hall shrank 
to become no more than a common entranceway to the various private rooms which now 
dominated domestic interior design.
Boys (1989) argues that these changes in housing design should not be seen simply as 
reflections of the separation of public and private but as interpretations by architects and 
builders of what were appropriate separations of public and private. However, precisely 
because their designs were interpretations of what were appropriate separations of public 
and private, they were also redefinitions of what ought to be regarded as public and 
private. In other words before they could be separated public and private had to be 
defined and in the transition to capitalism they were defined anew.
This argument, I believe, also explains the association between capitalism and the
gendering of public and private as masculine and feminine. This association has come
under critical scrutiny in recent years. Walby for example points out quite correctly that
the practice of confining women to the domestic sphere, which is supposed to be 
the symbol of gender relations after the rise of capitalism, is in fact found in its 
most developed forms in Islamic societies, both pre-capitalist and capitalist. 
Capitalism is not an exclusive hallmark of such patterns of gender relations; it 
cannot be treated as their cause.
(Walby 1990 pl83)
Walby’s argument is correct in its conclusions but faulty in its reasoning. Her point
applies only if the domestic sphere in Islamic society is private and feminized in the same
way as the domestic sphere is private and feminized in capitalist societies. Walby herself
argues that the transition to capitalism saw
the development of many new bases of power, most of which might be considered 
to be in the ’public’ sphere and from which women are debarred. The critical 
changes were not so much a new confinement of women to a private sphere as the 
growth of a public sphere to which men had nearly exclusive access.
(ibid. - emphasis added)
From the point of view of the argument presented here, it might have been better to say 
that the ’’critical changes were... the creation of a public sphere (and corrresponding 
creation of a private sphere) to which men had nearly exclusive access”. However,
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Walby does not address this question of how or in what sense the public sphere might be 
considered public. She goes on to argue that "the benefits capital gains from patriarchy 
are contingent, not necessary and that there are considerable costs involved", and it is on 
this conclusion that she bases her argument that capitalism cannot be considered the cause 
of the patterns of gender relations in capitalist society. Rather, I should say, in modem 
society. The crucial link between capitalism and gender is not in the SCA derived 
questions about whether patriarchy is functional for capitalism or not, but in the changing 
definitions of self which went with the creation of social relations based on abstract 
labour (Chapters 5 and 6 above - see also 8.4 below). It is not therefore whether there 
were public and private spheres before or in other contexts than capitalism, nor whether 
these public and private spheres were gendered or not; rather it is how the definitions on 
what was public or private, and masculine or feminine, came to be made, how the very 
concept of self was altered in the rise of capitalism.
The redefinition of public and private was not incidental to the transition to capitalism, 
but fundamentally implicated in it. The concept of self radically differentiated from the 
world which was developed in the context of the development of a capitalist society was 
a concept of self with, moreover, unprecedentedly developed conventions of privacy. 
Victorian developments in housing design (and domestic technologies also), it may be 
argued, were therefore not so much the consequence of a separation of life into public 
and private spheres, but rather of a redefinition of the public and private which went hand- 
in-hand with their separation in the course of the development of capitalist social 
relations.
The transition to capitalist relations of production in agriculture in the eighteenth and early 
ninenteenth centuries saw large numbers of people driven off the land in what has 
become famous as the Lewis model of the Virtuous circle' of capitalist development 
(llewis 1951, Green & Sutcliffe 1986 p286, 8.3 below). The high rates of accumulation 
which are possible in the virtuous circle are fuelled by this reserve army of surplus 
agricultural labour. The agricultural labour reserves eventually but inevitably dry up 
however, and this forces changes in the accumulation process. One consequence of the 
operation of the virtuous circle in England was the creation and constant replenishment of 
a large pool of labour, mainly young country girls (Weightman & Humphries 1983 p61), 
available for domestic service, in particular, in London. Never before or since has the 
keeping of servants been so feasible for so many. This model therefore provides a useful 
framework for understanding developments in housing design from Victorian times 
onward.
The daily routine of Louis XTV is testimony not only to changing definitions of public
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and private, however, but also to the fact that a life conducted in the continuous presence 
of servants can never succeed in being truly private; at least, not according to modem 
standards of privacy. The separation of public and private and the changes in nineteenth 
century housing design which accompanied this and which had been foreshadowed by 
the developments at Versailles in other words can all be interpreted as having been 
introduced so as to minimize contact between masters and servants.
Even the introduction of bathrooms and toilets may be interpreted in this manner. A 
flushing toilet was developed in in England as early as 1449 (Du Vail 1988 p228). 
Presumably therefore Versailles could have contained such conveniences; in fact it was 
notorious for its lack of them. Screens were simply brought out for the incontinent to 
squat behind (Mitford 1966). However it was not until Victorian times that toilets began 
to be included in domestic designs as a matter of course (Du Vail 1988 p231). The 
demand for these conveniences, it would seem, was as much a result of changing 
standards of appropriate private and public behaviour (even to the point of redefining 
who were to be regarded as the public), as of changing standards of hygiene and of 
'progress' in domestic living arrangements.
Bathrooms and toilets not only represent changes in internal housing design, but the 
bathroom fixtures and plumbing they incorporate are also a form of domestic technology. 
The development of domestic technologies and their introduction into the context of the 
Victorian domestic scene can then be interpreted as another means of responding to this 
desire to minimize contact between masters and servants.
The introduction of domestic technologies therefore betrayed a fundamental change in 
the nature of the class relations between masters and servants. The benefits from the 
installation in former times and in other contexts of chimneys and window glass in a 
building could be felt by all classes of people. Even in Versailles, the Sun King could 
not prevent the sunlight coming in through the extravagantly huge windows from falling 
on the lowliest of servants at the same time as it fell on His Most Christian Majesty. 
With the transition to capitalism however, large numbers of servants no longer 
represented an unencumbered enhancement of personality and status. Not bound to 
servitude through the compulsion of non-economic ties of kinship or tradition, but 
employed now as wage labourers, they represented an invasion of privacy instead. 
Domestic technologies were introduced for the express purpose of replacing privacy- 
invading domestic labour by domestic appliances. They did not benefit all classes 
incorporated under the household, but only one.
So far I have argued that gentrification is not about class but status, since the terms
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working class and middle class are misnomers, referring to status groups within the 
proletariat and not to economic classes in either the Marxist or the Weberian sense of the 
term. In either of these senses, class is not to be thought of as a thing or an attribute, but 
as a relation. In particular it is a relation governing the disposal of labour. 
Consequently, therefore, it is possible for any given individual to occupy a multiplicity of 
class relations. Class in capitalist society is about forms of income, not amounts of 
income: wealth (especially forms of wealth) concerns status. As an employee in a 
capitalist society, I am a proletarian; as an employer of waged labour however, I am a 
capitalist. If I pay my domestic labour out of my wages, I then occupy both class 
situations at the same time. The middle class in Victorian London, therefore, way actually 
a(n) (economic) class insofar as the class as a whole was involved in a class relation with 
its servants. As Stedman Jones and others have shown, the orientation of the economy, 
including the manufacturing sector, of Victorian London was primarily towards the 
provision of bespoke services to the aristocracy and haute bourgeoisie (Stedman Jones 
Chapter 1 1971). In other words, the definition of those who composed the servant class 
in Victorian London can be extended to comprise practically the entire working class of 
the city. One definition of the lower boundary of the Victorian middle class was the 
ability to employ at least one servant Rowntree used this definition in his survey of York 
in 1902 (Hardyment 1988 p34). The pretensions of the Footers of Holloway, were as 
amusing in respect of their difficulties with their serving girl Carrie, as all their other 
attempts at acquiring middle class status (Grossmith & Grossmith 1892).
Looked at in this light, the mistaking of the middle and working classes as (economic) 
classes rather than as status groups may be a carry-over from the days when they really 
did have a class relation with one another and the middle classes really did occupy 
contradictory class locations. Not only can domestic technology therefore be said to be 
class specific in its development and effects, it can also be said to have been class specific 
in its consequences. Simply put, the widespread application of domestic technology can 
be said to have ended the class relation between the middle and the working classes.
It was because their impact was now class specific that made the impact of domestic 
technologies historically unique, not because public and private were now defined and 
separated in different ways (although this affected the course of those developments - see 
below). Furthermore, not only was their specificity of impact on the organization of 
domestic work unprecedented in itself, but so also was the capitalist (and not feudal) 
nature of this class relation (D.Sayer Chapter 2 1991).
The class specificity of the impact of domestic technologies is another instance of the 
modernity of the class relation in capitalism. There is no incentive to rationalize the
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organization of servant labour in non-capitalist societies simply for its own sake; there is 
no Zweckrationalitat in these societies (D.Sayer 1991, Chapter 3 above), hence little or 
no incentive to replace servant labour by machinery.
Furthermore, historians of the development and application of domestic technologies all 
agree that the very fact that domestic technologies were introduced as replacements for 
domestic labour had in itself the greatest consequences for attempts to re-organize 
domestic work (Cowan 1983, Miller 1983, 1991, Hardyment 1988, Nye 1991). 
Precisely because domestic appliances were introduced as replacements for servant 
labour, it undermined attempts at demonstrating how domestic work might be 
reorganized in the light of the opportunities offered by electrification.
Late-Victorian and Edwardian feminists and socialists had sought to promote the 
application of domestic technologies as a means whereby domestic services could be 
provided collectively, or by outside contractors, instead of being the responsibility solely 
of underpaid or unpaid domestic female labour. Instead, the promotion, by the electricity 
supply companies in particular, of electricity as the "drudge and willing slave" (Nye 1991 
p247) of the electrified upper classes meant that the patriarchal relations of the Victorian 
family were continued.
If the patriarchal family relations of the Victorian domestic economy were not 
significantly altered by the onset of domestic technologies, however, housing design 
certainly was. As servants disappeared from the home, so houses became more open- 
plan (Nye 1991 p256). These changes in interior design cannot be interpreted simply as 
reflecting a change away from the tightly buttoned-up attitudes toward privacy 
characteristic of the Victorians: rather they are evidence of the freedom not to be tightly 
buttoned-up, precisely because, in the words of the British Electrical Development 
Association, the use of domestic technologies meant that no longer "shall the sotto voce 
'not before the servants' again be heard in the land" (advertisement. Ideal Home October 
1950).
Domestic technologies also fortified that trend toward residential segregation by status 
which I argued in Chapter 6 is a fundamental precondition for gentrification to occur at 
all. Olsen shows how in Victorian London, even the most prestigious of areas contained 
slum dwellings from which the serving classes came (Olsen 1971). In reducing the 
demand for servant labour altogether, therefore, application of domestic technologies in 
the houses of the well-to-do had the further class specific impact of reducing the pressure 
of numbers among those who had to live within calling distance of the houses they 
worked in (cf. Nye 1991 p257).
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The impact of domestic technologies on housing design (and on permitting residential 
segregation by status) also underpins Hoyt's famous radial sector theory of urban growth 
and differentiation (Hoyt 1939). In this theory, the well-to-do are continually attracted to 
housing incorporating the latest advances in design. For maximum profit, this housing 
will be located along the line of some environmentally attractive feature, or simply 
upwind of the city, hence the sectoral nature of the differentiation. The houses which the 
well-to-do leave behind filter down through the rest of the population. Hoyt's theory 
today sounds quaint at best, an example of U.S. gee-whizzery and fascination with 
gadgets, and reactionary at worst, used in support of arguments which suggest that the 
solution to the housing problems of the poor is to build more houses for the rich. Placed 
in its historical context, however it is a valuable testament not only to the new 
possibilities for housing design generated by the impact of domestic technologies, but 
also, and crucially from the point of view of understanding gentrification, it is a testament 
to the cost of these technologies. Originally introduced as replacements for servant 
labour, they could only be afforded by those with the largest of domestic staffs. To 
obtain the benefits of even some of these domestic technologies meant moving into the 
suburbs, the locations of new appliance- and user- friendly homes.
The trend to residential segregation by status was also underpinned by developments in 
transportation technologies. The development of mass transit, in particular permitted a 
greater physical distanciation between master and servants, that is, between the slums 
and the suburbs. However they also promoted the desire for distanctiation. Hoyt, 
discussing the factors underlying sectoral growth in Chicago, brings out this point 
clearly:
The first type of high rent development was the axial type with high grade homes 
in a long avenue or avenues leading directly to the business center. The avenue 
was a social bourse, communication being maintained by a stream of fashionable 
carriages, the occupants of which nodded to their acquaintances in other passing 
carriages and to other friends on the porches of the fine residences along the way 
such avenues were lined with beautiful shade trees and led to a park or parks 
through a series of connecting boulevards...
The axial type of high rent area rapidly became obsolete with the growth of the 
automobile. When the avenues became automobile speedways, dangerous to 
children, noisy, and filled with gasoline fumes, they ceased to be attractive as 
home sites for the well-to-do. No longer restricted to the upper classes, who alone 
could maintain prancing steeds and ghttering broughams, but filled with hoi polloi 
jostling the limousines with flivvers, the old avenues lost social caste. The rich 
then desired seclusion - away from the "madding crowd" whizzing by and honking 
their horns. Mansions were then built in wooded areas, screened by trees. The 
very height of privacy is now attained by some millionaires whose homes are so 
protected from the public view by trees that they can be seen from outside only 
from an airplane.
(Hoyt 1939 ppl 19-120)
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The behaviour Hoyt describes, the people parading up and down boulevards, 
participating in this "theatre of accumulation" (to adapt the title of McGee and Armstrong 
1989), prior to the advent of large numbers of automobiles in Chicago's streets, were 
exhibiting behaviour not at all dissimilar to that described by the chroniclers of the 
lifestyles of the gentrifiers (Jager 1986, N.Smith 1982). They were occupied in creating 
a place for themselves in a highly mobile and therefore insecure world.
Interpreted in terms of the themes broached in Chapter 6 therefore, the increased mobility 
of the population at large can be said to have led to the transformation of the boulevards 
of Chicago from a place of upper caste culture into a space of cosmopolitan civilization, 
and that this accounted for the creation of isolated as well as segregated upper class 
suburbs. However, what this passage from Hoyt also shows is how these developments 
did not just happen, in some mysterious way. They were linked to the advent of the 
leading edge of capitalist accumulation in the U.S. in the first half of the twentieth 
century, the development of the automobile. Gottdiener (1977) provides extensive 
documentation of the interaction of developments in transport and suburban 
developments in the U.S. Their interaction in the development of London is discussed in 
Jackson (1962), and Weightman & Humprhies (1984).
The links between these developments of technology on the one hand and segregated 
suburbs on the other provide another instance of the way in which technologies were 
affected by and in turn affected the social context in which they were developed and 
applied. As Chapter 6 argued, the desire for a sense of place is a key component in 
understanding gentrification, but technological developments were themselves key both 
in promoting that desire and in providing the means for its achievement. One of the first 
steps toward promoting the gentrification of the Bamsbury area of Islington was the 
establishment of a traffic management scheme in its streets; an attempt to reduce the 
mobility of the population in those streets, and thereby to recreate a sense of place (Ferris 
1972 Pitt 1977).
A focus on technological developments in an account of the origins of gentrification 
therefore does not inevitably mean surrender to technological determinism. The historical 
context in which domestic technologies were introduced meant that they inevitably had all 
kinds of class connotations and, also, connotations for personal identity.
As argued in Chapter 6 and above, that personal identity, as a private (not a social) 
individual and inhabitant of (not a participant in) society, is itself as much a consequence 
of capitalism as the class relations it embodies, and domestic technologies in particular
213
have been both cause and consequence of those redefined and hypostasized notions of 
privacy. That identity is also of course gendered and, I shall argue below, if one is 
looking for the impact of class or gender issues on gentrification, they are to be found in 
the development and application of these technologies in the gentrification process, and 
not in postindustrialist tall tales of aliens, disease and sin.
8.3 The importance of domestic technologies in understanding middle 
class abandonment of middle class housing
Gentrification, I shall show below, could only occur once the technologies which were 
developed elsewhere and in other contexts, in particular, in residentially segregated 
suburbs, had developed to the point where they could be applied profitably to existing 
housing. However, the profitability criterion is only one of the necessary conditions. It 
accounts for home improvements in general, not gentrification in particular, although it is 
a necessary pre-condition for gentrification to occur. Similarly, for displacement to 
occur, the income required to finance the improvements must be greater than that 
generated by the present occupiers but this criterion applies to all forms of displacement, 
not just gentrification. As argued in Chapter 7, for gentrification, not just displacement, 
to occur, H(q) + I (q - 4) must be larger than paY j. To explain gentrification, it is 
necessary also to account, not merely for the size of p - the gentrification factor, which 
in any case is an arbitrary constant - but for its very existence. In other words, to 
explain gentrification, it is necessary first to explain why housing did not just filter down 
through the various strata of the middle classes, but instead was abandoned by the middle 
classes altogether.
Without abandonment, there could be no substantial gap in income between that of the 
present occupier and that necessary for financing renovations, in other words, no p. If 
the housing simply filtered down through income cohorts, then housing renovation could 
always be financed by the the next highest income cohort, if it could not be financed by 
the present occupiers. This, as I have argued, could not be considered gentrification.
It might be thought that this is not so, that there is in fact no necessity to account for 
abandonment: as the ordinary processes of filtering down (through the strata of income 
cohorts) proceeds, a very substantial gap would in any event open up between the 
incomes of the present occupiers of a property and of those who are able to finance the 
repairs. However, such an argument overlooks the first boundary in the scenarios 
sketched out in Figure 6.3, namely the boundary between improvement and final
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abandonment of the property. When the ordinary processes of filtering down have 
occurred, there should be a fairly good correlation between age of stock (more precisely 
q - 4) incomes of present occupiers. By definition, therefore, if a house does 
require displacement-led improvement, that will be all that it will need: the incomes of the 
next highest income cohort will be sufficient to finance the renovations. If the cost of 
improvements would require the displacer to be from any higher income cohort than the 
next highest, then making the improvements would not be profitable, and the mortgage 
finance institutions would not fund i t
The ordinary processes of filtering down may well produce a large gap (in constant 
terms) between the incomes of the present occupiers and those for whom the housing 
was originally constructed. However that gap would be too large ever to be profitably 
filled and renovations would not proceed. Therefore if we are to explain gentrification, 
we do have to explain abandonment. Put another way, it must be explained why, despite 
all its other similarities to the workings of the Hoyt model of residential growth and 
differentiation, the ordinary processes of filtering down described in that model did not 
occur in the context of Victorian London.
In a memorable phrase, Raban gives the reasons for middle class abandonment of
housing in Victorian Islington and Camden as a "combination of class fear and railway
engineering" (1974 quoted in Hamnett & P.Williams 197 p3). Jenkins (1973) gives
similar reasons. The railway developments at Euston, Kings Cross and St. Paneras
during the 1850s and 1860s were routed through working class areas. The displacement
of population which followed put pressure on middle class areas such as Islington
(Weightman & Humprhies 1983). Islington was vulnerable to such pressures, and from
the 1860s till the 1880s, 'invasions' by these displaced working classes meant that
solidly middle class residential neighbourhoods went solidly and rapidly working class.
In the same way as white Americans have fled to the suburbs when the blacks 
moved in down the road, the rich occupants of the Angel, Canonbury, and 
Bamsbury left their houses, which rapidly went into multi-occupation.
Where did they move to? They couldn't move into what is now the northern half 
of the London Borough of Islington, as this was being laid out as a dormitory 
suburb for the likes of Mr Pooter and the less affluent white collar workers form 
the City. As working class families moved into south Islington, the rich 
leapfrogged the genteel respectable areas such as Holloway and Tollington [North 
Islington] and moved further out, probably to areas like Highgate or further along 
the railway.
(Pitt 1977 p5)
Pitt's account may seem to give a perfectly straightforward answer as to why Islington 
was abandoned to the working class, but in fact it begs important questions. Class fear 
and railway engineering were indeed important factors in the development of Victorian
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London, as Stedman Jones (1971), Olsen (1976), Connell (1987/88), Fussell (1988) and 
others have shown, and in this regard, it is as well to stress the novelty for Victorian 
Londoners of the concept of suburbia. For Victorian London, suburbs were a means for 
the uppper-middle class of escaping the evils of the city while continuing to maintain and 
benefit from control of the city (Rodger 1989, p2-3, p41- 43). Consequently, anything 
which threatened to visit the evils of the city on the suburb was to be feared; avoided if 
possible, and fled if not
Nevertheless these factors do not of themselves explain abandonment Even if the upper- 
middle classes sought housing elsewhere, why would they not be replaced in their old 
homes by the lower-middle classes? The lower-middle classes could have taken the same 
advantage as the working classes of the opportunities presented by the departure of the 
upper-middle classes from Islington and moved out of Tollington and into Canonbury, 
leaving their houses to filter down to the working classes. Why did they not do so? One 
reason which must be considerered is the Alonso type explanation (Alonso 1964).
Stedman Jones argues that London's manufacturing employment base depended on its 
ability to provide 'bespoke' services. All of these industries depended on close contact 
with a usually aristocratic clientele. This helped account for the high rents these sectors 
were prepared to pay, and consequently the tendency toward using 'sweated labour' 
rather than machinery. These firms, therefore, could not rely on increases in labour 
productivity, through the evolution of technology, and were constantly under threat from 
provincial firms who could (Stedman Jones Chapter 1 1971). Nearly all of them were 
seasonal, and their labour force therefore casualized. This meant that the working classes 
had to live close to their places of employment also. Hobsbawm notes the "extraordinary 
short-term immobility of the nineteenth century worker" (1963 p7-8). Stedman Jones 
reports average numbers of up to 13 per household in the working class areas of 
"Outcast London" (Stedman Jones 1971 -1984 pl76). Waller reports that over 35% of 
the central areas of London were overcrowded (more than 2 to a room) in 1891. In 
Alonso-style terms, therefore, the answer to the question of why the upper-middle class 
were replaced by the casual working class would be that the poor, needing to be in close 
proximity to their places of employment, were prepared to outbid the (comparatively) 
rich, sacrificing space for location. Hence they moved from Somers Town (King's 
Cross) to subdivided Pentonville, rather than to Tollington and single family dwellings.
The imperatives outlined in the Alonso model must have had some influence on the 
pressure placed on Islington's housing stock. To be decisive however, it would be 
necessary to show that the middle classes were outbid rather than intimidated, pushed out 
rather than fled; in other words that subdivision in, say, Pentonville was an active
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response by Pentonville landlords to working class displacement from Somers Town, 
with working class occupancy seen as a first option once the upper-middle class moved 
out. Renting to a lower-middle class family would then be only a second choice, taken 
up only if the working classes could not be persuaded to move in.
However, as historians of London's growth and development agree, the middle classes 
jumped well before they were pushed. Rates of residential mobility in Victorian London 
were extremely high (Olsen 1976 p232 - 244, FML Thompson 1988 pl70-173). Waller 
(1983) quotes Booth's remark that people moved like fish in a river. In addition to the 
push factors of class fear and railway engineering, the very high percentage of private 
rented accommodation (approximately 95% as late as 1911, according to Offer 1981) 
must also be taken into account, together with competitive development of aristocractic 
estates, often in combination with, or in response to the competitive development of 
suburban rail, tram and underground networks, and providing the latest amenities and 
styles to atttract middle class tastes (Olsen 1976 p75 - not surprisingly, housing in 
Victorian times was a depreciating asset - Thompson 1988 pl73). The Alonso model in 
other words, can explain the pressure, but not the result. Instead, I argue, the answer to 
abandonment lies, once again, in the Servant Question.
There is an old joke about the young Etonian asked to write a story about some poor 
people. The story began: "Once upon a time, there was a very poor family. The mother 
was poor. The father was poor. The children were poor. The horses were poor. Even the 
servants were p o o r . T h e  punchline of course is that poor people do not have servants 
at all, rich or poor. The point, for understanding why the filtration process in Victorian 
times would tend to lead to middle class abandonment of middle class areas rather than to 
the replacement of upper-middle class families by a lower-middle class families, is that 
lower middle-class families would not have poorer servants than upper-middle class 
families, they would have fewer of them. A house designed to be run by a complement 
of four servants could possibly be run by three for a while; it could not be run by two.
To argue that lower-middle class families were forced to have fewer rather than poorer 
servants is implicitly to argue that there were no variations in the wage rates for domestic 
service offered by upper and lower middle class households. In other words it is to argue 
that there were competitive labour markets for domestic servants in Victorian times. The 
feudal traditions of service for which Wooster so often praises Jeeves might at first make 
the notion of competitive labour markets in domestic service seem unlikely. However, as 
both Stedman Jones (1971) and Weightman & Humphries (1984) make clear, in 
London, even the servants of the aristocracy were hired only for the duration of the 
Season, the London social round of the upper 500, running from around the start of
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January to the end of July - Weightman & Humphries 1983 p51). Their practice of 
hiring and firing at will was, according to Stedman Jones, the fundamental reason for the 
casualization of the labour market for working class Londoners (Chapter 2 1971, 
Weightman & Humphries 1983 p65). The continual supply of domestics from the 
countryside also helped keep wages competitive. Country girls, especially from the West 
country, were much preferred to city girls, "as they were considered to be much more 
honest and diligent" (Weightman & Humphries 1983 p61).
The rationale for middle class abandonment of middle class housing in Victorian London 
(and the rationale for \i today) can therefore be traced to two specific economic conditions 
peculiar to the period: rixed co-efficients in the production of domestic services CL’ 
shaped isoquants) and competitive markets in labour for domestic service. Once capital 
could be substituted for labour in domestic work, neither of these conditions applied any 
longer. The 'ordinary processes of filtering down' depicted in the Hoyt model depend on 
the existence of domestic technologies.
In fact there is evidence that abandonment is in any case more likely than filtering. The 
spatial sociologists' accounts of tipping points in Chicago suburbs (the point at which 
black in-migration causes white flight) would indicate that filtering never really occured 
in Chicago at all (Peach 1975). Whether filtering down ever occurs in the way it is 
supposed to, however, is not really at stake here (see Murie, Niner and Watson 1976 for 
such a discussion). All I am interested in showing is what the specific factors were in 
Victorian London which prevented the processes of filtering down from working in that 
city, when so many other respects, its development matches the outlines of the Hoyt 
model (see below). Those specific factors were directly connected with the absence of 
domestic technologies.
The graphs presented in Chapter 7 will therefore be slightly misleading if the context 
underlying their construction is not fully appreciated. The curve q , which graphs the 
flow of housing services available from an unimproved house, should not be interpreted 
as indicating that housing services gradually decline with age, and did so between, say, 
1791 and 1951. The curve q , the the flow of housing services from a particular vintage 
does not chart a decline to the left as it were, but an increase to the right The actual flow 
of services from any individual servant run house prior to the advent of domestic 
technologies would look like that shown in Figure 8.1. The original flow of services 
may decline slightly with age, but the real drop occurs when the servants move out
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Figure 8.1 Flow of housing services in Victorian times from a house of vintage T
q(0,x)
q (t, X)
with servants without servants time
Curve q in figure 7.3, it must be appreciated, is the aggregate of services from all 
vintages, jq(0, x) dx, and not jq(x, t) dt. In other words the aggregation is over 
vintages, dx, and not over time, dt. The difference between Jq(0, x) dx, and Jq(x, t) dt 
is that the latter is only applicable in the case of disembodied technical progress, that is, 
in the presence of domestic technologies. Hoyt's filtering down theory and Smith's rent 
gap theory both implicitly assume that Jq(x, t) dt applies. In such circumstances middle 
class abandonment would not need to occur and to explain gentrification in economic 
terms we would have to rely on the criterion of sufficient wideness.
The housing which the middle classes abandoned to the filtering process was housing 
which was designed to be run by specific complements of servants and it was equally 
impracticable to try to run such housing without its full complement of servants or to 
install domestic technologies into it. In the absence of domestic staff or affordable 
domestic technology, housing services could only be derived from such properties either 
by running them communally, or by subdividing them. In the context of the new 
standards of privacy in Victorian life, the first option would not be a likely choice. It is 
this disparity, between the number of servants a lower-middle class family could afford 
and the number of servants a Victorian upper-middle class house would require if it were 
to be mn as any kind of middle class house at all, which accounts for the existence of the 
gentrification factor, p.
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However, this argument only accounts for the abandonment of individual houses. It does 
not account for the abandonment of whole areas. I have already argued that gentrification 
could not occur without residential segregation. Having, as promised, explained the 
social basis for the existence of |i, the next item which has to be dealt with is the 
existence of residential social segregation. In other words, having in these last two 
sections offered accounts of how class and economic relations would structure the 
demand for middle class housing in Victorian times, I turn now to an account of its 
supply.
8.4 The virtuous circle of capitalist development and its impact on middle 
class housing in Victorian London
The virtuous circle of capitalist development had very definite implications for the forms 
of housing provided in Victorian times. By driving people off the land and into the cities 
it created a continously replenished pool of labour potentially available for domestic 
service. This made servants extremely cheap to hire during the transition to capitalist 
relations of production, and housing design altered to take their availability into account. 
In particular, they encouraged the design of houses which depended on a considerable 
degree of mainly female servant labour. A four to five storey house would typically have 
required a complement of three to five servants in order to run it, including a cook, a 
scullery maid, and a chambermaid (Weightman & Humphries 1983 p60). This labour 
was mainly female because there was a tax on the employment of male servants, dating 
from 1777, originally imposed in an effort to maintain conscription for the American War 
of Independence. It lasted until 1937 (Hardyment 1988 p33). The very fact that such a 
tax had to be imposed to discourage the employment of male domestic servants indicates 
the strength of preference for domestic service among males, both employers and 
employees. It demonstrates the danger of reading present-day concepts of what 
constitutes men's work or women's work into a past which might itself have redefined 
those concepts (cf. discussion in 8.2 above). Definitions of masculine and feminine are 
after all no more than definitions of appropriate behaviour for men and women, 
definitions of who ought to be doing what. And as Hardyment demonstrates, the tax 
itself helped define gender divisions of labour in domestic work. "In Ireland, where no 
such tax existed, menservants continued to be employed and male and female domestic 
occupations were quite interchangeable." (ibid.). In England, one result of the tax was 
that "Male servants, especially footmen, were a particular status symbol in the West End, 
but were rarely found in other parts of London... " (Weightman & Humphries 1983 p60). 
They were a status symbol precisely because the tax made them so expensive:
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"...Usually it was only the grandest 'carriage fo lk ', living in the West End who could 
afford them" (ibid).
The high rates of in-migration (accounting for approximately 40% of London's growth in 
the nineteenth century - Stedman Jones 1971 pl45. Waller 1983 p28, Rodger 1989) 
which fuelled the virtuous circle can also be said to be responsible for the mobility of life 
in Victorian London and the undermining of identity and status which accompanied this. 
The virtuous circle, it might be said, encouraged social segregation by status (and the 
changing definitions of public and private which went with this) at every conceivable 
scale, from the interior design of houses to the residential development process as a 
whole. Dyos and Reeder articulate all these themes in their description of the relation 
between slum and suburb in Victorian London
The fact of the suburb influenced the environment of the slum; the threat of the
slum entered the consciousness of the suburb.
(Dyos & Reeder 1973 p360)
The rents extracted in the slums went to the upkeep of landlords' own dwellings in the 
suburbs, so the link between slum and suburb was not simply social or psychological, 
but economic in nature (1973 p381). Flows of money, in other words, and as argued in 
Chapter 5, underpinned the social structures of capitalism in Victorian London.
The development of Victorian London in fact displays great similarity to Hoyt's (1939) 
account of the stucture and growth of residential neighbourhoods in U.S. cities. The 
similarity is more than coincidental. Suburban developments in Victorian London took 
the form of opening up fresh aristocratic landholdings for housing, in much the same 
way as a new subdivision is opened up for suburban development in 20* century US 
cities. Residential developments also took place under the same conditions, namely 
speculative ventures under conditions of competitive capitalism (Olsen 19776, Rodger 
1989).
The major difficulty in applying Hoyt's model to the circumstances of Victorian London 
is that processes of filtering down do not appear to have occurred there, confirming the 
arguments presented in 8.3 above. Rodger (1989 p28) does argue that residential 
segregation in Victorian London was the result of a "filtration process". However, he 
continues, it was one "based on affordable rents". In other words the process he 
describes could equally be seen as one of segregation by rent, based on capacity to afford 
given numbers of servants. In Victorian London, developments on estates were targetted 
at specific income groups within the middle and upper classes (FML Thompson 1988 
pl73).
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Segregation in Victorian London was a result of the residential development process, not 
the filtration process. Olsen (1976 - 1979 p233) argues that in eighteenth century 
developments, such as Mayfair, segregation was street by street; in the nineteenth 
century developments segregation was estate by estate. One reason for the difference 
was that in nineteenth century London, as incomes increased in the virtuous circle, 
housing design could cater for more servants per household. There was therefore less 
demand for slums in the immediate neighbourhoods of Victorian developments compared 
to Georgian ones, since more servants could live in.
The virtuous circle finally comes to an end as the in-migrating surplus agricultural labour 
supplies eventually and inevitably dwindle, and with them the size of the pool of labour 
available for domestic service. For the newly gentrified bourgeoisie (Chapter 2 above), 
the struggle to maintain centrality in the processes of capitalist accumulation was not 
without its contradictions. In particular, the moves towards securing employment in 
producer services and property, rather than in industrial manufacturing helped a 
continuous process of undermining and transforming the very accumulation process to 
which they were attempting to render themselves indispensable. Having inaugurated the 
virtuous circle, in the first industrial revolution, the now-gentrified bourgeoisie helped 
bring it to an end with the close of the third, and with the onset of the First World War 
(Stedman Jones 1971 - 1986 p336).
Furthermore, with economic development and technical progress, alttnemative 
opportunities to domestic service became available in other areas of the economy. As the 
cost of hiring servants grew toward the end of the century (Thompson 1988 p61 
estimates that by the end of the century they were the highest paid of female workers), 
houses that required less domestic help to run became more attractive to the middle 
classes. This is what happened in the case of Victorian London from the 1880s on (FML 
Thompson 1988).
However, the number of employees in domestic service nationally did not fall 
appreciably until after 1931 (Table 8.2 below). Therefore it is not possible to see the 
cause of gentrification in a simple link between a progressive rise in the costs of servant 
labour and the abandonment of Victorian housing by the middle classes. As I have 
already suggested, the links between labour costs and abandonment lie in fixed 
production co-efficients and competitive markets in labour for domestic service. The 
reasons for the constant numbers in domestic service lie in an expanding middle class, 
and more productive domestic servants, equipped with domestic technologies. The first 
factor meant an increased potential demand for domestic service. The second meant that 
the total costs of domestic service to the middle classes could remain constant despite the
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increasing cost of servant labour. The combination of the two factors would mean that 
demand for domestic servants remained more or less constant, though housing design 
would alter to take advantage of the fewer servants required.
These factors were starting to take effect from the 1880s onwards, though they were not 
dominant until after the First World War (Stedman Jones 1976 - 1985 p336). The 
aftermath of the First World War confirmed the economic trends which had been 
incipient in the economy of Edwardian England, namely a shift in the geographical bases 
of capital accumulation in the UK away from the provinces toward the South East It also 
saw an end to the class fear which had dominated Victorian London, and which had 
determined the course of its suburban development (Stedman Jones 1971- 1986 p336). 
The worst slums went in the 1880s and 1890s also, but the sweated trades, small 
engineering firms and subdivided properties remained (Martin 1965) to await the return 
of the middle classes in the 1950s, 60s and 70s.
The social changes which took place in Victorian London bear out the arguments made 
for the historical preconditions which must be met before gentrification can occur, 
namely status segregation by area and abandonment of property rather than its filtering 
down. Loft conversions in New York (Zukin 1982) or London's docklands (Smith, A., 
1989) also meet these conditions in a sense. In these cases the abandonment is by light 
industry or the sweated trades, not by middle-class residents. Nonetheless gentrification 
is preceded by abandonment in these cases also. What the experience of Victorian 
London does show, is that if a rent gap is necessary for gentrification to occur, it can be 
in existence for up to 100 years before gentrification in fact occurs. In what follows, I 
shall show that if gentrification is indicative of changes in class structure, these occurred 
two generations ago, with the disappearance of the old middle class, not with the 
postindustrial arrival of the new, or, to say the same thing in another way, with the 
development of domestic technologies and their application to middle-class homes in 
suburban developments.
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8.5 The development of domestic technologies - the U.S. experience
The fact that domestic technologies were introduced as replacements for high priced 
domestic labour cannot be overstressed when considering gentrification. The 
development of domestic technologies was not the result of some innocent technological 
imperative. Since they were introduced from the U.S., it is necessary to consider briefly 
the conditions under which they were developed there.
Miller (1983 p73) argues that the lives of women underwent a major change in the U.S., 
what Walby (1990 p l9 1 ) calls "first wave feminism", with the onset of 
"suburbanization, social mobility [opportunities for female employment beyond domestic 
service] and an industrial economy increasingly based on domestic consumption, 
especially innovations in domestic technology". Similar causes can be adduced for the 
corresponding changes in the lives of women living in England between the wars 
(Glucksmann 1986, Weightman and Humphries 1984). However, the changes Miller 
relates date from a generation earlier, 1850 to 1920. When these changes in economic 
and urban development reached Britain, in Weightman & Humphries (1984) term the 
American invasion of London following the First World War, many of the options 
potentially available to first wave feminism for the reorganization of domestic work, 
which electricification in particular had offered, had already been closed off, as I shall 
now show.
Nye (1990) shows that the use of electricity in the U.S. for domestic purposes only 
began after its use as an industrial power source had reached a certain critical mass. Only 
once factory electrification had been achieved, did the electricity supply companies look 
to household consumption as a means of using the capacity they now had spare in the 
evenings.
The potential of electricity for domestic tasks was immediately apparent in its impact on 
house cleaning. As a clean source of light, it changed utterly the perception of domestic 
interiors. No longer was the ritual of spring cleaning necessary. Spring cleaning was 
undertaken largely to rid a house of the sooty deposits left by oil and gas lighting, which 
were much less used in the summer months. Cowan (1983) in particular shows how 
housework before the application of domestic technologies was extremely arduous, 
unpleasant, mind-numbing and downright dirty, so even in this particularly gendered 
form, the application of domestic technologies did represent a real advance.
Despite these technological advances in domestic economy, class issues were never far 
away:
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the relation of servant-keeping to domestic appliance adoption is more than a 
simple matter of cause and effect... despite the fact that [servants] were a dying 
breed, they had a powerful influence on the shaping of the mechanization of the 
home. They encouraged people to think of machines as replacing servants, rather 
than enabling a quite new form of domestic management to evolve
(Hardyment 1988 p33)
The habit of viewing domestic technologies as mechanical servants could still be seen in
the UK as late as the 1950's, as the following advertisement for the Triplex 'V  cooker-
boiler, (cost « £100) demonstrates:
Yes, the days when housewives could employ as many servants as they pleased 
are a memory. To-day with skeleton staffs - or none at all - every woman in the 
home demands 100% efficiency; the last word in labour saving design and 
efficiencv show that women who studv the problem at all insist on the Triplex "V'
{Ideal Home magazine, Jan 1951 p7)
Although this advertisement says that servants are but a memory, clearly, it cannot have 
been that long a memory, otherwise, servants would not have been referred to. Second, 
it is worth noting a subsidiary theme in the history of the application of domestic 
technologies to the home, namely the way in which their application was to be achieved 
scientifically. Domestic technologies, whether applied collectively or individualistically, 
were modernistic. Women were to be specialists in domestic science or home 
economics, that is, time and motion specialists. Taylorism came with domestic 
technologies (Hardyment 1988, Nye 1991). Time and again. Ideal Home during the 
1950's carried advertisements proclaiming how much extra time Mrs X had now that she 
had acquired the advertisers' products. Miller (1991) shows how these themes dominated 
U.S advertising of domestic technologies in the period 1910-1930, again, a generation 
earlier than such advertisements appeared in the U.K.
8.6 The introduction of domestic technologies in the U.K. and the 
suburban expansion of London between the wars
N.Smith (1982) locates the origin of the rent gap in suburban development. I agree that 
gentrification cannot be explained without taking suburban development into account, but 
for different reasons. If gentrification cannot be explained without reference to domestic 
technologies, then their introduction to the UK cannot be discussed outside of the 
suburban expansion of London between the wars. First, this expansion (and the 
changing gender roles which accompanied it) was the context within which these 
technologies were introduced, and that makes it significant in itself. Second however, if 
their introduction had not occurred in this way, then again, there would have been no 
gentrification, since there would have been no inner city, created in the backwash of that 
expansion, and thereby rendered ripe for gentrification. Smith would argue that this
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condition is what his rent gap theory is designed to highlight. I would argue that the real 
reason that the inner city was rendered ripe for gentrification is that suburban expansion 
maintained the residential segregation by status which (I have also argued) is a necessary 
precondition of gentrification. As I shall show, the development of domestic 
technologies was fundamental to this precondition.
Mechanical aids to servant labour had been introduced in Victorian London, mainly in the 
form of hand cranked kitchen machinery (Du Vail 1988). The application of power to 
these devices had to await the arrival of electric power in the home.The expansion in 
electrical capacity began with the First World War, but only really took off after 1926, 
with the establishment of the Central Electricity Generating Board and the National Grid. 
By this time the pattern of appliance production in the U.S. was well established (Cowan 
1983) and U.S. imports dominated the UK market. Alford (1981 p320) quotes figures 
showing imports of electrical goods rising from £670,(XX) in 1907 to £2.6m. in 1924 and 
£6.3m. in 1930. The import of U.S. products into the UK meant that U.S. decisions as 
to the "appliance of [domestic] science" (Zanussi advertising slogan 1990) would be 
imported to the UK also.
When the U.K. established 20% import duties on domestic appliances (Hardyment 
1988), in 1932, U.S. firms such as Hoover, Gillette, Firestone, and Macleans began to 
set up their subsidiaries along the Great West Road. These factories offered new forms 
of peacetime employment opportunities for women, enabling some to continue the 
independent existence which they had found working as drivers etc., during the First 
World War (Glucksmann 1986). The percentage of women (excluding juveniles) 
working in electrical engineering rose from 28.8% to 32.9% of the workforce between 
1923 and 1930 (Green 1991 p30). Although, obviously not every woman in London, 
and no married woman (Weightman & Humphries 1984), could work in such factories 
under such conditions, the example of the opportunity was there.
Other opportunities which could be taken up were employment in the new department 
stores. Although the first example was Parisian, the Bon Marché, built in Brixton in 
1877 (Olsen 1976 - 1979 pl26), the epitome of the modem department store was 
Selfridges, opened 1909, based on the example of Marshall Field in Chicago, where 
Gordon Selfridge himself had been a manager (Weightman and Humphries 1984 p25). 
Although, necessarily, they were few in number, the impact on employment was large: 
six of the fourteen (only) firms in London employing more than 2000 workers were 
department stores (Green 1991 p29). The form of the products sold in the new 
department stores and produced in the new consumer goods factories, it is worth 
pointing out once more, was intended as a replacement for mostly female domestic
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servants, so that women in these industries were still contributing their labour power to 
domestic service, only now at one remove.
The introduction of domestic technologies coincided with the years of the interwar 
suburban expansion of London promoted by the competitive development of mass 
transit (Weightman & Humphries 1984). The story of the suburban expansion of 
London is important to gentrification not simply because it is the Other in opposition to 
which gentrification is defined, but also because it was the environment in which the 
application of domestic technologies evolved. From the point of view of the story of 
gentrification, the story of the development of London’s suburbs has two important 
morals.
The first is the extent to which the form in which housing was provided, detached, or 
semi-detached single family dwellings, was bound up with the particular form taken by 
the development of domestic technologies. The shape which was imposed on domestic 
technology by the fact of its filtering down from upper class applications was to leave the 
mistress of the isolated suburban house in charge, not of a complement of servants, but 
of a collection of domestic appliances. The electric servant ideology incorporated in the 
evolution of domestic appliances took Victorian ideas on public/private and gender 
divisions of labour (Boys 1981, Bondi 1991) to their ultimate conclusion.
The second moral arises from the first. The principle that consumption cleavages, and 
hence the home as the locus of most consumption (Saunders 1990), form an alternative 
basis for class formation depends very much on the idea that the form of accommodation 
developed in the rise of suburbia, Saunders' principal point of reference, expresses 
deeply held, natural and transhistorical, desires. It would have been interesting to see 
some cross-national comparisons before making such a judgement. Olsen’s index 
contains the following summary of Victorian London’s attitude toward its principal 
European rival, Paris: expressed in the disgust and disquiet is nonetheless a clear 
recognition that the French derived ’ontological security’ in other things than housing:
Frenchmen
cared less for home life than English, 116 
did not bathe, 115 
had peculiar ideas of comfort, 116 
indifferent to privacy, 115-116 
wasted time in cafés, 108, 111
(Olsen 1976- 1979 p378)
Nye, in addition, summarizes a whole set of literature which also shows just how 
culturally bound are those desires Saunders argues are natural. A 1930s pamphlet 
presents a picture of electrified domesticity, in which
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Household tasks have become so undemanding that "Mrs. Modem Woman" is not 
exhausted on "Monday, which has long been proverbially the blue wash-day of the 
week, for Electricity, the silent,servant in the home, has.done much to make the 
day just as enjoyable as any other day of the week". In this account, machines 
take over house work, and the home is no longer defined by production but by 
consumption. The transformation is both automatic and bénéficient.
(Nye 1990 p238)
Miller (1991) also makes the same points in his analysis of 1920s and 1930s (U.S.) 
advertising copy. As with the 'production of gentrifiers' approach to gentrification, 
Saunders' arguments for the social significance of the home as locus of consumption 
take this for granted.
Such accounts of the home as locus of consumption have been countered by feminist 
arguments that "home economic specialists and new appliances [were used by - 
patriarchal - capital] to gain control over the domestic system of production" (Nye, ibid.). 
These two accounts, the "progressive" and the "feminist" (Nye, ibid.), have tended to 
define the terms of the debate over the impact of the domestic technologies on the home. 
Feminists, according to Saunders' progressive view, caricature the home as "the locus of 
gender domination and the exploitation of women", and socialists make the equally 
untenable claim that the home is "an obstacle to collective life and the place where 
capitalist social relations are reproduced" (Saunders 1989 pl78).
Feminists have of course argued in reply that Saunders has misrepresented their position 
(Bannion 1991). Nye argues against both positions. Both "accounts oversimplify... 
Both suggest that the home was a passive realm that new technologies or large 
corporations could invade at will" (Nye 1990 p239). In short, both the progressives and 
the feminists take the idea of the home as locus of consumption for granted, and simply 
argue about whether this is a Good Thing or a Bad Thing for women and gender 
relations generally. Nye's account demonstrates that the two poles of the progressive 
versus feminist argument overlook the degree to which the rise of the consumption 
oriented home is historically contingent upon the development of domestic technologies, 
and the links that these developments had with manufacturing production. Saunder's 
"social history of the home" (Saunders 1986 pl54ff.) contains no reference to domestic 
technologies.
Nye argues in fact that the Taylorist ethos promoted by advocates of domestic
technologies "brought with them the economic, time-oriented perception of efficiency"
that characterizes industrial culture (Nye 1990 p256). Paradoxically, it was this, Nye
argues, that led to the growth of the idea of the home as solely a locus of consumption
The home economics movement argued that these changes signalled that the home 
was no longer a site of production, but rather one of consumption. Domestic
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scientists encouraged housewives to buy canned goods, ready made clothing and 
other products of mass production. They redefinW the homemaker in books such 
as The Woman Who Spends which declared that the era of home production was 
over. Instead, "Women have gained a whole new field of economic activity, that 
of consumption". Sociologists such as Thorstein Veblen and Simon Patten 
reconceived the idea of the family as a unit of consumption so persuasively that the 
idea became an underlying assumption about family life by the time Helen and 
Robert Lynd conducted their Middletown study.
(Nye 1990 p259 emphasis added)
One of those underlying assumptions was the sexual division of domestic labour. 
Cowan argues that one of the hidden ironies of household technology is that as the means 
to keep homes and clothes clean and well ordered has improved, so have received 
standards of cleanliness and so therefore has the time spent by housewives in cleaning 
their homes (Cowan 1983), with the result that, as Nye puts it: "Only from the man's 
point of view had the home become a sphere of consumption." (1991 p258).
Walby seeks to qualify these arguments slightly, pointing out that they are only true for
women who are not in paid employment. Significantly, she goes on to argue that the
main cause of the increases in time spent in housework
is that between 1937 and 1961 the amount of housework done by middle-class 
housewives increased as they were losing the assistance of servants in housework, 
not a form of assistance working-class women ever had.
To-day the social class of the husband's job makes no significant difference to the 
unevenness of the domestic division of labour. However... the higher the class of 
the woman's job, the less uneven is the domestic division of labour
(Walby 1990 p83)
One reason for this might be of course that women in high status employment can still 
afford some domestic help. On the other hand, as another example of the impact of 
domestic technologies in levelling out differences between (social) classes in the field of 
domestic divisions of labour, just as elsewhere, it backs up the argument that 
gentrification is a one-off phenomenon. Walby's argument implies that domestic 
technologies have thoroughly penetrated the domestic environment at all levels of society 
and that no particular house poses class-specific problems to run. Therefore once the 
disparities between income and property values, which domestic technologies permit, 
have been closed, gentrification will not occur again.
Gershuny argues that as labour productivity increases, more and more ancillary activities 
are externalized to specialist suppliers of services. Gershuny's arguments can be applied 
to characterize the history of the electrified house. As electrification took over 
manufacturing, and productivity increased, labour time in general became more 
expensive. This of course led to the replacement of servants by domestic appliances. It
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also led to the disappearance of external domestic services, to be replaced by
manufactured products. Nye writes that
As electricity was adopted in many contexts, society began to change in ways that 
undermined some of the premises of the ... [Victorian] house. A whole set of 
trades [and door-to-door tradesmen] began to disappear... Electrification was part 
of the general process in which the home became more isolated from the rest of 
society.
(Nye 1990 p257)
Suburban developments also embodied the themes of isolation and separation which 
D.Sayer (1991) has argued are most socially consequential in the rise of capitalist social 
relations (see Chapter 6 above). This isolation was manifested in the suburban 
expansion of London. The housing which was built after the war was strikingly different 
in style to that of the Edwardian and Victorian periods, semi-detached (Weightman & 
Humphries 1984 pplOl-2).
The developers however continued to try to interpret what would sell to the middle
classes. Significantly for the story of gentrification, what sold was Tudorbethan', not
'modem' (Oliver Bentley and Davis, 1981), harking back to a past which would be
exemplified in the gentrified properties of a later generation of the middle class. People
might work in modem factories and modem offices, but they did not want to live in
modemist homes. They did however want modem conveniences. Weightman &
Humphries report that
By 1939, of those houses - about two thirds nationally - which had an electricity 
supply, nearly all would have electric lighting, 77 percent an iron, 40 percent a 
vacuum cleaner, 27 percent electric fires, 16 percent a kettle, 14 percent a cooker, 
and less than 5 percent a water heater.
(Weightman & Humphries 1984 pl31)
The new homes came ready wired, but electricity could not compete with gas, nor 
particularly coal, for heating or cooking purposes. The price advantage of coal in 
particular continued until the advent of North Sea gas. 1950 Ideal Home magazines are 
full of advertisements for coal fired cooker/boilers, costing around £25 to £30. The 
Rolls-Royce of such units, an Aga, cost between £85 to £115. Electric cooker/boilers 
started at £80.
Nye, Hardyment, Cowan and Weightman & Humphries all agree that a new woman was 
being created in these developments, the housewife, a solitary woman working as a 
rational consumer to keep an empty house clean warm and welcoming, awaiting the 
retum from work of the rational producer, the man of the house (Nye, 1990 Hardyment, 
1988 Cowan, 1983 and Weightman & Humphries 1984). The isolating effects of 
modemity that Baudelaire, Joyce and others had recognized in the Victorian and
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Edwardian city streets (Chapter 6 above) was now to be found in the homes of 
Metroland.
The data on employment in domestic labour would appear to support the view that the 
creation of suburbia saw the creation of the isolated housewife (Table 8.1).
Table 8.1
Domestic servants 1911-1951
1911 1921 1931 1951
Female 1,211,990 1,004,666 1,119,088 188,213
Male 42,034 227,380 260,267 9,234
(source: OPCS Census, Industry Tables 1911 -1951)
Data on employment activity rates do not begin until 1931, so only raw numbers can be 
presented here (employment activity rates are presented in Tables 9.6a,b & c). Why 
there should have been such a jump in male domestic service after the First World war is 
unclear. What is noticeable however is the precipitous decline after 1931. Again, 
whether this preceded the Second World War or not is unclear. It is admittedly doubtful, 
but the evidence is anecdotal. Would Ideal Home, for example, have been carrying so 
many advertisements in the 1950s appealing to upper-middle class women bewailing the 
loss of domestic servants, if the loss was not effectively recent and dramatic? 
Nevertheless it was during this period that the middle classes started moving into owner- 
occupied properties in large class-segregated estates, equipped with the latest 
technologies. Weightman & Humphries (1984 p i 14) report the giving away of gas 
cookers in sales promotions on these new estates.
This isolated existence in the inter-war suburbs led to what, in the 1950's would become 
known as 'New Town Blues'. Shops, friends, places of entertainment were all far 
away. These blues were the unintended consequence of the Victorian privatisation of 
domestic life and gendering of domestic work as female (Saunders 1987). When the 
house was full of servants and children, the mistress of the house, even though excluded 
from the masculine, outside, world of business, would have seen isolation (not in front 
of the servants) as a blessing. As servants disappeared from middle-class life, so 
housing design became more open plan (Nye 1990 p256). However, social attitudes, 
filtering down along with the housing stock, meant that when open plan designs were 
incorporated into the new towns, such as Harlow, they were most unpopular with 
working class residents (Humphries & Taylor 1985 p88).
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At the same time as the new towns were being built, the first signs of gentrification were 
occurring in Islington (Humphries & Taylor 1985). The waves of suburban expansion 
had carried with them the newest forms of social and domestic arrangements for the 
previous 150 years. The backwash was just about to start.
8.7 Conclusion
I have argued in this chapter that a focus on technological developments to explain 
gentrification does not meant a lapse into technological determinism. I have argued that 
the context in which domestic technologies were devised and introduced into domestic 
work was one dominated by the Servant Question, as this had been posed in the 
transition to capitalist modes of production. The change in the nature of the class relation 
of master and servant with the transition to capitalism, together with the easy availability 
of servant labour, was fundamental to the redefinition of public and private which 
occured in the course of the separation of public and private with the transition to 
capitalism. The invasion of privacy represented by the presence of waged labourers in the 
home, to say nothing of the costs involved, encouraged the development of domestic 
technologies as a replacement for servant labour. The particular forms of domestic 
technologies which emerged thus discouraged attempts at the reorganization of domestic 
work and maintained thereby the trends toward separation and isolation which Chapter 6 
argued were characteristic of personal experience in conditions of modemity. However 
these forms were not inevitable, but, as Nye shows, were partially dependent upon the 
peculiarities of the history of domestic supplies of electricity in the U.S. Although 
domestic electricity supplies were established comparatively more quickly in the 
U.K.than in the U.S., they were established a generation later. By that time, debate on 
the possibilities of adopting alternative forms of domestic management in response to the 
possiblities offered by the new technologies was effectively closed.
However, important as are domestic technologies to an explanation of gentrification now, 
the economic conditions prior to their introduction were equally as important. There is 
only a fixed amount of housing services which can be provided by labour power alone. 
Houses built for the middle classes therefore required a more or less fixed complement of 
servants for the achievement of their flows of housing services. Houses built for the 
upper-middle class would have higher required servant/house ratios than houses for the 
lower-middle class. When therefore the upper-middle class moved out, the lower middle 
class could not filter up since they would not have been able to afford the same numbers 
of servants. The only alternative then to upper-middle class occupation of upper-middle
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class housing was subdivision and working class occupation. Housing was in any case 
a depreciating asset in Victorian times so there would have been little financial incentive 
for the lower-middle class to move in; but the very fact that housing was a depreciating 
asset is but one more instance of the impact domestic technologies were to have on the 
housing market in the twentieth century.
Gentrification depends not only on abandonment of individual properties by the middle 
classes, but also on residential segregation by status. The history of London's Victorian, 
and indeed inter-war, developments show that this segregation was not achieved through 
the processes of filtering down but through the residential development process itself. 
Estates were not only built for the upper-middle classes but for all subdivisions of the 
middle classes. The barrier to filtering down imposed by the fixed co-efficients in the 
production of housing services only reinforced this trend to residential segregation by 
status.
The development of suburbia was associated with changing gender roles involving 
increased isolation in the home and increased participation in factory employment 
elsewhere as well as with the development of domestic technologies. In producing these 
changes, the development of suburbia was intimately bound up with the development of 
domestic technologies. Nonetheless the liberating possibilities these technologies offered 
from the daily grind of housework meant that the suburbs remained sought after 
locations, despite the increased isolation of the housewife in her suburban home which 
domestic technologies helped create. These possibilities were slow to be adopted 
elsewhere in the urban environment. Had it been conceivable earlier that they might be 
applied elsewhere, it is doubtful whether gentrification would or could have occurred. 
Technological progress in the supply of housing services would have become 
disembodied far earlier and filtering down rather than class abandonment would have 
occurred in London's housing stock. It was not until the 'Long Boom' (Armstrong, 
Glyn and Harrison 1984 167-309), dating approximately from 1953 to 1973, (the 
beginning of the Korean War to the end of the Vietnam War) that the age of 'mass 
consumption' really got underway and domestic technologies began to be liberated fi’om 
their suburban contexts. The problems of adjustment were to be seen in the costs of 
these new technologies.
As late as 1950 the cost of a vacuum cleaner, 15 guineas, excluding purchase tax of 
25%, was approximately that of the average weekly wage, and the price of a washing 
machine, around £125. Bendix, the first automatic washing machine, was so expensive 
that no prices were quoted in Ideal Home magazine, the source of these figures, during 
the first three years following its introduction in 1951. Instead, generous, but
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unspecified, H.P. terms were advertised. It must have been so expensive that quoting a 
price would have frightened off even the wealthy. The nearest competitor, the Servis 
twin tub, introduced in 1953, cost £95, including tax. Hunkin compared the price to 
approximately that of a small car (Channel 4 1989). Since 1960, the nominal average 
price of a washing machine, £200, has barely changed. The price of a house in 
Canonbury at this time was £2650 (Humphries & Taylor 1985 pl51) i.e., a washing 
machine alone cost between 5 and 10 percent of the cost of a gentrifiable house, and 
about 10 times the average weekly wage. If washing machine prices had kept pace with 
prices of Canonbury properties, they would cost over £10,000 to-day.
This then concludes the historical background to gentrification in particular insofar as that 
history may be interpreted in terms of the evolution of domestic technologies. I have 
argued that although the precursors to gentrification in Islington were residential 
segregation by status, fixed co-efficients in the production of housing services and 
competitive markets for servant labour in Victorian London, there are nonetheless 
conclusions to be drawn applicable to gentrification in other areas and in other contexts. 
The most important of these is that there have been no filtering down of the property 
before domestic technologies are applied to it, that its original occupiers have abandoned 
it. This precondition is present in the gentrification of the SoHo district of New York 
and in the gentrification of the Docklands.
The evolution of domestic technologies, as I have tried to show, is important not only for 
gentrification, but also for the evolution of gender and class relations. Gentrification, I 
have argued in earlier chapters and in this, should not be theorized in terms of class (or 
gender), but in terms of status and domestic technologies. If class or gender issues are 
important in gentrification, it is as they are mediated through the application of domestic 
technologies to housing. To date, I have made this argument most thoroughly in regard 
to class issues. I have taken account of gender issues only insofar as it has been argued 
by for example Bondi (1991) and others that class oriented explanations of gentrification 
should not ignore gender issues. While agreeing that explanations of gentrification 
should not ignore gender issues, I have suggested that, given the problems inherent in 
class oriented explanations of gentrification, adding gender issues into these explanations 
will not improve their chances of being able to explain gentrification. In the following 
chapter, I will address the issue of changing gender roles directly. I shall argue that 
gender issues play little part in the explanation of gentrification, as I have advanced it 
here. This is not to say that they have no impact on the processes of gentrification or on 
its outcomes. However, gentrification itself would have occurred whatever the changing 
status of women in the economy might have been.
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9 Gentrification in modern times 
9.1 Aims and Issues
The last chapter sought to place the roots of gentrification, not in the coming of post­
industrial society but in the coming of capitalist society, in the nineteenth, rather than the 
twentieth century. This chapter seeks to trace the processes involved in gentrification as 
it occurs in modem times, thus putting some more historical flesh on the economic bones 
of the model presented in Chapter 7. It concentrates on three interrelated themes, price 
trends in housing and in domestic technologies and trends in wages among the 
population at large and in higher income groups. It uses Islington, in North London, as 
an example of the process, but places this in a wider context than is normally the case in 
gentrification studies, comparing trends there with national and regional data. It also re­
considers the role of the state in gentrification in the UK.
Much has been written on the role of the state in gentrifying neighbourhoods; particularly 
in the U.S. context, where the practice of land use zoning has in itself meant that state 
intervention is often an essential prerequisite for the process to go ahead (Chapter 2 
above). That the state has a necessary role at all in gentrifying neighbourhoods in the 
U.K. is less obvious. This is partly for the reasons given in Chapter 2, the physical 
planning context in which gentrification occurs in the U.K. which is permissive rather 
than interventionist in essence. However, arising from this is a tendency to see state 
intervention in gentrification in the U.K. manifested only in the form of grants for home 
improvements and P.Williams speaks for many when he writes (in my view correctly) 
that
While it was accepted that the availability of such grants was an added incentive, it 
is suggested that it cannot be held to explain the process. It is likely that its effect 
was to heighten demand rather than cause i t
(P.Williams 1976 p80)
However, as Merritt makes clear, the rehabilitation of the housing stock has dominated 
U.K. housing policy since the Second World War (Merritt with Gray 1982). State 
intervention has not simply been limited to improvement grants but, by promoting owner 
occupation as a means to ensuring rehabilitation of the housing stock, has in fact been 
fundamentally implicated in the gentrification process in the U.K. State intervention and 
the context in which this arose are considered in the following section.
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9.2 The impact of state housing policy on gentrification
Housing considerations dominated the post-war history of London. According to Mack 
and Humphries (1986 pl49) almost half of London’s housing stock, some 1.25m. 
houses, had been damaged by V-1 attacks alone, 130,000 damaged beyond repair. In 
Islington 2,516 houses were totally destroyed, and around another 78,(XX) had suffered 
bomb damage (Roberts 1975 p203). "Three quarters of its [Islington's] households did 
not even have running water, an inside lavatory nor a bath [in 1951]" (Humphries & 
Taylor 1985 pl43).
The effects of bomb damage and the coming to power of a radical Labour administration 
meant that the problems of London’s housing stock would be tackled by seeking to deal 
with the problem at source, building directly and on a scale never heretofore managed for 
the working classes. In addition, stringent war-time controls on the economy would be 
kept in place in order to facilitate post-war reconstruction, and to start to come to terms 
with the financial burdens which had been imposed by the prosecution of the war. Two 
policies in particular were to be followed, relief of overcrowding in the central cities by 
the development of new towns (Humphries and Taylor 1985), and upgrading of the 
existing stock (Merrett with Grey 1982) or slum clearance where this was not possible.
In many ways, the New Towns story is the logical continuation of the history of the 
expansion of London, and Humphries and Taylor devote considerable attention to this. 
However, as the New Towns were the site of new developments in working class 
housing, the type of worker they attracted eventually acted to the detraction of London’s 
economic prospects. The post-war decentralization strategies eventually led to the 
creation of an economically marginal, elderly, unskilled vulnerable population, left 
behind after the new towns had creamed off aU the young skilled inner-city working class 
labour force (Humphries and Taylor 1985). Islington was one such location.
Following the third ’Industrial Revolution’ of the 1880s and 1890s, Islington’s 
employment base remained virtually unchanged. In common with the rest of the London 
manufacturing sector, however, there was a gradual haemorrhaging of jobs from 
Islington following the Second World War. This was encouraged at first, in the form of 
the New Town developments, in order to relieve the stress on London’s housing stock. 
The form of job loss in this period was mainly through migration of firms away from the 
area, rather than firms closing down as occurred during the 1970s. Unemployment in 
Islington stood at 500 in 1954. It stood at 17,000 in 1982. One implication of this out­
migration of firms and employment was an ageing population in the borough.
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These job losses were particularly pronounced during the 1960's. At the same time, the 
changes in the employment structure in the London economy as a whole were to 
emphasize the retum to dominance of the City in the Islington economy. Over the period 
1961-1971 the numbers of Islington residents employed in manufacturing fell by 342,00 
persons, while those employed in banking finance and insurance rose by 207,000 and 
the professional n.e.s. (not otherwhere specified) and scientific sectors by 101,000.
These sectoral shifts in employment however could be expected from Gershuny's 
arguments concerning the shift to a service economy. As manufacturing labour becomes 
more productive, and therefore more expensive, it makes economic sense to buy in 
services rather than waste valuable production time in attending to them oneself. 
Therefore these shifts tell us little about the changing class composition in Islington 
which can be attributed to gentrification, as compared with those to be expected from the 
changing occupational structure of the economy at large.
To get a perspective on the impact of gentrification in Islington, therefore, it will be 
necessary to keep comparing changes in Islington's socio-economic structure with 
changes in the national, and where possible local London socio-economic structure. To 
the best of my knowledge, the use of comparative analysis to meet the requirements of 
the Gershuny argument has not been undertaken in any other study of gentrification (see 
Dickens et al., 1985, for a discussion of the merits of comparative analysis). In Islington 
in 1951, 1.5% of the population of heads of household (overwhelmingly male - Table
9.7 below) were professional workers, employers and managers (S.E.G. I), 6.6% in 
1961, 11.5% in 1971 (Pitt 1977, Tables 1 & 4). By way of comparison (Halsey 1986 
Table 2.1), the proportion of UK males in S.E.G. I rose from 8.5 in 1951 to 9.3 in 















(source: Pitt 1977, Halsey 1986)
The rate of the rise in Islington's male S.E.G. I population was way above average, 
indicating a definite shift in the class composition of the borough which could not be 
attributed to macro or regional changes in the economy. Nonetheless, this spectacular 
rise came from a very low base. Even in 1971, Islington's S.E.G. I population 
accounted for only 5.1% (1961 4.25%) of the total S.E.G. I population of inner London. 
Only Tower Hamlets, with a 1971 S.E.G. I population of 3570 and falling, 2.5% (1961 
2.9%) of Inner London's S.E.G. I population had less.
In regard to the second prong of government policy to relieve the housing pressure on
London, Merrett (with Grey 1982) argues that the history of UK housing policy since the
Second World War can be written in terms of rehabilitation policies. These policies were
originally inteneded to encourage private landlords to upgrade their buildings (54% of the
housing stock in 1953), but instead had the effect of encouraging landlords to sell off
their housing stock, by stimulating demand for owner occupation:
the advances in legislation in the owner-occupied sector were a by-product of 
measures taken with a view to raising the quality of the privately rented stock...
.... in the 1950s nearly 90% percent of [rehabilitation] grants went to owner- 
occupiers.
(Merrett with Grey, 1982 p31)
By 1960, less than a third of the housing stock was in private rental. Merett's 
organization of the history of post-War housing around the theme of rehabilitation may
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appear to be a surprising perspective to take, given its lack of attention in academic 
literature and institutional reporting (Merrett with Grey 1982 pl97). Given also however 
that new buildings only ever account for around 2% of the housing stock in any year, 
however, it should in fact make good sense to concentrate policy attention on the 98% of 
the stock which is already built
Prior to 1954, building work was essentially subject to the same rationing controls as 
other important areas of the economy. Licences were required from the local council 
before any building work could be undertaken. The principle behind this policy was, on 
the one hand to ensure a conservation of resources in an economy drained by the War, 
and secondly to force the construction industry to deal with the effects of bomb damage, 
mainly suffered by the poor, rather than permitting the operation of effective demand, 
which would have concentrated on building for the rich and letting the filtering process 
take on the responsibility of alleviating poor housing conditions.
Licences were required for any spending on an existing property which exceeded £500, 
and/or which exceeded 1000 ft^ (later 1500 ft2). Owners who were able to obtain these 
licences could not sell the rehabilitated property for any more than a price set by the local 
council at the time a building licence was granted {Ideal Home March 1954). This 
obviously had an inhibiting effect on the owner-occupied sector of the market. In fact 
house prices were falling during the 1950s (Holmans 1990), those of large homes in 
particular {Ideal Home July 1954).
In terms of inner city rehabilitation, the 15 years following 1945 were the era of mews 
conversions for middle class occupation. The size of these properties would fall easily 
within the square footage limitations of a 1,000ft2 licence. Ideal Home carried a photo­
spread of such a conversion in its February 1950 issue. Mews were used as stables and 
coachmen's quarters in Victorian and Edwardian times. In these conversions, the garage 
doors would be replaced by large bow windows, and the entrance hoist to the hay stores 
on the upper floor would be converted into a French window with small balcony. These 
conversions were a recurrent theme in the magazine during the early 1950s. These mews 
were concentrated in the West End suburbs, Kensington, Chelsea and Westminster. 
There were no such mews in Islington. Consequently, the initial inner city property 
rehabilitations and conversions to middle class residential use could only generically be 
described as gentrification, since the middle class occupants were settling in 
predominantly middle class areas. The servants they would have been displacing had not 
returned after the war. Gentrification, conceived of as a process whereby the class 
composition of an area changes, could only be said to have been taking place in these 
areas in a very muted form, if at all.
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The 1954 Housing (Repairs and Rent) Act raised the maximum limits on spending on 
rehabilitation licenses from £500 to £10(X), and changed the basis on which cash grants 
(for improvements only were made to owners seeking to carry out such works. Prior to 
1954, councils could make grants towards the repairs of between £150 and £800. From 
1954, provided the cost of the work was over £100, the council could give a grant of up 
to half the cost of the work with a maximum of £400. However, the size of the property 
qualifying for a licence rose to 2,500 ft2 {Ideal Home July 1954). 2,500ft2 is the 
equivalent of a house 20' wide by 30' deep, five storeys high. This, according to Ruth 
Mellor, would easily cover most of the houses in Islington (personal communication). 
The standards to which rehabilitation and conversions had to adhere to qualify for grants 
was also relaxed (Merrett with Grey 1982). Licenses were finally abolished altogether in 
November 1954. The result was that the annual number of grants for rehabilitation to all 
private owners rose from approximately 4000 during the years 1949-1954, to 42,000 in 
the years 1954-1959, and, following the 1959 House Purchase and Housing Act to
90,000 in the years 1959-1964 (Merrett with Grey 1982).
As noted however, these policy initiatives did not persuade landlords to improve their 
properties, but to sell them off. This tendency was further encouraged by the abolition of 
Schedule A income tax on the implicit rental value of owner occupation. The other main 
policy initiative intended to protect the housing situation of the poor were rent controls. 
These were and are the subject of great controversy. It is argued that, by limiting the 
amounts landlords can charge in rents in times of shortage, they actually worsen the 
shortage of rental accomodation, by discouraging landlords from investing further in 
rental property, and by encouraging the run down of existing rental stocks through the 
withdrawal of maintenance expenditures in order to maintain profits at the same level as 
those of the rest of the economy. They have been widely blamed for the rundown state 
of properties in private rental and for the shift away from this tenure. P.Williams 
argued that they aided the gentrification process, since they
maintained a stock of vulnerable housing in a central location and did little to
reduce the vulnerability of both the housing stock itself and of its tenants.
(P.Williams 1976 p81)
These arguments are however historically weak. Nevitt (1966 pl31) has commented on 
"the apparent paradox that the decontrol of rents leads not to the supply of more rented 
accommodation but less" (cited in Murie Niner and Watson, 1976 p i88). Tenants can 
only have security of tenure if there is rent control. Decontrol of rents also means that it 
is easier to evict tenants.
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The theoretical argument against them is also weak, since it could as easily be argued that 
they protect landlords' incomes as a class. Rent controls ensure a constant supply of 
tenants for whom demand for rented accommodation has not been choked off by 
uncontrolled rents (Redfem 1983). Nevitt (1970) for example has also argued that the 
original piece of rent control legislation, the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (War 
Restrictions) Bill, 1915, was intended to protect the landlord as much as the tenant 
(Murie, Niner and Watson, 1976 p i87). The encouragment to private landlords to invest 
in their properties by rent decontrol meant only that they found it easier to obtain vacant 
possession, and thus make their profits by selling to owner occupiers, and invest the 
money elsewhere (see Hamnett & Randolph 1989 for an account of this process in the 
London area). As Merrett remarks in the context of a discussion of Labour policy during 
the 1960’s, the rehabilitation objectives of rent decontrol "was a house - rather than a 
household directed philosophy" (Merrett with Grey 1982 p204).
The accession of a Labour government in 1964 continued in essence the housing policies 
pursued by the Conservatives. Rehabilitation continued to be seen as the metier of the 
private sector, which by this time meant the owner occupier. In 1967, "the first National 
Sample Survey of the conditions of houses had shown that the scale of disrepair and 
unfitness was far greater than had been previously believed" (Merrett with Grey 1982 
p41). The result was an intensification of a policy which had already been experimented 
with by the 1963 Conservative administration, notably area based improvement schemes. 
The 1969 Housing Act re-introduced the concept, under the title General Improvement 
Areas (GIAs), subsequently modified by the 1973 Conservative administration in the 
form of the 1974 Housing Act, which introduced the concept of Housing Action Areas 
(HA As).
The GIAs in particular were accused of sponsoring gentrification, but it can be seen from 
this brief history that they were largely a continuation of what was by then, in this respect 
at least, a bipartisan housing policy. Owner occupation was to be the medium through 
which rehabilitation was to be carried out. However, as the numerous neighbourhood 
lifecycle studies have shown, if nothing else, rehabilitation, even state sponsored 
rehabilitation, is not likely to take place in a decaying environment (Merrett with Grey 
1982 p 196-7). If owner occupation was to be the state-sponsored medium through 
which rehabilitation was to be carried out, then it only made sense for the state, in good 
social democratic /  neo-Keynesian /  public-private partnership /  top-down planning 
fashion to take action which would improve the environmental quality, within which the 
private sector could carry out the objectives assigned to it (Ferris 1972).
With this background in mind therefore, it is possible to evaluate the processes of
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gentrification as they have occurred in one specific neighbourhood, Islington.
9.3 The impact of state housing policy on gentrification in Islington
Ferris (1972) argues that the turning point in the history of the gentrification of Islington 
was the Conservative 1957 Rent Act. The effect of the Act was to reduce protection to 
dwellings of less rateable value of less than £40 in London, but only for sitting tenants, 
and there was no protection against landlord harassment to obtain eviction (Murie, Niner 
and Watson 1976 p i83). The years following the passing of the Act became infamous as 
the Rachman era (Humphries and Taylor 1985). The 1953 Town and Country Planning 
Act had abolished the taxation of development values (Merrett with Grey 1982), this, 
together with the abolishment of licenses meant that prices of owner occupied properties 
were now completely decontrolled. Building societies were also encouraged to expand to 
finance this asset stripping. From 1959 to 1962, the government lent the building 
societies £100m. to be invested in pre-1919 property (Boddy 1980).
It was about this time that the major Islington estates started selling off their properties. 
The Northampton Estate in Canonbury were sold in 1952 (Pitt 1977). The Drapers’ 
Company sold off their property, based on Lonsdale Square, in 1954 (Zwart 1973). The 
property companies who bought these estates engaged in a form of asset stripping, 
breaking up the estates into individual properties and selling them off. Estate agents in 
these areas stopped being agents for the estates, collecting rents and managing property, 
and became instead more or less full-time property developers (Pitt 1977, P.Williams 
1976).
In Islington, the first area to experience gentrification were the old Northampton estates 
in the Canonbury ward. Significantly, this is close to Highbury, which has never 
experienced any real decline in its social status (Zwart, 1973 p25). This was followed by 
Bamsbury (Ferris 1972). Bamsbury was developed by three principal estates, the 
Thornhill family, centred on Bamsbury Square, but running down Hemingford Road to 
its junction with Pentonville, the Drapers' Company, already mentioned, and the 
Cloudsley Charity, centred on Cloudsley Square (Willats, 1987, see map 9.1).
The impact of gentrification in this period can be seen from the way in which the overall 
increase in male S.E.G. I s were concentrated. Bamsbury ward, recorded a increase of 
12.5 percentage points over the period 1961-1971, Junction at 9.8, Mildmay ward at 
7.7. and Hillmarton 6.5 (Table 9.1 below, see also Map 9.1 for location of wards). 
Pentonville, Highbury, St. Mary, St.Peter, and Station all had percentage point 
increases greater than the Islington average of 4.9 (Pitt 1977 Table 2).
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v .l  Islington: Wards and Estate Boundaries
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Major estates in Islington (and dates of principal development)
1. Batsofi (1855-1868)
2. St Bartholomews (pre-1800)
3. Beauchamp (1868-1877)
4 . Brewers' Company (pre-1800)
5. Charterhouse (pre-1800)
6. Chrlsfs Hospital (1862-1867)
7. Chur<^ Commissioners (pre-1800)
8 . City of London Corp (1862-1867)
9. Ciothworkers* (Packlngton) (1850 -i860)
10. Corpofthe Sons of the Clergy (1868-1877)
11. Drapers'Company (1831-35)
12. Harvlst (1868-1877)
13. Ironmongers' Company (pre-1800)
14. Knights of SL John (pre-1800)
15. Lloyd Baker (1831-1835)
16. Mercers'(1868-1877)
17. Mildmay (1735-1862)
18. Milner Gibson (1844-1847)
19. Neve (1868-1877)
20. New River Co. (pre-1800,1862-1868)
21. Northampton (pre-1800, 1830-1862)
22. Penton (1773-1793)
23. Penton (McWilliams) (1855-1860)
24. Poynder (1862-1877)
25. Rydon's Trustees 1862-1877)





31. Unknown (Berners/Eyre/Portland Estate) (1868-19877)
32. Wenlock (pre-1800)
Map 9.1 Islington: Wards and Estate Boundaries
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(source: Hamnett & Williams 1979)
By 1964, the middle-class in-migration to Bamsbury was extensive enough to provoke 
the first major class conflict between gentrifiers and gentrifiees. This was fought out 
over a traffic scheme, ostensibly intended to be part of an overall environmental 
improvement for the area (Ferris 1972). In the end, the environmental improvement 
schemes aroused so much popular opposition that it provoked a sea change in Islington 
Borough Council's own housing policy. It began (from 1971) to use its compulsory 
purchase powers to buy up existing tenanted properties, so converting private tenancies 
into council tenancies. Converting the tenancies on the threatened properties to municipal 
ownership achieved two ends. First, working class tenants were protected from 
harrassment and illegal eviction. Second, however, although these houses were now 
council property, no-one need ever know. Hence values of otherwise identical, but 
owner occupied properties could continue safely to rise. However, at the time, this was 
not occurring. In 1973, the Barber boom was collapsing, aided by the first oil price 
shock (Pitt 1973).
Pitt notes that this had three effects
i. Property values stopped rising, thereby making it impossible for property 
companies to stay liquid by re-mortgaging existing properties
ii. Interest rates went up, thereby increasing the monthly loss on owning tenanted 
property [see the discussion on speculator behaviour in Chapter 7 above]
iii. A mortgage famine severely depressed the market for houses that had been 
made empty.
(Pitt 1973, plO)
As a result, in Pitt's words, "willing sellers found a willing buyer, and Islington Council 
became the largest slum landlord in the borough" (ibid.). This did permit rehabilitation 
of the existing stock to take place without leading to pressures on the tenants to move. It
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was also in line with current GLC policy which was now seeking to reverse the 
detrimental effects of its post-war decentralization strategies (Humphries and Taylor 
1985). It was also promoted by the 1974 Housing Act, which gave official government 
backing to this type of municipalization, with the creation of the ability of local councils 
to designate Housing Action Areas, and thus the ability to manage the housing stock, 
enforcing improvements, regardless of the landlord's wishes.
However, the policy did contain an inherent contradiction. If, in principle, it enhanced 
private property values, which was still an objective of rehabilitation policy, then it 
would make it more difficult for the council to repeat the exercise, since the property 
values would have increased in the interim. The success of the policy in 1973 was 
largely due to the particular combination of circumstances outlined by Pitt, and not 
subsequently repeated. Pitt in fact ends his report with a plea that the Council continue 
its policy, which was obviously by then coming to an end. Since that time, conversions 
from rental to owner occupation have continued, house prices have increased and 
gentrification in the borough has continued apace.
This brief history of the initiation of gentrification in Islington bears out a number of 
important points. First, the ability to convert properties preceded the gentrification 
process. Mews conversions in West End suburbs and cottage conversions in the Green 
Belt preceded the 'classic' gentrification experienced in Islington. A case can be made 
for including both these activities, in particular the cottage conversions, under the 
heading of gentrification. I shall return to this question in the following chapter. 
However, in some cases the original gentrifying incomers to rural villages were 
welcomed as a source of new employment (in domestic service), bringing wealth into 
what had been a depressed agricultural community (Humphries and Taylor 1985). The 
displacement effects of classic gentrification were much longer in appearing.
Second, the effect of government policy has clearly been important in promoting 
gentrification, but its influence is ambiguous, both insofar as it has promoted owner 
occupation in general, and as regards the timing of gentrification. On the one hand, the 
property market was freed up around 1953-1954, but middle class inner city 
rehabilitation was already under way at this time. There does not appear to be any single 
legislative event to which one can point and say "that was the catalyst". Munt (1988) 
concurs, arguing that " empirical evidence for this institutional approach is sparse" 
(pi 178), quoting Balchin (1979, pl70) as showing that gentrification in West London 
was "already occurring prior to the considerable increase in improvement grant 
provision". Rees and Lambert (1985) are not alone in arguing that planning policies 
largely ratify private market decisions. Similarly with estate agent behaviour (Munt
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1988). In which case, one is forced back on the macro-economic conditions under 
which gentrifiable housing is produced and also consumed. In the next section, I look at 
the macro-economic changes which have caused the form of consumption to change.
9.4 Dom estic technologies and gender relations in the gentrification  
process
9.4.1 Women in the gentrified housing market
Female participation in the economy was boosted by the Second World War, just as it 
had been in the First, although the boost was less in terms of numbers and more in terms 
of an expanded range of sectors in which women were able to participate. Women 
accounted for only 30.8% of the labour force in 1951, compared with 30.7% in 1931 
(OPCS 1931, 1951). They accounted for about 40% of the labour force nationally in 
1981 (OPCS 1981 Summary Tables Table 1).
Humphries and Taylor (1985) describe the course of female employment in London since 
1945. Most of the growth in this employment was in office work, as the City of London 
stove to retain its financial pre-eminence, but also with the continuation of the shift 
toward service employment (Gershuny 1973). Tourism, advertising, and fashion also 
became major sources of employment.
Of these sectors, the major source of employment growth for both male and female was 
in financial services. Munt (1988) provides a detailed set of tables showing the 
occupational change, 1951-1981, in grouped S.E.G.s for 7 Inner London boroughs 
(City, Camden, Hammersmith & Fulham, Islington, Kensington & Chelsea, Tower 
Hamlets and Westminster). S.E.G. I occupations increased by 3% points, to 19% over 
this period, while all the others declined, except S.E.G. IV, semiskilled and service. 
Munt interprets this as due to the growth of demand for a service sector "to 'service' the 
changing occupational structure, the change [being] in favour of professional and 
managerial structure" (Munt 1988 p i 183). However, it is not easy to put this 
interpretation on the data. Munt does not consider the effect of the New Towns policies 
on the composition of the workforce, which, as has been shown, tended especially to 
attract skilled labour from the inner cities.
A more telling problem with Munt's data is that it considers only males in S.E.G.'s. 
Women are increasingly purchasing residential property on their own account.
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According to figures published by the Nationwide Anglia Building Society (1988), the 
proportion of women borrowing from the society on their own account almost doubled 
(from 8.2% to 15.9%) in the ten years 1975-1985.
Figure 9.2
Female Mortagagees in London compared with national situation 
SO-
ii joint
Female London National (m/f) National (male)
source: Nationwide Anglia Building Society
In the London area 76% of these female borrowers were single. 35% were purchasing 
jointly. 46% of these purchasers were under 30, with an average salary of £17, 160 
annually. 48% of all females were first time buyers, 52% in London. The impact of 
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However, great caution needs to be exercised with figures on women's participation in 
the housing market, in particular their participation in the gentrification process. To put 
their participation in context, I present below some figures on the interactions between 
incomes and house prices in gentrified Islington.
In 1971, over 50% of Islington owner occupiers were high income earners (more than 
£4,160) and 39% of Islington's male S.E.G. I population lived in owner occupied stock 
(Pitt 1977). Despite the increases in owner occupation, totals remained low.
Table 9.2 shows levels of owner occupation for the UK, London and Islington 1951- 
81. The 1951 figure for Islington is unknown, but I am estimating (for reasons see 
below) that the proportion of Islingtons's housing stock which was in owner occupation 
did not rise significantly during the 1950's.
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Table 9.2













(source: Pitt 1977, Conway 1985, Merrett with Grey 1982)
Figure 9.4 shows the changes in owner-occupation levels 1951-1981. Even though 
owner occupation was rising all through this period nationally, it was doing so at a 
decreasing rate. By contrast, within the London region as a whole including Islington, 
owner occupation was rising at an increasing rate.
Figure 9.4



















Table 9.3 shows the trend in incomes in this period. From the available statistics, I have 
compared the average with the upper decile of male white collar workers. This was the 
closest set I could find for income trends in S.E.G. I, the significant group for 
gentrification. The increase in wages and house prices are very closely linked, as would
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be expected given mortgage companies' practice of tying mortgage lending to a multiple 
(usually 2.6 to 2.7) of borrowers’ incomes. In 1981, the average income of borrowers 
for purchase of new properties was £9,500, for all properties £8,700 (Social Trends 
1983). These yield priceAncome ratios of 2.9 and 2.7 respectively.
Table 9.3
Incomes of male white collar workers 1951-1981, weekly wages
1951 1961 1971 1981
High incomes! £30 n/a £60 £209
Average £12 £20 £34 £159
(lupper decile white collar workers, source: Social Trends)
From these ratios and the figures presented in Tables 9.3 and 9.4 (below), some 
evidence on trends in house prices and the maximum permissible mortgage advances may 
be presented for the UK and for Islington (Figure 9.5 below). It can be seen that 
whereas incomes and mortgage advances rose faster than house prices nationally, for 
Islington, the opposite was the case.
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Figure 9.5
Trends in incomes, maximum mortgages and house prices 
197M981
National and Islington data
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The weekly income of a high income earner in 1981, £209, works out at £10,868 
annually; multiplied by 2.9, this yields an implicit house price of only £31,500 in 1981. 
This happens to be the average price of one and two bedroom flats in Islington in 1981. 
(Estimated from estate agents advertisements in the Islington Gazette, January 1981 - 
December 1981; the sample size of prices quoted is however very small, only 15, 
yielding a co-efficient of variation {s/x} of 28%).
Assuming that Pitt's high income earners increased their incomes at least at the same rate 
as those in Social Trends' upper decile over the decade 1971 to 1981 (and there is no 
obvious reason why they should not have achieved at least this), they would have had an 
income of £14,5(X) in 1981. Multiplying by 2.9 gives a figure of £42,(XX), the average 
price of unmodemized properties in the borough (n = 15, (s/x) = 21%). Multiplying 
by 2.7 however gives only £39,125. The average price of a modernized property in 
Islington in 1981, however, was some £58,200 {n -  34, (s/x) = 27%). This is 36%
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higher than the price of an unmodemized property and some 48% higher than even Pitt’s 
high income earners would be able to pay.
Having made this point however, it is as well to stress that the figures quoted are not 
ironclad. The co-efficients of variation are such that even if the figure of £58,000 was 
reduced by 27%, this would yield a figure of £42,500, which would be right at the limit 
of Pitt’s high income earner’s ability to pay. There was in fact some evidence of houses 
remaining unsold and prices dropping slightly. One property which came on the market 
in February 1981 at £59,000 had fallen to £56,000 by August.
P.Williams (1976) reckoned that these price movements meant that Islington properties 
were tending to come into line with other Inner London house prices in the 1960s. In 
other words, the investment of domestic technologies was bringing the flow of housing 
services from these properties into line with modem properties of equivalent size and 
design, as suggested in Chapter 7. The evidence from the 1981 figures further suggests 
that real capital gains were to be had for those who had already purchased their properties 
in 1971. Again, this is what might be expected from the arguments presented in Chapter 
7.
By 1981, the only way in which an upper decile household could afford a property in 
Islington would be if it contained two upper decile adults in employment. Assuming that 
these two adults were male and female yields the following results. Average female 
white collar wages in 1981 were £96 weekly, and the upper decile of female wages was 
173% of this figure. This would yield an income of £166 per week, £8636 annually. A 
dual income heterosexual couple in the upper deciles of income eamers would then have 
a joint income of £19,5(X). Multiplying that by 2.9 gives a figure of £56,560. In short, 
in 1981, a single upper decile income eamer could afford a fiat in Islington, but it would 
have taken two upper deciles in full time employment to afford to buy a house. This 




House Prices 1951-1981 (current prices)
1952/3 1961 1971 1981
Islington £262Qi £3,1002 £10,2102 £48,2506
London/SE £23024 £34504 £69204 £30,0003
UK
new5 £2810 £5510 £28,100
average^ .... £2722(4) £5775 £23,000
(sources: iHumphries & Taylor 1985, ^P.Williams 1976, ^Regional Statistics, 
^Holmans 1990, 5Social Trends 6All properties: estimated from Estate Agents' 
advertisements,/j/mgto/i Gazette 1981 - sample size 64, co-efficient of variation 
35%, )
This also gives a clue as to the where of gentrification. If the cost of new building sets 
the price of all housing, regardless of its actual historic and renovation costs, as most 
commentators agree (Chapter 7 above), then households will in the long run be allocated 
to housing on the basis of its price and their income. The unprecendented ability of 
developers to rehabilitate old properties to modem standards more cheaply than it would 
cost to rebuild those properties, means that gentrifiers come to be allocated to the inner 
city.
On the other hand, it does not tell us very much about the impact of changing gender 
relations as causal factors in the gentrification process. Specifically, just from looking at 
these figures it cannot be determined whether house prices in Islington rose in response 
to demand from women entering the upper echelons of the labour force, and expressing 
their new found economic muscle in the housing market, or whether women who would 
otherwise given up a career on marriage have been forced to remain in full-time 
employment simply to help meet with the mortgage repayments. Did the entry of women 
into the labour market push up the price of housing or did the rising price of housing 
drag women into the labour market?
If the purchase of gentrified houses does increasingly require the resources of a two- 
income household, and single women are increasingly entering the market for property, 
therefore, their occupational dynamics cannot be ignored (Bondi 1990). Tables 9.5 & 
9.6 (summarized in Figure 9.6) provide an attempt to redress this balance by considering 
the growth of the female labour force during this period and, in particular the growth of 
high status female employment
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Figure 9.6
Women in the labour force 
1961-1981
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Note that the census categorizes occupational groups bv residence^ but industrial status 
by place o f work. These categories only overlap at the aggregate level. I have therefore 
used the following joint occupational/industrial status categories in defining high status 
for the purposes of constructing these tables, "self-employed with employees", 
"managers large establishments", "professional workers". This is a fairly reasonable 
approximation to Munt's groupings^. For comparison, a analysis of female employment 
for the 1981 census S.E.G. I category (1981a) is provided for Great Britain and for 
Greater London.
Tables 9.5a & b compare the participation of women in the labour force nationally and 
regionally. Comparisons are provided between women’s participation in the labour 
force, the proportion of that participation which can be considered high status, and 
between the relative success of women and men at obtaining these high status posts. If 
women were to be represented in high status occupations at the same rate as their 
participation in the labour force. Figure 9.6 would show the triangles and the solid circles 
overlapping precisely. If women were to be equally represented with men in high status 
labour, the proportions of high status female (male) labour to total female (male) labour 
would be the same, i.e., the squares and the vertical bars would overlap precisely, along 
the line of the crosses (high status labour as a proportion of total labour). High status 
labour accounted for 10.98% of total labour in 1981.
1 Employers and managers in central and local government, industry, commerce 
etc. - large establishments; Employers and managers in small establishments; 
Professional workers - self employed; Professional workers - employees; and farmers- 
employers and managers (Munt 1988 p i 186).
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Table 9.5a
Status of women in the labour force 1961-1981
1961 1971 1981 (1981a)
Working in Great Britain
Total female participation 
in the labour force
(% total employed) 32.4 36.6 39.9 (38.8)
High status female 
participation in the 
labour force
(% total in employment) 1.0 1.34 1.86 (0.39)
High status female labour 
as a proportion of
total female labour 3.1 3.7 4.6 ( 1.03)
High status female labour 
as a proportion of
total high status labour 13.3 15.3 17.2 (10.5)
High status male 
participation in the 
labour force
(% total in employment) 6.6 7.4 9.0 ( 3 . 3 )
High status male labour 
as a proportion of
total male labour 9.7 11.7 14.9 (5.46)
High status labour 
as a proportion of 
total labour
(% total in employment) 7.6 8.8 10.8 ( 3.73)
(source: OPCS Censuses 1961,1971, 1981, Summary Tables, Table 1. 10% sample)
Female high status labour however constituted only 4.6% of total female as against 
14.9% for men. This meant that female high status labour constituted a mere 1.86 
percent of the total labour force. High status males on the other hand constituted 9 
percent of total labour.
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Table 9.5b
Status of women in the labour force 1961-1981
1961 1971 1981 (1981a)
Working in Greater London
Total female participation 
in the labour force
(% total in employment) ... 38.0 39.5 (41.2)
High status female 
participation 
in the labour force
(% total in employment) ... 1.9 2.2 (0.71)
High status female labour 
as a proportion of
total female labour ... 3.1 5.6 (1.7)
High status female labour 
as a proportion of
total h i ^  status labour ... 15.4 17.6 (15.6)
High status male 
participation in the 
labour force
(% total in employment) ... 10.5 10.5 (3.8)
High status male labour 
as a proportion
of total male labour ... 16.9 17.3 (6.5)
High status labour 
as a proportion of 
total labour
(% total in employment) ... 12.3 12.7 (4.5)
(source: OPCS Censuses 1961,1971,1981, Economic Reports, Table 1)
Using the Census categorizations gives lower absolute values of the percentages in the 
high status occupations, but does not alter the relative gap between the position of 
women in the labour force generally and women in high status occupations (39% and 
10% percent nationally and 41% and 16% in Greater London). In any case, the 
important thing to note is the upward trend in female employment, and the painfully slow 
upward trend in high status female employment
Tables 9.6a & b compare female employment in the City of London with occupational 
status among female residents in Islington. If it is true that Islington has been subject to 
gentrification because of its proximity to the City (cf Local Economy Policy Unit 1991),
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then the City comparison is appropriate. Similarly it makes sense to look at occupational 
status in Islington by place of residence, rather than workplace, as when compiling the 
tables for Great Britain and Greater London. Table 9.5b showed that although more 
female workers in Greater London are in high status occupations than the GB average, 
nonetheless they still only remain at approximately half their notional strength in these 
occupations. Table 9.6a indicates why perhaps this is.
Table 9.6a
Status of women in the labour force 1961-1981
1961 1971 1981
Employed in City o f London
Total female participation 
in the labour force
(% total in employment) 34.5 35.4 35.1
High status female 
participation in the 
labour force
(% total in employment) 0.69 1.04 2.16
High status female labour 
as a proportion of
total female labour 2.0 2.9 6.2
High status female labour 
as a proportion of
total high status labour 5.3 7.0 11.35
High status male 
participation in the 
labour force
(% total in employment) 12.4 13.7 16.9
High status male labour 
as a proportion
of total male labour 19.0 21.2 26.0
High status labour 
as a proportion of 
total labour
(% total in employment) 13.1 14.8 19.0
(source: OPCS Censuses 1961,1971,1981, County Reports, Table 3)
Interestingly, though the proportion of high status labour is higher in the City than 
anywhere else, it is exceedingly male dominated. Women only comprise 35% of the City 
labour force, compared to 41% in the conurbation as a whole, which adds up to only
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11.5% of the high status jobs, even though at 2.16%, they have managed to capture quite 
a high(!) proportion of high status jobs compared with the national average. However 
whereas there is an approximately 5 to 1 ratio between male and female participation in 
high status labour in Great Britain and in Greater London (1.86 & 9.0 percent and 2.2 &
5.0 percent, respectively), there is an almost 8 to 1 disparity between male and female 
high flyers in the City of London.
Compare now the representation of women working in high status jobs among Islington 
residents.
Table 9.6b
Status of women in the labour force 1961-1981
1961 1971 1981
Resident in Islington
Total female participation 
in the labour force
(% total economically active) 34.5 41.5 43.1
High status female 
participation in the 
labour force
(% total economically active) 0.13 1.11 1.8
High status female labour 
as a proportion of
total female labour 0.33 2.67 4.2
High status female labour 
as a proportion of
total high status labour 2.4 23.2 35.0
High status male participation 
in die labour force
(% total economically active) 5.2 3.7 3.8
High status male labour 
as a proportion
of total male labour 8.5 6.3 6.7
High status labour 
as a proportion of 
total labour
(% total economically active) 5.3 4.9 5.6
(source: OPCS Censuses 1961,1971, 1981, County Reports, Table 1)
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While still not equally represented on the basis of their participation in the labour force, 
the difference between the proportions of male and female Islington residents in high 
status occupations is a mere 2 t o i .  Women resident in Islington in 1981 account for 
35% of all high status labour, as compared to 43% of all labour. This figure, which has 
risen from 2.4% in 1961 (compared with a 1961 national average of 13.3%), indicates 
dramatically the impact high status women have had on the Islington property market
Figures published by the Nationwide Anglia Building Society (NABS) tend to confirm 
the importance of high status female labour in the London property market (NABS 1989 - 
see also Figures 9.2 & 9.3 above). These figures showed that in 1988 41% of female 
borrowers in the London market had incomes in excess of £18,200 annually, compared 
with only 21% of women nationally, but also compared with only 30% of men 
nationally. This is in line with the 1981 figures for high status female labour in 
Islington. 14% of all women bought properties worth over £70,000. Almost all of these 
were located in London or the South East.
The rise in high status female residence in Islington matches the rise in house prices 
relative to incomes mentioned in the discussion of Tables 9.3 & 9.4. However, the 
evidence of Tables 9.5 & 9.6 show that it is not the high prices that have forced women 
to go out and work. The minuscule participation of women in high status occupations 
both in Islington and beyond can only be interpreted as evidence of just how strong are 
the effects of patriarchy in British society (Duncan 1991, Walby 1989, McDowell 1986, 
Foord & Gregson 1986). Women would hardly be leaving the home to help with the 
mortgage payments for a while if  their chances of getting a job which paid a salary 
commensurate with their mortgage requirements were so low. It must be concluded 
therefore that prices of gentrified property have responded to the entry of women into 
high status occupations.
To conclude, this section has sought to highlight some of the gender issues in the 
gentrification process. It has shown the importance of women in this process in two 
ways, as contributors to joint house purchase, and as purchasers in their own right. The 
spectacular rise in the proportion of high status female labour resident in Islington since 
1961 parallels the growth in property prices in the area. However, it does not appear that 
the causes of this female-led gentrification lie in the growth of the financial services 
sector. Women do equally spectacularly badly in terms of success in City careers. Not 
much support for postindustrialism here, even when given a feminist twist.
It would be wrong therefore to conclude from the forgoing analysis that the streets of 
Islington are filled with high powered female executives.The proportion of women
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resident in Islington working in high status occupations was only 1.8% of the total 
Islin^on labour force in 1981,4.6% of the total female labour force. This is not high. It 
would suggest that though of great interest in understanding the processes of 
gentrification, female participation in the labour markets does not help account for the 
causes of gentrification.
9.42 Domestic technologies and domestic employment
Bondi (1991) also draws attention to the fact that increased participation in the labour 
force is not a uniformly glamorous experience for all women. Most women still work in 
low paid service sector jobs. I have concluded from this that gentrification cannot be 
explained by changes in gender relations in the workplace. Could, however, those 
changes in gender relations which have had an impact on the gentrification process be a 
secondary effect of developments in domestic technologies? Cowans (1983) and 
Hardyment (1988) have both argued that the impact of domestic technologies was to raise 
expectations about standards of cleanliness about the house, so that ironically, women 
work longer hours performing housework now than they did before the advent of 
(especially) electricity into the home. Walby (1990) disagrees. She argues that while 
this might be true for women not in paid labour, women who are economically active are 
able to combine their jobs both as paid workers and unpaid homemakers, because of the 
savings in time that domestic technologies permit. At the same time, for women in high 
status occupations, domestic technologies might permit them to hire in domestic service 
on a part-time basis. As well as making gentrification financially possible, therefore, 
they may also permit some women to participate directly in the process, as well as 
causing some other women to have their labour subsumed within the process, as a new 
breed of domestic servants.
Chapter 8 left domestic technologies still acting as a medium promoting an ideology of 
woman as domestic scientist, as compensation for an isolated suburban existence. These 
technologies were however becoming markedly cheaper. Compare the trends in house 
prices with those of an automatic washing machine over the same period. A washing 
machine is obviously not the be-all and end-all of domestic technologies, though as 
Cowan (1983) and Hardyment (1988) both make clear, it has been possibly the most 
significant of all domestic technologies in terms of its impact on the management of 
domestic work and its class relations. Attempts at creating a mechanical alternative to 
scrubbing clothes by hand form among the earliest of applications of technological 
principles to domestic labour. Despite all the attention given to their development, the
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cost of these machines in 1951 was still extremely high, as noted in Chapter 8. As the 
flagship domestic technology, the comparison is therefore instmctive.
Table 9.7
Automatic washing machine prices 1951-1981 (current prices)
1951 1961 1971 1981
Automatic
washing machine
new £110 . . .  £145 £220
second hand £80 £70
(sources: Ideal H om e , Exchange & Mart, Islington Gazette)
The price of a fully automatic washing machine (Bendix, Indesit, Hoover Keymatic), 
incorporating all the latest improvements, fell from around 4% of the purchase cost of 
housing to less than 1% over this period, less than 0.5% in Islington. If the figure of 
£31,500, the average price of a 1981 Islington flat is used, the ratio rises to 0.69%. If 
the figure of £42,5(X), the average price of an unimproved property is used, the ratio falls 
to 0.52%. Again, this is what would be expected if the arguments in Chapter 7 held.
Table 9.8
Automatic washing machine prices (new) as a percentage of average housing costs 1951 - 
1981
1951 1961 1971 1981
Islington
average 4.1 ... 1.45 0.46
unimproved 0.52
flat 0.69
London/SE 4.74 ... 2.09 0.73
UK .................  2.5 0.95
(sources: Table 9.4, Table 9.7)
These figures are graphed out below. Despite the absence of data for 1961, the trend is 
clear. Domestic technologies have fallen sharply in relation to house prices.
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Obviously an overall set of domestic technology prices would be preferable to only one. 
However no such set of prices exists. Indices for rehabilitation expenditures exist, but 
not in terms of unit costs of rehabilitation inputs (Holmans 1990). However, if the 
relative prices of all domestic technologies have fallen at the same rate as those for 
washing machines (and Hunkins' comparisons would suggest that this is so - Chapter 8 
above), then the non-labour costs of investment in an unimproved property would have 
fallen by about 100%. It of course cannot be proved from these figures that this is the 
percentage by which non-labour costs have fallen. However, in 1980 19% of the output 
value of the construction industry took the form of housing rehabilitation and this 
category made up 48% of total recorded housing output (Merrett with Grey 1982, pl98). 
In 1971, the equivalent figures were 11.5% and 28.5% respectively (HCS 1969-1979). 
In other words, the rehabilitation sector expanded considerably during the 1980s. I do 
not have figures for earlier periods.
More importantly perhaps, the relative cheapness of domestic technologies, combined 
with the value of a gentrifier's time, may mean that Gershuny's arguments about buying 
in services can be applied to gentrification (Hardyment 1988 argues this point). 
Domestic labour has become very expensive for gentrifiers to perform themselves, but it 
could be relatively cheap to purchase: that is, the dreams of the turn of the century 
feminists and socialists about the liberating potential of domestic technologies, their 
capacity for the reorganization of domestic labour, and the buying in of domestic
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services, may be about to come true, though in a very class specific way.
However, the census data is ambiguous on this point. Tables 9.9a, b & c show the 
evolution of domestic labour since 1931. Note that in these tables, the percentages are all 
taken as a proportion of the economically active labour force, and are figures for 
employment of those resident within the census boundaries. This is for two reasons. 
Percentages of economically active is a better measure than simply percentages of those 
in employment. Note for example the smaller figures for female participation which 
result when all the economically active are taken into account. Note also the very small 
rise in female employment, a mere 8.1% over 50 years.
Table 9.9a
Domestic labour 1931-1981 
(% economically active)
Great Britain
Women in the 
labour force
Domestic servants 






























0.51 1.80 0.22 1.15 0.15 0.80 0.03 0.33
0.84
0.05 ...
aEngland & Wales 100% b Great Britain 100% c Great Britain 10% 
(source: OPCS Occupation and Industry Tables 1931-1981)
Figures for the economically active can only be given by place of residence, and not for 
place of work. In this instance however, it is doubtful whether women engaged in 
domestic service in Islington would travel very far to undertake that employment. 
Therefore, it is possible to compare participation rates by economically active in the 
borough.
The extent to which women depended on domestic service for employment, as late as the 
1920s and 30s can be clearly seen from Table 9.9a. However, female workers in
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London were less dependent on this sector.
Table 9.9b
Domestic labour 1931-1981 
(% economically active)
London
193 Id 1951e 1961f 1971 1981
m f m f m f m f m f
Women in the
labour force 35.1 34.3 ... 36.5 38.8
Domestic servants
in the labour force 0.8 36.81 0.51 2.26 ... 0.07 0.52 0.03 0.33
Female domestic 
servants/total female
labour (%) 19.39 6.5 ... 1.6 0.90
Male domestic 
servants/total male
labour (%) 1.29 0.78 ... 0.12 0.05
d London & Middlesex e census defined London conurbation f data not available
(source: OPCS County Reports - Occupation and Industry Tables 1931-1981)
The "missing link" which a 1941 census would have been able to provide means that the 
timing of the dramatic drop in domestic labour as a category of employment cannot be 
precisely specified. It is not possible to tell whether the trends charted were already 
under way before 1939 or not. Nonetheless the war must have had a tremendous impact 
on the decline of domestic labour (Mack & Humphries 1985).
There are no signs in the national or London trends that domestic service has experienced 




Domestic labour 1931-1981 
(% economically active)
Islington
1931g 1951g 1961g 1971 1981
m f  m f  m f  m f  m :
Women in the
labour force 37.6 36.2 34.5 41.5 43.1
Domestic servants
in the labour force 0.18 2.76 0.02 0.57 0.03 0.35 0.39 0.65 0.02 0.19
Female domestic 
servants/total female
labour (%) 7.34 1.57 1.02 1.60 0.55
Male domestic 
servants/total male
labour (%) 0.28 0.04 0.05 0.67 0.03
Domestic servants
(raw data) 326 5138 42 969 60 640 420 700 20 230
g Islington & Finsbury
(source: OPCS County Reports: Occupation and Industry Tables 1931-1981)
As can be seen, the numbers in domestic service resident in Islington have historically 
been extremely low (even though female participation rates have been similarly high), 
reflecting no doubt the lack of middle class demand for domestic labour in the borough. 
But there are mysterious blips in the trends, such as the drop in female participation rates 
between 1951 and 1961, and in particular also the rise in domestic service, in particular 
male domestic service, between 1951 and 1971, and especially after 1961. Domestic 
service is not a category of employment which is liable to much change in definition 
between one census and the next. The numbers quoted are however from a 10% sample, 
not the whole population. Given that the numbers are so small the estimated figure of 
420 may simply be a sampling error.
There is also a marginal (9%) rise in the numbers of women employed in domestic 
service between 1961 and 1971, (against a background of declining importance in this 
sector for female employment) but neither trend is continued through to 1981. Again, it 
is unclear why this should be so. The economy at this point was in the throes of Mrs 
Thatcher's economic experiment (Keegan 1985). However these figures are for 
occupational groups and therefore apply whether one is in employment or not. Maybe
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women working in this sector got fed up and sought employment elsewhere during 1971 
to 1981, or simply retired. Or maybe new forms of domestic services, such as pre­
cooked meals and microwaves freed up a little extra time which could be devoted to 
doing the things the 'help' was previously paid to do. This is not a very highly 
researched area.
However, one important point which this analysis does bring out is that when 
commentators talk of dramatic rises in female employment in recent years, this is not 
correct What there has been however is a dramatic shift in the sectors in which women 
work. I have already noted the very slight rise in female participation in the (paid) labour 
force since 1931, but in 1931 domestic service accounted for nearly 21% of all female 
employment nationally and this had fallen to less than 1% in 1981. Domestic 
technologies have had a considerable impact in causing this shift (Glucksmann 1981, 
Miller 1983, 1991). When commentators talk of the rise of female participation in the 
paid economy, what they really should be pointing out is the rise of female participation 
in the male paid economy.
There is however little evidence to show that domestic technologies have had much effect 
on the organization of the domestic economy, paid or unpaid, in this process. Women, 
whatever their occupational status, are still likely to be responsible for the bulk of the 
housework done in home (Cowan 1983, Hardyment 1988 Walby 1990). Progress in 
domestic technology production has done little except cheapen, probably considerably, 
the process of rehabilitation. While I have argued that their impact on class relations has 
been considerable, there is little evidence that domestic technologies have promoted 
changes in gender roles which have led in themselves to an impact on gentrification via 
participation in the labour and thus the housing markets. Although the changing class 
relations involved in the introduction of domestic technologies have meant increased 
opportunities in other sectors of the economy, women's employment prospects in total 
have not dramatically increased since the 1930s. Apart from the enhanced status of the 
women benefitting from this process, the gentrifiers have not brought with them a new 
model of how the domestic and social economy might be organized in the future.
268
9.5 Social change and gentrification: causes and effects
9.5.1 Causes
I have argued, against those who would seek the origins of gentrification in qualititative 
changes in the bases of accumulation, that the introduction of domestic technologies was 
the primary enabling factor allowing for gentrification to become a possibility. 
Ironically, it was its application to housing which had originally been designed for 
servant use that helped bring about gentrification. However, the domestic and gender 
relations, which the production of that housing had such a role in helping constitute, did 
not appear to have changed that much. Just as there was little evidence of 
post-industrialism in the impact of gentrification, there was little evidence of new forms 
of organization of domestic labour.
The trends in social composition of Islington residents from 1971 to 1981 were as shown 
in Table 9.10 below.
Table 9.10
Socio-economic composition of Islington residents 1971-1981 
(% economically active or retired persons)
S .E .G ’s 1971 1981 Difference
1-4, 13
Professional, Managers 7.7 11.2 +3.5
5-6
Juniors, Intermediate
Non-Manual 28.1 30.1 +2.0
8,9,12,14
Foreman, Skilled-Manual,
Self-Employed 21.4 19.5 -1.9
7,10,15
Personal Service,
Semi-Skilled 20.1 20.4 +0.3
11,16
Unskilled, Armed Forces 10.3 8.7 -1.6
17
Inadequately Described,
Not Stated 12.1 10.2 -1.9
Total Persons (working,
seeking work, retired) 127,230 99,890
(source: L.B.Islington, Planning Department - reworked from Census data)
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The percentages given here for S.E.G. I differ slightly from those quoted in the 
construction of Figure 9.1. This is because of the different denominator used in the 
calculations, persons here as opposed to heads of households in Figure 9.1.
Against a background of a falling population, S.E.G. I s have increased proportionally 
to the rest of the population. However, comparing percentage point differences in this 
way hides the true scale of the change which has occurred. Table 9.11 reworks these 
figures using actual population data.
Table 9.11


















I 9797 11188 14.2 7723 3465 35.4
n 35752 30067 -15.9 28182 1885 5.3
m 27227 19479 -28.5 21462 -1983 -7.3
IV 25573 20378 -20.3 20158 220 0.9
V 13105 8690 -33.7 10330 -1640 -12.5
VI 15395 10189 -33.8 12135 -1946 -12.6
Totals 126849 99991 -21.2 99991 0
Overall % change -0.788
(source Table 9.10 - n.b. the totals do not quite match in the two tables because of 
rounding in the percentages quoted in there)
Column (6) shows the 'real' rates of change in socio-economic classes in Islington. It 
shows the extent to which change in the S.E.G. composition of Islington residents is 
above or below that which could be expected from the falling numbers of residents. 
Overall, population decrease in the borough's economically active population was - 
21.2%. If this decrease was evenly distributed among all classes, the resulting class 
distribution should appear as in column (4). The difference between the actual and the 
predicted distribution shows the real effect of population change in the various classes. 
This is given in column (6). Figures 9.4a and 9.4b graph the percentage and raw data 
respectively.
Overall, S.E.G. I's resident in the borough increased only by 14% over the period 1971-
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1981. But when the effects of population decline are taken into account, this works out 
at a real increase, over where the 1981 population is concerned, of 36%. S.E.G. II's, 
junior executives, also increased, in ’real' terms, though at a much lower rate. S.E.G. 
TV's, personal services & semi-skilled, remained more or less constant.
Figure 9.8a
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(source Table 9.11)
Figure 9.8b brings out quite clearly the fact that despite the large 'real' increase in S.E.G. 
I's in Islington in the period 1971-1981, their overall numbers remained nevertheless 
very low.
Figure 9.8b
























The populations in the other groups did experience 'real' rates of decline. These groups,
skilled manual and unskilled, are clearly not functional to the economy of the City. Rose
(1985) argued that gentrification was a contradictory process, because the gentrifying
population, who tended to hold executive positions in downtown corporations were
displacing "crucial service workers and clerical support staff for the headquarters'
functions of the CBD of the corporate city". The experience of gentrification in Islington
appears to support Beauregard's (1986) contrary hypothesis that the displacement that
characterizes gentrification occurs to groups no longer functional to the capitalist
accumulation process. This analysis is borne out by the Local Economy Policy Unit,
who have shown that Islington and Hackney are regarded by City employers as potential
residential locations, but not as sources of recruitment for its workforce {Guardian Nov 8
1991 pl7). Hamnett & P.Williams (1979 p i3) have also argued that:
It is frequently assumed that gentrification has proceeded through the purchase of 
working class owner-occupied property by the middle classes, but the... evidence 
[from P.Williams' study of the process of gentrification in Islington] tends to 
support the view that it occurs through the diminution of the private rented sector and 
the displacement of low status and often elderly tenants.
(1979 pl3)
The existence of a large group of retired working class tenants implies a decline in 
employment opportunities for the categories of work that these tenants had formerly 
engaged in, i.e., the prior creation of a vulnerable population - vulnerable that is to being 
displaced by the gentrification process. The actual rates of population decline in Islington 
among the semi-skilled and manual groups would appear to bear this out. In fact, rates 
of decline in the population of the semi-skilled and manual groups are not nearly so 
marked, when the overall effect of population decline is taken into account. Their 'real' 
rates of decline are only between a third and a quarter of their actual rates. If change in 
the occupational structure is occurring, such as the change to a post-industrial society, it 
has been occuring far too slowly to account for the occurrence of gentrification. An 
analysis of multiple deprivation carried out by Townsend (1987) on behalf of the Low 
Pay Unit shows that, of the 755 wards in Greater London, all of Islington's wards are in 
the worst 140, apart from St.Peter's, at 177, and Canonbury West at 217. Admittedly, 
the worst Islington ward of all, St.George's, ranks as high as 9 7 but  there was no 
ward within Islington which one could say was marked by the high consumption 
oriented living standards which could be supposed to mark post-industrialism. And this 
is after 30 years of gentrification in the borough.
The opportunities created by the advent of domestic technologies must be countered by 
the extremely low number of houses surviving from the nineteenth century. The census 
of 1891 quotes a figure of only 8,578 houses in Islington SE and 5,563 houses in
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Bamsbury, the areas which constitute the gentrified parts of modem Islington. This 
gives us the maximum number of houses potentially available for gentrification. But 
given the extent of bomb damage in Islington during the Second World War, and slum 
clearances subsequently, present numbers must be even lower.
This low number helps explain why, once domestic technologies are invested in an inner- 
city building, its value soars. There are so few of these buildings that the simple laws of 
supply and demand ensure that the price for them will be high, once renovated. The 
renovation affects the downward shift in occupancy rates in two ways. First the 
technologies permit the running of a larger property per unit of domestic labour. Second, 
high levels of occupancy were imposed by the level of rents in relation to the low 
incomes of the multiply occupying tenants. The higher incomes of the new occupiers 
mean that they can afford to 'rent' larger units from themselves.
And it is the short supply of this housing, though critical in understanding why 
gentrification involves spectacular rises in the price of housing in gentrified 
neighbourhoods, which is at the heart of the problem. In 1971, Islington ranked 28th 
out of 32 London boroughs in terms of owner-occupancy with only 13.4% of its 
housing stock owner-occupied. By 1981, this figure had risen to 16.95% but Islington 
had slipped to 29th place in the league table of owner-occupation in London. Even at 
16.95% however, the rate of owner occupancy in Islington remains extremely low in 
comparison with the national average of 56%, and not all of this would represent 
gentrified stock. Highbury, for instance has never known any significant downward 
trend in status or relative value (Zwart 1973 p25). Other components would, as 
mentioned, represent council house sales.
Where's the beef? Why does gentrification attract such attention? It poses interesting 
questions for theories of urbanization of which I hope I have identified the crucial one, 
that of the role of domestic technology. But quantitatively it is insignificant. As 
mentioned already, in 1891, the total housing stock of Islington SE and Bamsbury was 
only some 14,141 dwellings. By 1901, this figure had fallen to 13592. This is not a 
very substantial peg on which to hang the accounts of post-industrial society which 
gentrification is claimed to represent.
9.5.2 Ejfects
One reason for concern nonetheless would be the social effects of displacement, either
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by eviction or through being priced out of the market. Islington is not the only area of 
London to have experienced gentrification, so even if the housing stock of Islington is 
comparatively small, the total numbers threatened by displacement in the whole of 
London would still be substantial. Such arguments overlook four things. First, 
gentrification as it takes place in New York or Docklands loft or warehouse conversions 
involves no displacement at all. Gentrifiers in these locations occupy disused industrial 
premises. Second, they overlook the impact of government policy, both in its promotion 
of New Towns and in its emphasis on promoting rehabilitation. Third there is the 
continual reorganization of the bases of accumulation in capitalist production. 
Government policy has been to move people out of the overcrowded inner city, and the 
manufacturing jobs on which these people depended have also gone. If the housing 
stock is to be rehabilitated through the efforts of its occupiers, then displacement in these 
circumstances seems a logical option, not an untoward effect
Fourth, as also noted, there are not very many gentrifiers. Let us suppose for 
arguments' sake that each S.E.G. I who moved into Islington between 1971 and 1981 
displaced 3 other people from the borough; houses which had been subdivided to provide 
accommodation for three working class families were restored as a single family dwelling 
for a gentrifying S.E.G. I family. Let us further suppose that all families were the same 
size. Then every S.E.G. I who moved into Islington would displace three working class 
people in S.E.G.s III to VI. This would still only account for 18% of Islington's loss of 
its working class population in this period. To be fully responsible for Islington's 
population decline in this period, each S.E.G. I, and every member of their family,who 
moved into Islington would have to have displaced over 20 other people each. Figures 
on displacement are in themselves hard to come by (LeGates & Hartman 1986), but even 
so it is hard to imagine that each member of a gentrifying S.E.G. I family could be 
responsible for that much displacement. To argue that the effects of gentrification on 
London as a whole are indeed substantial, when the total numbers of surviving Victorian 
and Edwardian properties are added up, does not get around the problem that the 
numbers of gentrifiers themselves do not appear to be that great. Secondly, though the 
figures for Islington suggest rapid rates of in-migration of upper-middle class people into 
the borough. Figure 9.1 suggests that this is little more than a catching-up exercise, 
whereby Islington is approaching the national average. This would support the argument 
that gentrification is a transitory phenomenon, the result of the disembodiment of 
technical progress in the provision of housing services as a result of the cheapening of 
domestic technologies. I have already suggested that analysis is coloured by the fact that 
no-one likes gentrification and that gentrifiers are therefore regarded as legitimate targets. 
The expressed concern over untoward effects of gentrification such as displacement, 
when compared with the actual impact, would seem to bear this out.
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9.6 Conclusion: why is there so much controversy over gentrification?
I have shown that the causes of gentrification are very simplç, the application of domestic 
technologies to existing structures. I have also shown that gentrification has been 
facilitated by long-standing government policies, and that quantitatively, its impact is 
negligible. So where is the beef? Bondi notes that fundamental to gentrification is 
contrast:
This perspective implies that gentrification is, by definition, a process of transition.
It is, therefore, liable to be self-defeating in that, if an initial invasion of new territory
is successful, the source of contrast may eventually be entirely expunged.
(Bondi 1991 p ll7 )
This returns us to the themes of gentrification as fashion, as discussed in Chapter 3 and 
the larger questions of culture discussed in Chapter 6. Just now I stated that the "simple 
laws of supply and demand" could explain the rise in property prices once the buildings 
became renovated. Whatever the reasons underlying the conditions of supply and 
demand however, the social consequences of gentrification cannot be deduced from the 
economic rationale for its existence, namely the gains from applying domestic 
technologies to an existing housing stock. If gentrifiers are seizing upon areas which, in 
the act of being seized upon, makes those areas fashionable, then domestic technologies 
merely facilitate this activity.
Nor, as I have also argued, can they be deduced from theories of economic class. 
Fashion itself has no intrinsically class or status connotations. But fashion is used to 
make statements about identity, and as R.Williams makes clear, these statements, like all 
other communications between individuals-in-society, are imbedded in the culture of that 
society (R.Williams 1977). Although I have argued that class considerations cannot 
explain gentrification, I have been careful to avoid any suggestion that societies in which 
gentrification occurs are not class based. Class is fundamental to gentrification, but not 
in the directed unmediated fashion indicated by SCA (Chapter 4 above). This argument 
forms the conclusion to this thesis.
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10 The 'country' in the 'city': gentrification, class and 
hegemony
10.1 Aims and Issues
The last three chapters have demonstrated how gentrifiers gentiify because they can, and 
why they might want to. They are able, within the limits set by the financing process, to 
invest domestic technologies in old properties, which their Victorian forebears had 
abandoned, and thereby make windfall profits from the rise in property values which 
flow from this. However, it is also apparent that gentrification is of only limited 
quantitative importance, and is a transient phenomenon to boot, characteristic only of this 
period of adjustment to the rehabilitation possibilities offered by the cheapening of 
domestic technologies. What then drives the gentrification debate on? What gives 
gentrification such political and social significance when it is of such limited quantitative 
and historical importance? Furthermore the account of gentrifiers' motives in gentrifying 
has been largely passive. The question as to why people might actively wish to gentiify 
has yet to be be properly investigated. To answer all these questions it will be necessary 
to return to themes presented in Chapters 1, 3 ,5  and 6, thus shifting attention back from 
the question of gentrification as a housing market phenomenon to the question of the 
construction of identity in the city, and the role of a sense of place in constructing that 
identity.
Chapter 6 discussed how conditions of modernity render it necessary actively to create a 
sense of place. In the anonymous city, houses, in their role as homes, represent the 
stable moment of Park’s 'mobility, stability, consciousness' triad, and this gives effect to 
housing in constituting a 'sense of place'. Issues of status and identity would not have 
any 'purchase' on gentrification, if housing in general (including gentrified housing) did 
not itself have an important role in the construction of identity. Beginning with the 
personal should not implicitly mean neglecting questions of class and class 
consciousness, however. As Blanchard (1985) argues, quite correctly, an understanding 
of class consciousness can only begin from an understanding of individual 
consciousness (cf. Chapter 6.4). Personal identity under conditions of modernity is, as 
D.Sayer (1991) makes clear, founded in class-based exploitation. In this chapter, I wish 
to explore how sense of place is specifically affected, not Just by the experience of 
modernity generally but also by the specific experience of class society. In particular, I 
shall argue that this sense of place is constructed within the context of an ongoing 
hegemony which seeks to overcome the class contradictions which lie at the heart of the 
capitalist mode of production (cf. Chapter 1). It is the way in which the constitution of
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houses as 'places' is articulated within/appropriated into a particular hegemonic project 
that class relations enter gentrification.
Understanding how issues of identity and place relate within and to this wider context is 
therefore crucial to understanding the significance of gentrification. I shall argue that 
while, quantitatively speaking, gentrification itself is not significant, contests over 
gentrification resonate throughout a much wider cross-section of society insofar as they 
relate on the one hand to the struggle to maintain a dominant, yet contested, hegemony, 
and on the other, to the construction of identity through a sense of place.
From a cultural materialist perspective, the question of hegemony is an inseparable part 
of the question of the material conditions of production and reproduction. One cannot 
look just at work and housing, without also looking at the meanings bound up in and 
produced with them. At the same time, the importance of hegemony must not be allowed 
to obscure the fact that any accumulation process does not simply depend on the 
reproduction of the social relations which constitute it, it also depends on the 
accumulation of material products (or in the case of gentrification the lack of 
accumulation of material products, i.e., houses available to be gentrified). Indeed it is 
the emphasis placed on looking at the actual material production of gentrifiable houses in 
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 of this thesis which enables it to overcome the difficulties of 
conceptualization and explanation of gentrification from which other analyses have 
suffered. Every other analysis has simply taken it for granted that the capacity to produce 
gentrified housing exists. Nevertheless, to understand the controversy over the material 
processes of gentrification it is necessary to understand their symbolic aspects, and this 
means taking the metaphorical aspects of gentrification seriously, not dismissing them as 
obscuring, in some chaotic fashion, the 'real' relations of gentrification (cf. Chapters 2 & 
3). Only in examining how the metaphor of gentrification itself invokes persistent themes 
in a dominating and long-standing hegemony, is it possible to show how gentrification 
relates to class.
10.2 Hegemony and place
A successful hegemony (or hegemonic project - Hall 1980 - 1988 pl68) is one able to 
articulate personal experience convincingly, but, in a manner which suggests that that 
experience is natural, therefore inevitable and therefore unchallengeable. Hegemonic 
practices always involve processes of struggle and contestation, however; they are not 
unchallengeable themselves (R.Williams 1977 ppl 12-125). As Hall writes:
Hegemony' implies: the struggle to contest and dis-organize an existing
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political formation; the taking of a leading position' (on however minority a 
basis) over a number of different spheres of society at once - economy, civil 
society, intellectual and moral life, culture; the conduct of a wide and 
differentiated type of struggle; the winning of a strategic measure of popular 
consent; and thus the securing of a social authority sufficiently deep to conform 
society into a new historical project It should never be m ist^en  for a finished 
or settled project It is always contested, always trying to secure itself, always 
'in process'.
(Hall 1988 p7)
Hegemony proceeds by means of 'selective tradition' (R.Williams 1977): from the 
myriad events which have occurred in the past, only hegemony emphasises only those 
which advance its strategy to render natural the current, historically specific, forms of 
class-exploitation that it seeks to defend.
Social science depends on the same processes of selective tradition as do hegemonic 
practices: of all the events that have occurred in social life, the social scientist makes a 
selection in order to ratify his or her explanation of those events. Thus Smith highlights 
'structure' while Ley, looking at the same processes, highlights 'agency'. The hegemony 
exercised by the social scientist over his or her material, while it can be challenged by 
other, equally hegemonic accounts, is further evidence of the truth of Nietzsche's dictum 
that power produces knowledge rather than vice versa (Chapter 3 above).
Successful construction of hegemonies 'from above' depends on making connections 
with personal experience 'from below' (Hall 1988 p8). R.Williams (1977) argues that it 
is at such points of connection that hegemonic practices are at their strongest but also at 
their most vulnerable, since most open to challenge. A sense of place constitutes one 
such point of connection.
The concept of 'place' is not to be regarded as a pre-existing independent entity; it is 
always created and re-created by the inhabitants of that 'place (R.Williams (1973a - 
1980). This means that 'place' is created and re-created with reference to personal 
experience and therefore to memory. A 'sense of place' is consequently experienced at 
the personal or individual level, rather than at the collective or class level (cf. Chapter 6). 
However, memory is inevitably selective, and thus it is that personal experience of a 
sense of place can be retrieved and adapted to a particular hegemonic project.
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10.3 Class Struggle, Status And The Structuring Of Identity
As argued in this thesis, the question of identity is one which Marxists have tended to
ignore, as Hall & al. (1988, 1990) concede. Blanchard, comparing and contrasting
Engels' and Baudelaire's motives for writing about the city makes clear the reason why:
[For Baudelaire] life in the city is primarily a question of identification with the 
others with whom he shares a common space...
This quest fo r the se lf which was of no concern to Engels, because the social 
critic flatters himself that his only problem is to know others in their external 
material context, is the fundamental problem in the city.
(Blanchard 1985, ppl(H /5 ,106 emphasis added)
The quest for the self is the fundamental problem because status and identity are so fluid 
in the Soft City (Raban 1974). However, I have also argued (6.6 above) that status and 
identity are rendered fluid by the constant re-organization of work under conditions of 
capitalist accumulation, and introduced the concept of indirect, positional, forms of class 
struggle in order to bring out this experience of class more clearly. Whereas direct, 
confrontational, struggle is over participation in specific labour processes, positional 
struggles are for central status with regard to the processes of capitalist accumulation 
(Redfem 1992).
As discussed above and in Chapter 3, status is displayed and ratified in the consumption 
of possessions (D.Miller 1987, McCracken 1988, Wilson 1985), in particular in the 
possession of private property. But private property is predicated on conditions of civil 
society, and in such a society other people are, as Marx said, not a realization of the 
property-owner's freedom, but a barrier to it. The right to exclusive occupation of an 
area, the right to real property, naturally (under capitalism) denies that right to others. 
Ironically, "Property", therefore, "must be willing to bear the cost of government and the 
law" (Offer, 1981 p401); ironic because it must be willing therefore to permit 
governments to appropriate property, in taxes.
The pursuit of status via property raises many other contradictions among the
obligations, dependencies and insecurities which accompany such a pursuit
Like Isaiah Berlin's fox, this book knows many things'. ... the development 
of land law and the distribution of tenures, the unfolding of political discourse, 
the certitudes of economics and the constraints of the economy, the 
development of interest groups, the growth of social movements, and the 
mental and cultural dimensions of ownership. Behind this diversity of 
appearances, one senses a stubborn hedgehog, who 'knows one big thing'.
This is the pursuit of security and esteem: fleeting possessions that can only be 
captured and secured by the institutions of property.
(Offer 1981 p.xiii)
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It is not so much the hypocrisy, or unattainability of the ideals sought, in the pursuit of 
status in a society which apparently only property can secure; rather it is that, given such 
a society, this is the 'necessary form' of the contradictions which lie at its heart. Indeed 
given that those contradictions have not substantially altered, one can see why 
gentrification could have such an important function, not merely as a means to assisting 
personal accumulation, but also as a means of acquiring status in a specific cultural 
conjuncture. However, as Chapter 6.6 argued: "Gentrification undermines the 
ontological security of the inhabitants of a place by permitting gentrifiers to turn it into a 
new place, of their own. It is here that the resistance to gentrification begins.
However, even active resistance to gentrification from the potential displacees does not 
imply class struggle between them and their displacees. Rather, gentrification should be 
regarded as condensing the results of positional struggle for central status in the labour 
process. This is not to suggest, as do the postindustrialists, that gentrification 
'expresses' the attempt of some social group to create, constitute or reconstitute their 
class or status position, that gentrification is 'expressed' through housing, and therefore 
has an ideal existence prior to or separate from housing (for the same reasons as 'place' 
has no such prior existence either). Status is, notoriously, expressed through symbols. 
But, as R.Williams writes, the meanings such symbols convey "is always produced', it is 
never imply expressed" (1977 p i66). Housing, like other forms of consumption, has a 
dual role: in the reproduction of labour power; and in the shaping, maintenance and 
enhancement of status. However, it is also a place in which those other forms of 
consumption and status formation are carried on. It is the sense of place which these 
activities engender, and the space which these activities occupy, which gives housing its 
unique role in positional forms of class struggle over the labour process.
Gentrification cannot therefore be thought of as an explicit or unmediated outcome of 
positional struggle, either. Contests over the meaning of an urban place, and the status to 
be derived from it, help understand the hegemonic significance of gentrification 'from 
below', that is, from the point of view of questions of personal security (status) both of 
those displaced by the process, and also the pretensions to status exhibited by the 
gentrifiers. This is how descriptions of contests over gentrification are usually framed 
(Pitt, 1977, Schaffer & N.Smith 1988, Chapter 3 above). However, such descriptions 
are only half the story, and this is why gentrification's metaphors are so inadequate. 
Gentrification also needs to be understood 'from above', from the point of view of those 
doing the displacing, as forming a bridge between a real material source of experience 
and its representation, "through specific ideological forces and campaigns" (Hall 1980 - 
1988 pl37), in terms of a more general hegemonic project (Hall 1980 - 1988 p l54  &
10.4 below). It is in this context that the metaphors of 'country' and 'city' are produced.
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Only then are they adapted and put to use in the service of gentrification.
10.4 The country and the city
Of all the metaphors associated with gentrification, the most important is that of 
'gentrification' itself. The term 'gentrification' is derived from 'gentry', the English non- 
aristocratic rural landowning class. London & Palen (1977) report a lively debate on a 
range of (equally metaphorical) terms, such as inner city revitalization and urban 
renaissance, thought suitable for the processes covered by the term gentrification. 
Despite this, the original coinage, by Glass (1963) has stuck, not just in the UK, but in 
all other Anglophone countries for which the processes of middle class occupation of 
working class areas has been reported. The explanation of why this should be, I believe, 
explains the reasons why gentrification attracts so much attention. This explanation also 
provides a suitable coda to all the themes of this thesis.
Williams argues that the very completeness of the interaction between environment and 
"society" can allow the facts of human labour in the construction of that environment to 
be quite unrecognized (R.Williams 1972-1980, Jackson & S.Smith 1984 pp193-194), 
appear natural, and to become therefore the subject of a dominating hegemony. 
R.Williams (1973b) develops this argument by exploring the history of ideas of country 
and city in English literature, specific ways of seeing and not-seeing class exploitation.
Throughout English history, the exploitative social systems, first feudalism and then 
agrarian capitalism, through which the land has been worked, have at the same time 
represented the countryside thus created as Arcadian paradises, centred on the landlord's 
country-house. With the country-house and grounds symbolizing heaven on earth, all 
social relations which went into the maintenance of house and grounds were deemed 
harmonious, by definition. The exploitation of rural labour on which the whole edifice 
depended could thereby be overlooked, in some cases, even physically removed, as in 
the case of the mediaeval village of Woodstock, demolished and rebuilt beyond the walls 
of the grounds of Blenheim Palace in the course of its construction for the first Duke of 
Marlborough.
As capitalism moved from the country to the towns, literary attention turned to the new 
forms of social, though still exploitative, relationships being created in the towns. It was 
impossible to cover up the consequences of exploitation in the towns, despite Engels' 
suspicions (cf. Chapter 3). However, those consequences were typically not attributed to
282
the social system which had created both city and country, in their various ways, but to 
'the city' or 'city life' itself. The vision which developed therefore was one in which the 
exploitation which had created the city was not so much ignored as obscured by the 
hustle and bustle of the city.
This developing image of the city led in turn to developments in the imagery of the 
country. Writers living and working in the city began to take over the imagery of the 
country as Arcadia as a point of reference for their attempts at describing the experience 
of the city. The country, in other words, was heaven because the city was hell, and the 
country was now defined as everything the city was no t The country became, not merely 
a site of innocence however, but a place to retreat or retire to when city life became too 
much; rarely, if ever, was it seen as the site of labour. City dwellers, along with the 
occupants of the country houses, now connived at the existence of rural exploitation.
With the development of Empire, the perception of London changed again as the country 
house metaphors, centering paradise in the seat of local power, came to be applied to 
London, formerly the Great Wen, but now the seat of Imperial power: "one of the last 
models of 'city and country' is the system we now know as Imperialism" (R.Williams 
1973b p335). The contrast which could now be drawn between progressive city and 
backward country harked back to the mediæval slogan Stadt Luft machtfreU but with a 
significant difference in the meaning of frei. In mediæval times, as Sennett (1991) points 
out, the city was seen as a refuge from feudal obligations; 'freedom' meant sanctuary. 
However, in modem times, this sense of sanctuary has retreated from the city to the 
home; "an Englishman's home is his castle" is an exact idiom for this development.
Freedom in the modem city came to seen less in terms of escape, and more in terms of 
possibilities, enlargement of identity, heightening of faculties, and a heightening of 
danger (R.Williams 1973b p280 ff.), while the ideas of sanctuary and refuge formerly 
associated with the city, and now associated with the home, came, in a last ironic twist, 
to be associated with the country, most notably in the case of the so-called 'Home 
counties' surrounding London.
These literary images of country and city which developed with the development of 
capitalism itself are evidence of the development of new forms of consciousness, as well 
as the persistence of the older forms. The new sense of mobility (Chapter 6 above) was 
one response to the experience of the modem city, the sense of marginality yet another 
(ibid.) and both of these surrounded new stmctures of feeling (3.7 above) as to what 
constitutes a sense of place. These structures of feeling were and are persistently 
expressed in metaphors of 'country' and 'city': 'country' as a place of refuge, security.
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status and identity; ’city' as a place of adventure, insecurity, and lack of status (and 
therefore no identity).
These images can be linked to other aspects of modernity — marginality, in particular, as 
Oliver's description of the architectural styles adopted in the creation of suburbia 
demonstrates: suburbanites as marginal men and women, buying into an Arcadian image 
of Menie Englande:
Poised between a recent history, which for many was best forgotten, and an 
uncertain future; anxious only to secure a worthy home in a good clean 
environment for a growing family, the occupant of Dunroamin's semi-detached 
was happy with echoes made of Britain's Tudor past and largely oblivious of 
the ironic observations made as to his taste. Blurred, inaccurate, romantic, 
patriotic, the 'Tudorbethan' timbers, leaded lights to casement windows, 
chevron and herringbone pattern brickwork on the more expensive detached 
houses were all triggers to the responses which the mythological Elizabethan 
age evoked.
(Oliver gf o/., 1981 pl64)
It is this experience, from below, that informs the metaphors of country and city which 
provide the vocabulary of gentrification. In this view from below, the country or the 
home not only appears to be a retreat from the pressures of city life, but actually is such a 
retreat ("reification is a social process, not a... category error." D.Sayer, 1991 p65).
Nonetheless, the antimonies of country and city depend on accepting also a particular 
class view of the country, on denying in one way or another the exploitative class 
relations which have formed the present shape of the country (and also the city). The 
displacement of the obvious relations of class exploitation in the country leads it to be 
seen instead as a 'natural', and/or 'timeless' state, a consolation, a reconciliation between 
'man' and 'nature', after the unnaturalness of the 'city. But it is a reconciliation achieved 
only by acceptance of a myth, in which all labour in the country, and all requirement for  
labour as well is magically dispensed with. It is through this myth that the 'country' is a 
consolation, since the lucky prizewinner gets the comforts of the rural retreat, without 
having to face the consequences of the exploitative system under whose rules he and/or 
she won their prize.
Although Williams develops his arguments in the context of English literary history, 
these arguments are capable of being more widely applied. Williams (1973b) himself 
makes this claim in his chapter on The New Metropolis^ where he considers the 
extension of the system of 'country and city' to the world at large. The claim is implicit 
also in the discussion of The Figure in the City (Chapter 20), in which Williams uses the 
examples of Balzac, Baudelaire and Dostoevesky, to illustrate his themes. Nonetheless,
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it is true, as Pinckney (1989) points out, that Williams' analysis "leaps... from England 
to Third World in a single bold extension of cultural imagination and political 
sympathy... The simplest meaning of 'new metropolis' - not world-system but the 
internal mutations of the European capitals as a result of such a system is effectively from 
the book " (pl4).
Williams rectifies this omission in The metropolis and the emergence o f Modernism
(1985). Here, the relation between internal mutations and development of artistic forms
is made through the unprecendented rates of immigration into these cities: "it cannot be
too often emphasised how many of the major innovators were, in this precise sense,
immigrants" (R.Williams, 1985 p21). In an analysis which precisely parallels Park's
discussions of culture and civilization (6.5 above), Williams argues that the experience of
immigration, and the consequent need to develop new means of communication in a
world full of strangers, created a "community of the medium: of... practices":
Thus language was perceived quite differently. It was no longer, in the old 
sense customary and naturalized, but in many ways arbitrary and conventional.
To the immigrants especially, with their new second common language, 
language was more evident as a medium - a medium that could be shaped and 
reshaped - than as a social custom. Even within a native language, the new 
relationships of the metropolis, and the inescapable new uses in newspapers 
and advertising attuned to it, forced certain productive kinds of strangeness and 
distance: a new consciousness of conventions and thus of changeable, because, 
now open, conventions.... all were now passed through this crucible of the 
metropolis, which was in the important cases no mere melting-pot but an 
intense and visually and linguistically exciting process in its own right, from 
which remarkable new forms emerged.
At the same time, within the very openness and complexity of the metropolis, 
there was no formed and settled society to which the new kinds of work could 
be related. The relationships were to the open and complex and dynamic social 
process itself, and the only accessible form of this practice was an emphasis on 
the medium: the medium as that which, in an unprecedented way defined art.
(R. Williams 1985 p22)
This passage is interesting for two reasons. First, as Williams (1973b) recognizes,
sometimes, it is impossible not to attribute these new forms of consciousness to the
metropolis itself, which is itself, like Modernism, an international phenomenon:
at times these [ideas of country or city] express, not only in disguise and 
displacement, but in effective mediation or in offered and sometimes effective 
transcendence, human interests and purposes fo r  which there is no other 
immediately available vocabulary. It is not only an absence or distance of more 
specific terms and concepts; it is that in country and city, physically present and 
substantial, \he experience finds material which gives body to the thoughts....
(R.Williams 1973b p350, emphasis added)
Second, the emphasis on the medium in modernity, explains the importance of 
gentrification as fashion, not as a mode of (conspicuous) consumption, as Jager 
analyses it (Chapter 3 above), but as a production/practice, of self-definition, of
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meaning, in the modem metropolitan environment.
The main thrust of Williams' (1985) argument however is, that despite its pretensions to
the contrary, the images forced into consciousness by the experience of the modem
metropolis are not ones divorced from past history. The older forms of expression
continued to serve as means of describing urban experience, as Sharpe also explains:
since many readers of [the city poems of, e.g., Baudelaire or Whitman] have 
not lived in London or Paris, New York or Paterson, even when the poems 
were first published, it is also clear that poems like "Les Sept Vieillards", and 
"Crossing Brooklyn Ferry" speak to their audiences through widely shared 
presuppositions about the representation of the city, and understanding of the 
urban myth and textual conventions that each reader must possess.
(Sharpe, 1990 pxii)
All of these associations of ideas obviously need specifying in the different contexts in 
which the contrast is made: "ideas of the country and the city have specific contents and 
histories",
but just as clearly, at times, they are forms of isolation and identification of 
more general processes.... At every point we need to put the historical realities 
to the ideas...
(R.Williams 1973b p350)
Carter (1985), Sennett (1990) and Sharpe (1990) all comment on the religious 
significance of the grid layouts universally established in North American cities. 
According to Sennett (1990 p62), the grid layout was intended to eliminate not only 
difference within the city, but to eliminate any distinction between city and country, 
thereby aiding the inward orientation of action and character in the Protestant psyche. 
Distinctions between city and country nonetheless survived, notably in idea of the 
frontier as a place of, if not innocence, then certainly of authenticity (3.3 above) which 
then contrasted favourably with the corruption and (literal) sophistication of the big cities 
'back East'. In Australia, 'the outback' has similar associations, in Canada, 'the True 
North, strong and free' (Shields, 1990). Of particular interest however is the 
establishment of 'Country Clubs' in both North America and Australia, which serve 
entirely the same functions as the 'country' in English literature. Despite the fact that the 
oldest (and usually therefore most prestigious) country clubs are often to-day surrounded 
by later suburban developments, the 'country', in both North America and Australia, as 
well as in England, remains the ideal of those who have successfully manoeuvred their 
way through the systems of class and urban exploitation.
"Country" and "city" are metaphors not just of exploitation, but of place - "place" in the 
'city' and "place" in society. It is that dual sense of place which gives rise to the political 
importance of gentrification as an element in hegemonic practices. One objective of
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hegemony is to lay claim to (or to bid for) status as a member of the "imaginary 
community of the nation" (Hall 1988 p8). Gentrification, I shall show below, attempts 
to create and then lay claim to exclusive membership of the 'imaginary community' of the 
'one-nation' - therefore classless - (gentrified) 'neighbourhood' (cf. Pahl 1975, Williams 
1986). As well as condensing an aspect of a specific conjuncture in urbanization and 
capitalist accumulation and the hegemonic strategies surrounding these issues, 
gentrification is also fulfilling a need (for identity through the construction of a 'place'). 
In creating a place for themselves, gentrifiers at the same time exclude the original 
inhabitants from belonging to this place. In fulfilling a need for themselves, to create 
meaning in their lives under conditions of modernity, they deny the original inhabitants 
the ability to fulfill the same need.
10.5 Hegemony and the role of class relations in gentrification
Gentrification, as Bondi points out, is a matter of contrast (1991). However the contrast 
she points to is one between (comparatively) rich and poor. Gentrification has also been 
defined in terms of its contrast with the suburbs, because of the challenge it offered to 
theories of urbanization and urban growth (Ch.7 above). The intuition that something 
radically different was occuring in cities with the onset of gentrification is one which has 
carried through to the literature, postindustrialism in particular, hence the contrast with 
the suburbs - gentrification: a new form of housing for the middle class, ergo a new 
middle class. I want to argue in distinction to both Bondi and the postindustrialists that 
the contrast upheld by gentrification is really between 'country' and 'city'.
Images of country and city, which dominating hegemonies have represented (and re­
presented) the effects of the development of capitalism back to its subjects, are ways of 
seeing and not-seeing class-based exploitation. In gentrification, in the country instance, 
not-seeing the positional struggles involved as ones related to exploitation either of the 
groups who have been displaced or indeed of the gentrifiers themselves. This is a 
function which the exchange professionals (estate [^c] agents in particular) mediating the 
process are well served to carry out. As a result of their mediation, the gentrifier never 
has to deal with the displacement he or she has brought about.
There is however another form of displacement in the gentrification process. The 
metaphor implicit in the term gentrification is not only an attempt to import 'country' 
relations into the city. It also makes a statement about the 'city' of hustle and bustle, 
anonymity and danger:
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It is of the utmost importance to analyze, precisely, the mechanism through 
which the tilt in the crisis of hegemony from, consent to coercion is publicly 
signified... how it wins legitimacy by appearing to be grounded and connected, 
not simply in myths, fears and speculations, but in the experience of ordinary 
people... Crucially... it is sustained by what we might call a displacement 
effect: the connection between the crisis and the way it is appropriated in the 
social experience of the majority...
The second stage is where the moral panics converge and overlap: where the 
enemy becomes both many-faceted and 'one'; ... the thin end of that larger 
wedge: the threat to the state, the breakdown of social life itself, the coming of 
chaos, the onset of anarchy...
(Hall et al., 1978 - Hall 1988 pp36/7)
The 'city' metaphor which sustains gentrification has just such a displacement effect as 
Hall describes here. All of the moral panics quoted are also and at the same time, 
characteristics of the 'city' of sin and disease (Sontag 1978 - Chapter 3 above), in 
opposition to which the 'country' offers such a consoling vision. In a gentrifying area, 
the gentrified properties are the ones with the burglar alarms, or video camera entry 
systems. In the UK, the 'reclaiming' of the inner-city by the middle classes for the 
forces of law and order is one in which the state, both central and local, has long had a 
stake.
In the aftermath of the 1987 general election in the UK, the Sunday Times ran a series of 
interviews with former Conservative MPs who had been defeated in inner city 
constituencies: all urged the government to pursue strategies which would in one way or 
another break Labour's 'stranglehold' on the inner city. The hypothesis advanced by 
Ley (1974), that the black ghettos in US American cities could be best interpreted in 
terms of Caesar's Gallic Wars - The Inner City As Frontier Outpost - could now be 
reversed. Here, it is not the blacks but the yuppies who, it is intended, should occupy 
the inner city frontier outposts on behalf of the conservatives. Similarly, in local 
government, the strategies of social engineering pursued by Wandsworth and 
Westminster Councils, selling off council properties to redevelopers for 'luxury' 
accommodation in marginal wards is by now well known. These strategies are partially 
responsible for the so-called Battersea effect, where longstanding Labour seats in iriner- 
London constituencies have fallen to the Conservatives in recent years. However, 
despite their attentions to the inner city, and the operation of hegemony in gentrification 
must not be thought of in terms of some conspiracy by Conservative politicians in central 
and local government. In gentrified Islington, which has consistently returned Labour 
councillors, nonetheless, the gentrifiers took over the apparatuses of the local state, 
beginning with the Bamsbury traffic management scheme (Ferris 1972, cf. Chapter 9 
above). Restriction and control over mobility helped turn their 'space' into their 'place';
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precisely, however, to control the encroachment of traffic and thus the 'city' into their 
'space'. This only serves to demonstrate the way hegemony is 'lived', even by those 
who would, in other areas and on other fronts, define themselves in opposition to it.
If my interpretation of gentrification as importing country relations into the city is correct,
then the challenge gentrification apparently poses to theories of urbanization is less strong
than the postindustrialists suppose. However, it does add further weight to the need to
investigate the origins of gentrification in the development of suburbia. The difference
between gentrification and suburbanization is that in the latter, 'home' is realized by
going to the 'country', so far as that is possible. In the former, 'home' is realized by
bringing the 'country' into the town; more precisely, by bringing a particular (selective)
tradition of 'country' relations into town. Just like suburbanization, gentrification
depends on importing the "country" way of not-seeing exploitation outlined by
R.Williams as a means of coping with the "city". Davis reports how the 1930s
suburbanites were described as "pioneers" (Oliver & al. 1981 p79) in the territories of
suburban 'Dunroamin'. N.Smith has consistently criticized the frontier imagery of
gentrification (Schaffer and N.Smith 1989, cf. Chapter 3 above), but this imagery
appears the result once again of social process, not simply category error, evidence of
just such an hegemonic strategy in operation.
The idea of "urban pioneers" is as insulting as the idea of the original pioneers 
in the West. Now, as then, it implies that no-one lives in the areas being 
gentrified— no-one worthy o f notice, at least.
(N.Smith 1982, pl39 ftn 1)
The precise metaphorical location of 'the country' may be different in different contexts, 
but wherever the location, the 'city', is common throughout modernity, and, as the 
'city's Other, the 'country' plays the same role in each case —  that of granting the viewer 
the privelege of not-seeing the exploitation which has created the image thus presented.
The importance of class in gentrification issues is not therefore the supposed differences 
between the (so-called) middle class and the (so-called) working class, but the experience 
of class. Marginality is not just a condition of modernity, but of capitalism. As I argued 
in Chapter 6, everyone who can be considered to be part of the proletariat, in other 
words, sells their labour for a living, is in some sense living on the margins of culture 
and civilization, partially incorporated and partly excluded from the modes of capitalist 
production, partially included and partially excluded from the imaginary community of 
the nation, trying to remain central, but always in danger of being rendered peripheral to 
the capitalist accumulation process. Hegemony offers consolation for the insecurities it 
itself helps create. It is in this sense that gentrification helps people interpret their lives in 
class-specific ways, and frames the demand for gentrified housing in a class-specific
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form. In this sense also gentrification is both a product of a dominating hegemony, and 
helps carry that hegemony forward.
If gentrification is significant, it is because it illustrates a moment in a hegemonic contest 
over changing interpretations over what is 'natural' over time (R. Williams 1972 - 1980) 
as forms of exploitation, in this instance, forms of capitalism change. Stedman Jones' 
account of the 'gentrification of the bourgeoisie' in terms of the ironies of this nineteenth 
century urban gentry visiting its new-found status on the poor, and bitterly resented for 
it, can be compared with the activities of the Jeremys and Pamelas chronicled by Raban 
(Stedman Jones 1974, Raban 1974). These activities can be regarded as similar 
attempts, as those engaged in positional struggle, to take on the 'leading positions' of 
society (Hall 1988 p 8 ).
To summarize, the encouragement given to gentrifiers by government (central and local) 
policies on the one hand connects with a series of disarticulating and rearticulating 
discourses in which the "country" metaphor is reinforced through the mediation of the 
"exchange professions", so that the gentrifiers (Jeremy and Pamela) do not engage 
directly in the displacement created by gentrification. Instead, gentrification is presented 
as "reclaiming" the inner-city, and those displaced presented as "marginal". On the other 
hand, the strategy is not one ‘which succeeds without conflict. It is in the resistances 
encountered in the process of carrying that hegemony forward that the impact of 
gentrification has resonances for far wider sections of the population than its quantitative 
significance would suggest
Gentrification, as I argued in Chapter 3 can best be understood in terms of Nietszche's 
ontology of resistances (Conolly 1988). The challenge to identity created both by the re- 
evaluation of a place through the processes of gentrification, and by the labelling process 
this implies is not one which is simply accepted by those affected by the change in the 
sense of that place. Indeed the otherness engendered in the working class inhabitants of 
the gentrified area by the gentrifiers' views of them as exotic, colourful characters to be 
found only in the alien 'city', itself helps to create the resistance to gentrification. 
Inasmuch as gentrification is a qualitatively new process, it engenders its own 
resistances. However, the themes of "reclamation" and "improvement" are ones with 
which the potential displacees may also identify, though the medium through which these 
processes are constituted is not themselves, but the newcomers. In other words, 
aspirations toward reclamation and improvement of an about to be gentrified 
neighbourhood may well extend to the potential displacees as well as to the potential 
gentrifiers. The difference however is that the investments required are funnelled not via 
the displacee, but via the gentrifier.
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The term ’gentrification*, then, has stuck, despite a wide range of proffered alternative 
descriptions. It has stuck, in Anglophone countries generally, because of certain 
associations between visions of the ’country* and the visions of a certain class, visions 
associated with a dominant and dominating hegemony, even though the in-movers are 
not necessarily, nor even usually, from the non-aristocratic rural landowning class (the 
original gentry). Gentrification is well named because it signifies the bringing of this 
version of the ’country' back into the 'city'. This vision of the 'city' is one which 
obscures rather than ignores the relations of class exploitation which underlie it. 
Therefore one must not regard the 'country' way of seeing as a callous and wilful refusal 
to accept the consequences of profiting from a particular conjuncture of exploitation 
relations, though it may be all of these. Instead, like the alternative vision of the 'city', it 
is a feature of the dominant and dominating hegemony, and one which carries that 
hegemony forward. Gentrification is a specific instance of the selective tradition which 
that hegemony promotes. It is this reference to the wider themes of this dominating 
hegemony which gives gentrification its resonances, and causes it to attract so much 
attention and controversy.
In questions of gentrification, one comes to realize, it is very difficult, not only to 
separate questions of form from questions of content, but also even to decide which out 
of the material artifact - the gentrified house, or its symbolism - the statements it makes, 
actually is the form and which the content. This indicates not only the futility, but also 
the theoretical mistakenness, from a cultural materialist perspective, of attempting to 
make a separation of the form and content of social production, whether it be of 
gentrified housing in particular, or of commodities or value in general. Culture produces 
particular forms of material production, both in the way that production is undertaken, 
and in the material products that result, as well as producing particular forms of social 
relationship and consciousness.
Taking seriously the metaphorical aspects of gentrification also enables one to avoid the 
sterility of the debates over what to call the phenomenon and over whether or not it is a 
'chaotic concept'. As a metaphor in a particular hegemonic discourse it possesses a 
'contradictory unity' which notions of a 'chaotic concept' in the gentrification literature 
seem unable to address. It would be unsuccessful as a metaphor in this hegemonic 
discourse if that metaphor were simply a myth, i.e., had no material referent. However, 
as seen in Chapter 7, gentrification is only part of a continuum of potential improvements 
to the housing stock. The metaphor of gentrification thus appropriates aspects of a real 
material process and change in the constraints and opportunities yielded by the housing 
market. In so doing, those using, benefiting from, living this metaphor are participating
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in the constitution of an hegemonic discourse in which real anxieties of identity arising 
from living in a particular capitalist city in a particular period of crisis in capitalist 
conjunctural relations are resolved via the creation of new meaning in and for the places 
in which they live; and the potential for creating this meaning is given only by the 
peculiar circumstances of the impact of domestic technology on a capitalist housing 
market, on a housing market in a capitalist, class, society. Gentrification could only 
occur, in its metaphorical and material unity, in a class society.
However, just as, in capitalist societies, these processes of production and reproduction 
are contradictory unities, so also are the "class-laden" meanings they condense and 
constitute. The interpretation of gentrification offered in this thesis may be regarded as 
evidence of the validity of this proposition.
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